In the Interest of K.U., J.U., J.U., M.U., C.U., Z.U., and K.U., Minor Children

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
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No. 25-2212
Filed May 13, 2026
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In the Interest of K.U., J.U., J.U., M.U., C.U., Z.U., and K.U., Minor
Children,
J.U., Father,
Appellant,
K.L., Mother,
Appellant.
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Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Harrison County,
The Honorable David W. Brooks, Judge.
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AFFIRMED
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William T. Early, Harlan, attorney for appellant father.

Keith R. Tucker of Woods Tucker, P.L.L.C., Glenwood, attorney for
appellant mother.

Brenna Bird, Attorney General, and Mackenzie Moran, Assistant Attorney
General, attorneys for appellee State.

Abby L. Davison, Council Bluffs, attorney and guardian ad litem for minor
children.
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Considered without oral argument
by Greer, P.J., and Schumacher and Chicchelly, JJ.
Opinion by Greer, P.J.

2
GREER, Presiding Judge.

A mother and father separately appeal the termination of their parental
rights to seven children. Both parents challenge the statutory grounds for
termination. The mother additionally argues that termination was not in the
children’s best interests. Upon our de novo review of the record, we affirm
the juvenile court’s termination of the mother and father’s parental rights to
all seven children.

I. Background Facts and Proceedings.

The mother and father are the parents of seven children—four girls
and three boys—born in 2014, 2015, 2019, 2021, 2022, 2023, and 2024.1 The
family most recently came to the attention of the Iowa Department of Health
and Human Services (HHS) in June 2024 due to concerns of substance use,
domestic violence between the parents, inadequate food, and unstable
housing. At the time, the parents and four of the children were living in a
camper in a friend’s backyard in a small Iowa town. The mother was
pregnant with the youngest child, and the two oldest children were living
with friends due to a lack of space and transportation issues.

On July 3, after the parents failed to participate in HHS’s attempts to
create a safety plan, the six older children were temporarily removed from
the parents’ custody. After the July 10 removal hearing, the court concluded
that continued removal was necessary and ordered the parents to obtain

1
No one disputes that the father is the father of the children, but four of the
children’s birth certificates do not list a father. The parental rights of any unknown fathers
were terminated under Iowa Code section 232.116(1)(b) (2025), and no unknown fathers
have appealed that determination.

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mental-health and substance-use evaluations, participate in drug testing, and
engage with Family-Centered Services (FCS).

Shortly after the removal hearing, the mother gave birth to the
youngest child and tested positive for benzodiazepine while still in the
hospital. She later claimed the positive result was from a valid prescription
from the emergency room, but she never produced any documentation to
support that claim.

The youngest child required hospitalization in a neonatal unit for a
period of time after she was born. The mother only visited the child in the
hospital once or twice but claimed she monitored the child more frequently
on an application on her phone. The father never visited the child in the
hospital. The child was removed from the parents’ custody upon her
discharge from the hospital.

On August 28, all seven children were adjudicated children in need of
assistance (CINA). The court again ordered the parents to undergo mental-
health evaluations and participate in drug testing. The mother, who was
participating in methadone therapy, was ordered to continue working with
her treatment provider and to participate in a domestic violence prevention
program. The father was again ordered to obtain a substance-use evaluation
and was further ordered to complete anger management classes.

The mother began participating in supervised visits with the children,
but she often did not bring enough food for the children or other necessary
supplies, such as diapers for the youngest child. The mother sometimes
struggled to provide care for all the children at the same time. In November,
the mother showed up for two visits smelling of alcohol. The mother
canceled or no-showed for several visits in December 2024 and January 2025,

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and she did not consistently attend visits from March to July. Even when at
visits, she often left early. During one visit in January, the children were
transported to the visit location and were waiting for the mother, but the
mother, who was aware of the visit, missed the visit because she was across
the street talking to an HHS employee. Throughout this case, the mother
did not communicate consistently with HHS or FCS, and she did not
progress beyond supervised visits.

The mother tested positive for methamphetamine on September 27,
November 22, and December 5, 2024, and February 21, 2025. Despite these
positive drug tests, the mother continued participating in methadone
treatment and substance-use therapy for most of this case.

In March, the mother moved to a larger city two hours away from the
children to participate in a trauma-informed supportive living program for
women. However, she was unsuccessfully discharged from the program in
May after failing to comply with several of the program’s rules. She did not
report the unsuccessful discharge to HHS. After leaving the program, the
mother lived in a homeless shelter in the city. During this period, she no-
showed for a visit even though she had confirmed it and the children had
traveled to the city to see her. Around this time, the mother also had limited
contact with HHS and did not participate in drug testing. It is unclear
whether the mother participated in methadone therapy during this time.

