State of Iowa v. James Gerald Deaton III

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
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No. 25-0365
Filed April 15, 2026
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State of Iowa,
Plaintiff–Appellee,
v.
James Gerald Deaton III,
Defendant–Appellant.
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Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Polk County,
The Honorable Brendan Greiner, Judge.
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AFFIRMED
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Austin Jungblut and Natalie Shroyer (until withdrawal) of Parrish
Kruidenier L.L.P., Des Moines, attorneys for appellant.

Brenna Bird, Attorney General, Anagha Dixit (until withdrawal) and Adam
Kenworthy, Assistant Attorneys General, attorneys for appellee.
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Considered without oral argument
by Greer, P.J., Chicchelly, J., and Mullins, S.J.
Opinion by Chicchelly, J.

1
CHICCHELLY, Judge.

James Deaton III appeals his conviction for operating while intoxicated
(OWI) after a stipulated trial on the minutes of testimony. He challenges the
denial of his motion to suppress the evidence obtained during a traffic stop of
his vehicle. Because the stop falls under the community caretaking exception
to the warrant requirement, we affirm.

BACKGROUND FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS
Sergeant Brian Kempnich of the Clive Police Department was
patrolling Hickman Road in the early morning hours of October 14, 2024,
when he passed a red Chevrolet Equinox driven by Deaton.
Sergeant Kempnich was driving a marked law enforcement vehicle, and there
were almost no other vehicles on the road at the time. Once
Sergeant Kempnich was about four or five car lengths ahead of the Equinox,
he saw its high beams flashing in his rearview mirror. Sergeant Kempnich
estimated that the Equinox’s high beams flashed between ten and fifteen
times, which he found unusual. Concerned that the driver needed help,
Sergeant Kempnich slowed to let the Equinox pass while he tried to look
inside. Unable to see anything, Sergeant Kempnich activated his emergency
lights and stopped the vehicle.

During the stop, Sergeant Kempnich noted signs that Deaton was
intoxicated: a strong odor of an alcoholic beverage, bloodshot and watery
eyes, slurred speech, and appearing “a little confused.” Deaton denied that
he had been drinking but was unable to complete one field sobriety test and
refused the rest. He was arrested and transported to the police department
where chemical testing showed a blood alcohol content of 0.211.

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The State charged Deaton with OWI. Before trial, Deaton moved to
suppress all evidence obtained during the traffic stop, claiming it violated
federal and state constitutional protections against warrantless searches.
The State resisted, claiming that Sergeant Kempnich had probable cause to
stop Deaton. Alternatively, the State argued that the traffic stop fell under
the community caretaking exception to the warrant requirement. After a
hearing, the district court denied Deaton’s motion under the community
caretaking exception.

SCOPE AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
We review the denial of a motion to suppress based on constitutional
grounds de novo. State v. Cyrus, 997 N.W.2d 671, 676 (Iowa 2023). “Each
case must be evaluated in light of its unique circumstances.” Id. (quoting
State v. Coffman, 914 N.W.2d 240, 244 (Iowa 2018)). De novo review requires
that we “review the entire record to independently evaluate the totality of the
circumstances.” Id. (citation omitted). We defer to the district court’s
factual findings, particularly those involving witness credibility, but we are
not bound by them. Id.

DISCUSSION
The Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution and
article I, section 8 of the Iowa Constitution protect the right of the people to
be free from “unreasonable searches and seizures.” Evidence obtained in
violation of these provisions is inadmissible, “no matter how relevant or
probative the evidence may be.” State v. Freeman, 705 N.W.2d 293, 297 (Iowa
2005) (citation omitted). Warrantless searches and seizures are per se
unreasonable unless they fall under one of the exceptions to the warrant
requirement. State v. Bradford, 620 N.W.2d 503, 506 (Iowa 2000).

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Deaton contends the district court erred by denying his motion to
suppress based on the community caretaking exception to the warrant
requirement. The exception is based on the community caretaking functions
of police, which are “totally divorced from the detection, investigation, or
acquisition of evidence relating to the violation of a criminal statute.”
Coffman, 914 N.W.2d at 244 (quoting Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 443, 441
(1973)). Instead, community caretaking functions involve an officer’s duty
to help a citizen if the officer has a reasonable belief that the citizen may need
help. Id.

