Dean Christiansen v. Christopher Eral, Rex Mueller, and City of Sioux City

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA

No. 22-1971
Filed January 10, 2024

DEAN CHRISTIANSEN,
Plaintiff-Appellant,

vs.

CHRISTOPHER ERAL, REX MUELLER, and CITY OF SIOUX CITY,
Defendants-Appellees.
________________________________________________________________

Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Woodbury County, Roger L. Sailer,

Judge.

The plaintiff appeals the district court’s dismissal of his state constitutional

and common law tort claims against the defendant municipal employees and

municipality. AFFIRMED.

Adam C. Witosky, Matthew M. Boles, and Christopher Stewart of Gribble

Boles Stewart & Witosky Law, Des Moines, for appellant.

Steven R. Postolka, Caleb C. Christopherson, and Connie Anstey, Sioux

City, for appellees.

Heard by Greer, P.J., and Ahlers and Buller, JJ.
2

GREER, Presiding Judge.

Dean Christiansen appeals the district court’s dismissal of his state

constitutional and common law tort claims against two municipal employees, Sioux

City Police Officer Christopher Eral and Sioux City Police Chief Rex Mueller, as

well as the City of Sioux City (the City) (collectively, the Defendants). He contends

that despite our supreme court’s ruling in Burnett v. Smith, 990 N.W.2d 289 (Iowa

2023), he has a right of recovery under article I, sections 8 and 9 of the Iowa

Constitution for violations of unreasonable seizure by excessive force and

substantive due process and that the district court erred in dismissing his claims

of negligence, negligent training and supervision, and respondeat superior. We

affirm the dismissal.

I. Background Facts and Prior Proceedings.

As this case comes to us on appeal from the district court’s ruling on the

Defendants’ motion to dismiss, we accept the facts stated in Christiansen’s petition

to be true and consider only those facts stated in the petition. See U.S. Bank v.

Barbour, 770 N.W.2d 350, 353 (Iowa 2009). In Christiansen’s petition, he alleged

that around 1:47 a.m. on June 2, 2019, he left the parking lot of a North Sioux City

casino in his truck. A North Sioux City police officer, Andrew Ryan, saw

Christiansen leaving and initiated his lights and sirens as he pursued Christiansen,

attempting to get Christiansen to pull over so he could inform him of a mechanical

issue. Officer Ryan identified Christiansen as the registered owner of the truck.

Christiansen did not pull over. After a couple of minutes, Christiansen

entered Sioux City where his vehicle reached speeds of eighty miles per hour

(mph). Officer Ryan alerted the Sioux City police department about the chase and
3

his suspicion that Christiansen was operating his vehicle while intoxicated. Armed

with that information, Sioux City police officers became involved and deployed stop

sticks to get Christiansen to stop the truck, but they were ineffective; a bystander

vehicle and a Sioux City police officer hit the stop sticks instead of Christiansen.

Christiansen continued driving between fifty and sixty mph along a residential

street and eventually sped up to over seventy mph. At this point, Officer Eral joined

the pursuit. After another couple of minutes and in another attempt to end the

pursuit, Officer Eral performed a Pursuit Intervention Technique (PIT)1 maneuver

by using his patrol vehicle to collide with the rear of Christiansen’s vehicle. The

impact caused Christiansen’s vehicle to spin into the ditch, crash into a light pole,

its doors to wedge shut, and its engine to start on fire. Christiansen sustained

injuries to his chest, knee, and hip.

