State of Iowa v. Duval Tremont Walker, Jr.

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
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No. 24-1108
Filed February 11, 2026
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State of Iowa,
Plaintiff–Appellee,
v.
Duval Tremont Walker Jr.,
Defendant–Appellant.
_______________

Appeal from Iowa District Court for Linn County,
The Honorable Kevin McKeever, Judge.
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REVERSED AND REMANDED FOR A NEW TRIAL
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Kent A. Simmons (argued), Bettendorf, attorney for appellant.

Brenna Bird, Attorney General, and Joseph D. Ferrentino (argued),
Assistant Attorney General, attorneys for appellee.
_______________

Heard at oral argument
by Tabor, C.J., and Badding and Sandy, JJ.
Opinion by Tabor, C.J.
Special concurrence by Sandy, J. Dissent by Badding, J.

1
TABOR, Chief Judge.

Before going to trial for murder and going armed with intent, Duval
Walker Jr. moved in limine to exclude evidence of his “criminal history and
any other charges stemming from this incident.” The district court granted
his motion, preventing jurors from learning that he had a prior felony
conviction and that he had pleaded guilty to being a felon in possession of a
firearm for conduct during this incident. But potential juror R.L. saw a news
alert about Walker’s guilty plea. When Walker moved to strike R.L. for cause,
the district court refused, citing R.L.’s assertion that he had not formed an
opinion that Walker was guilty of the other charges. And R.L. promised not
to tell his fellow jurors what he had learned.

But because R.L. had information so prejudicial that it could not be
offered as evidence or shared with other jurors, his exposure to the news
account implanted actual bias. See Iowa R. Crim. P. 2.18(5)(o) (allowing
challenges for cause “[w]here the circumstances indicate the juror would
have an actual bias for or against a party”). Thus, the court abused its
discretion by denying the motion to strike. Because Walker used a
peremptory strike to remove R.L. and the court denied his request for an
additional peremptory strike, we presume prejudice. The remedy is to
reverse his convictions for murder and going armed with intent and to
remand for a new trial.

I. Facts and Prior Proceedings

A St. Patrick’s Day brawl at a Marion bar ended in the fatal shooting
of Cameron Barnes. Security cameras inside the bar showed the fight started
when Walker punched Barnes in the face. After that, “all hell broke loose,”
according to a witness. Bystanders jumped in, chairs were thrown, and pool

2
cues were broken. During the melee, a gun dropped on the ground. Walker
picked the gun up, advanced towards Barnes, and shot him.

Walker was arrested two weeks later and charged with first-degree
murder, felon in possession of a firearm, and going armed with intent. The
case proceeded to a jury trial in March 2024. Before jury selection, Walker
filed a written guilty plea to being a felon in possession. Because of that guilty
plea—and Walker’s stipulation that he “was engaged in illegal activity at the
time of the shooting”—the district court granted Walker’s motion in limine
to exclude his criminal history.

At the start of jury selection, the prosecutor asked: “Has anyone seen
or heard anything about this case prior to coming in here today?” Noting that
“we have quite a few hands up,” the prosecutor and defense counsel engaged
in individual voir dire of those prospective jurors. Among those examined
were M.W. and R.L. After learning about their exposure to news accounts,
Walker moved to strike both prospective jurors for cause, which the district
court denied. Walker used two of his peremptory strikes to eliminate them
from the jury.

The jury found Walker guilty of first-degree murder and going armed.
Walker appeals.

II. Analysis

In this appeal from those convictions, Walker contends the district
court abused its discretion in failing to grant his for-cause challenges. He also
claims the court erred in refusing to instruct the jury on the doctrine of
imperfect self-defense. We need only address the challenges for cause. We
review denials of challenges for cause for an abuse of discretion. See State v.
Jonas, 904 N.W.2d 566, 570 (Iowa 2017).

3
A. Framework

To obtain a new trial, Walker must prove three elements. See id. at 583.
He must show that (1) the district court erred in denying his challenge for
cause, (2) the denial caused him to use a peremptory strike on that
prospective juror, and (3) he requested a replacement strike that was refused.
Id. “Where the defendant makes such a showing, prejudice will then be
presumed.” Id.

Walker followed this approach, using two of his peremptory strikes to
remove potential jurors M.W. and R.L. who he unsuccessfully challenged for
cause. Once he exhausted his strikes, Walker asked for two more and
identified the jurors he would have removed if his challenges had been
granted. The court denied that request, satisfying the second and third
prongs of the Jonas presumed-prejudice approach. So we focus on the first
prong: whether the court abused its discretion in denying Walker’s
challenges for cause.

Iowa Rule of Criminal Procedure 2.18(5) lists available challenges for
cause. Although Walker did not specify at trial which grounds he was relying
on, he cites paragraphs (k) and (o) on appeal. See State v. Booker, 989 N.W.2d
621, 632 (Iowa 2023) (noting that while rule 2.18(5) requires the challenging
party to “distinctly specify” the grounds for cause, the parties “were well
aware of why” the for-cause challenge was raised).

