State of Iowa v. Owo Robin Nyal Bol

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA

No. 22-0158
Filed November 8, 2023

STATE OF IOWA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,

vs.

OWO ROBIN NYAL BOL,
Defendant-Appellant.
________________________________________________________________

Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Polk County, Scott J. Beattie, Judge.

Defendant appeals his convictions for attempted murder, intimidation with a

dangerous weapon, and willful injury causing serious injury. AFFIRMED.

Christopher Kragnes, Sr. and Tiffany Kragnes, Des Moines, for appellant.

Brenna Bird, Attorney General, and Louis S. Sloven, Assistant Attorney

General, for appellee.

Heard by Greer, P.J., and Schumacher and Ahlers, JJ.
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SCHUMACHER, Judge.

Owo Bol appeals his convictions for attempted murder, intimidation with a

dangerous weapon, and willful injury causing serious injury. He argues the jury

verdicts are not supported by sufficient evidence and the verdicts are inconsistent;

the trial court erred in failing to sever his case from two of his co-defendants; the

court erred in admitting the recorded statements of defendants whose cases had

been severed; the court erred in admitting a detective’s testimony as an expert on

group crimes; and the court erred in failing to remove a juror or failing to determine

whether the juror could remain impartial.

I. Background Facts and Prior Proceedings

N.M., who was sixteen years old, lived with her mother, sister, eight-year-

old brother, and two-year-old nephew, D.M., at a home in Des Moines. On

March 1, 2021, she planned and held a surprise birthday party for her sister. By

10:00 p.m., the party had died down. N.M. was left at home with her brother and

nephew. By 10:30 p.m., her brother was asleep in his room, and N.M. sat with her

nephew while he watched cartoons in the living room. After N.M. decided it was

time for both her and her nephew to retire for the evening, she went outside to

retrieve her cell phone charger from her mother’s vehicle parked in the driveway.

D.M. remained on the couch, watching cartoons.

While N.M. was in the driveway, a vehicle stopped in front of the house.

N.M. saw at least four people in the car, one who was wearing a black ski mask.

N.M. inquired, “Who are you?” One of the occupants responded, “You know who

this is, motherfucker,” and shots rang out. Twenty to thirty shots were fired from

the vehicle. N.M. dove into her mother’s car, fearing that her brother or nephew
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might be shot if she ran back into the home. The car eventually pulled away and

N.M. ran to the front door of her home to make sure her brother and nephew were

all right. But the door was jammed, and N.M. could not get in. She ran to a

neighbor’s house to call the police, but no one came to the door. She went to

another neighbor’s house who let her use a cell phone. N.M. then ran home. By

that time, her brother had opened the door. N.M. found her nephew lying in the

hallway, crying softly. He had been shot in the back of his head. N.M. managed

to call 911. Two-year-old D.M. arrived at the hospital in critical condition. He

survived but has permanent brain damage.

Law enforcement arrived on the scene shortly after the 911 call. With the

benefit of a neighbor’s porch camera, they identified the vehicle involved in the

shooting as a dark-colored Nissan Rogue. Law enforcement quickly learned that

a dark-colored Nissan Rogue had crashed in Dallas County. There were five

occupants of that vehicle, including Bol and his co-defendants, Thon Bol1 and Odol

Othow. Officers at the scene of the crash observed spent nine-millimeter shell

casings on the floor of the vehicle. Spent shell casings had also been placed inside

an empty water bottle inside the vehicle. One of the occupants had a ski mask.

The individuals in the crash, including Bol, were detained. And when police

detained Bol, they found two firearms in the waistband of his clothing. A third gun

was found in the vehicle. Analysis of those firearms and the spent casings

recovered from the scene of the shooting determined that the casings were

1 Thon Bol is Bol’s brother. To distinguish the two brothers, Thon Bol will be
referenced using both his first and last name.
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consistent as being fired from the recovered firearms. Bol and the other occupants

of the vehicle were transported back to Des Moines for further investigation.