Christiansen brought suit against Officer Eral, Chief Mueller, and the City in

May 2022. He raised claims of unreasonable seizure by excessive force and

substantive due process2 under article I, sections 8 and 9 of the Iowa Constitution

1 The parties refer to this as a Precision Intervention Technique and Pursuit
Intervention Technique interchangeably. We refer to only Pursuit Intervention
Technique for consistency. See State v. Shears, 920 N.W. 2d 527, 538 (Iowa
2018) (referring to “an officer’s execution of a ‘pursuit intervention technique,’ or
PIT, maneuver”); see also Iowa Code § 321.231(4) (2022) (identifying a “pursuit
intervention technique” as “a method by which a peace officer operating a motor
vehicle in pursuit of a fleeing motor vehicle causes or attempts to cause the fleeing
motor vehicle to stop”); but see Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 375 (2007)
(describing an attempt at employing “a Precision Intervention Technique (‘PIT’)
maneuver, which causes the fleeing vehicle to spin to a stop”).
2 In his petition for relief, Christiansen pled a violation of substantive due process

under article I, section 8 of the Iowa Constitution. We assume that Christiansen
meant article I, section 9, which protects against deprivation “of life, liberty, or
property without due process of law.” Christiansen then argued a theory under
section 9 in the hearing on the motion to dismiss. In its written ruling granting the
4

against Officer Eral individually; negligence against Officer Eral individually and in

his official capacity; negligent training and supervision against Chief Mueller

individually and in his official capacity; and respondeat superior naming only Chief

Mueller and the City. The Defendants filed a pre-answer motion to dismiss for

failure to state a claim in June 2022. In their motion, the Defendants alleged that

there were no constitutional violations of Christiansen’s rights; the claims against

Officer Eral and the City were subject to qualified immunity; the negligence claim

against Officer Eral was exempted from tort liability under Iowa Code section 670.4

(2019); and as there were no underlying constitutional violations, the claims of

negligent training and supervision and respondeat superior against Chief Mueller

and the City also failed.

The district court held a hearing on the motion in August 2022. In October

2022, the district court granted the Defendants’ motion and dismissed the petition

in its entirety.3 In its written ruling granting the motion to dismiss, the district court

concluded that Christiansen had failed to state a claim upon which relief could be

motion to dismiss, the district court referred to section 9 as the source for
substantive due process protection.
3 Christiansen also unsuccessfully petitioned for federal relief by bringing a 42

U.S.C. § 1983 federal civil rights action against the Defendants. See Christiansen
v. Eral, et al., 52 F.4th 377, 379-81 (8th Cir. 2022) (dismissing excessive force and
substantive due process constitutional claims for failure to state a claim as Officer
Eral’s actions were objectively reasonable under Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372,
374-75 (2007), and from the complaint there were no facts that made the PIT
maneuver “so dangerous that it . . . evinces a malicious intent by Eral to harm
Christiansen”). The district court noted this finding in its ruling but refused to take
judicial notice of the opinion and based its ruling only on the facts and claims
alleged in the petition filed in the case before it. Because of the application of
Burnett, we see no need to rely upon the federal decision. But see Burnett, 990
N.W.2d at 303 (noting that excessive force claims are typically joined with § 1983
federal civil rights claims and the federal and state constitutional claims have risen
or fallen together).
5

granted under article I, sections 8 or 9 of the Iowa Constitution and that Iowa Code

sections 670.4(1)(k) and 670.12 provided immunity against the negligence,

negligent training and supervision, and respondeat superior claims as Officer Eral

was providing emergency response. Christiansen appeals.

II. Standard of Review.

We review the dismissal of the constitutional claims de novo. Burnett, 990

N.W.2d at 293. We review the dismissal of the remaining claims for correction of

errors at law. See Ortiz v. Loyd Roling Constr., 928 N.W.2d 651, 653 (Iowa 2019).

“In reviewing a ruling on a motion to dismiss, we accept the facts alleged in the

petition as true and view the allegations in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.”

White v. Harkrider, 990 N.W.2d 647, 650 (Iowa 2023) (cleaned up). “A party is

entitled to dismissal only if the petition shows the claim or claims are legally

deficient and the plaintiff has no right of recovery as a matter of law.” Id.; see also

Iowa R. Civ. P. 1.421(1)(f) (providing for dismissal based on failure to state a claim

upon which any relief may be granted).

