State of Iowa v. Sydney Leiann Slaughter

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA

No. 22-0892
Filed August 9, 2023

STATE OF IOWA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,

vs.

SYDNEY LEIANN SLAUGHTER,
Defendant-Appellant.
________________________________________________________________

Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Black Hawk County, Kellyann M.

Lekar, Judge.

A defendant appeals her conviction for a making a false claim for a slot

machine jackpot. REVERSED AND REMANDED.

Martha J. Lucey, State Appellate Defender, and Vidhya K. Reddy, Assistant

Appellate Defender, for appellant.

Brenna Bird, Attorney General, and Martha E. Trout, Assistant Attorney

General, for appellee.

Considered by Bower, C.J., and Tabor and Greer, JJ.
2

TABOR, Judge.

“So who’s my lucky winner?” This question was standard for the casino

worker who approached Sydney Slaughter and Anthony McNeese after the jackpot

light flashed on their slot machine. As it turns out, that question would later be

posed to a jury as the State charged Slaughter with falsely claiming the jackpot

when McNeese made the wager. See Iowa Code § 99F.15(4)(h) (2020). The jury

found Slaughter guilty. She now alleges four errors: (1) section 99F.15(4)(h) did

not encompass her conduct; (2) the State offered insufficient proof she had the

intent to defraud; (3) the State failed to prove that she did not make a wager

contingent on winning at the slot machine; and (4) the district court allowed a

special agent for the State to testify to the meaning of “wager.”

Because the State did not present sufficient evidence of guilt, we reverse.

I. Facts and Prior Proceedings

In the early morning hours of November 29, 2020, McNeese played a slot

machine at the Isle of Capri Casino and won a $4000 jackpot.1 Slaughter, his

girlfriend, was by his side, and took his seat in front of that machine after the

“candle” on top signaled a jackpot win.2

1 Under Iowa law, when an individual wins $1200 or more in a single game, it is a

taxable event that must be documented; the jackpot winner is identified, and their
personal information is collected. Iowa Code § 422.16(1)(d) (“State income tax
shall be withheld on winnings in excess of twelve hundred dollars derived from slot
machines authorized under chapter 99F.”); see id. § 99F.18.
2 Special Agent John Bergman with the Iowa Division of Criminal Investigation

(DCI) testified that when a single spin on a slot machine returns a jackpot “the
machine freezes up and requires human intervention on the part of a casino
employee.”
3

Alerted by that signal, slot machine attendant Danielle Rademaker arrived

and asked who won the jackpot. To Rademaker, Slaughter “really seemed kind of

flustered” but said she won the money. Slaughter then filled out the casino’s

paperwork with her name and Social Security number. She designated 95% of the

winnings to be withheld for federal income tax.3 Meanwhile, Rademaker requested

surveillance video of the casino floor, believing she had seen McNeese—not

Slaughter—playing the machine. Confirming Rademaker’s suspicion, the

surveillance team determined that McNeese had been sitting at the machine

before the candle flashed. Slaughter later admitted to casino supervisor Jesse

McCarvel that McNeese had hit the button on the machine. With that information,

Rademaker and McCarvel told McNeese that he had to be the one to claim the

jackpot. So he did, designating $3800 (95% of the winnings) for federal income

tax withholding.

Critical to the prosecution theory, McNeese owed $1386 to the Iowa

Department of Human Services (DHS)4 bureau of collections for child support and

$41,446 to the Linn County Clerk of Court in unpaid fines when he claimed this

jackpot. Those debts qualified as setoffs under Iowa Code section 99F.19(2).5

Casino employees are required to check an electronic database to see if jackpot

winners have such setoffs. See Iowa Code § 99F.19(1)–(2); see also id. § 8A.504.

3 The casino automatically deducts five percent from the jackpot for state taxes.

Special Agent Bergman testified: “The other 95% is up to the patron.”
4 The agency is now known as the Iowa Department of Health and Human Services
5 Iowa Code section 8A.504(1)(d)(1) defines “qualifying debt” to include “[a]ny

debt . . . which the child support recovery unit is otherwise attempting to collect.”
Iowa Code section 8A.504(1)(d)(3) also lists “[a]ny debt which is in the form of a
liquidated sum due, owing, and payable to the clerk of the district court.”
4

But casino service manager Akaesha Mergen testified that because McNeese

“wanted a hundred percent in taxes taken out,” the casino could not hold any

money for the setoffs.