Des Moines Police Department Detective Jeffery Shannon served as the

lead detective. After Bol and the other occupants of the vehicle were brought to

the station, Detective Shannon began the interviews, which were recorded. During

Bol’s interview, Bol conveyed that he was friends with everyone in the vehicle and

that one of the individuals was his brother. Bol also told Detective Shannon that

he was in Des Moines and with the others about the time of the shooting. A video

taken the night of the shooting was recovered from Bol’s phone which showed Bol

sitting in the back of the Nissan Rogue with the others. In the video, they were

brandishing the firearms recovered from Bol’s waistband. Bol admitted the

firearms were his and stated that no one shot the firearms that night. Bol was

arrested and charged with attempted murder of N.M., attempted murder of B.C.

and D.M., intimidation with a dangerous weapon with intent to injure or provoke

fear, and willful injury.

Bol and the four other individuals in the vehicle were initially slated to be

tried together as co-defendants. Before trial, the State requested a hearing on the

admissibility of statements made by each of the defendants. The court determined

the statements were not being offered to show the truth of the matter asserted,

and determined portions of the recorded statements by some defendants to law

enforcement were admissible. Bol moved to sever. He argued that severance

was necessary because the five co-defendants had conflicting defenses. The

court originally denied the motion to sever, then granted the motion to sever, and

then, following the State’s motion to reconsider, the court consolidated the trial for
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Bol and two others. Bol filed a motion in limine, seeking to prohibit testimony from

Detective Shannon on “gangs, complex crimes, and evasive answers.” The court

ruled that the detective could testify to complex criminal activity but not as to

evasive answers or gangs. Bol was ultimately tried with two other co-defendants,

Thon Bol and Othow.

N.M.’s 911 call was admitted as evidence and played for the jury. Defense

counsel noticed a juror crying while the call was played. Defense counsel moved

to remove the juror, or in the alternative, question the juror to determine whether

she could remain impartial. The court declined the invitation to do either but

advised counsel that the court would monitor the juror and reexamine the issue if

any further issues with the juror presented themselves. No other issues were

raised concerning this particular juror during trial, and the matter was not

addressed again.

Jury trial commenced on July 26, 2021, and concluded on August 2. The

State called sixteen witnesses, including Detective Shannon who testified to his

knowledge and experience regarding “group crimes.” Bol did not testify, but one

of his co-defendants, Othow, testified in his own defense. The jury found Bol guilty

of attempted murder of N.M., intimidation with a dangerous weapon, and willful

injury causing serious injury. Bol was acquitted of the attempted murder of B.C.

and D.M. Following the verdict, Bol filed a motion for a new trial and a motion in

arrest of judgment. He argued the verdict was contrary to law and evidence. The

court denied his motions and sentenced Bol to a total term of imprisonment not to
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exceed thirty-five years, with Bol eligible for parole after twenty-two and a half

years.2 Bol now appeals.

II. Analysis

a. Sufficiency of the Evidence

Bol argues that there was insufficient evidence presented at trial to support

the verdicts.3 Sufficiency of the evidence is reviewed for correction of errors at

law. State v. Crawford, 972 N.W.2d 189, 202 (Iowa 2022). “In conducting that

review, we are highly deferential to the jury’s verdict. The jury’s verdict binds this

court if the verdict is supported by substantial evidence.” Id. Evidence is

substantial when it is sufficient to convince a rational trier of fact of guilt beyond a

reasonable doubt. Id. Evidence is viewed in the light most favorable to the State,

but evidence that raises only suspicion, speculation, or conjecture is not

substantial. State v. Howse, 875 N.W.2d 684, 688 (Iowa 2016).

There is no dispute that a shooting occurred at the home on March 1, 2021,

or that D.M. was shot and sustained serious injury. But, Bol argues that the

evidence presented at trial is insufficient to show he had anything to do with the

shooting. He states, “merely being together does not a crime create.” In essence,

Bol asserts that although he was found in a vehicle matching the description of the

vehicle involved in the shooting; in possession of two of the firearms consistent as

being used in the shooting; surrounded by spent casings from those firearms;

2 Bol’s sentences for willful injury and intimidation with a dangerous weapon were

run concurrently with each other and consecutively with his sentence for attempted
murder.
3 Bol’s brief captions this argument as a “weight of the evidence” challenge, but we

address the arguments raised in the body of the brief concerning a sufficiency
challenge.
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featured in a video brandishing those firearms taken after the shooting; with Thon

Bol, who was in possession of a black ski mask which N.M. described one of the

shooters wearing; in the vehicle with a third gun which was also consistent as being

used in the shooting; such does not rise to the level of substantial evidence for a

rational trier of fact to find him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. We disagree.