III. Analysis.

Christiansen raises several arguments on appeal: (1) his claims of

unreasonable seizure by excessive force under article I, section 8 and of

substantive due process under article I, section 9 of the Iowa Constitution survive

after Burnett; (2) his negligence claim is not barred by any exemption from

immunity in Iowa Code section 670.4, and (3) his remaining claims, specific to

Chief Mueller and the City, likewise survive. We first address Christiansen’s

constitutional claims of unreasonable seizure by excessive force and substantive

due process violations against Officer Eral.
6

A. State Constitutional Tort Claims.

Because of a supreme court decision filed in May 2023—after the district

court ruled on the motion to dismiss—Iowa courts “no longer recognize a

standalone cause of action for money damages under the Iowa Constitution unless

authorized by the common law, an Iowa statute, or the express terms of a provision

of the Iowa Constitution.” Burnett, 990 N.W.2d at 307. And, after Burnett, our

supreme court has repeatedly found that there is no express, independent cause

of action for claims for monetary damages under article I, section 8 or 9 of the Iowa

Constitution. Venckus v. City of Iowa City, 990 N.W.2d 800, 803 (Iowa 2023)

(applying Burnett and ruling that “[t]he plaintiff’s constitutional tort claims cannot

go forward” under sections 8 or 9); White, 990 N.W.2d at 652 (applying Burnett

and holding that the plaintiff’s “constitutional tort claims” under section 8 “thus

cannot proceed”); Carter v. State, No. 21-0909, 2023 WL 3397451, at *1 (Iowa

May 12, 2023) (applying Burnett and determining that the “constitutional tort claims

therefore cannot proceed” under sections 8 and 9).

Here, Christiansen’s claims for money damages based on claims of

unreasonable seizure by excessive force under article I, section 8 and substantive

due process under article I, section 9 are thus barred from recovery after Burnett.

As an effort to work around the application of Burnett, Christiansen attempts to

salvage these claims by challenging Burnett’s retroactivity as a new rule. But our

supreme court has repeatedly applied Burnett to cases in which the appeals were

still pending at the time of the May 5, 2023 ruling in Burnett and concluded those

claims were barred. Venckus, 990 N.W.2d at 812 (decided on May 19, 2023);

White, 990 N.W.2d at 652 (decided May 12, 2023); Carter, 2023 WL 3397451, at
7

*2 (decided on May 12, 2023). In deciding Venckus, White, and Carter, our

supreme court adhered to the requirement that a new rule “applies to the case

creating the standard as well as all pending cases.” State v. Hahn, 961 N.W.2d

370, 372 (Iowa 2021); accord State v. Johnson, 539 N.W.2d 160, 165 (Iowa 1995)

(stating a new rule “applies to the present case, prospectively to cases pending at

the time this decision is filed, and to cases in which the issue resolved herein was

preserved”).

A panel of this court also recently stated the same and reversed and

remanded for a grant of summary judgment to the State on a constitutional tort

claim filed before May 5, 2023. See Dishman v. State, No. 22-1491, 2023 WL

8068563, at *3 (Iowa Ct. App. Nov. 21, 2023) (“[W]e conclude Iowa no longer

recognizes Godfrey constitutional tort claims, whether on file before Burnett or

not . . . .”). Therefore, we find that Christiansen’s constitutional tort claims cannot

proceed based on our supreme court’s holding in and the subsequent application

of Burnett in cases pending at the time of the decision.