Another critical piece to this theory was that this jackpot was not a first-time

event for Slaughter or McNeese. In fact, Slaughter won a $2,000 jackpot the

previous night. McCarville attended to that payout and handed Slaughter an “offset

letter”6 notifying her that the casino withheld $1050 that she owed to the Linn

County Clerk of Court. And as for McNeese, he won seven jackpots between July

and November that year.

The State charged Slaughter with making a false claim of winning the

jackpot under Iowa Code section 99F.15(4)(h).7 Before trial, Slaughter moved to

exclude evidence of McNeese’s setoffs. The court overruled her motion. And after

three days of trial, the jury found Slaughter guilty as charged. She now appeals.

II. Analysis

A. Applicable Gambling Statute

The State charged Slaughter under this provision:

A person commits a class “D” felony and, in addition, shall be
barred for life from excursion gambling boats and gambling
structures under the jurisdiction of this commission, if the person
does any of the following:
....
h. Claims, collects, or takes, or attempts to claim, collect, or
take, money or anything of value in or from the gambling games . . . ,
with intent to defraud, without having made a wager contingent on
winning a gambling game . . . .

6 The parties use the term “offset” interchangeably with the statutory term “setoff.”
7 Special Agent Bergman testified that he also charged McNeese with a gambling

offense.
5

Iowa Code § 99F.15(4)(h). Here, the statute defines “gambling game” as “any

game of chance authorized by the” state racing and gaming commission. Id. §

99F.1(14). The commission has authorized slot machines as a game of chance

for play in casinos. Iowa Admin. Code r. 491-11.5.

On appeal, Slaughter asserts that this language did not proscribe the

actions alleged by the State.8 She argues that paragraph (h) covers only

circumstances when a person claims to win when they have not—or claims a larger

amount than they won—intending to defraud the actual winner or the casino.9

Instead, she claims “the intent to avoid offset obligations” is covered by

paragraph (o), enacted two years after the incident at issue. See 2022 Iowa Acts

ch. 1143, § 7. She also cites paragraph (n) that the legislature added in that 2022

amendment. See id.

Under those new paragraphs, a person commits a class “D” felony if that

person does either of the following:

n. Knowingly or intentionally passes a winning wager or share
to another person or provides fraudulent identification in order to
avoid the forfeiture of any money or thing of value as a voluntarily
excluded person pursuant to the processes established under
section 99F.4, subsection 22.
o. Knowingly or intentionally passes a winning wager or share
to another person or provides fraudulent identification in order to
avoid the application of a setoff as provided in section 99F.19.

Id. (codified at Iowa Code § 99F.15(4)(n), (o) (2022)).

8 If Slaughter had preserved error on her statutory-interpretation argument, our

review would be for correction of errors at law. State v. Watkins, 914 N.W.2d 827,
837 (Iowa 2018).
9 Paragraph (h) was a part of the original gambling regulations enacted in 1989.

See 1989 Iowa Acts ch. 67, § 15. Aside from a change in its paragraph designation
from (i) to (h) in 2015, see 2015 Iowa Acts ch. 44, the language has remained
unchanged.
6

It is true that we examine amendments “with an eye toward determining the

legislative design which motivated the change.” Jenney v. Iowa Dist. Ct., 456

N.W.2d 921, 923 (Iowa 1990). “When an amendment to a statute adds or deletes

words, a change in the law is presumed unless the remaining language amounts

to the same thing.” Davis v. State, 682 N.W.2d 58, 61 (Iowa 2004). In other words,

we assume that the legislature “sought to accomplish some purpose and [the

amendment] was not a futile exercise.” Id. In Slaughter’s view, the legislature

would not have needed to add new alternatives if the prohibited conduct was

covered by existing language.10 Cf. State v. Smith, 08-1757, 2009 WL 3337632,

at *3 (Iowa Ct. App. Oct. 7, 2009) (“If section 99F.15(4)(i) covered any situation

where the defendant claimed more than he or she ‘legitimately won,’ what would

be the need for a separate prohibition on cheating in section 99F.15(4)(d)?”).11

While Slaughter’s argument has some allure, we agree with the State that

it is not preserved for our review. Slaughter claims that her conduct did not amount

to the offense charged in the trial information. “If it appears from the indictment or

information and the minutes of evidence that the particulars stated do not

constitute the offense charged . . . or that the defendant did not commit that

10 Maybe. Or maybe not. Our supreme court has recognized from time to time the
“belt-and-suspenders” canon when interpreting statutes. See Anderson v. Iowa
Dist. Ct., 989 N.W.2d 179, 183 (Iowa 2023) (“[L]egislatures may opt for redundant
drafting in relation to previously enacted statutes.” (citation omitted)); but see
Antonin Scalia & Bryan A. Garner, Reading Law: The Interpretation of Legal Texts
178 (2012) (writing that “words with no meaning—language with no substantive
effect—should be regarded as the exception rather than the rule”).
11 Smith involved a casino patron cheating at blackjack by increasing his “caps”

after seeing he had a favorable hand. 2009 WL 3337632, at *1. Our court decided
that paragraph (h) (then paragraph (i)) did not apply because Smith won the
amount he claimed, just not within the rules of the game. Id. at *3.
7

offense,” then the appropriate response is a motion to dismiss. State v. Majeres,

