State of Iowa v. Joseph James O'Brien

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
_______________

No. 25-0871
Filed April 15, 2026
_______________

State of Iowa,
Plaintiff–Appellee,
v.
Joseph James O’Brien,
Defendant–Appellant.
_______________

Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Johnson County,
The Honorable Brandon Schrock, Judge.
_______________

SENTENCE VACATED AND REMANDED FOR RESENTENCING
_______________

Raya D. Dimitrova of Carr Law Firm, P.L.C., Des Moines,
attorney for appellant.

Brenna Bird, Attorney General, and Adam Kenworthy, Assistant Attorney
General, attorneys for appellee.
_______________

Considered without oral argument
by Greer, P.J., and Schumacher and Ahlers, JJ.
Opinion by Ahlers, J.

1
AHLERS, Judge.

Joseph O’Brien pleaded guilty to assaulting his then-girlfriend, causing
bodily injury. See Iowa Code §§ 708.1, .2(2) (2024). The district court
sentenced him to pay a fine and serve 365 days in jail with all but sixty days
suspended. As a condition of suspending part of the term of incarceration,
the court placed him on probation for two years.

O’Brien appeals his sentence. 1 He contends the court considered
improper sentencing factors by relying on unproven allegations contained in
his ex-girlfriend’s victim impact statement.

We only reverse a sentencing decision if there is a showing of an abuse
of discretion or some defect in the sentencing procedure. State v. Duffield,
16 N.W.3d 298, 302 (Iowa 2025). Relying on an improper factor in making a
sentencing decision constitutes an abuse of discretion. State v. Hallock, 31
N.W.3d 36, 41 (Iowa 2026). But there is a presumption that a sentence is
valid, and a defendant must affirmatively show reliance on an improper factor
to overcome the presumption. Id.

Here, like in many cases, the victim impact statement strayed into
alleged misconduct by O’Brien that was outside the scope of the crime to
which O’Brien pleaded guilty by detailing conduct by O’Brien prior to the

1
Because he challenges only his sentence, which was neither mandatory nor
agreed to by the parties, we have jurisdiction of O’Brien’s appeal despite his guilty plea.
See Iowa Code § 814.6(1)(a)(3) (requiring a defendant appealing from a guilty plea to a
crime other than a class “A” felony to establish good cause to obtain appellate
jurisdiction); State v. Damme, 944 N.W.2d 98, 105 (Iowa 2020) (finding good cause to
appeal following a guilty plea if the defendant only appeals a sentence and it is neither
mandatory nor agreed to by plea agreement).

2
date of the crime. See id. at 44 (recognizing that it is a common occurrence
for victim impact statements to so stray). The statement described how
O’Brien treated the victim over the life of their relationship—explaining that
O’Brien would belittle her through name calling, search through her phone
messages, physically isolate her from others, threaten her, and physically
abuse her. O’Brien objected to the victim’s comments about extraneous,
unproven conduct—though he wasn’t required to do so to preserve error. See
id. at 43. The court sustained O’Brien’s objection and stated that “the court
specifically does not consider any unadjudicated or uncharged offenses.” In
relevant part, the court gave these reasons for its sentencing decision:
In determining this sentence, the court has considered the entirety
of the court file, including the recommendations of the parties, the
allocution of Mr. O’Brien, and the victim impact statement provided by [the
victim].

The court has considered the defendant’s age, his lack of a prior
criminal history. The court specifically does not consider any unadjudicated
or uncharged offenses. The court would acknowledge and sustain [defense
counsel]’s objection on that matter and will not consider those.

The court does consider the facts and circumstances around this
case, particularly the recommendations of counsel.

The court finds that the sentence imposed will offer the defendant
the maximum opportunity for rehabilitation when balanced against the need
to protect the community.

Mr. O’Brien, I’m basically going to tell you my sentence today is
because this is just some of the worst controlling behavior I’ve seen as a
judge. And, you know, when you’re eighteen and you’re—seventeen or
eighteen, or however old you were when you were dating someone—I
presumed this happened when you were eighteen or you wouldn’t be in front
of me, but whether you’re dating, married, partners, parent, whatever
relationship, no human being gets to control another human being like this.
Relationships are intended to be based out of mutual respect, and that’s
what continues relationships on, is the fact that the parties respect each

3
other. It’s not the fact that they control each other, that they look at each
other’s phones, that they engage in actions of abuse or intimidation.

