Ryan Christopher Barnhardt v. State of Iowa

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
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No. 24-1703
Filed February 25, 2026
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Ryan Christopher Barnhardt,
Applicant–Appellant,
v.
State of Iowa,
Respondent–Appellee.
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Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Boone County,
The Honorable Jennifer Miller, Judge.
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AFFIRMED
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Alexander Smith of Parrish Kruidenier L.L.P., Des Moines, attorney for
appellant.

Brenna Bird, Attorney General, and Louis S. Sloven, Assistant Attorney
General, attorneys for appellee.
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Considered without oral argument
by Ahlers, P.J., and Chicchelly and Sandy, JJ.
Opinion by Chicchelly, J.

1
CHICCHELLY, Judge.

Ryan Barnhardt appeals the denial of his application for postconviction
relief (PCR) concerning his conviction on seven counts of sexual abuse in the
second degree, in violation of Iowa Code section 709.3 (2016) and three
counts of sexual abuse in the third degree, in violation of Iowa Code section
709.4. He alleges ineffective assistance of appellate counsel. Upon our
review, we affirm.

BACKGROUND FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS
In October 2016, Michigan state law enforcement was made aware of
an allegation that Barnhardt sexually abused a minor child. While
investigating, Michigan authorities learned Barnhardt had active warrants for
his arrest in Iowa. Barnhardt was arrested and transported to the Boone
County Jail. The State charged him with seven counts of second-degree
sexual abuse and three counts of third-degree sexual abuse.

As part of their investigation, Michigan State Police visited
Barnhardt’s ex-wife, Kent. Investigators became aware that a trailer on
Kent’s property was recently purchased by Kent from Barnhardt. Kent
consented to the search of the trailer. Inside, law enforcement found several
thumb drives, several SD cards, a phone, and a computer. These items were
found to contain child sexual-abuse material including videos of Barnhardt
performing sexual acts on minor children.

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Barnhardt moved to suppress this evidence arguing officers lacked
actual and apparent authority to consent to the search. The district court
denied Barnhardt’s motion to suppress.1

After a jury found Barnhardt guilty on all ten counts, he was sentenced
to 205 consecutive years of incarceration. Barnhardt appealed. See State v.
Barnhardt, No. 17-0496, 2018 WL 2230938 (Iowa Ct. App. May 16, 2018).
On appeal, Barnhardt’s counsel argued that the court erred in three aspects:
(1) the district court mistakenly allowed an expert witness to vouch for the
credibility of the victims, (2) the district court gave an improper jury
instruction, and (3) the district court improperly denied his challenge to
strike a juror for cause. Id. at *1–5. A panel of our court affirmed Barnhardt’s
convictions.

Barnhardt filed a PCR application claiming his appellate counsel was
ineffective for failing to raise the issue of the denial of his motion to suppress
on direct appeal. The PCR court found that Barnhardt failed to establish that
his appellate counsel failed to perform his essential duty, and the court denied
his PCR application. Barnhardt now appeals.

STANDARD OF REVIEW
We normally review denials of PCR applications for corrections of
errors at law. Schmidt v. State, 909 N.W.2d 778, 784 (Iowa 2018). However,
because ineffective assistance of counsel raises constitutional problems we
review those claims de novo. Trane v. State, 16 N.W.3d 683, 692 (Iowa 2025).

1
Kent testified at the motion-to-suppress hearing that Barnhardt sold her the
trailer prior to his arrest. She was able to produce a bill of sale bearing Barnhardt’s
signature proving the sale. Based on our review, the district court found her testimony
credible in denying the motion to suppress.

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DISCUSSION
Barnhardt contends the PCR court erred in finding that he received
effective assistance of appellate counsel. To succeed on an ineffective-
assistance-of-counsel claim, a defendant must show by preponderance of the
evidence that (1) counsel breached an essential duty (2) and that this
breached prejudiced the defendant. See State v. Smith, 7 N.W.3d 723, 726
(Iowa 2024). Failing to prove either prong “defeats” the claim. Id. This test
is also used to decide ineffective-assistance-of-appellate-counsel claims.
Ledezma v. State, 626 N.W.2d 134, 141 (Iowa 2001).