We now examine those two grounds. Paragraph (k) allows a party to
object if a prospective juror has “formed or expressed such an opinion as to
the guilt or innocence of the defendant as would prevent the juror from
rendering a true verdict upon the evidence submitted on the trial.” Iowa R.
Crim. P. 2.18(5). Under this paragraph, the district court should grant the

4
motion if “the juror holds such a fixed opinion on the merits of the case that
he or she cannot judge impartially the guilt or innocence of the defendant.”
State v. Neuendorf, 509 N.W.2d 743, 746 (Iowa 1993) (citation omitted).
Covering different territory, paragraph (o) applies “[w]here the
circumstances indicate the juror would have an actual bias for or against a
party.” Iowa R. Crim. P. 2.18(5) (effective July 1, 2022).

Because paragraph (o) is a recent addition to the rules of criminal
procedure, we take this chance to discuss its origin and language. In
summarizing the 2022 changes to the rules of criminal procedure, the Iowa
Judicial Branch criminal procedure task force noted that this added challenge
for cause arose from the supreme court’s decision in Jonas.1 In that case, our
supreme court found that the district court abused its discretion in refusing
to disqualify a potential juror for cause under paragraph (k). 904 N.W.2d
at 575. During jury selection, that potential juror said he “would try to keep
an open mind” but “would have a hard time overlooking” the fact that Jonas
was gay. Id. at 569. As the court found, the potential juror should have been
struck based on his original expression of “actual bias” against gay people,
despite his “generalized statements the potential juror could be fair.” Id.
at 571. Because paragraph (o) reflects this principle from Jonas, jurors’
assurances that they can be fair judges of the evidence—despite
circumstances indicating bias—are not dispositive on this ground for
disqualification.

Finally, we note that rule 2.18(5)(o) does not define “actual bias.” In
deciding a post-trial claim of juror misconduct, our supreme court explained
that jurors may be disqualified for either actual or implied bias. State v.

1
See Supreme Court Approves Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, Iowa Judicial
Branch: News Releases (Feb. 1, 2022), https://perma.cc/W6ZF-5S5K

5
Webster, 865 N.W.2d 223, 236 (Iowa 2015). “Actual juror bias occurs when
the evidence shows that a juror, in fact, is unable to lay aside prejudices and
judge a case fairly on the merits.” Id. “Implied bias arises when the
relationship of a prospective juror to a case is so troublesome that the law
presumes a juror would not be impartial.” Id. Examples of implied bias can
be found in paragraphs (d) through (j) of rule 2.18(5).

When determining whether potential jurors harbor actual bias, their
statements may be relevant. See Jonas, 904 N.W.2d at 575. But potential
jurors could maintain that they have no opinion which would disqualify them
from rendering a verdict according to the law and evidence, yet they could
still be struck for cause if the circumstances suggest that they would not be
impartial. See Davenport Gas Light & Coke Co. v. City of Davenport, 13 Iowa
229, 231 (1862).

B. Application to potential juror R.L.

With that framework in mind, we turn to Walker’s motion to strike
potential juror R.L. The prosecutor and defense counsel questioned him
twice, separate from the other potential jurors. On the first day, he explained,
“I just remember seeing in the headlines, you know, when it happened in the
news.” R.L. couldn’t recall any details, aside from the fact that a shooting had
occurred at a local bar. R.L. agreed that he could be fair and impartial and
base his verdict “solely on the evidence” presented at trial. And he denied
having formed an opinion as to Walker’s guilt or innocence. R.L. was excused
from the court’s chambers and returned to the courtroom. But the next day,
R.L. told the court that he had seen a new headline about Walker:
R.L.: On one of the top headlines on Google News after we got
done yesterday, there was a KCRG article in regards to the defendant
pleading guilty to a charge. I didn’t read the article. I just saw the headline
because it popped up at the top of the story.

6
PROSECUTOR: And do you recall the specifics of what you read
of the headline?

R.L.: It said he was a felon in possession of a weapon and pled guilty
to it.

PROSECUTOR: Okay. Having read that headline, do you have an
opinion as to whether or not Mr. Walker’s guilty or not guilty of the
charges that the State will be presenting?

R.L.: No. I mean, one can happen without the—one can be true
without the other.

....

PROSECUTOR: And do you think you would be able to form a
verdict solely on the evidence in the courtroom and be able to set aside
what you’ve previously read about this case?

R.L.: Yes.

PROSECUTOR: And do you think that at this point in time, you
still would be fair and impartial to both the State and Mr. Walker?

R.L.: Yes.

....

PROSECUTOR: Okay. So it—you wouldn’t say, “I’m going to find
him guilty because I know he was a felon in possession”?

R.L.: No, I wouldn’t.

PROSECUTOR: And you’re not going to let that sway your
opinion as—in regards to the other charges?