No. 01-1805, 2002 WL 31031048, at *2 (Iowa Ct. App. 2002) (citation omitted)

(distinguishing a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence). Because Slaughter

did not move to dismiss the trial information, this issue is not properly before us.

B. Sufficiency of the Evidence

Focusing then on paragraph (h), we turn to Slaughter’s substantial-

evidence challenge. To convict Slaughter, the jury had to find that the State proved

beyond a reasonable doubt these elements:

1. On or about the 29th day of November, 2020, Sydney Slaughter or
someone Sydney Slaughter aided and abetted, conspired with, or
entered into a common design with, did claim, collect or take or attempt
to claim, collect or take money from a gambling game.
2. Sydney Slaughter or someone Sydney Slaughter aided and abetted,
conspired with, or entered into a common design with had the specific
intent to defraud.[12]
3. The money was claimed, collected or taken or was attempted to be
claimed collected or taken without Sydney Slaughter having made a
wager contingent on winning a gambling game.

On appeal, Slaughter challenges the State’s proof of elements two and

three. She contends the State did not offer substantial evidence to show that she

acted with specific intent to defraud or had knowledge of McNeese’s intent to

defraud. She also claims the evidence was insufficient to show that she did not

make a wager contingent on a gambling game.

We review challenges to sufficiency of the evidence for correction of errors

at law. State v. Dalton, 674 N.W.2d 111, 116 (Iowa 2004). We view the evidence

in the light most favorable to the State to determine if there was substantial

12 While the marshalling instruction included a conspiracy alternative, the other

instructions only defined aiding and abetting.
8

evidence that could “convince a rational trier of fact that the defendant is guilty

beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id. (citation omitted). This standard means that

evidence must do more than raise “suspicion, speculation, or conjecture” to a

reasonable jury. State v. Leckington, 713 N.W.2d 218, 221 (Iowa 2006).

1. Intent to defraud

The State had the burden to prove that in attempting to claim the jackpot,

Slaughter acted either with a specific intent to defraud or knew about McNeese’s

intent to defraud. The term “defraud” is not defined in Iowa Code chapter 99F.

Nor do we have case law defining “intent to defraud” in the context of our gambling

statutes. But our supreme court has discussed the meaning of “intent to defraud”

when construing the crime of fraudulent practices. See State v. Hoyman, 863

N.W.2d 1, 8 (Iowa 2015) (interpreting Iowa Code section 714.8). There, the court

accepted Hoyman’s distinction between the “intent to deceive” and the “intent to

defraud.” Id. at 9. The court explained that “to deceive means to mislead, whereas

to defraud means to mislead with the further purpose of obtaining some gain from

the victim of deceit.” Id. We find that definition helpful to our analysis of the

identical phrase here.

Before addressing the parties’ appellate contentions, we return to the trial

for some framing. In closing argument, the prosecutor told the jury that defraud

“just means, in this case, cheat, try to get away with something for financial gain

that you know you’re not entitled to.” The prosecutor continued:

Now, who did she try to defraud? Was it child support? . . . What
about the Linn County Clerk of Court for unpaid fines? . . . Was the
intent to defraud the IRS so that Anthony McNeese wouldn’t have to
pay taxes on his winnings? Was the intent to defraud the casino and
9

say, hey, look, pay me money even though I’m not the one who
claimed—the one who placed the bet?

In answering those rhetorical questions, the prosecutor told the jury: “It doesn’t

matter. The burden is not on the State to prove who they were intending to

defraud, only that she was cheating at gambling by falsely claiming a winning and

she did it anyway.”

