Lawrence Seamans and Seamans Farms, Inc. v. Adam Kleiss and A.K. Family, LLC

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
_______________

No. 25-1277
Filed June 10, 2026
_______________

Lawrence Seamans and Seamans Farms, Inc.,
Plaintiffs–Appellees,
v.
Adam Kleiss and A.K. Family, LLC,
Defendants–Appellants.
_______________

Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Chickasaw County,
The Honorable John J. Sullivan, Judge.
_______________

AFFIRMED
_______________

Brandt D. Kahler (argued) and Stephanie A. Koltookian of Brown, Winick,
Graves, Gross and Baskerville, P.L.C., Des Moines,
attorneys for appellants.

Jackson Blais (argued), Megan Merritt, and Laura L. Folkerts of
Shuttleworth & Ingersoll, PLC, Cedar Rapids, attorneys for appellees.
_______________

Heard at oral argument
by Tabor, C.J., and Chicchelly and Sandy, JJ.
Opinion by Chicchelly, J.

1
CHICCHELLY, Judge.

This appeal involves a dispute over an easement agreement involving
the purchase and disposal of hog manure. After a bench trial, the district
court found in the plaintiffs’ favor on claims for specific performance and
injunctive relief and awarded monetary damages for breach of contract and
tortious interference with an easement. On appeal, the defendants challenge
the district court’s interpretation of the easement agreement, the finding that
they breached the easement agreement, the award of $134,757.94 in
monetary damages, and the finding that the defendants tortiously interfered
with the easement agreement. Finding no error, we affirm.

BACKGROUND FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS
Lawrence Seamans has farmed for half a century and is part-owner of
Seamans Farms, Inc.1 He owns land in Chickasaw County that he farms for
corn and “a few beans.”

In November 2010, Seamans sold 2.1 acres of their land to C&N
Livestock Farms, L.L.C. (C&N). The purpose of the sale was to allow C&N
to build and run a hog farm. The arrangement was mutually beneficial as
C&N needed farmers to dispose of the liquid manure produced at the site,
and Seamans wanted to use the manure for fertilizer.

Seamans and C&N signed an easement agreement for purchase and
disposal of manure effective date July 9, 2011. The relevant parts of the
agreement state:
1. [C&N] owns and operates a hog feeding facility . . . (hereinafter
“Premises”)[. Seamans] agrees to purchase liquid animal manure for

1
For ease of reading, we will refer to Seamans and Seamans Farms jointly as
Seamans unless it is necessary to distinguish them.

2
$2500.00 per year, payable on or before September 1st of each year, and
remove liquid animal manure, excluding animals and animal parts, from
livestock operations conducted on the Premises (hereinafter “Manure”)
commencing on the date of this Easement and continuing through
August 31st, 2026. This Agreement will perpetuate after the August 31st,
2026, date until pork production permanently ceases on Premises. The
annual fee will be prorated after 30 days of nonproduction of swine on the
Premises.

2. [Seamans] will apply the Manure at or below the legal limits
permitted in the Manure Management Agreement . . . after the crops are
harvested in the fall . . . .

3. [Seamans] has the right to apply the Manure to other Properties
owned or controlled by [Seamans] as long as [Seamans] does so under a
Manure Management Plan [(MMP)] approved by the Iowa DNR.

4. [C&N] agrees to pay all costs and fees associated with procuring
and maintaining a legal [MMP].

5. [Seamans] shall notify [C&N] or [C&N]’s site manager at least
24 hours prior to beginning the removal of manure. If [Seamans] does not
take timely action to remove and apply the Manure to [Seamans]’s Land as
field conditions change from year to year, [C&N] is granted an easement
upon [Seamans]’s Land to remove the Manure and apply it to [Seamans]’s
Land (“Easement”), at rates prescribed by the [MMP]. No Manure may
be applied on any portion of [Seamans]’s Land between March 1st and
harvest of mature crops unless agreed to by [Seamans].