R.L.: No. I don’t believe—I mean, it all depends on what’s
presented in front of me, you know, but I’m—at this point in time, no.

PROSECUTOR: Would you tell the other jurors of the information
that you heard, or would you not tell them about what you’ve heard—

R.L.: I wouldn’t say anything.

7
Defense counsel challenged R.L. for cause based on his knowledge that
Walker pleaded guilty to being a felon in possession of a firearm. Counsel
argued that “as part of our motion in limine, the jurors are not to know that
[Walker] has a prior conviction, prior bad acts, anything of the such, and
now . . . [R.L.] know[s] that he is a felon.” The district court denied the
motion:
Based on his answers, he seemed to be wanting to just evaluate this
case based on what this case was about and not on what—anything that
may have been pled to in the past.

He didn’t seem to think there was a relationship between the two,
so I don’t think that there was—I mean, based on his answers, there
doesn’t appear to be any of the kind of prejudice that I was hoping to avoid
by excluding the evidence because we can’t—you know, once the once this
is presented to the jurors, we don’t know whether it will or won’t affect
them.

Here in jury selection, we have the benefit of asking them what
people think. Some people come in here and tell us they’ve made up their
minds and we’ve thrown them out. Other people told us they’ll be open-
minded and think about them, and we’ve kept them.

So I think [R.L.] said he would be fair, and I have no reason to doubt
that based on his own statements.

Walker contends the district court abused its discretion by “taking the
risk of keeping a juror who admitted he had knowledge of facts the judge had
already ruled should be excluded from the knowledge of jurors.” He points
to our supreme court’s warning in Jonas “against allowing close issues to
creep into the record and threaten the validity of a criminal trial.” 904
N.W.2d at 575. As the court reiterated in Jonas,
Although a ruling may be technically right, if it must be so doubtful as to
raise a fair question as to its correctness, it is far better to give the accused
the benefit of the doubt, to the end that he and all other men may be
satisfied that his rights have not been invaded.

8
Id. (quoting State v. Teale, 135 N.W. 408, 410 (Iowa 1912)); accord State v.
Beckwith, 46 N.W.2d 20, 26 (Iowa 1951); see also May v. Elam, 27 Iowa 365,
368 (1869) (“It is not difficult, in general, to obtain jurors of whose
impartiality there can be no doubt. If there is any fair doubt . . . concerning a
person called into the jury box, it is better to let him stand aside and call
another.”).

Indeed, that warning is good advice for trial courts. What’s more, the
ruling here was not “technically right” under Rule 2.18(5)(o). Jurors may be
disqualified even if they have not “formed or expressed an opinion as to the
guilt or innocence of the defendant as would prevent the juror from rendering
a true verdict upon the evidence submitted on the trial.” Iowa R. Crim.
P. 2.18(5)(k) (emphasis added); see also Jonas, 904 N.W.2d at 575 (finding
abuse of discretion under paragraph (k) when juror expressed actual bias).
Paragraph (o) requires the district court to decide whether “the circumstances
indicate the juror would have an actual bias” against a party. Iowa R. Crim.
P. 2.18(5)(o) (emphasis added).

Here, the court failed to consider whether, independent of R.L.’s
assurances that he would not be swayed by his exposure to the damaging
information and would keep it secret from other jurors, the circumstances
justified denying the motion to strike. See id.; see also Jonas, 904 N.W.2d
at 575 (citing Dyer v. Calderon, 151 F.3d 970, 984 (9th Cir. 1998), which
determined that when a potential juror is prejudiced, the court must presume
bias despite assertions to the contrary); see also Neuendorf, 509 N.W.2d at 747
(disqualifying juror after her exposure to news report that Neuendorf’s
codefendant was found guilty though juror said she would try to be fair).

Did the circumstances indicate actual bias here? During jury selection,
a news account reached R.L. revealing that Walker was a felon and pleaded

9
guilty to being a felon in possession of a firearm for his conduct in this
incident. The district court had excluded that same information from the jury
because it posed too great a risk of unfair prejudice. 2 From that ruling on
Walker’s motion in limine, we may infer that “the nature of the improper
information” was “sufficiently prejudicial to deny [Walker] a fair trial,” given
the charges yet to be tried and Walker’s justification defense. Cf. State v.
Henning, 545 N.W.2d 322, 325 (Iowa 1996) (finding juror misconduct
sufficient to warrant a new trial).3

And under paragraph (o), R.L.’s assurances that he would not be
swayed by his exposure to the damaging information and would keep it secret