B. Common Law Negligence Claim.

Still as Burnett confirmed, there are “two paths for a plaintiff to go to court

and recover money damages: the common law and positive law.” 990 N.W.2d at

305. And recognizing that alternative path, Christiansen asserts that the district

court improperly dismissed his common law negligence claim against Officer Eral
8

after wrongly ruling that the Defendants had statutory immunity under Iowa Code

section 670.4(1)(k).4 Section 670.4(1)(k) provides:

1. The liability imposed by section 670.2 shall have no application to
any claim enumerated in this section. As to any of the following
claims, a municipality shall be liable only to the extent liability may
be imposed by the express statute dealing with such claims and, in
the absence of such express statute, the municipality shall be
immune from liability:
....
k. A claim based upon or arising out of an act or omission
of a municipality in connection with an emergency response
including but not limited to acts or omissions in connection with
emergency response communications services.

(Emphasis added.)

Thus, under this emergency response exemption from civil liability,

Christiansen’s negligence claim should fail, but Christiansen maintains the

analysis is more complicated than that. The Defendants contend municipal

immunity does apply to Officer Eral’s emergency response and, in any event,

Officer Eral’s actions were lawful.

To start we consider the Defendants’ first argument that Officer Eral’s

actions were lawful as a matter of law. “A party is entitled to dismissal only if the

4 The Defendants also argued for immunity under section 670.4(1)(c), but the
district court denied that defense after finding “[u]pon examination of the Petition,
the Court finds that the Petition, taken as true and resolving any doubts or
ambiguities in favor of the Plaintiff, establishes that Officer Eral was not (or at least
may not have been) acting with due care.” (Emphasis added.) Section 670.4(1)(c)
provides:
Any claim based upon an act or omission of an officer or
employee of the municipality, exercising due care, in the execution
of a statute, ordinance, or regulation whether the statute, ordinance
or regulation is valid, or based upon the exercise or performance or
the failure to exercise or perform a discretionary function or duty on
the part of the municipality or an officer or employee of the
municipality, whether or not the discretion is abused.
(Emphasis added.) The Defendants dispute this finding.
9

petition shows the claim or claims are legally deficient and the plaintiff has no right

of recovery as a matter of law.” White, 990 N.W.2d at 650 (noting a motion to

dismiss challenges the petition’s legal sufficiency). To this point, the Defendants

emphasize if a suspect is fleeing law enforcement, the officer may use force that

is reasonable to effectuate a seizure, including a PIT maneuver. And in fact, in a

federal action filed by Christiansen on these same facts, only as to a claim under

the United States Constitution, the Eighth Circuit determined Officer Eral’s use of

a PIT maneuver was constitutionally reasonable as a matter of law. See

Christiansen, 52 F.4th at 381 (“We think that the complaint demonstrates only that

Eral made a split-second decision in a high-pressure circumstance to end a chase

in a manner that the Supreme Court has already blessed . . . .”); but see Planned

Parenthood of the Heartland, Inc. v. Reynolds, 962 N.W.2d 37, 46 (Iowa 2021)

(“While federal precedent is instructive when interpreting Iowa’s similar equal

protection provisions, we are not bound to follow federal analysis in construing

Iowa’s constitutional provisions.”).

In Christiansen’s federal case, the Eighth Circuit court found guidance in

the holding in a similar case decided by the Supreme Court. See generally Scott

v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372 (2007). In Scott, the threshold question involving the Fourth

Amendment of the United States Constitution was “[t]aken in the light most

favorable to the party asserting the injury, do the facts alleged show the officer’s

conduct violated a constitutional right?” Id. at 377. The answer was no. Id. at

382. Scott laid down a rule that “[a] police officer’s attempt to terminate a

dangerous high-speed car chase that threatens the lives of innocent bystanders

does not violate the Fourth Amendment, even when it places the fleeing motorist
10

at risk of serious injury or death.” Id. at 386. Like Scott, from the facts gleaned

from Christiansen’s petition, he failed to stop for law enforcement and then led the

officers on a chase through city streets, at speeds ranging between fifty and eighty

miles per hour.