By the father’s own admission, he did not participate in any services
from July 2024 through June 2025. During that same time, he rarely
participated in visits with the children and did not tell HHS whether he had
a job, where he was living, or how to contact him. In March 2025, the father
was arrested, and he remained in jail until he was released in June. After the
father’s release from jail, he began meeting with the HHS social worker and

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participating in visits with the children. He participated in his first drug test
on June 26, which was negative.

In early July, the mother moved back to the small town where they had
previously lived. At that time, the mother informed the HHS social worker
that she intended to move to a farm in Nebraska, which was two hours from
the children, to work in exchange for lodging. The social worker expressed
concern because visits could not be offered out of state, but the mother said
she was going to get a vehicle so she could drive back and forth for visits.

After the July 9 permanency hearing, the juvenile court changed the
permanency goal from reunification to termination of parental rights and
ordered the State to file termination petitions. After this hearing, the mother
abandoned her plan to move to the farm in Nebraska.

Sometime after this hearing, the father got a job, but his employment
status was not stable and he was still barred from driving. The father did not
have a plan to travel legally to the current job.

In August, the HHS social worker asked the mother to register the
children for school. Despite saying that she would, the mother never
followed through. Eventually, the children’s placements had to register the
children for school. On August 22, the State filed petitions to terminate the
parents’ rights to all seven children.

The father underwent substance-use and mental-health evaluations in
September. The substance-use evaluation reported the father’s last date of
use was March 2025. The father was diagnosed with severe cannabis-use
disorder and mild methamphetamine-use disorder. He was found to be a
“moderate risk” to relapse. The report recommended he participate in
extended-outpatient treatment.

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The mental-health evaluation diagnosed him with adjustment
disorder, unspecified, but no treatment was recommended. This conflicted
with the father’s report during the substance-use evaluation that he had been
diagnosed with schizophrenia and bipolar disorder while in jail. Those
diagnoses were not mentioned in the mental-health evaluation report.

Also in September, the father informed HHS that he bought a three-
bedroom, one-bathroom trailer in a town forty minutes away from the
children. HHS inspected the trailer and determined that it needed work
before it would be appropriate for the children. For example, the kitchen
cabinets did not have doors. The father did, however, have beds for six of the
children.

In October, the father was arrested twice within eight days for driving
while barred. These charges remained pending at the time of the termination
hearing.

The juvenile court held the termination hearing over two days, on
October 22 and November 4. The HHS social worker and guardian ad litem
recommended termination of both parents’ parental rights to all seven
children. The father consented to termination of his rights to the youngest
child.

At the time of the termination hearing, the father had not completed
anger management classes as ordered and had not participated in any
substance-use treatment. The father had not attended any of the children’s
appointments and provided minimal financial assistance to the children
throughout the case. While he had a vehicle, he was still barred from legally
driving and did not know when he would get his license back. The father had
not made the requested repairs to the trailer. He had recently quit his job and

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accepted another job at a restaurant, but he had not yet started. He had also
recently undergone hand surgery.

The mother had not completed domestic violence prevention classes
as ordered, although she had completed the SafeCare program. The mother
had only participated in mental-health therapy during her stay at the
supportive living program. She had not completed a mental-health
evaluation as ordered by the court. The mother’s last few drug screens were
negative, and she continued to participate in methadone treatment and
substance-use therapy, which she claimed had a mental-health component.

The mother did not have consistent housing or employment during
this case. At the time of the termination hearing, she was living in a one-
bedroom apartment with a friend and the friend’s two children. She testified
that she had been approved for a four-bedroom apartment through municipal
housing in Council Bluffs and a four-bedroom house in Harrison County, but
neither were currently available. She anticipated that she would be able to
move into one of those options at the end of November. For the two months
before the termination hearing, the mother had been working a part-time job
doing cleanup for a construction company. The mother did not have a
vehicle. She had provided minimal financial support for the children and had
attended few of the children’s appointments.

After the hearing, the juvenile court terminated the mother and
father’s parental rights under Iowa Code section 232.116(1)(e) as to all seven
children, under section 232.116(1)(f ) as to the older four children, and under
section 232.116(1)(h) as to the younger three children. The parents
separately appeal.

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II. Standard of Review.

We review termination-of-parental-rights cases de novo. In re W.M.,
957 N.W.2d 305, 312 (Iowa 2021). “We are not bound by the factual findings
of the juvenile court, though we give them respectful consideration,
particularly with respect to credibility determinations.” Id.

The grounds for termination must be established by clear and
convincing evidence. In re M.W., 876 N.W.2d 212, 219 (Iowa 2016).
“Evidence is considered clear and convincing when there are no serious or
substantial doubts as to the correctness of conclusions of law drawn from the
evidence.” Id. (cleaned up).