Bol also argues that the State failed to show that there had been a

conspiracy between him and his co-defendants. But Bol was not convicted of

conspiracy.4 He also argues that there was no direct evidence presented to put

him in the car at the time of the shooting, but “direct evidence of guilt is not required

. . . . A defendant may be convicted solely on circumstantial evidence if it is

sufficiently compelling to convince a . . . jury of the defendant’s guilt beyond a

reasonable doubt.” State v. Tipton, 897 N.W.2d 653, 692 (Iowa 2017). We

determine a rational trier of fact had sufficient evidence to convict Bol of attempted

murder of N.M., intimidation with a dangerous weapon, and willful injury causing

serious injury.

b. Inconsistent Verdicts

We turn to Bol’s argument that the verdicts returned by the jury were

inconsistent. “The consequence of a potentially inconsistent jury verdict is a

question of law, and accordingly, our review is de novo.” State v. Merrett, 842

N.W.2d 266, 272–73 (Iowa 2014). When examining jury verdicts for inconsistency

we look to see if “the verdict is so logically and legally inconsistent as to be

irreconcilable within the context of the case.” State v. Fintel, 689 N.W.2d 95, 101

4 Bol was not charged with conspiracy.
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(Iowa 2004). In addition, “Our review of a jury’s verdicts for consistency is highly

deferential; verdicts are to be liberally construed to give effect to the intention of

the jury and to harmonize the verdicts if it is possible to do so.” State v. Goodon,

No. 19-0174, 2020 WL 2060301, at *3 (Iowa Ct. App. Apr. 29, 2020). To analyze

the consistency of jury verdicts we look to the pleadings and the jury instructions.

Id.

Bol specifically points to the jury’s “not guilty” finding on Count II, attempted

murder of B.C. and D.M., and the jury’s “guilty” finding on Count IV, willful injury

causing serious injury. He argues that because these are both specific intent

crimes, the verdicts were inconsistent. How could the jury fail to find specific intent

in Count II, but find it in Count IV? We determine the answer is contained in a

reading of the jury instructions.

Jury Instruction 25, on attempted murder, read: “When the Defendants, or

someone they aided and abetted acted, they specifically intended to cause the

death of D.M. . . . and/or B.C.” Jury Instruction 30, willful injury, read: “The

Defendants or someone they aided and abetted specifically intended to cause a

serious injury to D.M. . . . or any of the occupants of the home.” A careful reading

of these jury instructions, in addition to questions submitted by the jury at trial

reveals a lack of an inconsistent jury verdict. During deliberation, the jury asked

the court, “Instruction 25, charge 2, element 3. Does the wording mean they

specifically knew [B.C.] and [D.M.] were in the house? Did they have to know

specifically [B.C.] and [D.M.] were in the house?”

It is plausible, even likely, that the jury determined Bol, or someone he aided

and abetted, intended to injure someone in the home but they did not intend to
9

specifically injure B.C. or D.M. Given our mandate concerning the high degree of

deference afforded to a jury verdict, we conclude the verdicts are not inconsistent.

c. Motion to Sever

Bol argues the court erred by denying his motion to sever after his case had

been consolidated with those of Thon Bol and Othow. The trial court’s decision to

deny severance is reviewed for abuse of discretion. State v. Belieu, 288

N.W.2d 895, 900 (Iowa 1980). “To establish an abuse of discretion, the defendant

must show sufficient prejudice to constitute denial of a fair trial.” Id.