To counter, the defense closing argument drew the jury’s attention to the

instruction on specific intent: “[I]t means not only being aware of doing an act and

doing it voluntarily, but in addition, doing it with a specific purpose in mind.” See

State v. Fountain, 786 N.W.2d 260, 264 (Iowa 2010) (delineating between general

and specific intent). Defense counsel then synopsized the prosecution theory:

“[T]he State has tried to tell you that the specific purpose that Ms. Slaughter had

in mind—that she and McNeese had in mind—well, that was to try and prevent him

from having to pay his offset.” But counsel insisted that the State did not prove its

theory: “Have you seen any evidence whatsoever that Ms. Slaughter knew that Mr.

McNeese had an offset?”

Slaughter reprises that argument on appeal. She acknowledges that

because she’d just paid her own setoff the night before, “she was aware of the

concept of offsets generally.” But she maintains that “the record evidence failed

to establish that she was aware that McNeese had any offset outstanding against

him.” Slaughter also contends that the State failed to prove that she knew about

McNeese’s outstanding debts or that she had been with him when he had won his

previous jackpots.
10

The State can seldom prove specific intent by direct evidence. State v.

Crawford, 974 N.W.2d 510, 518 (Iowa 2022). So “proof of intent usually arises

from circumstantial evidence and inferences reasonably drawn from the

circumstances.” Id. To that end, we examine Slaughter’s actions and the

surrounding circumstances to determine whether there was substantial evidence

to prove her specific intent. See id. We look at her conduct before and after the

alleged crime, and, in the case of aiding and abetting, active encouragement,

participation, or assent to the crime. See id.

The State first points us to Slaughter’s association with McNeese. The

record shows they came to the casino together. Special Agent Bergman narrated

the surveillance video of their interactions while playing the slot machines. He

noted that over the course of two hours they engaged in many “public displays of

affection.” Then came the event at issue. As described in the State’s brief:

“McNeese scored a jackpot and then moved to a different slot machine two seats

away while Slaughter slid into the chair in front of the winning machine and claimed

the jackpot.”

But we are not persuaded that the jury could reasonably infer—just from

their close association that night and her act of taking McNeese’s seat—that

Slaughter had the specific intent to mislead McNeese’s creditors and further to

obtain a gain from them on his behalf. See Hoyman, 863 N.W.2d at 9. The State

had to prove Slaughter or someone she aided and abetted had the specific intent

to defraud the beneficiaries of McNeese’s setoffs—the DHS and the Linn County
11

clerk of court.13 To prove Slaughter’s specific intent, the State had to show that

she knew about McNeese’s setoffs. See id.

The State notes that both McNeese and Slaughter won jackpots at the

casino the night before, implying that Slaughter could have been present when the

casino presented McNeese with the “offset letter” listing his debts. But that

implication lacks support in the record. As Slaughter points out, the State offered

no evidence that McNeese and Slaughter were together when they won their

jackpots on November 28. In fact, the State offered no proof of their interactions

beyond those at the casino on November 29. For Slaughter to know of McNeese’s

intent to defraud his creditors, she would need to have heard or seen information

about his setoffs. The State offered no such proof. Indeed, prosecution witnesses

admitted they could not be sure whether Slaughter knew about McNeese’s debts

or his intent to defraud his creditors that night.

We also look to Slaughter’s actions before and after the November 29

jackpot. Although not the main focus of its argument, the State contends that

Slaughter knew it was improper to claim someone else’s winnings because she

had won her own jackpot the night before. We find that fact insufficient to prove

her specific intent to defraud. Supervisor McCarvel testified that after her first

jackpot win, he gave Slaughter a letter explaining her setoffs were paid. That letter,

which was entered into evidence, did not mention any consequences for claiming

the winnings from someone else’s wager. As for her conduct after the second

13 Recall that the trial prosecutor asserted that the State did not have to identify

the intended victim of the fraud. But, on appeal, the State limits its argument to
McNeese’s creditors: “The inference to draw is that by having Slaughter collect the
jackpot, McNeese could avoid paying the offset.” We hold the State to that theory.
12

jackpot win, it does not cement her intent to defraud. Switching chairs and her

flustered demeanor raised no more than a suspicion of wrongdoing. And

“[s]uspicion is no substitute for proof.” State v. Barnes, 204 N.W.2d 827, 829 (Iowa

1972). Without proof that she knew about McNeese’s setoffs, reasonable doubt

exists as to the purpose behind Slaughter’s actions.

Because the State failed to offer substantial evidence of Slaughter’s specific

intent to defraud, we reverse and remand for entry of a judgment of acquittal.

Although we could end our opinion here, we find it necessary to address

Slaughter’s arguments on the third element of the offense for the sake of

thoroughness. Cf. Matter of Dethmers Mfg. Co., 985 N.W.2d 806, 818 (Iowa 2023)

(continuing analysis “[i]n the interest of thoroughness); W. Bend Mut. Ins. Co. v.

