In the Interest of K.H., L.H., and A.S., Minor Children

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA

No. 23-0636
Filed June 7, 2023

IN THE INTEREST OF K.H., L.H., and A.S.,
Minor Children,

A.H., Mother,
Appellant.
________________________________________________________________

Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Story County, Stephen A. Owen,

District Associate Judge.

A mother appeals the termination of her parental rights. AFFIRMED.

Chad E. Schneider of Hastings & Gartin Law Group, Ames, for appellant

mother.

Brenna Bird, Attorney General, and Michelle R. Becker, Assistant Attorney

General, for appellee State.

Shannon M. Leighty of the Public Defender’s Office, Nevada, attorney and

guardian ad litem for minor children.

Considered by Bower, C.J., and Tabor and Greer, JJ.
2

BOWER, Chief Judge.

Angela is the mother of A.S., born 2014; L.H., born 2017; and K.H., born

2018. She appeals the termination of her parental rights pursuant to Iowa Code

section 232.116(1)(d) (2023) (A.S. and K.H.), (e) (A.S.), and (g) (all).1 She

contends the Iowa Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS) failed to

support her with appropriate services. She also maintains the court erred in finding

the children could not be returned to her care at the present time, concluding

termination of her parental rights was in the children’s best interests, and declining

to apply an exception.

“We review termination of parental rights proceedings de novo.” In re J.H.,

952 N.W.2d 157, 166 (Iowa 2020). “We are not bound by the juvenile court’s

findings of fact, but we do give them weight, especially in assessing the credibility

of witnesses.” In re D.W., 791 N.W.2d 703, 706 (Iowa 2010).

Our review of termination of parental rights under Iowa Code
chapter 232 is a three-step analysis. First, we determine whether
any ground for termination under section 232.116(1) has been
established. If we conclude affirmatively, we next determine whether
the best-interest framework as laid out in section 232.116(2)
supports the termination of parental rights. If we conclude section
232.116(2) supports termination, we consider whether any
exceptions in section 232.116(3) apply to preclude termination of
parental rights.

In re W.M., 957 N.W.2d 305, 313 (Iowa 2021) (internal quotation marks and

citations omitted). We need not consider a step the parent does not dispute on

appeal. In re P.L., 778 N.W.2d 33, 40 (Iowa 2010).

1 L.H.’s biological father’s rights were not terminated at this time. A.S.’s father
consented to termination of his parental rights. The biological father of K.H. and
legal father of L.H. had his parental rights terminated. Neither appeals the
termination of their parental rights.
3

Because we conclude the State proved termination of the mother’s parental

rights was appropriate under Iowa Code section 232.116(1)(g), we need not

address the other grounds. See In re A.B., 815 N.W.2d 764, 774 (Iowa 2012)

(“When the juvenile court terminates parental rights on more than one statutory

ground, we may affirm the juvenile court’s order on any ground we find supported

by the record.”).

A court may terminate parental rights pursuant to section 232.116(1)(g)

when it finds all of the following have occurred:

(1) The child has been adjudicated a child in need of
assistance [(CINA)]pursuant to section 232.96.
(2) The court has terminated parental rights pursuant to
section 232.117 with respect to another child who is a member of the
same family . . . .
(3) There is clear and convincing evidence that the parent
continues to lack the ability or willingness to respond to services
which would correct the situation.
(4) There is clear and convincing evidence that an additional
period of rehabilitation would not correct the situation.

The mother does not dispute all three children have been adjudicated

children in need of assistance.

The mother’s parental rights to the children’s younger siblings, J.H. and T.H.

Jr. (then-aged one and two, respectively) were terminated on February 6, 2023.

The mother appealed the termination of her parental rights, and this court affirmed.

In re J.H., No. 23-0292, 2023 WL 3612388, at *1 (Iowa Ct. App. May 24, 2023);

see also In re H.B., No. 18-0835, 2018 WL 3913110, at *3 (Iowa Ct. App. Aug. 15,

2018) (noting children with the same mother are members “of the same family”

within the meaning of Iowa Code section 232.116(1)(g)(2)).
4

As for services offered, the mother has been provided services to remedy

ongoing concerns about her inadequate parenting for at least six years.2 The case

manager, Tammy Hicks, testified, “I don’t know of any other service that they

haven’t already received that could be provided.” The juvenile court found:

[The mother] perceives and understands things in their basic, literal
sense. She seems unable to carry forward the meaning of words
and circumstances with deeper understanding. The court intends no
disrespect. However, her testimony supported Ms. Hicks’s
assessment that she is able to parrot information and mimic skills
picked up through services but cannot translate them into action for
longer than short periods because she may not really understand the
deeper meaning of the services and so she does not appreciate their
relevance or utility to the goal of reunification. As such she does not
respond to them.