....

7. This Agreement shall be binding upon and shall inure to the
benefit of the parties here to and their respective successors, assign[s], and
legal representatives and shall be deemed to be an easement running with
[C&N’s] premises and [Seamans’s] land.

Seamans testified that he would not have sold the land without the easement.

C&N ran the hog confinement facility until 2022. For ten years, C&N
sold all the manure produced at the facility to Seamans. C&N also prepared

3
and submitted MMPs to the Iowa DNR. It submitted an MMP in 2022 that
included crop years 2023 through 2026.

In December 2022, C&N negotiated an agreement to sell the hog
confinement facility to A.K. Family, L.L.C. (A.K.). Adam Kleiss, A.K.’s
owner, signed the purchase agreement, which lists special provisions:
4. [C&N] to provide [A.K.] a copy of current site MMP . . . and all
current manure easements/application agreements, which are subject to
[A.K.]’s approval at [A.K.]’s sole discretion.

5. Manure easements and/or agreements acceptable to [A.K.] at
[A.K.]’s sole discretion, to be assigned to [A.K.]. [C&N] will acquire
acceptance by easement grantor if required by easement document. Any
manure easements and/or agreements [A.K.] determines to re-negotiate
will be developed at the [A.K.]’s expense.

....

11. Contingent upon [A.K.] having unrestricted manure rights to
barns.

Kleiss admits that he received a copy of the easement agreement before
signing the purchase agreement with C&N. He also received a title opinion
that noted the easement. C&N conveyed the property to A.K. by warranty
deed in February 2023.

After A.K. bought the hog confinement facility from C&N, Seamans
contacted Kleiss and proposed changing the easement agreement. Seamans
suggested that he assume the costs associated with the MMP as set out in
Paragraph 4 of the MMP in lieu of paying A.K. $2,500 per year for manure.
Kleiss rejected the offer.

In April 2023, A.K. sent the DNR a new MMP that excluded
Seamans’s fields. Kleiss claimed he did not include the fields because
Seamans never provided the soil samples needed. According to Seamans,

4
A.K. never asked for soil samples and he would have provided them if A.K.
had.2 Seamans received no manure from in 2023, and his $2,500 payment
was returned. Because the MMP excluded Seamans’s fields, it was illegal for
Seamans to remove the manure.

In 2024, A.K. amended the MMP to include Seamans’s fields. But
A.K. limited Seamans to a single load of manure, which was insufficient to
cover the field. Without access to manure, Seamans bought commercial
fertilizer in 2024 and 2025 to replace nutrients in his fields.3

Seamans filed this action seeking specific performance and monetary
damages from A.K. for breach of the easement agreement. Seamans also
asked the court to permanently enjoin A.K. and Kleiss from interfering with
the easement agreement and declare the easement agreement is a valid and
enforceable. Finally, Seamans asked the court to order Kleiss to cease his
tortious interference with the easement. The defendants counterclaimed,
asking the court to declare that the easement agreement was unenforceable.

After a bench trial, the district court entered judgment for Seamans.
It found that A.K. breached the easement agreement and Kleiss intentionally
and improperly interfered with it. The court held that Seamans had exclusive
right to all manure produced at the hog confinement facility on the adjacent
property and enjoined the defendants from removing manure unless
Seamans did not do so as set out in paragraph 5 of the easement agreement.
The court also declared that the parties are bound by the easement
agreement “until pork production permanently ceases” on the premises. It

2
Because soil samples are good for four years, A.K. could have used soil sample
reports from 2020 to complete the 2023 MMP.
3
Seamans again tendered $2,500 for the manure, but A.K. never deposited it.

5
awarded Seamans $134,757.94 in damages, holding the defendants jointly and
severally liable, and taxed costs of the action to the defendants.