State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 624 N.W.2d 422, 425 (Iowa Ct. App. 2001)

(continuing analysis because we found it “useful and necessary”).

2. Wager contingent on winnings

Slaughter next contests the State’s proof that she attempted to claim the

jackpot without having made a wager contingent on winning a gambling game.

This second sufficiency claim dovetails with Slaughter’s evidentiary challenge to

an expert’s opinion on the definition of making a wager. Because defining that

phrase is essential to assessing the sufficiency of the State’s evidence, we start

with Bergman’s challenged testimony.14

14 Generally, we review evidence rulings for an abuse of discretion. State v.
Huston, 825 N.W.2d 531, 536 (Iowa 2013). We find an abuse when the grounds
for the ruling are “clearly untenable or to an extent clearly unreasonable.” State v.
Rodriquez, 636 N.W.2d 234, 239 (Iowa 2001) (citation omitted).
13

As its first witness, the State called Special Agent Bergman for his expertise

on the basics of gambling. After he described the general workings of the casino

floor and slot machines, the prosecutor asked: “So when is a wager actually

placed?” Over a defense objection, Bergman offered this response:

[I]n the context of a slot machine, the wager is placed when the
machine is caused to go into its, for lack of a better term, I’ll say spin.
So it could be when a button is pushed to cause that machine to play,
or maybe in the case of a machine with a handle that’s pulled, it
would be when the handle is deployed. It’s not when the credits are
inserted into the machine. It’s when the button is actually pushed.

On cross examination, defense counsel tried to clarify that Bergman was

simply giving his opinion on when a wager is placed. But Bergman responded:

“No, ma’am. There is case law that specifically defines when a wager has

occurred.”

This exchange followed:

Q. Well, you would agree with me, Agent, that it is not your job to tell
the jury today what the law they should follow is; is that right?
A. That’s not my job.
Q. So when you tell them that’s when a wager is placed, you are not
telling them that is the law they should be following. Is that fair to
say?
A. I’m telling them that in my twenty-two years of experience in my
job, that’s the definition of when a wager is placed.

Later, when moving for judgment of acquittal, defense counsel recounted

his objection to the special agent’s definition of wager:

In terms of the last element, that it had to be done without having
made a wager contingent on winning, that has not been proven
either. Bergman did state that he believes a wager means each time
you press the button. He said there was case law that said that.
Apparently, Mr. Bergman is better than I am at researching cases
because I haven’t been able to find a case that says a definition of a
wager. If Ms. Slaughter had been the one who placed the money in
the machine, that could have been considered her making a wager.
We have heard no testimony whatsoever as to who put the money in
14

the machine, who made that wager; therefore, the State has not met
their burden, and no reasonable jury could find Ms. Slaughter guilty,
and we ask that you grant the motion for a directed verdict.

The district court decided the State had generated a fact question for the

jury. But defense counsel revisited the wager issue in closing argument:

So then we turn to the third element, that Ms. Slaughter had
not made a wager contingent on winning. Members of the Jury,
these Jury Instructions are the law. This is the law that the Judge
has instructed you to follow. Witnesses do not get to make the law.
Witnesses do not get to tell you what the law is. So while Agent
Bergman can sit up there and tell you that, in his opinion, a wager is
when you press a button, that is not the law listed in these Jury
Instructions.
So Members of the Jury, is it reasonable to think that Ms.
Slaughter could have believed she made a wager if it was her money
placed into that machine? If her money was placed into that machine
and she thought, if this wins, that's my money. I made that wager. I
paid for that game. Well, then she has made a wager contingent on
winning, and the State has not met their burden.
As we discussed, you didn't hear any evidence to tell you
whose money was in there, so maybe it was Ms. Slaughter's, maybe
it wasn't. We don't know, and it was the State's burden to make sure
that you did know . . . .

And the State did not let the wager issue go, offering this rebuttal:

[McNeese is] the one who’s playing [the machine], and we all know,
not just from the testimony of a twenty-year veteran of DCI who does
nothing but gaming for a living, that gambling means you’ve got the
money in the machine you’re sitting at, you’re pushing the button.

After the jury returned its guilty verdict, the defense moved for a new trial,

complaining that the court allowed Bergman to define “wager—a legal term of art

and an element of the offense” not otherwise described in the jury instructions.

The court overruled the new-trial motion.