Due to the judgment calls that advocates have to make, “[j]udicial
scrutiny of counsel’s performance must be highly deferential.” Strickland v.
Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 689 (1984); see also Osborn v. State, 573 N.W.2d
917, 922 (Iowa 1998) (“Selecting assignments to assert as grounds for
reversal is a professional judgment call we are reluctant to second-guess.”).
Barnhardt has the burden to overcome this strong presumption. Strickland,
466 U.S. at 689.

To satisfy the first prong in an ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim,
Barnhardt must prove that his appellate counsel failed to perform an essential
duty. See State v. Kuhse, 937 N.W.2d 622, 628 (Iowa 2020). Failing to
perform an essential duty means that counsel “made errors so serious that
counsel was not functioning as the ʻcounsel’ guaranteed the defendant by the
Sixth Amendment.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687. And because there was no
testimony given in the PCR proceedings to show the thoughts and strategies
of appellate counsel, we must review the record to establish whether
appellate counsel was derelict in his duties. See Osborn, 573 N.W.2d at 922
(Iowa 1998) (“The ultimate test is whether under the entire record and

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totality of the circumstances counsel’s performance was within the normal
range of competency.”).

Barnhardt argues his appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to
challenge the denial of his motion to suppress on appeal. We disagree. We
find that Barnhardt has not sufficiently proven that counsel breached his
essential duty and has not overcome the presumption afforded to the
appellate counsel’s decisions. See Davis v. State, No. 18-2073, 2021 WL
592226, at *9–10 (Iowa Ct. App. Jan. 21, 2021) (“An assertion that if the issue
[had] been raised on appeal, it would have been successful is not sufficient to
establish ineffective assistance of appellate counsel.”).

Barnhardt cannot establish his appellate counsel’s performance fell
below an objective standard of reasonableness. See Lado v. State, 804 N.W.2d
248, 251 (Iowa 2011). “Highly competent appellate lawyers generally assign
only the strongest points and rely on them for reversal. . . . Hindsight [may
show the] judgment call . . . was wrong. But this is a far cry from qualifying
as ineffective representation.” Cuevas v. State, 415 N.W.2d 630, 633 (Iowa
1987); see also Jones v. State, 479 N.W.2d 265, 272 (Iowa 1991). Appellate
counsel is presumed to have acted competently. Ledezma, 626 N.W.2d at 142.
The search of the trailer was consented to by Kent—the trailer’s owner at
the time—and the district court determined she had actual and apparent
authority to consent to the search. Because Barnhardt cannot establish his
suppression issue had merit, we find his appellate counsel was not required
to raise it on direct appeal. See Stonerook v. State, No. 09-696, 2010 WL
786045, at *4 (Iowa Ct. App. Mar. 10, 2010) (finding an appellate attorney
“was not ineffective in failing to raise meritless issues on direct appeal”).

Upon our review of the record, we find it was not a breach of an
essential duty for counsel to not raise the motion-to-suppress issue.

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Although the district court referenced Kent’s ownership of the trailer,
ownership is not itself dispositive of authority to consent to a search. Rather,
actual authority turns on whether the consenting party possessed common
authority—defined as “mutual use of the property by persons generally
having joint access or control for most purposes.” State v. Jackson, 878
N.W.2d 422, 429 (Iowa 2016) (citations omitted).

The record supports such use here. Kent testified—and the district
court expressly credited—that she had purchased the trailer, that it was
located on her property, and that it was understood she would have actual
access and use of the trailer to store her own belongings as well as Barnhardt’s
belongings and to sell items on Barnhardt’s behalf. Because we have no
evidence to show otherwise, we find Barnhardt has not overcome the strong
presumption that his appellate counsel provided effective representation.

CONCLUSION
Because we find Barnhardt’s appellate counsel did not breach an
essential duty, we conclude that Barnhardt has failed to prove his appellate
counsel was ineffective. Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s denial of
his PCR application in its entirety.

AFFIRMED.

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