SCOPE OF REVIEW
The parties disagree on the scope of our review, which depends on
how the case was tried in district court. Carroll Airport Comm’n v. Danner,
927 N.W.2d 635, 642 (Iowa 2019). “If the case is tried at law, our review is
for correction of errors at law.” Id. If the case was tried in equity, our review
is de novo. Id.

Whether the clerk of court dockets a case as one at law or one in equity
does not govern the court’s review. Longfellow v. Sayler, 737 N.W.2d 148, 152
(Iowa 2007). The question is how the case was tried. See Horsfield Materials,
Inc. v. City of Dyersville, 834 N.W.2d 444, 452 (Iowa 2013) (“[T]he manner
in which the district court actually tried the action determines our standard
of review.”). We look at the pleadings, requested relief, and nature of the
case. Allamakee County v. Collins Tr., 599 N.W.2d 448, 451 (Iowa 1999). If
there is uncertainty, whether the lower court ruled on evidentiary objections
may serve as a litmus test. Van Sloun v. Agans Bros., Inc., 778 N.W.2d 174, 178
(Iowa 2010). But see Horsfield Materials, 834 N.W.2d at 452 (applying de novo
review despite the trial court ruling on evidentiary objections because “any
rulings excluding evidence were minor and did not have a significant effect
on the proceedings” (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)). We
may also consider whether the parties filed motions normally made in legal
actions and whether the district court issued a decree (equitable) or judgment
(legal). Van Sloun, 778 N.W.2d at 178.

This case was docketed in district court as an action at law. Although
Seamans requested both monetary damages and equitable relief, this action

6
is primarily one for damages. The court ruled on the evidentiary objections
lodged during trial and entered an order for judgment rather than a decree.
We review for correction of errors at law.

DISCUSSION
The defendants raise several claims on appeal. First, they challenge
the court’s interpretation of the easement agreement. They also challenge
the finding that A.K. breached the agreement by not preparing and
maintaining the MMP and by not offering Seamans all manure produced.
Next, the defendants contest the award of monetary damages for breach of
contract. Finally, the defendants challenge the finding that Kleiss is
personally liable for tortiously interfering with the easement agreement.

I. Did the court err in interpreting the easement provisions?

We begin with the defendants’ claims about the court’s interpretation
of the easement. Because the easement was created by the parties’ express
agreement, the court must interpret it to give effect to the parties’ intention
as shown by the language used in the agreement or circumstances
surrounding its creation. McNaughton v. Chartier, 977 N.W.2d 1, 9
(Iowa 2022). If the easement is granted using specific terms, those terms
decide the limits of the easement. Id. at 9–10. The defendants challenge the
court’s interpretation of the easement’s duration and the extent of
Seamans’s right to the manure generated at the site.

A. Duration

The defendants first challenge the court’s interpretation of the
easement’s duration. The contested provision is in paragraph 1, which
describes Seamans’s right to remove manure beginning on the date of the
easement and continuing through August 31, 2026. The defendants focus on

7
the next line, which states: “This Agreement will perpetuate after the August
31st 2026 date until pork production permanently ceases on Premises.” The
defendants argue that the provision violates Iowa law and the Iowa
Constitution.

The district court rejected the defendants’ argument that finding the
easement runs in perpetuity makes the date superfluous. The court rejected
that argument, finding that interpreting the easement to end on a specific date
makes the provision on perpetuity superfluous. It also noted Seamans’s
testimony that C&N’s mortgage holder insisted on adding the date:
They required it because that is fifteen years, which is the life of their
contract that they had with C&N Livestock, so they required that that date
be there and then that agreed to continue on until production permanently
ceased.

Q. So the lender wanted to ensure that the hog confinement facility
owner had a mandatory avenue for removing the animal manure from the
facility? A. Yes.

Q. If a hog confinement facility owner fails to remove liquid manure
from its operation, what’s the problem? A. The barn would fill up, and
they would have to stop production at that site.

