In the Interest of M.W.-T. and C.W.-T., Minor Children

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
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No. 25-1529
Filed February 11, 2026
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In the Interest of M.W.-T. and C.W.-T., Minor Children,
State of Iowa,
Appellant.
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Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Polk County,
The Honorable Rachael E. Seymour, Judge.
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REVERSED AND REMANDED
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Brenna Bird, Attorney General, and Mackenzie L. Moran,
Assistant Attorney General, attorneys for appellant.

Andrea McGinn of The Law Shop Iowa, Van Meter, attorney for
appellees intervenors.

Lynn Vogan of Juvenile Public Defender, Des Moines, attorney and
guardian ad litem for minor children.
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Considered without oral argument
by Ahlers, P.J., and Buller and Sandy, JJ.
Opinion by Sandy, J.

1
SANDY, Judge.

This appeal turns on a narrow but mandatory question of jurisdiction.
After parental rights were terminated, the Rosebud Sioux Tribe moved to
transfer the child-custody proceedings to tribal court under Iowa Code
chapter 232B (2025). The juvenile court denied the request, finding good
cause based on perceived logistical and procedural hardships. On our de novo
review, the record does not support that conclusion. Because the statutory
exception to mandatory transfer was not established, the court was required
to grant the Tribe’s motion. We therefore reverse and remand for transfer of
jurisdiction.

FACTS & PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
M.W.T., born in July 2016, and C.W.T., born in October 2018, are
minor children who have resided in Polk County, Iowa, throughout the
pendency of these proceedings. The children came to the attention of the
Iowa Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) in March 2022
following concerns regarding inadequate supervision and parental substance
use. Law enforcement responded to reports that the children had been
outside their residence for an extended period without adult supervision.
When officers entered the home, the mother was unaware of the children’s
whereabouts and was in violation of an active no-contact order. One child was
later located several blocks away from the home. As a result, the State sought
and obtained an order for temporary removal in March of 2022.

The children were subsequently adjudicated children in need of
assistance under Iowa Code section 232.2(6)(c)(2) and (6)(n) (2022). The
juvenile court ordered services aimed at reunification, including substance-
abuse treatment, mental-health services, and visitation as permitted by
criminal no-contact orders. The father did not meaningfully participate in

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services and ultimately consented to the termination of his parental rights.
The mother engaged intermittently in treatment services over the course of
the case, including residential and transitional substance-abuse
programming, but struggled to maintain sustained sobriety and consistent
engagement with services addressing the children’s trauma.

In June 2022, the children were placed with maternal relatives, C.R.
and R.R. They remained in that relative placement for approximately two
years. During that time, the case proceeded through review and permanency
hearings. The children received therapeutic and educational services and
demonstrated behavioral improvement in the structured placement, though
significant needs persisted.

In December 2023, following termination proceedings, the juvenile
court entered an order terminating the parental rights of both parents and
placing the children in the guardianship of HHS for purposes of permanency
planning.

The mother appealed the termination and in August 2024, we reversed
the termination of the mother’s parental rights, concluding the juvenile
court’s order did not comply with the statutory requirements governing
expert testimony under the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA). We remanded
the case for further proceedings. See In re M.W.T., 13 N.W.3d 852, 855 (Iowa
Ct. App. 2024).

While that appeal was pending, HHS removed the children from the
relatives’ home in July 2024 and placed them in an adoption-only foster
placement based on concerns arising in the relatives’ home. Those concerns
were investigated but ultimately not confirmed. Following the removal, the

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relatives moved to intervene in the juvenile proceedings, and the court
granted the intervention.

In September 2024, the State filed a second petition to terminate the
mother’s parental rights. However, after termination hearings in
January 2025, the mother consented to termination. On April 1, the juvenile
court entered a second termination order, again terminating the mother’s
parental rights. In that order, the court removed HHS as guardian, found
HHS had acted unreasonably in its handling of the children’s placement, and
appointed the juvenile court as guardian while leaving physical custody with
HHS pending further placement determinations.