On appeal, Slaughter attacks this wager question on two fronts. First, she

argues the record lacks evidence as to whether she made a wager or not. Second,
15

she contends the district court abused its discretion in allowing the State’s expert,

to give his opinion on a legal definition. We tackle her second contention first.

As an overarching principle, Iowa courtrooms embrace expert witnesses for

their specialized knowledge that helps jurors in their factfinding. In re Det. of

Palmer, 691 N.W.2d 413, 419 (Iowa 2005), overruled on other grounds by Alcala

v. Marriott Int’l, Inc., 880 N.W.2d 699, 708 n.3 (Iowa 2016). Experts may provide

opinions that reach an ultimate issue. Iowa R. Evid. 5.704. But there are limits.

“Experts are not to state opinions as to legal standards.” Haskenhoff v. Homeland

Energy Sols., LLC, 897 N.W.2d 553, 600 (Iowa 2017) (citing Iowa R. Evid. [5.]704,

advisory committee’s comment (1983)). When deciding whether an expert witness

has overstepped, we consider whether the opinion relies on a term with “a

separate, distinct, and specialized meaning in the law different from” its ordinary

meaning. Palmer, 691 N.W.2d at 420. We also consider whether the term was

essential to an element of the charge and whether it was a “fighting issue at trial.”

Id at 421.

We see no problem with Special Agent Bergman discussing his experience

with the gaming bureau and the relevant investigation. But his definition of wager

fell outside the scope of admissible testimony by providing an opinion on a legal

standard essential to the charged offense. Id. The State had to prove that

Slaughter did not make “a wager contingent on winning a gambling game.” Iowa

Code § 99.F15(4)(h). Who made the winning wager was a contested issue. And

it was the role of the court—not an expert witness—to provide that legal standard

for the jury.
16

Making the situation worse, Bergman testified that “case law” supported his

definition of making a wager as pushing the button on a slot machine.15 Like

defense counsel at trial, our legal research located no cases defining “wager” for

the purposes of chapter 99F. When our supreme court did consider the meaning

of “wager” in another context, it used the word interchangeably with “bet.” State

ex rel. Turner v. Drake, 242 N.W.2d 707, 709 (Iowa 1976). Drake defined a bet as

“an agreement to pay something of value upon the happening or non-happening

of a specified contingent event.” Id. at 710. Other jurisdictions define “wager”

consistent with this idea. See, e.g., Overturf v. Cal. Horse Racing Bd., 150 Cal.

Rptr. 657, 660 (Cal. Ct. App. 1978) (“The noun ‘wager’ means ‘something (as a

sum of money) that is risked on an uncertain event.’” (citation omitted)); State v.

Amman, 68 N.E.2d 816, 818 (Ohio Ct. App. 1946) (“A wager is something

hazarded on the issue of some uncertain event . . . .” (citation omitted)); W. Va.

Code § 29-22D-3 (2023) (“‘Wager’ means a sum of money or thing of value risked

on an uncertain occurrence.”).

Under this authority, making a wager or bet involves reaching an agreement

to risk something of value on an uncertain result. When that agreement is reached

would vary depending on the situation. Yet the court let Special Agent Bergman

offer a narrow definition focused on the action that triggered the slot machine’s

spin. His definition confined the term to just one area where wagering occurs.

Presumably, a different action would constitute making a wager for horse races or

15 We fear the term “case law” itself could be misconstrued by the jurors. See
Palmer, 691 N.W.2d at 419 (establishing primary reason that legal conclusions are
inadmissible is because they may be “misunderstood by the witness and the jury”).
17

sports betting. See Iowa Code §§ 99D.11 (pari-mutuel wagering), 99F.1(28)

(sports wagering). Even under our liberal view of expert testimony, Bergman’s

opinion on when a wager is placed did not assist the jury in deciding if Slaughter

violated the statute.16 But because we reverse on sufficiency grounds, the

inadmissibility of his opinion only matters for our review of the third element of the

offense. And as we review the evidence, “we are mindful that criminal statutes are

to be strictly construed with doubts resolved in favor of the accused.” State v.

Schultz, 604 N.W.2d 60, 62 (Iowa 1999).

Turning back to the sufficiency question, we review the record to see if the

State proved beyond a reasonable doubt that Slaughter tried to claim the jackpot

without having made a wager contingent on winning a gambling game. We

recognize that “[a]s a practical matter it is never easy to prove a negative.” State

v. Boone, 989 N.W.2d 645, 651 (Iowa 2023) (citation omitted). But if Slaughter

risked something of value contingent on winning at the slot machine, regardless of

who pushed the button, then she is not guilty of the felony charged. See Drake,

242 N.W.2d at 709. The State bore the burden to show that she did not have any

“skin in the game” so to speak.