III. Analysis.

Our courts use a three-step analysis to review the termination of
parental rights under chapter 232. Id. We must first determine whether the
State has proved a statutory ground for termination. Id. If so, we then
consider whether termination of parental rights is in the children’s best
interests. Id. at 219–20. Finally, if termination is in the children’s best
interests, we then “consider whether any exceptions in section 232.116(3)
apply to preclude termination of parental rights.” Id. at 220. If a parent does
not challenge one of the steps in the analysis, we need not consider that step
in our review of the juvenile court’s termination order. See In re P.L., 778
N.W.2d 33, 40 (Iowa 2010).

On appeal, both parents challenge the statutory grounds for
termination. The mother additionally argues that termination was not in the
children’s best interests. We address each parent’s appeal separately.

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A. Mother’s Appeal. The mother challenges the statutory grounds
for termination and the juvenile court’s best-interests determination. We
address each argument in turn.

1. Statutory grounds for termination. The juvenile court terminated the
mother’s parental rights under section 232.116(1)(e), (f ), and (h). When the
juvenile court terminates parental rights on multiple grounds, we need only
find termination was proper on one ground to affirm. In re A.B., 815 N.W.2d
764, 774 (Iowa 2012).

We choose to focus on subsections 232.116(1)(f )2 and (h).3 These two
subsections are substantially similar, differing only in the ages of the children

2
Section 232.116(1)(f ) provides that termination is appropriate when:

(1) The child is four years of age or older.

(2) The child has been adjudicated a child in need of assistance
pursuant to section 232.96.

(3) The child has been removed from the physical custody of the
child’s parents for at least twelve of the last eighteen months, or for the last
twelve consecutive months and any trial period at home has been less than
thirty days.

(4) There is clear and convincing evidence that at the present time
the child cannot be returned to the custody of the child’s parents as
provided in section 232.102.

3
Section 232.116(1)(h) provides that termination is appropriate when:

(1) The child is three years of age or younger.

(2) The child has been adjudicated a child in need of assistance
pursuant to section 232.96.

(3) The child has been removed from the physical custody of the
child’s parents for at least six months of the last twelve months, or for the

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each subsection applies to and the length of time the children are removed
from the home. The mother challenges only the fourth element of both
subsections: that the children could not be returned to her custody “at the
present time.” Our courts have defined “at the present time” to mean “at
the time of the termination hearing.” See In re D.W., 791 N.W.2d 703, 707
(Iowa 2010).

On appeal, the mother argues that she had made progress with her
substance-use treatment and was testing negative for illegal substances. She
also argued that “[w]ithin a reasonable amount of time” she would have
adequate housing for the children. For those reasons, the mother maintains
the district court erred in concluding the children could not be returned to
her custody.

We conclude there is clear and convincing evidence that the children
could not be returned to the mother’s custody at the time of the termination
hearing. At the time of the hearing, the mother was working part time, did
not have a vehicle, and was living in a one-bedroom apartment with three
other people. While the mother claimed she had been approved for four-
bedroom housing, it would not have been available until, at the earliest,
several weeks after the termination hearing. Additionally, the mother had not
progressed beyond supervised visits with the children and had difficulty
caring for all of the children on her own during the supervised visits. But
more importantly, the mother had not ever completed a mental-health

last six consecutive months and any trial period at home has been less than
thirty days.

(4) There is clear and convincing evidence that the child cannot be
returned to the custody of the child’s parents as provided in
section 232.102 at the present time.

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evaluation and had not shown progress in the work involved to be a caretaker.
She participated in few of the children’s appointments and provided minimal
support for the children throughout the case.

Despite having over one year to resolve the issues that brought the
children to HHS’s attention, the mother is still not in a place to be a safe,
stable caregiver to the children. See In re Z.P., 948 N.W.2d 518, 524
(Iowa 2020) (“Our legislature has carefully constructed a time frame to
provide a balance between the parent’s efforts and the child’s long-term best
interests.” (cleaned up)). We conclude the State proved grounds for
termination by clear and convincing evidence under Iowa Code
section 232.116(1)(f ) as to the children born in 2014, 2015, 2019, and 2021,
and section 232.116(1)(h) as to the children born in 2022, 2023, and 2024.

2. Best interests. The mother next argues that termination is not in the
children’s best interests because she has a strong bond with the children and
because termination would likely lead to the children being split up in
separate homes.