The community caretaking exception follows a three-step analysis:
“(1) was there a seizure within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment?;
(2) if so, was the police conduct bona fide community caretaker activity?; and
(3) if so, did the public need and interest outweigh the intrusion upon the
privacy of the citizen?” Id. at 245. The State concedes that the traffic stop
was a seizure under the state and federal constitutions.

I. Was Sergeant Kempnich engaged in bona fide community
caretaking activity when he stopped Deaton?

An officer is involved in a bona fide community caretaker activity if
based on the facts available at the time of the seizure, a reasonable person
would believe the officer’s actions were appropriate. Id. at 251. The supreme
court has recognized three categories of conduct form bona fide community
caretaking activity: “(1) the emergency aid doctrine, (2) the automobile
impoundment/inventory doctrine, and (3) the ʻpublic servant’ exception.”
Id. at 244. “The emergency-aid and public-servant doctrines are closely
related.” Id. The difference involves the seriousness and exigency of the
event:

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Under the emergency aid doctrine, the officer has an immediate,
reasonable belief that a serious, dangerous event is occurring. In contrast,
the officer in a public servant situation might or might not believe that
there is a difficulty requiring his general assistance. For example, an officer
assists a motorist with a flat tire under the public servant doctrine, but an
officer providing first aid to a person slumped over the steering wheel with
a bleeding gash on his head acts pursuant to the emergency aid doctrine.

Id. at 244–45 (cleaned up).

The circumstances at the time Sergeant Kempnich stopped Deaton
would allow a reasonable person to believe Deaton might need help. The
sergeant explained that he did not see flashing high beams before passing the
Equinox and that it is unusual for drivers to flash their high beams in the
manner that Deaton did:
Usually people won’t sit there and continuously flash their high beams.
They might flash them once or twice for whatever reason they are flashing
them for, I don’t know, maybe try to see something in the road or what not,
so usually when this happens, this usually means to me that somebody is
trying to get my attention.[1]

1
Flashing headlights or high beams are recognized as a sign of distress or warning
to other drivers. See, e.g., Sarber v. Comm’r of Pub. Safety, 819 N.W.2d 465, 469 (Minn.
Ct. App. 2012) (“[I]t is a common practice for drivers to flash their high beams to warn
other drivers of hazards, or to signal others to adjust their own headlights.”); State v.
Gardner, 501 P.3d 925, 930 (Mont. 2022) (“Flashing one’s high beams is a common form
of signal from one driver to another: to warn a driver they have forgotten to dim their
brights, or to warn of hazardous roads conditions, a traffic accident, or wildlife on the road
ahead.”); People v. Marquez, 563 N.Y.S.2d 987, 989 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1990) (“The courts have
held that the use of high beam headlights is a recognized signal of distress justifying the
stop of the vehicle.”); State v. Carlile, No. 17270, 1999 WL 301422, at *4 (Ohio Ct. App.
May 14, 1999) (“Flashing one’s high beams is a common form of signal from one driver
to another.”); cf. State v. Hilpipre, 395 N.W.2d 899, 900 (Iowa Ct. App. 1986) (noting that
a police officer “flashed his high-low beams to signal the driver of the truck to stop”).

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Sergeant Kempnich also testified that he was concerned Deaton “was in
distress or needed help with something” and gave two examples:
Sometimes we’ve had people that have had medical emergencies, like
they’ve had a passenger that might be their wife that’s in labor, or needing
help, or it could be a domestic violence situation where the victim is the
driver in that case and is needing help with trying to get our attention, from
maybe if there is a passenger in the seat, needing help from getting away
from them.