2
This situation differs from State v. Winters, where we held a juror’s knowledge
that the defendant “had previously been arrested for aggressive or violent things” was not
enough to sustain a challenge for cause under Rule 2.18(5)(k). No. 19-2130, 2021
WL 610204, at *6–7 (Iowa Ct. App. Feb. 17, 2021). Because the juror in Winters “stated
unequivocally he had not formed an opinion of the case,” we found the court did not abuse
its discretion in denying the challenge for cause. Id. at *7.
This situation also differs from State v. Owens, where our supreme court rejected
a claim that trial counsel was ineffective for not moving to sever a charge of felon in
possession from drug-related crimes. 635 N.W.2d 478, 482–83 (Iowa 2001). There, the
court rejected Owens’s request for a “per se rule compelling severance whenever the State
charges a felon with being in possession of weapons along with other related charges.” Id.
at 482. But Owens acknowledged that deciding to consolidate a felon in possession charge
could be an abuse of discretion depending on the jury’s ability to compartmentalize the
evidence offered to prove each consolidated charge. Id. (discussing State v. Smith, 576
N.W.2d 634, 637 (Iowa Ct. App. 1998), overruled on other grounds by Owens, 635 N.W.2d
at 484).
3
In Henning, jurors learned during a break in a trial for vehicular homicide that the
defendant had prior convictions for operating while intoxicated. 545 N.W.2d at 324. Our
supreme court granted Henning a new trial, finding the jurors had been exposed to
information “of a type more likely than not to implant prejudice of an indelible nature
upon the mind.” Id. at 325.

10
from other jurors did not justify denying the motion to strike. See Jonas, 904
N.W.2d at 575; see also Neuendorf, 509 N.W.2d at 747.

We recognize that trial judges have broad discretion in ruling on
motions to strike potential jurors who have been exposed to pretrial publicity
about a case. See State v. Simmons, 454 N.W.2d 866, 868 (Iowa 1990). But
“[g]eneralizations beyond that statement are not profitable, because each
case must turn on its special facts. We have here the exposure of jurors to
information of a character which the trial judge ruled was so prejudicial it
could not be directly offered as evidence.” Marshall v. United States, 360 U.S.
310, 312 (1959) (presuming prejudice when jurors saw news accounts of
defendant’s prior felony convictions though they told the trial judge they
would not be influenced by the articles). 4 “The prejudice to [Walker] is
almost certain to be as great when that evidence reaches the jury through
news accounts as when it is a part of the prosecution’s evidence.” Id.

Contrary to the district court’s reasoning, the difference between the
two sources of the information about Walker’s guilty plea—the media or the
prosecution—did not justify denying the motion to strike and allowing R.L.
to sit with the damaging disclosure. To that end, it is telling that the district
court and the prosecutor harbored concerns that R.L. might reveal the
restricted information to the other jurors. But they ultimately took his word
that he would not share the secret.

4
Granted, the presumption of prejudice in Marshall is based in the federal courts’
supervisory authority and not the Constitution; thus, state courts are not compelled to
adopt that presumption. See Britz v. Thieret, 940 F.2d 226, 231 (7th Cir. 1991). But Iowa
now has rule 2.18(5)(o), which requires trial courts to decide whether the objective
circumstances indicate that the juror has an actual bias.

11
In finding an abuse of discretion, we do not mean to criticize the
district court. As noted above, paragraph (o) is of recent vintage, and we have
few, if any, cases interpreting the new ground for striking a potential juror.
And as Walker notes on appeal, his motion to strike presented “a unique
situation in these procedural and evidentiary circumstances.” Unlike
common cases where potential jurors may equivocate on their ability to set
aside prejudicial information, R.L. was “unwavering in his confidence that he
could be fair and impartial in the process of reaching a verdict.” But that
confidence did not prevent finding circumstances indicating the potential
juror would have actual bias under paragraph (o), given the court’s earlier
ruling on the motion in limine.

Our conclusion is reinforced by the conditional nature of R.L.’s belief
that his knowledge of Walker’s guilty plea to being a felon in possession
would not influence his decision to convict or acquit on the murder and going
armed with intent charges. When asked if he would let the guilty plea “sway
his opinion” on the other charges, R.L. replied: “I mean, it all depends on
what’s presented in front of me, you know, but I’m—at this point in time,
no.” The State contends that R.L. was just saying that he would rely on the
evidence at trial. But the State’s interpretation reads out the qualifications
embedded in R.L.’s response.

In sum, because denying the motion to strike R.L. was an abuse of
discretion, we reverse and remand for retrial.

REVERSED AND REMANDED FOR A NEW TRIAL.

Sandy, J., specially concurs; Badding, J., dissents.

12
SANDY, Judge (specially concurring).

If a court must extract a promise from a prospective juror to not share
objectively prejudicial information known only to him, the inquiry is already
over. And when a juror can remain qualified only by promising not to speak
about prejudicial facts uniquely within his knowledge, disqualification is not
discretionary—it is mandatory. Voir dire exists to identify disqualifying
bias—not to preserve hope that a juror can silently quarantine information
the court itself has deemed too prejudicial for any juror to possess.