The court found this testimony was corroborated by A.K’s expert witness,
who testified that “today mostly it is the lenders that require the easements
because they don’t want to be stuck with a barn where they can’t spread the
manure from.” The court thereby concluded that “the Easement Agreement
is to continue until pork production permanently ceases on the premises. As
pork production has not permanently ceased on the Premises, . . . the
Easement Agreement remains in effect.”

The defendants argue that interpreting the easement as continuing
until pork production permanently ceases on the property is overly

8
ambiguous because one can never know if production may resume at some
future time, even if it is in fifty years. 4 The district court noted that the
defendants made this argument in their trial brief, but it found the issue was
not before it because pork production continued on the premises. In
reviewing the district court’s ruling for correction of errors at law, we do not
ordinarily address arguments on appeal that were not decided below. See
Braaksma v. Bd. of Dirs. of Sibley-Ocheyedan Cmty. Sch. Dist., 981 N.W.2d 134,
140 (Iowa 2022).

Finally, the defendants claim that the provision violates article I,
section 24 of the Iowa Constitution, which states: “No lease or grant of
agriculture lands, reserving any rent, or service of any kind, shall be valid for
a longer period than twenty years.” The district court correctly held that
article I, section 24 applies to lease agreements, not easements. See Iowa
Arboretum, Inc. v. Iowa 4-H Found., 886 N.W.2d 695, 705 (Iowa 2016)
(holding that the aim of article I, section 24 is preventing long leases of
farming lands for agricultural purposes, which led to oppression of tenants
and violent unrest, as well as stagnation and alienation of those parcels of

4
The defendants cite Seamans’s testimony:
Q. All right. And I believe you would agree with me, sir, that there
is no way to determine whether pork production on the premises has ever
permanently ceased; right? A. I don’t agree with that.
Q. Let me give you an example, sir. Let’s say that A.K. Family shut
the hog barn down tomorrow. There would be no way of knowing whether
that ceasing of pork production is going to be permanent or not; correct?
A. Correct.
Q. Okay. And that’s because there is no way to know what’s going
to happen at some point in the future; right? A. Right.

9
land). Because the district court did not err in applying the law and
substantial evidence supports its finding, we affirm on this issue.

B. Manure rights

The defendants also challenge the district court’s determination that
Seamans is entitled to all the manure produced at the defendant’s hog
confinement facility. The easement agreement says that Seamans will pay
$2,500 per year to remove liquid animal manure from the livestock operation
conducted on the property. The court found that the easement agreement
grants Seamans exclusive rights to all manure produced on the site.

The defendants dispute the district court’s interpretation of
Seamans’s manure rights. They primarily rely on the fact that the easement
agreement does not refer to a specific amount of manure or grant Seamans
exclusive right to the manure. They also cite paragraph 2 of the agreement,
which limits Seamans to application of manure to an amount “at or below the
legal limits permitted in the [MMP],” and paragraph 5, which prohibits the
application of manure to Seamans’s land between March 1 and harvest
without Seamans’s permission. From these provisions, the defendants
extrapolate a limit to the amount of manure applied to Seamans’s land
amounting to something less than all the manure produced. In other words,
if more manure was produced than could be applied under the MMP or if
application was necessary before harvest, the easement agreement “clearly
contemplates manure being removed and spread elsewhere.”

The district court gave three reasons for finding the easement
agreement grants Seamans exclusive rights to all manure from the facility.
The court also found that Seamans would not agree to pay a set price of
$2,500 per year for an undetermined amount of manure that would be
decided solely at C&N’s discretion. The court also cited the provision

10
granting C&N an easement to remove the manure and apply it to Seamans’s
land if Seamans did not take prompt action in doing so. Finally, the court
found its interpretation was bolstered by the course of dealing between
Seamans and C&N, as the undisputed evidence shows Seamans received all
the manure each year that C&N ran the facility. See N. Nat. Gas Co. v. Knop,
524 N.W.2d 668, 671 (Iowa Ct. App. 1994) (“If ambiguity exists by the terms
of the easement agreement, the manner in which the parties themselves have
construed them is presumptive evidence of their intention.”).