Throughout the proceedings, the Rosebud Sioux Tribe received notice
based on the father’s tribal affiliation. Although the children were not
enrolled members, they were determined to be eligible for enrollment. The
Tribe participated informally through its ICWA specialist but did not
formally intervene until May 2025.

On May 20—after both parents’ rights had been terminated—the
Tribe filed a motion seeking transfer of jurisdiction to the Tribe pursuant to
ICWA and Iowa Code chapter 232B. The State supported the transfer.
However, the intervening relatives and the guardian ad litem resisted, citing
the advanced procedural posture of the case, the children’s lack of
connection to the reservation, and practical hardships associated with the
transfer.

The juvenile court held hearings on the motion to transfer on May 27
and June 9. The Tribe presented testimony that its court could conduct
proceedings remotely and would assume jurisdiction if transfer were granted.
In August, the juvenile court denied the motion concluding that good cause

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existed to deny transfer under Iowa Code section 232B.5(13) (2025),
including the length and complexity of the proceedings, the children’s
established ties in Iowa, and the logistical and procedural burdens associated
with transferring jurisdiction at that stage.

The State applied for interlocutory appeal, which was granted.1

STANDARD OF REVIEW
Child welfare proceedings are generally reviewed de novo. In re J.S.,
846 N.W.2d 36, 40 (Iowa 2014). The juvenile court’s factual findings are
given weight, but they are not binding. Id. Statutory interpretations are
reviewed for correction of errors of law. In re N.V., 744 N.W.2d 634, 636
(Iowa 2008).

DISCUSSION
I. Federal ICWA

Congress enacted ICWA in 1978 to address the removal of an
alarmingly high percentage of Indian2 children from their Indian families by
nontribal public and private agencies and the placement of such children in
non-Indian foster and adoptive homes and institutions. See 25 U.S.C.
§ 1901(4). In response to these concerns, ICWA provides a dual jurisdictional

1
Although a denial-of-transfer order under ICWA is not an appealable final order,
see In re T.F., 972 N.W.2d 1, 8 (Iowa 2022), Iowa Rule of Appellate Procedure 6.104
provides that a party may apply to the supreme court for permission to appeal an
interlocutory order.
2
We are mindful that the term “Indian” is not necessarily the preferred
nomenclature for Native Americans; however, the term is used in the statutes at issue in
this case as well as the case law. Therefore, we use the term for the purpose of consistency
and clarity.

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scheme over Indian child custody proceedings. See Miss. Band of Choctaw
Indians v. Holyfield, 490 U.S. 30, 36 (1989). ICWA delineates “child custody
proceeding” into four categories: foster care placement 3 , termination of
parental rights4, preadoptive placement, and adoptive placement. 25 U.S.C.

3
The first jurisdictional component of ICWA, § 1911(a), concerns all four
categories of actions and acknowledges exclusive tribal jurisdiction over actions involving
Indian children who reside or are domiciled within the tribe’s reservation and over cases
involving Indian children who are wards of tribal courts regardless of residence or
domicile. Here, the Tribe does not assert exclusive jurisdiction under § 1911(a) as the
children have never resided or been domiciled within the Tribe’s reservation, nor are they
a ward of the Tribe’s court.
4
The second jurisdictional component of ICWA, § 1911(b), concerns transfer
proceedings. It addresses two of the four categories of actions involving Indian children
by acknowledging concurrent but presumptively tribal jurisdiction over foster care
placement and termination-of-parental-rights actions. See Holyfield, 490 U.S. at 36.
Section 1911(b) states:
In any State court proceeding for the foster care placement of, or termination
of parental rights to, an Indian child not domiciled or residing within the
reservation of the Indian child’s tribe, the court, in the absence of good
cause to the contrary, shall transfer such proceeding to the jurisdiction of
the tribe, absent objection by either parent, upon the petition of either
parent or the Indian custodian or the Indian child’s tribe: Provided, [t]hat
such transfer shall be subject to declination by the tribal court of such tribe.