The district court not only relied on R.L.’s assurances of impartiality,
but his promise to contain information the court had already deemed too
prejudicial for any juror to possess. A fair trial should not ride on the hope
that a single juror—however well intentioned—will both silently
compartmentalize excluded facts and successfully suppress any disclosure of
those facts while participating fully in collective deliberations. Jury
deliberation is, by design, a communicative and collaborative process. See
State v. Campbell, 294 N.W.2d 803, 812 (Iowa 1980). Expecting a juror to
actively contribute to that process while simultaneously withholding highly
salient information known only to him is not a safeguard against prejudice—
it is a gamble. See State v. Gesch, 482 N.W.2d 99, 103 (Wis. 1992) (“Whether
[a certain juror]’s presence in the jury room actually hindered [deliberations]
we will never know, but what is important is the fact that it could have.”).

Voir dire is designed to identify bias, not to manage it through
promises of nondisclosure. See State v. Webster, 865 N.W.2d 223, 236–37
(Iowa 2015). Once a prospective juror possesses information that must be

13
excluded from the jury as a whole, the risk of prejudice is no longer
speculative—it is structural.5

That risk was especially acute here. R.L. did not merely learn that
Walker had a prior felony conviction. He learned that Walker had pleaded
guilty to being a felon in possession of a firearm arising from the same
incident—and that the firearm he admitted possessing was the very weapon
the State alleged was used to commit the homicide.6 This was not collateral
or abstract criminal history. It went to the central factual narrative the jury
was tasked with deciding: whether Walker unlawfully armed himself and
intentionally shot the victim. See State v. Neuendorf, 509 N.W.2d 743, 746
(Iowa 1993) (determining a juror’s knowledge of a prior guilty plea
demonstrated that she would “begin the case with a prejudice that the
defendant would have to overcome” and that such knowledge affected her
impartiality.) Knowledge that Walker had already admitted criminal

5
“Bias may be inferred when a juror discloses a fact that bespeaks a risk of
partiality sufficiently significant” to excuse the juror for cause, even if the juror gives good
faith assurances of impartiality. United States v. Torres, 128 F.3d 38, 47 (2d Cir. 1997); see
also Murphy v. Florida, 421 U.S. 794, 800 (1975) (holding a juror’s representations
concerning his or her ability to judge a case fairly and impartially are not dispositive).
6
What’s more, Self-Defense Instruction No. 48 placed squarely before the jury
whether the defendant was engaged in illegal activity at the place where force was used. A
juror who knew that the defendant had already pleaded guilty to being a felon in possession
of a firearm arising from the same incident necessarily approached that inquiry with a
settled factual premise that the defendant was unlawfully armed at the time of the
encounter. That knowledge did not merely bear on credibility or character; it supplied an
answer to a predicate element of the justification instruction itself. Because the jury as a
whole was forbidden from considering that fact (by way of the limine ruling), allowing a
single juror to retain it risked collapsing the justification analysis before deliberations
began. No assurance of impartiality can neutralize prejudice that directly resolves an
element the jury was instructed to decide.

14
responsibility for possessing the murder weapon carries an obvious and
powerful prejudicial force, one the district court correctly ruled could not be
presented as evidence. See State v. Debruin, No. 05-0833, 2006 WL 2419138,
at *5 (Iowa Ct. App. Aug. 23, 2006) (holding jurors should not have access
to extraneous information that has significant bearing on a defendant’s
defense and was specifically excluded from trial pursuant to a defendant’s
motion in limine).

In that context, the notion that the prejudice could be neutralized by a
juror’s promise “not to tell the other jurors” underestimates the nature of
the harm. The concern is not only that the information might be shared, but
that it cannot be unlearned. A juror who knows that the defendant admitted
illegal possession of the weapon alleged to have caused the death enters
deliberations with a fundamentally altered evidentiary lens—one that no
instruction and no assurance of good faith can correct. 7 Iowa R. Crim.

7
Self-assessments of one’s own impartiality are often overly optimistic. See
Webster, 865 N.W.2d at 250 (Hecht, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)
(“[ J]urors often state they can be impartial simply because they believe the judge wants
them to be.”); Mary R. Rose & Shari Seidman Diamond, Judging Bias: Juror Confidence
and Judicial Rulings on Challenges for Cause, 42 Law & Soc’y Rev. 513, 516 (2008)
(“[P]eople often have difficulty producing accurate self-assessments of bias and find it
difficult to estimate whether events or prior experiences are likely to influence them.”);
see also Shari Seidman Diamond, Leslie Ellis & Elisabeth Schmidt, Realistic Responses to
the Limitations of Batson v. Kentucky, 7 Cornell J.L. & Pub. Pol’y 77, 92 (1997) [hereinafter
Limitations of Batson]. Jurors often state they can be impartial simply because they believe
the judge wants them to be. See Mark W. Bennett, Essay, Unraveling the Gordian Knot of
Implicit Bias in Jury Selection: The Problems of Judge-Dominated Voir Dire, the Failed Promise
of Batson, and Proposed Solutions, 4 Harv. L. & Pol’y Rev. 149, 160 (2010) (“As a [federal]
district court judge for over fifteen years, I cannot help but notice that jurors are all too
likely to give me the answer that they think I want, and they almost uniformly answer that
they can ‘be fair.’”); Limitations of Batson, at 91 (“[ J]urors may be hesitant to reveal
opinions that they believe might engender disapproval from the judge or others.”).