Slaughter argues it was unclear from the record whether she made the

wager that led to the jackpot. She notes that she was standing near the machine

16 Even the State recognized in its rebuttal closing argument that making a wager

might encompass more than pushing the button on the slot machine: “There’s no
way, no evidence whatsoever, none, that Sydney Slaughter had any money in the
machine, that she was pushing any buttons, that she was doing anything.” But
that concession disappears on appeal. The State now argues: “If she did not hit
the button to win the jackpot, she did not make a wager as the statute requires.”
We reject that cramped view.
18

before the candle lit. And she asserts that she and McNeese had been sharing

other machines throughout the night.

Slaughter also points to times, captured on the surveillance video, when the

pair was shuffling in pockets and purses, leading to an uncertainty about where

the money for the jackpot came from. Even after the jackpot win, the two appeared

to be gambling in tandem, standing at the same machines while McNeese dug into

his pockets. McNeese even handed Slaughter his winnings so that she could put

them in the machine to redeem them before they left for the night. While Slaughter

admitted to casino staff that she did not push the button for the jackpot, the State

presented no evidence of whose money went into the machine. On this record,

we find reasonable doubt that Slaughter did not make a wager contingent on

winning at the slot machine.

The State failed to land the second and third elements of this gambling

offense. So it can’t hit jackpot. We reverse Slaughter’s conviction and remand for

entry of judgment of acquittal.

REVERSED AND REMANDED.

Bower, C.J., concurs; Greer, J., dissents.
19

GREER, Judge (dissenting).

I must dissent from the majority opinion because I view the circumstantial

evidence in this case as sufficient support for the conviction. First, in the casino

video of the events of that evening, Anthony McNeese took the seat to play the

gambling machine and Sydney Slaughter was not by his side. Slaughter came up

shortly after McNeese started playing the machine and only stood watching him as

he played. As she watched the gambling, Slaughter hugged McNeese, and she

later admitted she was with him that night, which was confirmed by other video

footage at the casino. The video also establishes that Slaughter did not hand

McNeese any coins17 to play the machine as she stood next to him. Once the

machine’s candle lit up to show a $4000 jackpot had been won, McNeese moved

two seats away from the machine and from Slaughter’s passive standing position.

Then, Slaughter moved into the seat. When approached by the slot attendant who

handles the process involved with the jackpot collection, Slaughter was asked if

she was the one who “pushed the button and won the money”; she lied by replying

“yes.” She pulled out her identification card, gave the slot attendant her Social

Security number, and signed the slot request form to collect the money, effectively

claiming the jackpot. After having the surveillance team view the video, the casino

service supervisor shift manager (supervisor) approached Slaughter; he testified

about what took place after he approached, saying:

I approached her, and I said, were you the one that had hit
this jackpot? Like, were you the one that had hit the button? She
seemed really kind of flustered, kind of out of sorts. She said, I—I
think so, and then I went on to explain to her that it is against the law

17 “Coins” and “credits” seem to be used interchangeably as the testimony was

“the coins played is how many credits they played.”
20

to claim somebody else’s jackpot due to, like, tax evasion, everything
like that. And eventually, she ended up telling me, no, it was actually
Anthony that had hit it; that she was claiming it for him.

After this admission, no one told the casino crew that Slaughter had advanced the

coin to McNeese to play the machine. On top of all of that background, the slot

request form showed that only one coin had been played to access the jackpot.

Thus, McNeese must have inserted his coin as he began playing the machine

before Slaughter walked up to him.

With the results of the surveillance video on hand, the supervisor “informed

[Slaughter and McNeese] that we knew it wasn’t her that won that; it was him; and

he would have to claim the jackpot.” A second slot request form was filled out with

McNeese’s information and, as the slot attendant testified, McNeese complied but

was not “happy.” As the majority notes, McNeese owed several offsets that would

have cleaned out the remaining jackpot earnings. At the supervisor’s request,

McNeese signed the form confirming he was the person who actually won the

jackpot and directed all of the rest of the money toward his federal tax liability. 18

That meant no credit would be paid on the offsets—here the child support he owed

or the Linn County fines assessed against him. And as was emphasized at trial,

for Slaughter, because she won a jackpot the night before and cleared out the

potential offsets against any winnings, had she actually won the $4000 jackpot,

she could have been paid all of it but for the mandatory 5% paid for state tax

liability. It benefitted McNeese to direct Slaughter to accept the winnings and

18 The State of Iowa requires that 5% of the winnings be paid for state tax liability.
21

defraud those owed the offsets. If Slaughter were in on the scheme, a jury could

properly find she entered into a common design with a specific intent to defraud.