Under the Iowa Rules of Criminal Procedure, “A joint trial is permissible if in

the discretion of the court a joint trial will not result in prejudice to one or more of

the parties; otherwise, the defendants shall be tried separately.” Id. (internal

quotation marks and citation omitted); see Iowa R. Crim. P. 2.6(4)(b). Our

supreme court has found that severance is warranted if:

(1) if admission of evidence in a joint trial would have been
inadmissible and prejudicial if a defendant was tried alone, (2) if a
joint trial prevents one defendant from presenting exculpatory
testimony of a codefendant, (3) if consolidation will produce a trial of
such complexity and length that the jury will be unable to effectively
compartmentalize the evidence against each defendant, [or] (4) if
defenses presented by different defendants conflict to the point of
being irreconcilable and mutually exclusive.

State v. Williams, 525 N.W.2d 847, 849 (Iowa 1994). Bol primarily argues

severance was necessary as he and Othow presented conflicting defense

theories, pointing to the fourth Williams factor. But he also argues factors (1) and

(3) were fulfilled.

It is important to note:

It is a defendant’s burden to establish that separate trials are
necessary to avoid prejudice that would deny him a fair trial. In
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meeting this burden, we have repeatedly stated that a defendant
must show more than the attempt by one defendant to exculpate
himself or herself by incriminating the other defendant. A defendant
must show that he was unfairly prejudiced by the joint trial.

State v. Clark, 464 N.W.2d 861, 864 (Iowa 1991) (internal citations omitted). For

such prejudice to occur “the defenses must be more than merely antagonistic, they

must conflict to the point of being irreconcilable and mutually exclusive.” State v.

Leutfaimany, 585 N.W.2d 200, 203 (Iowa 1998). For this to be the case, “the jury,

in order to believe the core testimony offered on behalf of one defendant, must

necessarily disbelieve the testimony offered on behalf of a codefendant.” Id.

Bol fails to show that he was unfairly prejudiced by the joint trial. His

argument begins with the fact that Othow chose to testify at trial. Othow offered

testimony that conflicted with other accounts of what happened. Othow stated that

he was sitting in the middle backseat of the vehicle, but law enforcement testified

that Bol was sitting in the middle backseat. He also testified that Bol had a permit

to have guns and that they had been shooting at a range that day. Bol claims that

Othow “essentially pointed the finger at Bol saying he was in the car while they

were off doing whatever they were doing.”5

Even considering these assertions, the record does not reflect two defenses

that are “irreconcilable and mutually exclusive.” See id. Asked at trial about the

shooting, Othow maintained he was unaware of it until he was questioned by

police. He was asked:

Q. You were with them when you shot up the house? Yes or
no. A. I never knew about a house getting shot up, sir, until I got into

5 Othow testified at trial that he had been dropped off in Des Moines before the

shooting occurred, ostensibly to meet a girl, and he was not picked up until
afterward.
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a car accident. Like I said, I was brought to the investigation room,
questioned about a shooting. That’s the first time I heard about a
shooting.

And later:

Q. So did they tell you what they were doing after they
dropped you off? A. No. I never knew what they were going to do.
Q. So you just came with them, not knowing what they were
going to do, to Des Moines? . . . . A. As far as I was concerned, I
thought they was going to visit their auntie whose family member had
just passed away in Africa.

Even as he was asked repeatedly if he was in the car while “they” shot up

the house, Othow continued to maintain that he knew nothing about a shooting.

At no time did Othow “point the finger” at Bol, despite several opportunities to do

so. Any conflict between their defenses, such as which seat in the car they were

sitting in, does not rise to the level of “irreconcilable and mutually exclusive.” See

id. To the extent that there are differences in the defenses of Bol and Othow, they

are, at most, “merely antagonistic.” See id. We determine that the court committed

no abuse of discretion in denying the request to sever Bol’s case from that of his

two co-defendants.

d. Admission of Recorded Statements

Bol argues that the court erred in admitting the recorded statements of two

defendants that had been severed from this case. He argues that these

statements are hearsay, not subject to any exception, and therefore inadmissible.

The challenged statements were made to law enforcement during interviews after

the car crash.
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Although evidentiary rulings are normally reviewed for an abuse of

discretion, we review hearsay for correction of errors at law. State v. Buelow, 951

N.W.2d 879, 884 (Iowa 2020).