25 U.S.C. § 1911(b) (emphasis added). Thus, § 1911(b) by its terms governs only foster
care placement and termination-of-parental-rights actions.
ICWA defines “foster care placement” as:

[A]ny action removing an Indian child from its parent or Indian custodian
for temporary placement in a foster home or institution or the home of a
guardian or conservator where the parent or Indian custodian cannot have
the child returned upon demand, but where parental rights have not been
terminated . . . .

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§ 1903(1)(i)–(iv). In this case, only the latter categories are applicable:
preadoptive and adoptive placements—due to the permanent termination of
the mother’s parental rights effective April 1, 2025.5 The Tribe did not move
for transfer and dismissal until May 20. Thus, when the Tribe requested the
transfer, the action was not one for foster care placement or termination of
parental rights because the court had already terminated the children’s
parental rights. Therefore, section 1911(b) does not govern the Tribe’s
motion to transfer. But even if preadoptive and adoptive placements proceed
in state court, a tribe may continue to participate if, as here, it has intervened
under § 1911(c).6

Although ICWA does not govern the transfer of preadoptive and
adoptive placement actions, state courts may nonetheless transfer such cases
involving Indian children to tribal courts. The 2016 Bureau of Indian Affairs
Final Rule and Guidelines support this conclusion, stating the following:
“Parties may request transfer of preadoptive and adoptive placement
proceedings, but the standards for addressing such motions are not dictated

Id. § 1903(1)(i) (emphasis added). And ICWA defines “termination of parental rights” as
“any action resulting in the termination of the parent-child relationship.” Id. § 1903(1)(ii)
(emphasis added).
5
Termination of the father’s parental rights were effective December 31, 2023.
6
Many courts have held that section 1911(c), which recognizes a tribe’s right to
intervene in foster care placement and termination proceedings, does not bar state courts
from allowing intervention in adoption proceedings. See In re Appeal in Maricopa Cnty. Juv.
Action No. A-25525, 667 P.2d 228, 234 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1983) (“Although [ICWA] explicitly
provides a tribe with the right to intervene in foster care and termination proceedings, it
does not preclude a trial court from exercising its discretion in allowing intervention by a
tribe in an adoption proceeding.” (citation omitted)); In re Baby Boy C., 805 N.Y.S.2d 313,
329 (App. Div. 2005) (“Many courts have held that although ICWA does not provide a
statutory right of intervention, neither does it prohibit intervention under applicable state
law.”).

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by ICWA or these regulations.” See Bureau of Indian Affairs, Response to
Comment on Indian Child Welfare Act Proceedings, 81 Fed. Reg. 38778,
38822 ( June 14, 2016); Off. of the Assistant Sec’—Indian Affs., U.S. Dep’t
of Interior, Guidelines for Implementing the Indian Child Welfare Act 47 (2016);
see also In re M.S., 237 P.3d 161, 166 (Okla. 2010) (“[W]e cannot construe
§ 1911(b), as a matter of law, as an expression of intent to preclude tribal court
jurisdiction when transfer is requested after parental rights are terminated.”);
but see In re R.S., 805 N.W.2d 44, 49–50, 55–56 (Minn. 2011) (concluding that
federal and state law did not authorize transfer of a state preadoptive action).

In examining the juvenile court’s decision to deny the Tribe’s motion
to transfer jurisdiction under federal ICWA, it is essential to consider the
distinction between child custody proceedings and post-termination
preadoption proceedings. For example, in Gila River Indian Community v.
Department of Child Safety, the Arizona Supreme Court clarified that the
federal ICWA does not apply to proceedings that occur after parental rights
have been terminated and before adoption, as these are not considered child
custody proceedings under the Act. 395 P.3d 286, 291 (Ariz. 2017).

The present case falls squarely within this post-termination
pre-adoption phase. Parental rights have already been terminated, and the
proceedings are focused on the placement of the children for adoption. As
such, the statutory mandate for transferring jurisdiction to the tribal court
under federal ICWA does not apply, and we cannot say that the district court
erred in concluding the same. But, unlike Arizona, our inquiry does not end
there. Because Iowa has its own codified version of ICWA, we must next
address its implications.