I agree that the case resolution comes down to if Slaughter had the intent

to defraud, but we know that intent cannot often be shown directly. See State v.

Ernst, 954 N.W.2d 50, 55 (Iowa 2021) (“Specific intent is seldom capable of direct

proof.” (citation omitted)). We view the challenges to sufficiency of the evidence

supporting a jury verdict “in the light most favorable to the State, including all

reasonable inferences that may be fairly drawn from the evidence.” State v.

Sanford, 814 N.W.2d 611, 615 (Iowa 2012) (citation omitted). We can make

“legitimate inferences and presumptions that may fairly and reasonably be

deduced from the record evidence.” Ernst, 954 N.W.2d at 54 (citation omitted).

So, here the circumstantial evidence in my view allows a jury to deduce that

Slaughter attempted to claim money from the gambling game with the intent to

defraud by avoiding the payment of those winnings towards McNeese’s court-

ordered offsets. See id. at 55 (opining that circumstantial evidence, along with the

reasonable inferences drawn from that evidence, is often part of proof of specific

intent). A jury could find from Slaughter’s demeanor that she participated in a

deception to access more cash and that she knew of the scheme. Why would she

be so quick to claim the jackpot? How else can we rationalize her actions of

moving into the seat and lying to the casino staff?

Recognizing the jury instructions are the law of the case, I would find

substantial evidence that Slaughter aided and abetted McNeese in a common
22

design with the specific intent to defraud.19 See State v. Crawford, 974 N.W.2d

510, 520–21 (Iowa 2022) (discussing that jury instructions become the law of the

case for purposes of review for sufficiency of the evidence). The jury was told that

they could consider “the facts and circumstances surrounding the act to determine

[Slaugther’s] specific intent.” And the instructions guided the jury to consider if the

State proved “[1] such specific intent or [2] ‘aided and abetted’ [the commission of

the crime] with the knowledge the others who directly committed the crime had

such specific intent.” Considering Slaughter’s experience with jackpots and

offsets, it does not take a large leap for a jury to conclude that when McNeese

moved two chairs away after scoring the jackpot on the gambling machine and

Slaughter quickly moved into the seat at the winning machine, the act was done

with the intent to help McNeese avoid the imposition of the offsets, exceeding

$40,000, against his winnings. The majority is not persuaded that a jury could infer

from the close association between McNeese and Slaughter and Slaughter’s act

of taking McNeese’s seat that she had the requisite specific intent. But, there is

more. Slaughter then falsely represents she scored the jackpot and, more

19 The instruction provided:

The State must prove all of the following elements of
Gambling, False Claim of Winnings:
1. On or about the 29th day of November, 2020, Sydney
Slaughter or someone Sydney Slaughter aided and abetted,
conspired with, or entered into a common design with, did claim,
collect or take or attempt to claim, collect or take money from a
gambling game.
2. Sydney Slaughter or someone Sydney Slaughter aided and
abetted, conspired with, or entered into a common design with had
the specific intent to defraud.
3. The money was claimed, collected or taken or was
attempted to be claimed collected or taken without Sydney Slaughter
having made a wager contingent on winning a gambling game.
23

importantly, then when confronted with the potential she committed a crime, took

back the statement the jackpot was hers. A jury could find otherwise, true, but the

circumstantial evidence here is substantial and supports this conviction that

Slaughter aided McNeese to avoid his offsets against his winnings. See State v.

Dohlman, 725 N.W.2d 428, 430 (Iowa 2006) (“Evidence is not insubstantial merely

because we may draw different conclusions from [the evidence]; the ultimate

question is whether it supports the finding actually made, not whether the evidence

would support a different finding.” (alteration in original) (citation omitted)).

Finally, Slaughter also contends the State offered insufficient evidence that

she did not make a wager. On that element, we have Slaughter’s statement that

McNeese had hit the jackpot and she was only claiming it for him. Thus, I would

find substantial evidence supports Slaughter’s conviction given that both

Slaughter’s and McNeese’s actions as shown on the video and through how the

forms were processed point to him as having made the wager.

After considering the evidence presented in the light most favorable to the

jury’s verdict, including the reasonable inferences that can be drawn, I would affirm

the conviction because I believe it was supported by substantial evidence on all

elements. I dissent on these grounds.