In considering the children’s best interests, we “give primary
consideration to the child[ren]’s safety, to the best placement for furthering
the long-term nurturing and growth of the child[ren], and to the physical,
mental, and emotional condition and needs of the child[ren].” Iowa Code
§ 232.116(2). “If the children have been placed in foster care, we consider
the extent to which they have become integrated into that family.” M.W., 876
N.W.2d at 224; see also Iowa Code § 232.116(2)(b). “[W]e may also consider
statements of foster parents or relatives with whom the children have been
placed.” M.W., 876 N.W.2d at 224; see also Iowa Code § 232.116(2)(c). “It is
well-settled law that we cannot deprive a child of permanency after the State
has proved a ground for termination . . . by hoping someday a parent will learn

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to be a parent and be able to provide a stable home for the child.” In re A.S.,
906 N.W.2d 467, 474 (Iowa 2018) (cleaned up).

After the children were removed from their parents’ custody, they
were split between three placements. All three placements testified at the
termination hearing. As the district court aptly noted,
The Court had the opportunity to observe all three of the children’s
placements testify at the termination trial and found the placements
credible, including when testifying about the harm that the parents have
caused and continue to cause the children by their failure to participate in
their lives. During their testimony, the placements tearfully testified
regarding the harm that the parents continue to cause the children by their
failure to provide for them, make consistent progress, and participate in
visits. The Court finds that the parents have not demonstrated that they
will ever be able to provide long-term, stable care. Throughout the history
of this case, both parents have consistently shown a lack of interest in their
children’s lives by frequently missing important events, including school
functions, medical appointments, and visits. In contrast to the placements,
it is unclear to the Court whether the parents are bonded with the children,
particularly the younger ones.

We agree with the juvenile court. While it is extremely unfortunate
that these children may be separated from each other because of the
termination of their parents’ rights, termination is nevertheless in the
children’s best interests. See In re T.J.O., 527 N.W.2d 417, 420 (Iowa Ct. App.
1994) (noting that while “wherever possible brothers and sisters should be
kept together,” the court’s “paramount concern . . . must be the child’s best
interests.”). These children have done well in their current placements, and
they deserve the safety and stability they will only achieve through
termination of parental rights. We conclude the State has proven by clear
and convincing evidence that termination is in the children’s best interests.

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B. Father’s Appeal. Although the father consented to the
termination of his rights to the youngest child, he now appeals the juvenile
court’s order terminating his rights to all seven children under Iowa Code
section 232.116(1)(e), (f ), and (h). Like the mother’s appeal, we choose to
address subsections (f ) and (h). The father challenges only the final element
of both subsections: that the children could not be returned to his custody at
the time of the termination hearing. See Iowa Code § 232.116(1)(f )(4),
(h)(4).

We conclude the State proved by clear and convincing evidence that
the children could not be returned to the father’s custody at the time of the
termination hearing. As the father acknowledged, he was largely absent from
this case for almost one year. Even after he started participating in this case,
the HHS social worker testified that his visitation was not consistent, had
“been extremely limited,” and she was “not sure that [the father] knows what
each of [the children] need on a day-to-day basis.” He had not progressed
beyond supervised visits and had not attended any of the children’s
appointments. The father had not completed the work on his home to make
it suitable for the children to safely live there, including putting doors on the
kitchen cabinets.

Additionally, the father did not comply with the juvenile court’s order
to undergo mental-health and substance-use evaluations until shortly before
the termination hearing. He was also not participating in the recommended
substance-use treatment. While the father underwent a mental-health
evaluation, this evaluation did not discuss his significant diagnoses of
schizophrenia and bipolar disorder. It is not clear whether the father
disclosed those diagnoses to his evaluator, and it is also unclear what impact
these diagnoses have on the father’s day-to-day life. In any event, the father

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had not participated in any mental-health therapy. He also had not
completed anger management classes as ordered.

Further, the father had quit his job shortly before the termination
hearing. While he purportedly had another job lined up, he had not yet
started. The father was also recovering from a recent hand surgery. It is
unclear whether he would be able to work or care for the children on his own
until his hand healed. The father had recently been arrested twice for driving
while barred, still did not have a license, and did not know how long it would
be before he could legally drive again. Though the father had a vehicle, it was
not big enough to accommodate all seven children.

While the father has taken positive steps since his release from jail, this
progress is too little too late. The father has not demonstrated that he can be
a safe and stable caregiver to these children, nor has he shown that he is
capable of taking care of the children on his own. For the above-stated
reasons, the State proved grounds for termination of the father’s parental
rights to the children under Iowa Code section 232.116(1)(f ) as to the
children born in 2014, 2015, 2019, and 2021, and section 232.116(1)(h) as to
the children born in 2022, 2023, and 2024.

IV. Conclusion.

Upon our de novo review, we conclude the State proved grounds for
termination of both the mother’s and father’s parental rights to all seven
children by clear and convincing evidence. The State also proved by clear
and convincing evidence that termination of the parents’ rights was in the
children’s best interests. For those reasons, we affirm.

AFFIRMED.

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