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II. State ICWA

“Iowa passed the Iowa Indian Child Welfare Act in 2003 to ‘clarify
state policies and procedures regarding implementation’ of the federal
ICWA.” In re T.F., 972 N.W.2d 1, 11 (Iowa 2022) (quoting Iowa Code
§ 232B.2).

The Iowa ICWA provides:
Unless either of an Indian child’s parents objects, in any child
custody proceeding involving an Indian child who is not domiciled or residing
within the jurisdiction of the Indian child’s tribe, the court shall transfer
the proceeding to the jurisdiction of the Indian child’s tribe, upon the
petition of the following persons:

a. Either of the child’s parents.

b. The child’s Indian custodian.

c. The child’s tribe.

Iowa Code § 232B.5(10) (emphasis added).
If a petition to transfer proceedings as described in subsection 10 is
filed, the court shall find good cause to deny the petition only if one or more
of the following circumstances are shown to exist:

a. The tribal court of the child’s tribe declines the transfer of
jurisdiction.

b. The tribal court does not have subject matter jurisdiction under
the laws of the tribe or federal law.

c. Circumstances exist in which the evidence necessary to decide
the case cannot be presented in the tribal court without undue hardship to
the parties or the witnesses, and the tribal court is unable to mitigate the
hardship by making arrangements to receive and consider the evidence or
testimony by use of remote communication, by hearing the evidence or
testimony at a location convenient to the parties or witnesses, or by use of
other means permitted in the tribal court’s rules of evidence or discovery.

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Id. § 232B.5(13).

The first step to our analysis is not a consideration of what constitutes
“good cause” but rather, what is a “child custody proceeding.”

Iowa Code section 232B.3(3) states:
“Child custody proceeding” means a voluntary or involuntary
proceeding that may result in an Indian child’s adoptive placement, foster
care placement, preadoptive placement, or termination of parental rights.

Indeed, the federal counterpart likewise gives similar definition to
“child custody proceeding”:
For the purposes of this chapter, except as may be specifically
provided otherwise, the term—

(1) “child custody proceeding” shall mean and include—

(i) “foster care placement” which shall mean any action
removing an Indian child from its parent or Indian custodian for
temporary placement in a foster home or institution or the home of
a guardian or conservator where the parent or Indian custodian
cannot have the child returned upon demand, but where parental
rights have not been terminated;

(ii) “termination of parental rights” which shall mean any
action resulting in the termination of the parent-child relationship;

(iii) “preadoptive placement” which shall mean the
temporary placement of an Indian child in a foster home or
institution after the termination of parental rights, but prior to or
in lieu of adoptive placement; and

(iv) “adoptive placement” which shall mean the
permanent placement of an Indian child for adoption, including
any action resulting in a final decree of adoption.

25 U.S.C. § 1903(1). The difference, however, is how “good cause”
interplays with the different categories of placement. Specifically, unlike its

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federal counterpart, Iowa ICWA’s good-cause clause found in
section 232B.5(13) applies to all categories of placement— “Indian child’s
adoptive placement, foster care placement, preadoptive placement, or
termination of parental rights.” See Iowa Code § 232B.3(3). And in this case,
the children are in a post-termination preadoptive placement. Thus, the State
is correct that transfer is required—without regard to the children’s best
interests7—unless good cause is shown otherwise.

And good cause here is confined to circumstances in which the
evidence necessary to decide the case “cannot be presented in the tribal court
without undue hardship to the parties or the witnesses . . . .” Id.
§ 232B.5(13)(c). Relative to that analysis, the juvenile court stated:
The Tribe had notice of these proceedings for several years, but did
not formally intervene until May 6, 2025, after termination of parental
rights had been entered for both parents. The State has been involved with
the children since 2022 and handled complicated matters in the numerous
cases involving the children that have culminated into three years of
litigations during both Child in Need of Assistance [(CINA)] and two
Termination proceedings. The issue of placement was raised in the fall of
2024, and parties were in the middle of a contested hearing when the Tribe
decided to intervene and request transfer. The Tribe is located
approximately 460 miles (a 7-hour and 14-minute drive) from the
children’s current residence in West Des Moines, Iowa. See In re J.R.H.,
358 N.W.2d [311,] 314 [(Iowa 1984)](finding undue hardship existed to

