In the Interest of K.E., a/k/a K.W.

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA

No. 23-1456
Filed November 21, 2023

IN THE INTEREST OF K.E., a/k/a K.W.,
Minor Child,

K.W., Mother,
Appellant,

N.E., Father,
Appellant.
________________________________________________________________

Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Clinton County, Kimberly K.

Shepherd, District Associate Judge.

A mother and father separately appeal the termination of their respective

parental rights. AFFIRMED ON BOTH APPEALS.

Taryn R. McCarthy of Clemens, Walters, Conlon, Runde & Hiatt, L.L.P.,

Dubuque, for appellant mother.

Jennifer Triner Olsen of Olsen Law Firm, Davenport, for appellant father.

Brenna Bird, Attorney General, and Dion D. Trowers, Assistant Attorney

General, for appellee State.

Barbara E. Maness, Davenport, attorney and guardian ad litem for minor

child.

Considered by Bower, C.J., Schumacher, J., and Danilson, S.J.*

*Senior judge assigned by order pursuant to Iowa Code section 602.9206

(2023).
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DANILSON, Senior Judge.

The parents of K.E. separately appeal the termination of their respective

parental rights. The father challenges one of the statutory grounds authorizing

termination, claims termination is not in the child’s best interests, contends his

bond with the child should preclude termination, and requests additional time to

work toward reunification. The mother challenges whether termination of her rights

is in the child’s best interests and requests additional time to work toward

reunification. The mother also relies in part upon her bond with the child and

willingness to cooperate with offered services. Upon our review, we affirm on both

appeals.

I. Background Facts

The Iowa Department of Health and Human Services became involved with

this family in March 2022 following reports that the parents were using

methamphetamine and marijuana and that the home was both unsafe and

unsanitary. The couple was involved with law enforcement at that time as well.

Officers executed a search warrant at the parents’ home and found drug

paraphernalia. And the mother reported to law enforcement that the father

strangled her and slammed her head into the center console of a vehicle.

The juvenile court formally removed the child from the parents’ custody in

April. That same month, the mother obtained her own apartment separate from

the father that was generally free from safety risks. Visits with the child were held

at the mother’s apartment for some time, but the caseworker moved visits back to

a public place due to concerns the mother was using methamphetamine in the

apartment.
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Both parents completed department-requested drug testing in July—both

tested positive for methamphetamine. The father successfully completed an

outpatient treatment program just four days later, suggesting he was not truthful

with his treatment providers. The mother sought inpatient treatment in August.

She tested positive for methamphetamine when she arrived at the facility and left

the program less than a week later without successfully completing treatment. The

father failed to comply with department-requested drug testing eighteen separate

times between August 2022 and May 2023. During the same period, the mother

failed to comply with testing nineteen times.1

In November, the father perpetrated another act of domestic violence

against the mother. He spat in her face and punched her in the back of the head.

Then he ran into her apartment and struck a male friend.

The child was placed with her paternal aunt and her husband in January

2023. Since her placement there, the child bonded well with her caregivers, calling

her aunt “ma” or “mom.” Also in January, the mother’s mental-health service

provider removed the mother from her schedule due to the mother’s failure to

attend numerous appointments.2

By April, the parents had not progressed towards reunification, so the State

petitioned for termination of both parents’ parental rights. However, the juvenile

1 The mother reported she missed one test because she had to attend an interview

and could not test another time because she did not have photo identification with
her.
2 The mother no showed her first two appointments—one in June 2022 and another

in July. She completed an intake assessment, completed one therapy session,
and no showed another in December. The mother no showed an appointment in
January, prompting the provider to remove the mother from her schedule.
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court did not hold the termination hearing until mid-July. At the termination hearing,

the mother reflected on her failure to complete substance-abuse treatment and

conceded she “should have just stuck it out.” She also was honest in admitting

she “messed up more than a couple of times in this case.” She went on say that

if she had more time to work toward reunification she would “do anything that [she]

had to do. Anything that was asked, [she] would do it.” Similarly, the father

admitted he did not complete another substance-abuse evaluation or engage in

any substance-abuse treatment after testing positive for methamphetamine.

Likewise, he admitted he has not completed a mental-health evaluation. However,

he offered to return to substance-abuse treatment if given the chance.

The juvenile court found multiple statutory grounds for termination satisfied

with respect to both parents, concluded termination is in the child’s best interests,

declined to apply a permissive exception to termination, and did not grant either

parent additional time to work toward reunification. Both parents separately

appeal.