Before the individuals who made these statements were severed from trial,

the court had ruled their statements admissible as those of a party opponent. But

after severance, the court revisited this decision in light of the change of

circumstances. The State argued that the recorded statements were made to

conceal the group’s involvement in the shooting, and therefore, they were

statements made in furtherance of an ongoing conspiracy admissible under Iowa

Rule of Evidence 5.801(d)(2)(E). The State also argued that the statements were

non-hearsay, as they were not offered to prove the truth of the matter asserted.

Instead, they were offered “because the statements are false, which establishes

consciousness of guilt.”

Bol argues that the State failed to show there was a conspiracy. However,

the court ultimately admitted the statements as non-hearsay, concluding the

statements were not being offered to prove the truth of the matter asserted:

The court, after further research and investigation, has come to a
conclusion, in fact, those statements, quite frankly, as argued by the
State, are not hearsay . . . for the purpose that they are being offered
here today. In other words, they’re not being offered for the truth of
the matter asserted.

The court cited several cases to support this decision, including State v. Crowley,

309 N.W.2d 523 (Iowa Ct. App. 1981). In Crowley, the court ruled on the admission

of a false out-of-court statement:

The claim that the declaration by defendant is not an
admission because it is exculpatory assumes that it otherwise is
excludable from evidence as hearsay. It is not. . . . The statement
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in the present case clearly was not offered by the state to prove the
truth of the fact asserted . . . . Obviously, the state was trying to show
precisely the opposite that defendant was not telling the truth . . . .
This evidence was relevant and material on the theory that
consciousness of guilt may be inferred from attempted evasion,
palpable falsehood, or suppression of the true facts by one
suspected of crime.

309 N.W.2d at 524 (internal citation omitted). Bol failed to address this basis for

admission in his brief beyond a passing mention. He instead focused on whether

the State had shown there was a conspiracy, which was not the basis for the

court’s decision.

Because the recorded statements were not offered to show the truth of the

matter asserted, the court did not err in admitting them. The statements were

non-hearsay.

e. Detective Shannon’s Testimony on Group Crimes

Bol argues that the testimony of Detective Shannon at trial breached the

court’s previous ruling which disallowed discussion of gang activity by talking about

his experience with cases involving multiple suspects.

Bol filed a motion in limine with the court asking that the State be prohibited

from introducing evidence of “complex crimes” or “complex criminal investigations

involving multiple co-defendants.” In Bol’s view, this would violate the court’s

previous prohibition on testimony about gang activity. The court disagreed:

“[c]omplex criminal activity can take place outside the involvement of a gang.” The

court ultimately ruled this testimony admissible. At trial, Detective Shannon never

used the phrase, “complex crimes,” but he did testify to “cases involving multiple

suspects.”
14

Because the State argues Bol failed to preserve error on this issue, we

begin our discussion there. When a trial court rules on a motion in limine, “if the

ruling reaches the ultimate issue and declares the evidence admissible or

inadmissible, it is ordinarily a final ruling and need not be questioned again during

trial.” State v. O’Connell, 275 N.W.2d 197, 202 (Iowa 1979). The State’s argument

rests on the idea that because Detective Shannon did not use the words, “complex

crimes,” error was not preserved. We choose to address the merits of Bol’s

argument.

Trial court rulings on the admissibility of evidence and the scope of expert

testimony are reviewed for abuse of discretion. State v. Stendrup, 983 N.W.2d

231, 238 (Iowa 2022). Bol relies on the court’s prior ruling barring gang evidence

and the ruling in State v. Nance, 533 N.W.2d 557, 562 (Iowa 1995), where our

supreme court found gang evidence “inherently prejudicial.”

The district court ruled that testimony on “complex criminal investigations

involving multiple co-defendants” was not equal to testimony on gangs. Detective

Shannon did not speak on gangs. He never used the word gang, nor did he use

“euphemisms” for gang activity as Bol contends. The specific language challenged

by Bol is Shannon’s testimony that in certain investigations, activities occur with

groups, and “sometimes you see strength in numbers.” He also testified in “cases

with multiple suspects, oftentimes you’ll see different roles or responsibilities

amongst the group.” He also testified to his work on cases with multiple suspects

and how he learned they operate within a group.