15
P. 2.18(5)(o) (A challenge for cause of an individual juror may be made if
“circumstances indicate the juror would have an actual bias for or against a
party.”); see also Webster, 865 N.W.2d at 237 n.7 (“[A] jury consisting of
eleven impartial jurors and one actually biased juror is constitutionally infirm
without any showing that there was juror misconduct . . . .”); United States v.
Eubanks, 591 F.2d 513, 517 (9th Cir. 1979) (“Regardless of what role [the
potentially biased juror] played during jury deliberations, appellants were
denied their constitutional right to an impartial jury by his presence on the
panel.”).

A fair trial does not depend on a juror’s vow of silence. When a juror’s
continued service requires the suppression of information the law forbids the
jury to hear, the error is not cured by confidence in good faith—it is
confirmed by the risk itself.

16
BADDING, Judge (dissenting).

After learning from a Google News headline that Duval Walker Jr. had
pleaded guilty to being a felon in possession of a firearm, potential juror R.L.
unequivocally stated he could set that knowledge aside and render a verdict
“solely on the evidence in the courtroom.” Yet the majority opinion
concludes that even though R.L. was “unwavering in his confidence that he
could be fair and impartial,” the circumstances indicated that he would have
an actual bias against Walker as required to sustain a challenge for cause
under Iowa Rule of Criminal Procedure 2.18(5)(o). I respectfully conclude
otherwise.

***

Rule 2.18(5)(o) is concerned with actual bias—and that is lacking here
with Walker’s challenge to R.L. Unlike the potential juror in State v. Jonas,
904 N.W.2d 566, 575 (Iowa 2017), who expressed actual bias against gay
people in a pretrial questionnaire and during voir dire, R.L. simply reported
that he had learned about Walker’s guilty plea to a felon in possession charge.
It was the expression of actual bias that concerned the court in Jonas, despite
the juror’s “later, generalized statements” of impartiality: “If a potential
juror expresses actual bias, ‘the law will not trust him’ to be fair and
impartial.” 904 N.W.2d at 571–72 (citation omitted). I disagree with the
majority’s conclusion that—without an expression of actual bias—“potential
jurors could maintain that they have no opinion which would disqualify them
from rendering a verdict according to the law and evidence, yet they could
still be struck for cause if the circumstances suggest that they would not be

17
impartial.”8 That, in my mind, is implied bias—which is dealt with in other
paragraphs of rule 2.18(5).

Beyond the lack of any expression of actual bias, the circumstances
here did not indicate that R.L. would have such a bias. Walker’s argument
on this point suggests that knowledge about a defendant’s prior conviction
means a prospective juror is presumptively biased or automatically incapable
of rendering a fair verdict. But our supreme court has rejected that
proposition in other contexts.

In State v. Simmons, the court found that the defendant was not
deprived of a fair trial when her motion for change of venue was denied. 454
N.W.2d 866, 867 (Iowa 1990). The defendant’s “principal contention [wa]s
that prejudice against her arose from the publicity surrounding” her
codefendant’s conviction. Id. at 868. The court rejected that claim,
reasoning that a “prior conviction does not by itself . . . create presumptive
prejudice.” Id. (collecting cases); see also Murphy v. Florida, 421 U.S. 794, 799
(1975) (rejecting the idea “that juror exposure to information about a state
defendant’s prior convictions or to news accounts of the crime with which he
is charged alone presumptively deprives the defendant of due process”).
Similarly, in State v. Owens, the court disagreed with a defendant’s claim

8
The case cited for this proposition—Davenport Gas Light & Coke Co. v. City of
Davenport, 13 Iowa 229, 231 (Iowa 1862)—also involved an expression of actual bias by a
stricken juror in an action to recover for gas furnished to lamp posts. The court sustained
the challenge to the juror, who had stated during voir dire
that he was a taxpayer in the city, lived in the sixth ward, did not believe it
was right for the inhabitants of that ward to pay their share of the taxes,
and get no gas, but had no opinion as to this cause which would disqualify
him from rendering a verdict according to the law and evidences.

Davenport Gas, 13 Iowa at 231.

18
“that, by its very nature, a felon-in-possession charge puts the jury on notice
of a defendant’s status as a felon, thereby injecting unfairness into its
deliberations.” 635 N.W.2d 478, 482 (Iowa 2001). The court in Owens found
no abuse of discretion in not severing that charge from the others at trial,
noting the “specific felony was not identified, nor were facts concerning the
crime detailed for the jury.”9 Id. at 483. As in Owens, R.L. did not know the
specific felony Walker had been convicted of, nor any details about that
crime. See id.

