In the Interest of M.M., Minor Child

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
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No. 25-2191
Filed April 15, 2026
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In the Interest of M.M., Minor Child,
A.M., Mother,
Appellant.
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Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Linn County,
The Honorable Carrie K. Bryner, Judge.
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AFFIRMED
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Annette F. Martin, Cedar Rapids, attorney for appellant mother.

Brenna Bird, Attorney General, and Tamara Knight, Assistant Attorney
General, attorneys for appellee State.

Robin L. O’Brien Licht, Cedar Rapids, attorney and guardian ad litem for
minor child.
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Considered without oral argument
by Ahlers, P.J., and Buller and Sandy, JJ.
Opinion by Ahlers, P.J.

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AHLERS, Presiding Judge.

The Iowa Department of Health and Human Services first became
involved with a mother and her two children regarding concerns about abuse
the older child suffered at the hands of the mother’s paramour. Custody and
physical care of the older child was placed with the child’s father through a
bridge order to district court. But as to the younger child, the juvenile court
eventually terminated the mother’s parental rights to the child because of her
unresolved anger issues and pattern of involvement with domestically
abusive paramours.1

The mother appeals. She challenges the statutory grounds for
termination, contending that the child could have been returned to her
custody at the time of the termination hearing. She also claims that
termination of her rights is not in the child’s best interests and the juvenile
court should have applied a permissive exception to forgo termination.

We review termination of parental rights cases de novo. In re A.B., 957
N.W.2d 280, 293 (Iowa 2021). We give respectful consideration to the
juvenile court’s factual findings, especially when assessing witness
credibility, but we are not bound by them. Id.

We follow a three-step process of review by determining: (1) whether
a statutory ground for termination has been established; (2) whether
termination is in the child’s best interests; and (3) whether a permissive
exception should be applied to avoid termination. In re L.A., 20 N.W.3d 529,
532 (Iowa Ct. App. 2025) (en banc).

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The younger child’s father consented to termination and does not appeal the
termination of his parental rights.

2
The juvenile court terminated the mother’s parental rights under Iowa
Code section 232.116(1)(h) (2025). This ground permits termination of
parental rights upon clear and convincing evidence that (1) “[t]he child is
three years of age or younger”; (2) “[t]he child has been adjudicated a child
in need of assistance”; (3) the child has been removed from the physical
custody of a parent for at least six of the last twelve months; and (4) the child
cannot be returned to the custody of the parent at the present time. Iowa
Code § 232.116(1)(h). The mother only challenges the fourth element,
whether the child could be safely returned to her custody at the time of the
termination hearing. See In re D.W., 791 N.W.2d 703, 707 (Iowa 2010)
(interpreting “at the present time” as used in section 232.116(1)(h)(4) to
mean at the time of the termination hearing).

Following our de novo review of the record, we agree with the juvenile
court that the child could not be safely returned to the mother’s custody at
the time of the termination hearing. The mother has a history of domestically
abusive relationships, the most recent with the man who physically abused
her other child. At the termination hearing she would not definitively admit
her paramour abused the child, equivocating because she did not witness the
abuse herself.

And while the mother contends that their relationship is over, the
record suggests otherwise. She has a history of claiming the relationship is
over only to rekindle the romance. They last got together about three months
prior to the termination hearing. That reunion resulted in violence that
included the paramour breaking into a room in the mother’s apartment and
holding a gun to her head. Officers arrested the paramour, and the State
criminally charged him. Even though the mother is the main witness in that
case and has been advised of the importance of her cooperation with the

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county attorney, she has yet to contact that office to assist in those criminal
proceedings. She was pregnant with his child at the time of the termination
hearing, and she suggested she would be willing to revisit a relationship with
him under certain conditions.

Based on this evidence, we agree with the caseworker who testified at
the termination hearing that the mother lacks insight with respect to healthy
relationships. In short, the mother’s lack of insight and history strongly
suggest that she will continue to involve herself with domestically abusive
paramours, which creates a dangerous environment for the child. See, e.g., In
re J.D., No. 21-0391, 2021 WL 3379037, at *1 (Iowa Ct. App. Aug. 4, 2021).
To be clear, we are mindful of the fact that the mother is a victim of domestic
violence, and it is the actions of her abusers that are the root of this issue.
Our conclusion that the child cannot be safely returned to her custody is not
punishment for her inability to separate herself from her abusive paramours,
as it is not the purpose of juvenile law to punish her for her mistakes. See In
re C.M., No. 25-1836, 2026 WL 221762, at *2 (Iowa Ct. App. Jan. 28, 2026).
Rather, our purpose is to make sure the child is in a safe home, and a safe
home for this child has not been provided due to the mother’s entanglement
with abusive men. See id.

In addition to the violence in the home caused by abusive paramours,
the mother also struggles with her own anger. The mother denied having
“anger issues,” instead explaining that she has “had moments of anger.” But
she admitted to having “moments of blackouts due to anger.” And she
elaborated that “at any moment it could happen and [she] can’t control it.”
At one point during the department’s involvement with the mother, she
assaulted her neighbor in front of a young child.

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As the juvenile court aptly summarized it, the mother “appears to
thrive off of drama and her life is chaotic because of it. This is a case where
the totality of the circumstances indicate that the mother cannot ensure her
daughter’s safety due to the people and situations in which she places
herself.” The child could not be safely returned to the mother’s custody,
establishing a statutory ground for termination.

The mother indirectly challenges the juvenile court’s determination
that termination is in the child’s best interests. When making a best-interests
determination, we “give primary consideration to the child’s safety, to the
best placement for furthering the long-term nurturing and growth of the
child, and to the physical, mental, and emotional condition and needs of the
child.” Iowa Code § 232.116(2). But we recognize that a child’s safety and
need for permanency are “the defining elements in a child’s best interests.”
In re H.S., 805 N.W.2d 737, 748 (Iowa 2011) (citation omitted). Because the
mother has not demonstrated an appreciation of the harm that domestic
violence poses to the child, she is not a safe caregiver. We agree with the
juvenile court that termination is in the child’s best interests.

Finally, the mother argues that the juvenile court should have applied
a permissive exception to termination that permits the court to forgo
termination when “[t]here is clear and convincing evidence that the
termination would be detrimental to the child at the time due to the closeness
of the parent-child relationship.” Iowa Code § 232.116(3)(c). As the parent
resisting termination, it is the mother’s burden to establish a permissive
exception to termination. See In re A.S.,906 N.W.2d 467, 476 (Iowa 2018).
When applying the exception in section 232.116(3)(c), the “consideration
must center on whether the child will be disadvantaged by termination, and
whether the disadvantage overcomes [the parent’s] inability to provide for

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[the child’s] needs.” See D.W., 791 N.W.2d at 709. While we recognize the
record establishes there is a loving bond between the mother and child, the
mother has not met her burden to establish that the child would be
disadvantaged by the termination of the mother’s parental rights. We decline
to apply this permissive exception.

AFFIRMED.

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