7
To support its argument the State cites to T.F. for its narrow reading of “good
cause.” 972 N.W.2d at 17. And T.F.—in part—cites to N.V. for its understanding of “good
cause.” Id. at 16. In N.V., our supreme court recognized that Iowa Code section 232B.5(10)
and (13) does not provide for a best-interests exception to transfer. 744 N.W.2d at 637–38.
Moreover, the N.V. court recognized that the Iowa ICWA does not consider the best
interests of the child in the traditional sense. See id. at 638. Instead, the court declared in
N.V. that “it is in a child’s best interest to place him or her in a home that will preserve the
unique values of the child’s tribal culture and assist the child in establishing relationships
with the tribe and tribal community.” Id. at 638–39.

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deny transfer to tribal court when children were located in Iowa and the
tribe was located in South Dakota). Cf. . . . T.F., 972 N.W.2d at 17 (finding
no undue hardship when the tribal court was located 170 miles or 2 hours
away from the parties). At the time of the Tribe’s motion, the children had
never visited the reservation, and no tribal member had ever made an effort
to meet the children. The children have no connection to any tribal
member, other than their biological father who had a very limited
relationship with the children. The Court currently serves as guardian of
the minor children. All parties, witnesses and evidence involving the cases
are located in Iowa. Transfer would require the District Court’s
participation in proceedings before the Rosebud Sioux Tribal Court.
During the hearing, tribal witnesses, Ms. Bad Wound and Ms. Whipple,
were unable to fully articulate how the matter would proceed in tribal court
if transferred. While the Tribe offered that remote proceedings would be
readily available, the Court has serious concerns regarding the feasibility
of remote participation given hearings during both the CINA and
Termination proceedings had to be repeatedly rescheduled due to issues
coordinating with the Tribe via remote communications—significantly
delaying proceedings in the cases. Ms. Whipple could confirm the
intervenors would be able to participate in the proceedings. If able to do
so, it would require the [placement family] to hire an attorney who is
licensed to practice for the Tribe. When asked to explain the request for
transfer, the Tribe merely asserted its entitlement to do so, offering no
meaningful explanation for the request at this stage in the proceedings.
Moreover, as of the time of the hearing, the Tribe has made only minimal
efforts to identify or connect the children with extended family or tribal
resources, citing limited resources and staffing constraints. Under these
circumstances, the Court concludes that undue hardship would result
from a transfer to the tribal court and good cause exists to deny the transfer.

Upon our de novo review of the record, we disagree with the juvenile
court’s findings relative to undue hardship. The juvenile court cited a
number of concerns, many of which had bearing on the children’s best
interests—not on the undue hardship of a jurisdictional transfer. Yet our
supreme court in T.F. held that ICWA transfer decisions are purely
jurisdictional determinations focused on forum convenience, not substantive

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best-interests inquiries, and that the best interests of the children have no
bearing on this jurisdictional threshold. 972 N.W.2d at 16–17.

Denita Whipple, the chief clerk of court for the Tribe for the past
twenty-eight years, testified that the Children’s Tribal Court operates with a
dedicated clerk responsible for issuing notices and coordinating remote
participation. According to Whipple, that clerk routinely sends notices and
arranges Zoom access for attorneys and parties who appear remotely, and the
court has continued to use such technology following its initial adoption
during the COVID-19 pandemic. This testimony establishes that the
Children’s Tribal Court possesses the administrative capacity to conduct
proceedings with remote participation when necessary.

Here the Tribe’s representative appeared at both transfer hearings by
Zoom, and that remote appearance created little to no difficulty for the
parties or the district court. Moreover, the Tribe’s chief clerk of court
established the Tribe’s ability to conduct remote proceedings, and thus its
ability to “mitigate the hardship by making arrangements to receive and
consider the evidence or testimony by use of remote communication.” Iowa
Code § 232B.5(13)(c). Because paragraph (c)’s exception to mandatory
transfer does not apply, the juvenile court was required to transfer
jurisdiction to the Tribe.

REVERSED AND REMANDED.

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