Although the defendants make a case for a different interpretation, the
district court did not misapply the law in interpreting Seamans’s manure
rights. Because substantial evidence supports the court’s interpretation, we
affirm.

II. Does sufficient evidence show that the defendants breached the
easement agreement?

The defendants next claim that the court erred by finding that A.K.
breached the agreement by not preparing and maintaining the MMP in 2023
and 2024 as required by paragraph 4 of the easement agreement. That
paragraph requires that the operator of the livestock facility agrees to pay all
costs and fees associated with procuring and maintaining a legal MMP. The
defendants claim that A.K. could not legally include Seamans’s fields in the
MMP without Seamans’s soil samples. They claim that the easement
agreement does not address which party is responsible for providing or
obtaining soil samples or grant A.K. permission to enter Seamans’s fields to
gather soil samples. They add that C&N never gave A.K. the prior MMP or
soil samples, and that Seamans did not give A.K. soil samples until October 1,
2024. The defendants also challenge the finding that A.K. breached the
easement agreement by not providing Seamans with all the manure from the

11
facility during that period because Seamans’s failure to provide soil samples
kept A.K. from adding Seamans’s land to the MMP and thus prevented
Seamans from removing manure.

The district court rejected the defendants’ claim that Seamans’s
failure to provide soil samples excused A.K.’s performance. The evidence of
Seamans’s and C&N’s past dealings shows that C&N obtained soil samples.
The court also found that the easement agreement granted permission to
collect soil samples from Seamans’s land. And the court found it was
unnecessary for A.K. to obtain new soil samples in 2023 because the sample
taken in 2020 remained good through 2023. Finally, Kleiss never asked
Seamans for permission to take soil samples, and Seamans testified that he
would not have prohibited him from doing so. The court found Seamans’s
testimony more credible than Kleiss’s and concluded that Kleiss could have
obtained soil samples if he had wanted them.

Considering the district court’s credibility findings on the issue of
which party was responsible for obtaining the soil samples that prevented the
manure removal in 2023 and 2024, the evidence supports the finding that
A.K. breached the easement agreement. We therefore affirm.

III. Does sufficient evidence support the award of monetary damages?

The defendants next challenge the monetary damages awarded to
Seamans for breach of contract. We have already found that the defendants
breached the contract and rejected their claim that cannot show the quantity
of manure it is entitled to under the agreement. But the defendants also claim
that Seamans did not prove monetary damages because he testified that he
buys and adds fertilizer to his fields even when manure has been applied.

12
The district court awarded Seamans $134,757.94 in monetary damages
for breach of the easement agreement. In arriving at this figure, the court
reviewed the evidence offered by the parties and found the measure used by
Seamans provided the most accurate measure of the nutrients that would be
in Seamans’s soil if he received manure from A.K. in 2023 and 2024. The
court found that the evidence of what Seamans paid for commercial fertilizer
to replace the nutrients he would have received from the manure minus the
hauling expense Seamans provided a reasonable basis for inferring the
approximate amount of Seamans’s damages. We find no error.

IV. Did Kleiss tortiously interfere with the easement agreement?

Finally, the defendants challenge the finding that Kleiss tortiously
interfered with the easement agreement. They argue that a party to a
contract cannot be found to have tortiously interfered with that contract.
Because Kleiss owns A.K., which is a party to the purchase agreement, the
defendants argue that he cannot be held liable for tortious interference with
the easement agreement.

Seamans claims that the argument the defendants raise on appeal
differs from the one raised below. In their trial brief, the defendants argued
that “a member of a single-member LLC cannot be found to have tortiously
interfered with the LLC’s contracts.” The district court only addressed this
claim in a footnote, finding that Kleiss did not show A.K. is a single-member
LLC. Because the district court did not rule on the issue, we cannot consider
the argument on appeal.

AFFIRMED.

13