We conclude that his testimony did not violate the ruling made by the court:
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The Defendant argues that the testimony of “complex crimes”
is an attempt by the State to skirt the court’s previous ruling regarding
gang activity. . . . However, the court does not believe that reference
to “complex criminal activity” is equivalent to gang affiliation.
Complex criminal activity can take place outside the involvement of
a gang. As such, the court does not find Defendant’s argument on
this issue compelling.

Testimony on crimes involving multiple suspects is different from testimony

on gang affiliation, and our precedent establishes that where a defendant is not

painted as a gang member, there is no prejudice. See State v. Thomas, No. 03-

1642, 2005 WL 1224585, at *3 (Iowa Ct. App. May 25, 2005), State v. Dixon,

No. 00-829, 2001 WL 1450991, at *4 (Iowa Ct. App. Nov. 16, 2001), State v.

James, No. 00--831, 2001 WL 803814, at *4 (Iowa Ct. App. July 18, 2001). Even

where minimal gang evidence has been presented, we have found no prejudice.

State v. Caples, 857 N.W.2d 641, 647–48 (Iowa Ct. App. 2014). Here, there was

no mention of gang activity or gang affiliation. Accordingly, we find no abuse of

discretion in the court allowing the detective’s testimony.

And even if some of Officer Shannon’s testimony should have been limited,

Bol cannot demonstrate prejudice, given the other evidence offered by the State

and the limited testimony of Officer Shannon that discussed groups or multiple

suspects. See State v. Boehmer, 967 N.W.2d 191, 197 (Iowa Ct. App. 2021)

(holding that any error in admission of the challenged evidence would be harmless

under the circumstances); see also State v. Holland, 485 N.W.2d 652, 656 (Iowa

1992) (finding error was harmless due to overwhelming evidence).

f. Juror Bias

Bol argues that the court erred in failing to remove or question Juror 31,

who was seen crying when the 911 call by N.M. was played. “We review a denial
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of a motion for a new trial based upon juror misconduct or juror bias for an abuse

of discretion.” State v. Webster, 865 N.W.2d 223, 231 (Iowa 2015). In this case,

Bol does not allege that the juror engaged in misconduct but that the juror’s tears

revealed that this juror was biased.

A juror can be biased without engaging in misconduct. Id. at 236. Bias can

be actual or implied, and “[i]mplied bias arises when the relationship of a

prospective juror to a case is so troublesome that the law presumes a juror would

not be impartial.” Id. Usually voir dire is used to “smoke out” potential juror bias.

Id. at 237.

On the second day of trial, the 911 call made by N.M. on the night of the

shooting, after she found her nephew had been shot in the head, was played for

the jury. During the playing of that call, defense counsel informed the court that

Juror 31 was crying. The defense described this juror as “sobbing uncontrollably,”

and although the State disagreed with that characterization, the parties agreed that

the juror had been crying. The defendants moved to remove the juror, or for the

court to conduct additional questioning of the juror to confirm her impartiality.

The court declined and instead ruled that the court would “continue to

observe, and if there are further reasons to believe that we need to question this

individual juror, that issue can be readdressed.” The court explained its decision

by citing the fact that extensive time had been spent on voir dire, and this juror had

confirmed under oath that she would not make decisions based on emotion.

Serious questions of bias can arise when a juror fails to tell the truth during

voir dire, see id., but here, Bol has made no such claim. Instead, he relies solely

on the juror’s emotional reaction to the 911 call. However, the court found her oath
17

not to make decisions based on emotion compelling. We give this finding weight.

See id. at 238. A juror expressing empathy for the victims of a crime does not

merit disqualification for bias: “If we disqualified jurors because they empathized

with the family of crime victims, we would have no jurors.” Id. at 239. The juror’s

single display of emotion, which was not repeated, is not an example of juror bias.

We find no abuse of discretion on this point.

III. Conclusion

Because sufficient evidence exists to support the verdicts, the jury verdicts

are not inconsistent, there was no abuse of discretion in refusing to sever Bol’s

case, statements made by defendants whose cases were severed from Bol’s were

not hearsay, there was no abuse of discretion in admitting evidence about complex

criminal investigations, and no juror bias was established, we affirm.

AFFIRMED.