II. Standard and Scope of Review

Appellate review of termination-of-parental-rights proceedings is de novo.

In re A.B., 957 N.W.2d 280, 293 (Iowa 2021). Our paramount concern in

termination proceedings is the best interests of the children. In re L.T., 924 N.W.2d

521, 529 (Iowa 2019). Typically, our review follows a three-step process that

involves determining if a statutory ground for termination is satisfied, whether

termination is in the child’s best interests, and whether any permissive exceptions

should be applied to preclude termination. A.B., 957 N.W.2d at 294. However, if
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a parent does not challenge any of the three steps, we need not address the

unchallenged steps on appeal. See In re P.L., 778 N.W.2d 33, 40 (Iowa 2010).

III. The Father

We begin by addressing the father’s claims on appeal. With respect to the

statutory grounds authorizing termination, the juvenile court terminated his

parental rights pursuant to Iowa Code section 232.116(1)(e), (h), (i), and (l) (2023).

When the juvenile court terminates on multiple statutory grounds, we may affirm

on any one of those grounds. See In re A.B., 815 N.W.2d 764, 774 (Iowa 2012).

The father challenges the grounds under paragraph (e) but raises no challenge

under paragraphs (h), (i), and (l). The father’s failure to challenge all the statutory

grounds relied upon by the juvenile court waives any claim of error related to the

unchallenged grounds, in this case section 232.116(1)(h), (i), and (l). See, e.g., In

re A.W., No. 23-1125, 2023 WL 6290680, at *1 (Iowa Ct. App. Sept. 27, 2023); In

re J.P., No. 19-1633, 2020 WL 110425, at *1 (Iowa Ct. App. Jan. 9, 2020); In re

N.S., No. 14-1375, 2014 WL 5253291, at *3 (Iowa Ct. App. Oct. 15, 2014). So we

find statutory grounds authorizing termination satisfied under those unchallenged

grounds.

Termination of the father’s parental rights must also serve the child’s best

interests. See Iowa Code § 232.116(2). The father argues termination is not in

the child’s best interests, citing his improved attendance at visits in the month

leading up to the termination hearing and his willingness to “comply with the

services offered to him and any treatment recommended.” When considering the

children’s best interests, we “give primary consideration to the child’s safety, to the

best placement for furthering the long-term nurturing and growth of the child, and
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to the physical, mental, and emotional condition and needs of the child.” P.L., 778

N.W.2d at 40 (quoting Iowa Code § 232.116(2)).

The father has not demonstrated he has the ability or willingness to provide

for the child’s safety and needs. He has not meaningfully engaged in services to

address his substance abuse or his history of domestic violence. We view his past

conduct as indicative of how he will act in the future. See In re C.K., 558 N.W.2d

170, 172 (Iowa 1997) (“[W]e look to the parents’ past performance because it may

indicate the quality of care the parent is capable of providing in the future.”). It is

not safe for the child to be around a parent who uses methamphetamine and is

domestically abusive. Instead, the child deserves permanency as soon as

possible. See In re A.M., 843 N.W.2d 100, 112 (Iowa 2014) (“It is well-settled law

that we cannot deprive a child of permanency after the State has proved a ground

for termination under section 232.116(1) by hoping someday a parent will learn to

be a parent and be able to provide a stable home for the child.” (citation omitted)).

The child’s paternal aunt and her husband are bonded to the child and willing to

adopt. See Iowa Code § 232.116(2)(b). We conclude the child’s interests are best

served through termination of the father’s parental rights.

Nonetheless, the father contends we should forgo termination due to his

bond with the child, which may serve as a permissive exception to termination. Id.

§ 232.116(3)(c). However, it is the father’s burden to establish a permissive

exception. In re A.S., 906 N.W.2d 467, 475–76 (Iowa 2018). We question whether

this issue is preserved as the juvenile court’s termination order does not make an

explicit ruling on whether termination of the father’s rights should be precluded due

to the strength of the parent-child bond. See In re R.P., No. 23-0419, 2023 WL
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3612412, at *2 (Iowa Ct. App. May 24, 2023); see also Meier v. Senecaut, 641

N.W.2d 532, 537 (Iowa 2002). Still, we note application of this exception “requires

clear and convincing evidence that ‘termination would be detrimental to the child

at the time due to the closeness of the parent-child relationship.’” In re A.B., 956

N.W.2d 162, 169 (Iowa 2021) (quoting Iowa Code § 232.116(3)(c)). While there is

a bond between father and child, it is not so strong that its severance would be

detrimental to the child. As a result, we do not apply this permissive exception.

