State of Iowa v. Ceagan Alexander Janssens

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA

No. 22-0387
Filed June 21, 2023

STATE OF IOWA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,

vs.

CEAGAN ALEXANDER JANSSENS,
Defendant-Appellant.
________________________________________________________________

Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Polk County, David Porter, Judge.

A defendant appeals the sentence imposed upon his conviction for

attempted murder committed when he was a juvenile. AFFIRMED.

Martha J. Lucey, State Appellate Defender, and Shellie L. Knipfer, Assistant

Appellate Defender, for appellant.

Brenna Bird, Attorney General, and Martha E. Trout, Assistant Attorney

General, for appellee.

Considered by Ahlers, P.J., Badding, J., and Scott, S.J.*

*Senior judge assigned by order pursuant to Iowa Code section 602.9206

(2023).
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BADDING, Judge.

One month before he turned sixteen, Ceagan Janssens fired a gun into a

group of people. He shot one person in the face and another in the leg. Both

survived. Janssens was charged in a delinquency petition with two counts of

attempt to commit murder, intimidation with a dangerous weapon, and conspiracy

to commit a forcible felony. The juvenile court waived him to district court for

prosecution as a youthful offender. See Iowa Code § 232.45(7) (2020).

In December 2020, Janssens pled guilty as a youthful offender to one count

of attempt to commit murder. The court transferred his supervision to the juvenile

court for disposition. See id. § 907.3A(1). Janssens was placed at the state

training school, where he “had a number of behavioral problems (interspersed with

some periods of ‘good’ behavior).” Because of these problems, the juvenile court

terminated its dispositional order and returned Janssens to the supervision of the

district court. See id. § 232.54(1)(h)(1). Janssens was placed at a county juvenile

detention center for a few months. But while there, the center’s administrator

reported that Janssens “was completely disrespectful and very assaultive” to

“several staff and other kids.” So, pending his sentencing, Janssens was

transferred to jail.

Before his sentencing hearing in December 2021, the court ordered a

presentence investigation report and granted Janssens’s request for evaluation by

a forensic psychologist due to the State’s intent to seek a mandatory minimum

sentence. See State v. Majors, 940 N.W.2d 372, 386 (Iowa 2020) (stating the

“sentencing court must consider the Miller/Lyle/Roby factors in an individualized

sentencing hearing if it is contemplating imposing a mandatory minimum sentence
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on a juvenile offender”); see also Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 477 (2012)

(identifying the “hallmark features” of youth); State v. Roby, 897 N.W.2d 127, 144

(Iowa 2017) (endorsing the five factors in Miller “as guideposts for courts to

follow”); State v. Lyle, 854 N.W.2d 378, 404 n.10 (Iowa 2014) (adopting the Miller

factors for resentencing of juvenile offenders subject to mandatory minimums).

The presentence investigation report recommended incarceration. The

evaluation completed by Janssens’s expert witness—forensic psychologist

Dr. Tracy Thomas—recommended a “structured, supervised environment” for

Janssens, but not prison. Instead, Dr. Thomas thought Janssens’s needs could

be met at a residential facility called Adult and Teen Challenge, which offered many

of the services he needed “at a developmentally-appropriate level.”

At Janssens’s sentencing hearings, Dr. Thomas outlined the information

she considered in preparing her report, which included Janssens’s history of

unsuccessful residential placements while a juvenile; the tests she performed; and

her analysis of the Miller factors. After doing so, Dr. Thomas concluded that

based on his history and the conduct he continued to engage in after
these charges, he needs to be in that secure, structured environment
to protect . . . community safety and to make sure that he does do
the treatment. But I do think there’s a potential for change in Mr.
Janssens.

At the conclusion of the hearings, the State asked for incarceration with

“several years of mandatory minimum before he’d be eligible for parole.” The

defense, in turn, asked for a deferred judgment and probation, with evaluation for

the Adult and Teen Challenge program. After taking the matter under advisement,

the court sentenced Janssens to an indeterminate term of imprisonment not to

exceed twenty-five years with no mandatory minimum.
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Janssens appeals, claiming his sentence “was an abuse of discretion for its

disregard of the forensic psychologist’s recommendations.” See Majors, 940

N.W.2d at 385 (“If the sentence imposed is within the statutory limits, as it is here,

we review for an abuse of discretion.”). But the court extensively discussed those

recommendations, along with the expert’s analysis of the Miller factors. The court

accepted Dr. Thomas’s findings as they related to Janssens’s age and level of

immaturity; his family home environment; the circumstances of the offense; and

the incapacities of youth. The only factor where the court parted ways with Dr.

Thomas was Janssens’s potential for rehabilitation.

On that issue, the court explained:

The Court accepts, in part, and rejects, in part, Dr. Thomas’
findings as they relate to Mr. Janssens’ potential for rehabilitation.
Although Dr. Thomas believes Mr. Janssens’ needs should be
addressed in a highly structured and supervised environment, Dr.
Thomas concluded that an adult prison would not be ideal in terms
of targeting Mr. Janssens’ specific rehabilitative needs.
The difficulty for Mr. Janssens is that he has exhausted all
viable treatment and placement options specifically targeted for
juveniles. Both Dr. Thomas and counsel for defendant contend
placement at Teen Challenge of the Midlands would be appropriate
for Mr. Janssens.
Although this program is, indeed, structured in terms of
addressing rehabilitative needs, as the State correctly noted, it is not
capable of providing the type of supervision necessary to protect the
community.
Without that supervision, the Court is firmly convinced Mr.
Janssens will return to past patterns of negative behavior; therefore,
incarceration is the only viable option in that it meets the twin goals
of addressing the offender's rehabilitative needs while also protecting
the community.

The record does not support Janssens’s contention that the court “arbitrarily

reject[ed] the testimony of the expert.” The court thoroughly explained why it

rejected Dr. Thomas’s recommendation for Janssens’s placement, following
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extended sentencing hearings at which the court asked probing questions of the

attorneys and Dr. Thomas. Cf. State v. Cruz, No. 20-1625, 2021 WL 5106448,

at *7 (Iowa Ct. App. Nov. 3, 2021) (vacating juvenile offender’s sentences and

remanding for resentencing where the court “failed to give sufficient (any) weight

to the expert opinion” and “failed to rebut or even acknowledge the expert opinion);

see also State v. Farnum, 397 N.W.2d 750, 751 (Iowa 1986) (“The court as trier of

fact, however, ‘is not obliged to accept opinion evidence, even from experts, as

conclusive.” (citation omitted)).

Janssens also implies that the court wrongly “blended the use of the Miller

factors into the reasons for denying parole.” But once the court declined to

impose a minimum period of incarceration without parole, the
Miller/Lyle factors remain relevant in considering the remaining
sentencing options, along with all other mitigating and aggravating
circumstances. Yet the court is not required to specifically examine
and apply each factor on the record at this point but considers all
relevant factors in exercising its discretion to select the proper
sentence.

State v. Crooks, 911 N.W.2d 153, 173 (Iowa 2018).

Our review of the record shows the court followed the outlined sentencing

procedure by conducting individualized hearings for Janssens, applied the

appropriate factors, and imposed a sentence authorized by statute and supported

by the evidence. See Majors, 940 N.W.2d at 387 (“But if the court follows our

outlined sentencing procedure by conducting an individualized hearing, applies the

Miller/Lyle/Roby factors, and imposes a sentence authorized by statute and

supported by the evidence, then we affirm the sentence.”). We find no abuse of

discretion and affirm Janssens’s sentence.

AFFIRMED.