And so you’re sitting here today, eighteen, almost nineteen, you got
the rest of life to try to make these corrections, and I sincerely hope you do
so, or else you and I are probably going to be seeing each other a lot, because
I can guarantee you in life, your interpersonal relationships are going to get
far more complicated than the ones you had in high school. Once you
actually get into a marital relationship and children are involved, and all the
other stressors of life, things are only going to get more difficult; they’re not
going to get less difficult. And unless you take some time to reflect and learn
the mechanisms you need to deal with these angers and these aggressions in
a healthy way that is respectful to the other party, you’ll be back in here
again, and no one wants to see that. They don’t want to see it, the State
doesn’t want to see it, your attorney doesn’t want to see it, and, honestly, I
don’t want to see it either. So I’m going to give you a pretty severe
consequence today in the hopes that it sends that message and you learn the
lessons you need to learn.

O’Brien acknowledges the court sustained his objection and stated
that it would not consider unadjudicated or uncharged offenses. But he
contends the court did just that when it went on to refer to controlling
behavior and looking through the victim’s phone—conduct he contends he
did not concede occurred. We agree with O’Brien that, although the court
sustained his objection, the district court’s rationale for its selected sentence
reveals that it did in fact consider unadjudicated or uncharged offenses that
took place prior to the charged assault.

The court was permitted to consider facts contained in the minutes of
testimony that O’Brien admitted. See State v. Black, 324 N.W.2d 313, 316
(Iowa 1982). In his written guilty plea, O’Brien admitted that the minutes of
testimony were “substantially correct insofar as necessary to provide a
factual basis for the offense(s) previously listed.” By so acknowledging the
accuracy of the minutes, O’Brien admitted the facts contained in the

4
minutes, at least to the extent they supported the factual basis for the charge
of assault causing bodily injury.

As charged here, assault causing bodily injury has the following
elements: (1) O’Brien did an act which was intended to cause pain or injury;
result in physical contact that was insulting or offensive; or place the other
person in fear of immediate physical contact which would be painful,
injurious, insulting, or offensive; (2) O’Brien had the apparent ability to do
the act; and (3) O’Brien’s act caused a bodily injury to the other person. See
Iowa Code §§ 708.1(2)(a), .1(2)(b), .2(2); see also Iowa Crim. Jury
Instructions 800.2. Relevant to these elements, the minutes contained
allegations that O’Brien and his girlfriend got into an argument; while in a
car together, O’Brien began driving dangerously while repeatedly stating he
was going to kill her; during the argument, O’Brien grabbed her wrists and
slapped her cheek, which caused pain; and, as she was on her phone trying
to get her friends and parents to come help her, O’Brien tried to take her
phone from her. These factual allegations all help establish elements of the
crime of assault causing bodily injury.

But the basis for the court’s sentence went beyond those admitted
facts from the minutes. The court’s basis for its sentence was rooted in the
controlling nature of O’Brien’s relationship with the victim, including his
practice of searching her phone. Beyond that information not being
necessary to support a factual basis for assault causing bodily injury, it does
not appear in the minutes of testimony, meaning O’Brien did not admit to
those facts. The controlling nature of the relationship could only be gleaned
from the victim impact statement detailing the nature and history of
O’Brien’s relationship with the victim. While details from the victim impact
statement are incredibly troubling, they were not proven or admitted to by

5
O’Brien. So the district court could not consider the details from the victim
impact statement regarding the controlling nature of the relationship or prior
assaults when making a sentencing determination. See State v. Fetner, 959
N.W.2d 129, 135 (Iowa 2021) (“[A] sentencing court cannot consider
unproven or unprosecuted offenses in fashioning a defendant’s sentence
unless the defendant admits them or facts are presented to prove them.”);
State v. Formaro, 638 N.W.2d 720, 725–26 (Iowa 2002).

We do not “speculate about the weight the district court mentally
assigned [these facts],” so we must remand to the district court for
resentencing. Fetner, 959 N.W.2d at 136 (cleaned up). We vacate O’Brien’s
sentence and remand for resentencing before a different judge. See State v.
Duffield, 16 N.W.3d 298, 304 (Iowa 2025) (requiring resentencing before a
different judge when “the sentencing process was tainted against the
defendant”); State v. Lovell, 857 N.W.2d 241, 243 (Iowa 2014) (finding
consideration of improper factors requires resentencing before a different
judge “to protect the integrity of our judicial system from the appearance of
impropriety”); State v. Sundall, No. 24-0982, 2025 WL 1322623, at *2 (Iowa
Ct. App. May 7, 2025) (requiring resentencing before a different judge when
the court considered an improper sentencing factor) State v. Hubler, No. 24-
0631, 2025 WL 855934, at *3 (Iowa Ct. App. Mar. 19, 2025) (same).

SENTENCE VACATED AND REMANDED FOR
RESENTENCING.

6