Finally, we address the father’s request for additional time to work toward

reunification. The court may grant a parent six additional months to work toward

reunification under certain circumstances. See Iowa Code § 232.117(5)

(permitting the court to enter a permanency order pursuant to section 232.104 if it

does not terminate parental rights); see also id. § 232.104(2)(b) (providing a

permanency option of giving an additional six months to work toward reunification).

To grant such an extension, the court must be able to “enumerate the specific

factors, conditions, or expected behavioral changes which comprise the basis for

the determination that the need for removal of the child from the child’s home will

no longer exist at the end of the additional six-month period.” See id.

§ 232.104(2)(b).

While we understand the father claims he is now willing to engage in

services and seek more substance-abuse treatment, we do not believe his

methamphetamine use and domestic violence would be resolved in six months’

time given his current lack of progress. This is not an instance where a parent is

on the precipice of reunification and just needs a few more months to demonstrate

sobriety and stability. This father was no closer to reunification at the time of the
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termination hearing than he was when the child was removed from his custody. An

additional six months would not be enough time for the father to meaningfully

address the barriers to reunification that he already failed to address for more than

a year. We do not grant the father any additional time to work toward reunification.

IV. The Mother

We turn to the mother’s appeal. She does not challenge the statutory

grounds authorizing termination, so we do not address them on appeal. See P.L.,

778 N.W.2d at 40. Instead, we move on to address the mother’s claims that

termination of her parental rights is not in the child’s best interests and she should

have been granted additional time to work toward reunification. As previously

discussed, when determining what is in the child’s best interests we “give primary

consideration to the child’s safety, to the best placement for furthering the long-

term nurturing and growth of the child, and to the physical, mental, and emotional

condition and needs of the child.” P.L., 778 N.W.2d at 40 (quoting Iowa Code

§ 232.116(2)). And the court may grant additional time to work toward reunification

when it is able to “enumerate the specific factors, conditions, or expected

behavioral changes which comprise the basis for the determination that the need

for removal of the child from the child’s home will no longer exist at the end of the

additional six-month period.” See Iowa Code § 232.104(2)(b).

The mother highlights her difficulty getting to visits once the child was placed

with the paternal aunt as an explanation for her inconsistency with visitations, 3

presumably suggesting she would do better at securing transportation if given

3 Between August 2022 and June 2023, the mother attended roughly sixty-three

percent of visits offered.
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additional time. She also points to her past failed attempts at substance-abuse

treatment and testimony that she is willing to seek treatment as evidence she does

want to address her methamphetamine use. Finally, she notes the child is placed

with family who intends on adopting the child in the event of termination, reasoning

the grant of additional time to work toward reunification would not be disruptive to

the child because it would not impact the child’s placement. 4

We recognize the mother submitted paperwork seeking admission to a

mental-health and substance-abuse treatment provider the day before the

termination hearing. We commend the mother both for taking that important first

step toward bettering herself and being forthright when discussing her past

failures. But we also note the mother admitted to using methamphetamine about

a month prior to the termination hearing. So, like the father, we believe the mother

is not on the threshold of reunification. Rather, she has a long way to go before

she can safely care for a young child. We do not see enough evidence that the

mother will be able to demonstrate the need for removal will not exist within just

six months. We do not grant her additional time to work toward reunification.

Instead, we believe termination is in the child’s best interests. As previously

noted, the mother has unresolved substance-abuse issues. She also has not

addressed her domestically abusive relationship with the father by meaningfully

engaging in mental-health treatment beyond medication management. She

4
To the extent the mother attempts to invoke section 232.116(3)(a), which permits
the court to forgo termination when “a relative has legal custody of the child,” she
cannot. While the child was placed with her paternal aunt, the department retained
legal custody of the child. Thus, section 232.116(3)(a) is inapplicable. See In re
J.B., No. 21-1688, 2022 WL 244867, at *2 (Iowa Ct. App. Jan. 27, 2022).
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cannot provide the child with a safe environment or meet the child’s basic needs

because of these issues. Conversely, the paternal aunt and her husband are

willing to adopt the child and provide the child with permanency. Termination is a

necessary step toward adoption, meaning it is in the child’s best interests in this

instance.

V. Conclusion

We affirm the termination of the father’s parental rights. We also affirm the

termination of the mother’s parental rights.

AFFIRMED ON BOTH APPEALS.