While the mother complains she has not received “appropriate” or

“adequate” services, she does not suggest what those services might be. The

court found:

As Ms. Hicks testified, the family has received services since
2016. In 2018, the first CINA cases were opened in Story County.
They closed after the parents cooperated with services and showed
improvement. Ms. Hicks testified that over the years the parents
have received every service available to a family. In fact, in all of her
years of service to [D]HHS, she has never seen parents who have
been provided so many parenting classes. Yet, they are unable to
appreciate the lessons and do not respond to services. The children
have over the years been subjected to harm in their parents’ care.
The children have been exposed to sexual abuse, physical abuse,
they have been exposed to sex offenders, the parents have failed to
meet the children’s medical needs, the children have been denied
critical care including lack of supervision and the youngest have been
diagnosed with failure to thrive. Domestic violence has been an
issue in the past and [the mother] was injured by [her spouse] again
in January 2023.

2 A.S. is eight years old, and DHHS has been involved with the family either
formally or informally since at least 2016.
5

The mother remains unable to appreciate danger and lacks the ability to

safely parent her children. It is unlikely more services would be any more

successful in remedying the mother’s parenting deficiencies. See J.H., 952

N.W.2d at 171 (describing how a parent’s past conduct may be indicative of future

care). The mother’s parental rights were properly terminated pursuant to Iowa

Code § 232.116(1)(g).

We turn to our best-interests analysis, where we “give primary consideration

to the child[ren]’s safety, to the best placement for furthering the long-term

nurturing and growth of the child[ren], and to the physical, mental, and emotional

condition and needs of the child[ren].” Iowa Code § 232.116(2). “[I]t is well-settled

law that we cannot deprive a child of permanency after the State has proved a

ground for termination under section 232.116(1) by hoping someday a parent will

learn to be a parent and be able to provide a stable home for the child.” In re A.S.,

906 N.W.2d 467, 474 (Iowa 2018) (citation omitted). These children have been

exposed to unsafe conditions due to the mother’s inability to protect or recognize

when the children are unsafe. Children need safe, stable, and consistent

parenting—which the mother is unable to provide. See In re L.L., 459 N.W.2d 489,

495 (Iowa 1990) (“Parenting cannot be turned off and on like a spigot. It must be

constant, responsible, and reliable.”). Termination is in the children’s best

interests.

The mother argues the children are bonded together and their placement in

separate foster homes is not in their best interests. The children were placed in

separate foster homes because the foster parents were unable to supervise the

three children together (all are attention-seeking and have behavioral problems
6

and tantrums). It is reported A.S. has made some progress with a consistent

schedule and expectations; her behavioral outbursts have decreased while in

foster care. A.S. has progressed out of her individual education plan, her speech

is improving, and her medications have been adjusted. She continues to receive

occupational and speech therapy, as well as mental-health counseling. The

younger two, K.H. and L.H., are on individual education and behavior plans and

are in speech therapy. Their foster mother is a special education teacher and uses

those skills with the children. This foster family has indicated they can be a

permanent placement. On our de novo review, we believe termination of the

mother’s parental rights will best advance the children’s need for permanency.

The mother next asserts her bond with the children militates against

termination. See Iowa Code § 232.116(3)(c) (allowing court to avoid termination

of parental rights where “termination would be detrimental to the child . . . due to

the closeness of the parent-child relationship”). The exceptions noted in

subsection (3) “are permissive, not mandatory.” In re A.M., 843 N.W.2d 100, 113

(Iowa 2014) (citation omitted). The parent has the burden to prove any statutory

exception applies once the State has proved a ground for termination. A.S., 906

N.W.2d at 476. The mother has not proved terminating her parental rights would

be detrimental to the children due to the bond they share with her. We thus affirm.

AFFIRMED.