While the Iowa Supreme Court has not considered the issue in jury
selection context, this court has. In State v. Winters, we held a juror’s
knowledge that the defendant “had previously been arrested for aggressive
or violent things” was not enough to sustain a challenge for cause.
No. 19-2130, 2021 WL 610204, at *6–7 (Iowa Ct. App. Feb. 17, 2021). We
reasoned that the “juror’s exposure to information potentially inadmissible
by the rules of evidence at trial does not by itself prohibit him from serving
as a juror.” Id. at *7. Because the juror in Winters “stated unequivocally he

9
The majority points out that in State v. Henning, our supreme court found that
several jurors’ knowledge of a defendant’s past convictions was “sufficiently prejudicial
to deny defendant a fair trial.” 545 N.W.2d 322, 324 (Iowa 1996). But, unlike here, the
defendant in Henning was on trial for the same charge as his past convictions—operating
while intoxicated. Id. (noting the “information went beyond merely advising the jurors
that defendant had been guilty of bad acts other than the one alleged in the present case”
and instead “demonstrated that he was a habitual operator of a motor vehicle while under
the influence,” which “was a paramount issue in the case”). I disagree with the special
concurrence’s assertion that R.L.’s knowledge of Walker’s guilty plea to felon in
possession of a firearm “went to the central factual narrative the jury was tasked with
deciding.” It was clear from the video of the shooting that Walker possessed a firearm,
and the parties stipulated that Walker “was engaged in illegal activity at the time of the
shooting.” In any event, it was R.L.’s knowledge of Walker’s “felon” status that drew the
motion to strike—and that fact had nothing to do with the elements of the offense at issue.

19
had not formed an opinion of the case,” we found the court did not abuse its
discretion in denying the challenge for cause. Id.; see also State v. Webster, 865
N.W.2d 223, 238 (Iowa 2015) (finding no juror misconduct where a juror was
familiar with the victim’s family but “emphatically emphasized that she was
capable of, and did in fact, base her verdict solely on the evidence”).

Walker argues that R.L. did not make such an unequivocal statement
about whether his knowledge of the guilty plea would impact his assessment
of the remaining charges. He points to R.L.’s response that “it all depends
on what’s presented in front of me, you know.” In Walker’s view, this was
R.L. “say[ing] he could not be sure he would not use improper extra-judicial,
media information in reaching a verdict.” I disagree.

First, as the State argues, the “less strained reading” is that R.L. “was
saying that his belief in Walker’s guilt would depend on the evidence in front
of him.” That is precisely what the law expects of a juror. See Irvin v. Dowd,
366 U.S. 717, 723 (1961) (“It is sufficient if the juror can lay aside his
impression or opinion and render a verdict based on the evidence presented
in court.”).

Second, Walker’s interpretation ignores all the discussion that came
before, during which R.L. repeated that Walker could be guilty of one offense
but not the others. See State v. Beckwith, 46 N.W.2d 20, 25 (Iowa 1951) (“It
is from the whole examination that the final conclusion must be
reached. . . .”). Throughout his two voir dire sessions in the court’s
chambers, R.L. maintained that he could be fair and impartial, that he could
decide the case on the facts presented at trial, and that he did not have an
opinion about Walker’s guilt or innocence. Contrast these statements with
those in State v. Neuendorf, where a potential juror who knew that a

20
co-defendant had been found guilty expressed this opinion when asked if she
could be impartial:
I’m afraid I probably would find it difficult. I figure that a jury’s
found one of them guilty, probably the other is a co-partner and probably
equally as guilty; but if I were forced into it, I would try to do it fairly; but
I honestly think that [it] would be hard.

....

I probably wouldn’t want me on the case. I’d probably want
someone who hadn’t read the outcome of the prior trial.

509 N.W.2d 743, 745 (Iowa 1993). Only after being questioned by the court,
did the juror state that she would “try” to judge the defendant only on what
he did or did not do. Id.

As our supreme court observed close to fifty years ago—and is
undoubtedly even more true today—in “these days of swift, widespread and
diverse methods of communications,” it is not required “that the jurors be
totally ignorant of the facts and issues involved.” State v. Sallis, 262
N.W.2d 240, 246 (Iowa 1978) (citation omitted). “Voir dire of prospective
jurors should be trusted to expose any substantial prejudices among them.”
State v. Walters, 426 N.W.2d 136, 138 (Iowa 1988); see also Webster, 865
N.W.2d at 237 (noting the very purpose of voir dire is “to smoke out actual
juror bias”).