Sergeant Kempnich repeated his reasoning to another officer who arrived at
the scene shortly after the stop, showing that Sergeant Kempnich stopped
Deaton’s vehicle for genuine community caretaking purposes. See Coffman,
914 N.W.2d at 257–59 (holding that under the Iowa Constitution, the State
must prove with objective and subjective facts that the officer was engaging
in community caretaking). Under the circumstances, a reasonable person
could believe that Deaton was seeking help by flashing his high beams at the
sergeant’s patrol car between ten and fifteen times. See, e.g., Carlile, 1999
WL 301422, at *4 (finding an officer’s interpretation of flashing high beams
as an attempt by a citizen to gain the officer’s attention was objectively
reasonable); State v. Campbell, 789 A.2d 926, 928 (Vt. 2001) (finding an
officer had a reasonable belief that the occupants of a vehicle parked in a lot
on a stormy night were seeking his assistance by flashing their lights at a
marked police cruiser); cf. State v. Day, 263 S.W.3d 891, 905 n.12 (Tenn.
2008) (holding that a motorist’s act of flashing her lights and pointing at the
defendant’s vehicle was “not sufficiently specific and articulate to support
the stop and seizure of the defendant,” though it “would certainly be
sufficient to support a stop of [the motorist] to investigate the nature of her
distress”).

Deaton argues that the circumstances of the stop are like those the
supreme court found violated a defendant’s constitutional rights in State v.

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Smith, 919 N.W.2d 1 (Iowa 2018). In Smith, an officer was investigating a
single-vehicle accident that ended with the vehicle in a ditch at 4:30 a.m. one
Saturday. 919 N.W.2d at 2. Dispatch relayed that a passerby had seen
someone who may have been the driver walking away from the vehicle
without injuries. Id. The officer was unable to find the driver but saw a van
pull into the driveway of a nearby residence before leaving. Id. After
checking the van’s license plate, the officer learned that it was registered to
the same address as the registered owner of the vehicle in the ditch. Id. The
officer testified that he stopped the van as part of a welfare check because he
was concerned that the vehicle’s driver was inside or the people in the van
were looking for the driver. Id. at 3.

The supreme court held that the officer’s conduct in Smith fell outside
the community caretaking exception because “[t]he van clearly did not need
assistance” when the officer stopped it:
The possibility exists that the driver of the vehicle in the ditch needed
assistance and that the van was looking for the driver, but this is seemingly
belied by the fact that the van left the scene, presumably after noticing the
presence of a law enforcement vehicle.

Deputy Smith did testify that he was “checking on the welfare of
the people involved,” given the possibility that the van either was looking
for the driver of the vehicle in the ditch or had already picked him up. Yet
the van appeared not to want Deputy Smith’s help, and from everything
the deputies had heard and seen, there was no indication of an injury or
other emergency.

Id. at 5.

Deaton argues that like the driver of the van in Smith, he showed he
was not looking for help by driving past Sergeant Kempnich when he slowed.
The difference is that the driver in Smith never signaled a need for help, while
a reasonable person could conclude that Deaton had. We agree with the

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district court that under the circumstances, “[i]t was perfectly reasonable for
the officer to believe that the red Equinox was attempting to get his attention
by flashing the lights 10 to 15 times.” Thus, Sergeant Kempnich was involved
in bona fide community caretaking activity when he stopped Deaton.

II. Did the public need and interest outweigh the intrusion on
Deaton’s privacy?

An officer engaged in bona fide community caretaking activity “may
act reasonably for the purpose of giving aid to a person in distress and finding
information bearing upon the cause of that distress.” State v. Mitchell, 498
N.W.2d 691, 694 (Iowa 1993). We have already found that Sergeant
Kempnich had a reasonable belief that Deaton needed help. To inquire
further, the sergeant first slowed his patrol car to allow the Equinox to catch
up to him and tried to discern what was happening inside, but the Equinox
passed by too quickly for Sergeant Kempnich to see anything.
Sergeant Kempnich was justified in stopping Deaton long enough to figure
out if he needed help. A stop continuing for longer than that would have
violated Deaton’s constitutional rights. See, e.g., State v. Nikolsky,
No. 02-1813, 2004 WL 151070, at *7 (Iowa Ct. App. Jan. 28, 2004) (finding
a defendant’s privacy interests outweighed the officer’s need to investigate a
possible public safety concern when the officer stopped the defendant’s
vehicle, asked him to get into the patrol car, and engaged in a lengthy
discussion on a variety of topics). But at once, it was obvious to Sergeant
Kempnich that Deaton showed signs of intoxication, giving him probable
cause to investigate further.

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Under the circumstances, we agree that the stop falls under the
community caretaking exception to the warrant requirement and affirm the
denial of Deaton’s motion to suppress.

AFFIRMED.

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