The voir dire process worked here. The district court struck other
jurors who did not unequivocally state that they could be fair and impartial
and kept ones who could—R.L. included. Because R.L. expressed no actual
bias against Walker, and the circumstances did not indicate that he would
have one, I would defer to the district court’s “privileged position to observe
‘the questions and answers live, while watching [R.L.’s] demeanor,’” and

21
affirm. State v. Gills, No. 22-1074, 2024 WL 3518061, at *5 (Iowa Ct. App.
July 24, 2024) (citation omitted); see also Skilling v. United States, 561
U.S. 358, 386–87 (2010) (“Reviewing courts are properly resistant to second-
guessing the trial judge’s estimation of a juror’s impartiality for . . . . the
in-the-moment voir dire affords the trial court a more intimate and immediate
basis for assessing a venire member’s fitness for jury service.”).

Because I would affirm the district court’s denial of Walker’s challenge
for cause to R.L., I briefly address the two other issues that he raises on
appeal.

***

Walker claims the district court should have sustained a challenge that
he made to M.W., another potential juror who said that she had heard
something about the case. M.W. could not recall specific details but was
concerned “that when they start talking about the case, it would come back,
because it was all over the news.”

Defense counsel challenged M.W. for cause, arguing “our fear is that
if [M.W.] starts to remember something, that she could remember something
that is not brought in on these facts in question, and therefore, she may make
a decision based on that.” Before ruling, the district court noted:
I don’t think anyone has explained yet that one of the requirements
of her is that if she’s selected as a juror, she has to agree to decide the
evidence in the courtroom versus the evidence—or any other information.
I haven’t heard anyone ask that specific question yet. If you wanted to ask
that question, then I’ll consider the motion.

DEFENSE COUNSEL: [M.W.], would you be able to form your
opinion based on only the evidence you hear in this courtroom and separate
what you heard outside of the courtroom?

M.W.: I would think so. I would think so.

22
Counsel renewed the challenge to M.W. because “she’s saying she
thinks so, not that she definitely would be able to do that.” The court denied
the challenge, reasoning:
When asked directly whether she would abide by the rules, she said that
she thinks that she would be able to do that, and that’s all I can—we can
ask for people is to give us their best estimate as to what they’ll be able to
do if they’re faced with that choice, and she thinks she can follow the rules.

Walker claims the district court improperly posed a “magic question”
that embedded the correct answer, violating our supreme court’s warning in
Jonas about juror rehabilitation. But that’s not what the district court did
here. Walker is correct that in Jonas, the court recognized that in “actual-
bias cases, a later affirmative response to a ‘magic question’ using the words
fair and impartial is not enough to rehabilitate the potential juror.” 904
N.W.2d at 572. But unlike Jonas, M.W. did not express any actual bias against
Walker. See id. at 575.

Walker also likens M.W. to the prospective juror in Neuendorf, arguing
that M.W. “could not promise she would be fair and impartial.” But unlike
the juror in Neuendorf, M.W. did not express any opinion on Walker’s guilt,
unequivocally answering “No” when asked whether she had formed one
before trial. 509 N.W.2d at 746 (concluding a challenge for cause should have
been sustained when the juror stated that the defendant “probably [was]
equally as guilty” as his codefendant). And impartiality does not require
absolute certainty, as Walker seems to argue. See Simmons, 454 N.W.2d at
868 (recognizing that a juror’s “mere reservation about impartiality” was
insufficient to sustain a challenge for cause). Indeed, we have affirmed
denials of challenges for cause where jurors have been hesitant about their
ability to be fair and impartial. See, e.g., State v. Boat, No. 21-0934, 2024 WL
466562, at *5 (Iowa Ct. App. Feb. 7, 2024) (finding no abuse of discretion in

23
the court’s denial of a challenge to a juror who admitted that it would be hard
for her to set aside her experience as a witness in her ex-husband’s murder
trial); Gills, 2024 WL 3518061, at *5 (affirming denial of a challenge to a juror
who “was equivocal about almost everything [but] did not express any
opinion as to guilt or bias against” the defendant). I would do the same here
with Walker’s challenge to M.W.

***

I would also reject Walker’s challenge to the district court’s refusal to
submit his requested imperfect self-defense instruction to the jury,10 which is
reviewed for the correction of errors at law. State v. Plain, 898
N.W.2d 801, 811 (Iowa 2017). The imperfect self-defense instruction has
been rejected by our court in unpublished decisions, which held the defense
is inconsistent with Iowa law. See State v. Erlbacher, No. 22-0299, 2023
WL 8447939, at *3 (Iowa Ct. App. Dec. 6, 2023); State v. Cusic, No. 16-0323,
2017 WL 1278293, at *3 (Iowa Ct. App. Apr. 5, 2017); State v. Irving,
No. 14-1479, 2015 WL 5965171, at *6–7 (Iowa Ct. App. Oct. 14, 2015); State
v. Gomez-Rodriguez, No. 06-0527, 2007 WL 1688987, at *2–3 (Iowa Ct. App.
June 13, 2007). I see no reason to depart from these decisions.

10
The proposed instruction read:
If you find that in the Defendant’s mind the danger was actual, real,
imminent or unavoidable; however, find that a reasonable person would
not have believed there to be such a danger, then the Defendant did not act
with malice. . . .

24