Our supreme court in State v. Shears, a case involving a high-speed chase

with similar facts to those here, held that “a reasonable fact finder could conclude

under the circumstances of [that] case that it was foreseeable that police would

engage in [a PIT maneuver] to apprehend the speeding Shears and that police

vehicles could be damaged in the effort to bring Shears’s vehicle to a halt.” 920

N.W.2d 527, 541 (Iowa 2018) (addressing restitution damages to the officer’s

vehicle caused by use of a PIT maneuver). Thus, considering as persuasive the

federal court ruling that Officer Eral’s actions were objectively reasonable such that

he did not violate Christiansen’s constitution rights during the seizure and because

we have no Iowa case that rejects the rule developed in Scott for the purpose of

claims brought under the Iowa Constitution, we conclude that Officer Eral’s actions

cannot be negligent because they were authorized under the law. See Burnett,

990 N.W.2d at 299 (“The common law tradition permitted common law claims

against local law enforcement officials for tortious actions taken in excess of their

authority.” (emphasis added)).

And even if the officer’s actions were legal under the constitutional

standards but negligent under our common law, we find qualified immunity applies

in this case. Iowa Code chapter 670 establishes parameters for tort liability for

negligent acts and omissions by a municipality or its officers or employees.

Keystone Elec. Mfg., Co. v. City of Des Moines, 586 N.W.2d 340, 345–46 (Iowa
11

1998). As a panel of our court noted, because a municipality is “subject to liability

under chapter 670, . . . fairness dictates that it also benefit from the immunities

listed in section 670.4.” Harrod v. City of Council Bluffs, No. 07-0864, 2008 WL

2200083, at *3 (Iowa Ct. App. May 29, 2008).

Yet, as Christiansen argues, section 670.4 is applicable only if there is not

an “express statute dealing with such claims” and, if there is not, “in the absence

of such express statute, the municipality shall be immune from liability.” Iowa Code

§ 670.4(1) (emphasis added). Christiansen directs us to the language in Hoffert v.

Luze, 578 N.W.2d 681, 683 (Iowa 1998). In Hoffert, Christiansen emphasizes that

our supreme court referred to section 321.231 as an express statute when

addressing the interplay of then section 670.4(11) (renumbered section 670.4(1)(k)

in the 2019 Code) and 321.231, just as we are asked to do here.5 Id. (referencing

section 321.231 as an express statute dealing with claims regarding emergency

response vehicles after discussion of the introductory paragraph in chapter 670);

see also McClellan, 2019 WL 2375244, at *3. But Hoffert found that the ambulance

driver and the city could be held liable “only to the extent liability may be imposed

by section 321.231.” 578 N.W.2d at 683. Thus, we need to square the use of the

term “express” in Hoffert with the facts developed here. In 2019, section

321.231(5) generally provided that the emergency vehicle driver must drive “with

5 We look to the Code in force at the time the action giving rise to the claim

occurred. See Hoffert, 578 N.W.2d at 681–82 (noting the action occurred in 1995
and thus analyzing the applicability of chapter 668 and sections 321.231,
670.4(11), and 670.12 in the 1995 Code); McClellan v. Orlando Ramirez, No. 18-
1974, 2019 WL 2375244, at *1 (Iowa Ct. App. June 5, 2019) (noting the action
occurred in 2016 and applying sections 321.231 and 670.4(1)(k) from the 2016
Code).
12

due regard for the safety of all persons,” and the statute does not “protect the driver

. . . from the consequences of the driver’s . . . reckless disregard for the safety of

others.” (Emphasis added.) Christiansen points to section 321.231(5) and

maintains it is an express statute that deals with claims governing the operator of

an emergency response vehicle. Thus, Christiansen urges it should control and

guide the analysis over whether liability should be imposed under his common law

negligence claim arising from use of the PIT maneuver.

Effective May 24, 2022, subsection (5) was renumbered to 321.231(6) and

a specific section related to PIT maneuvers was added to the chapter as Iowa

Code section 321.231(4) (Supp. 2022). See 2022 Iowa Acts ch. 1087, § 3; see

also Iowa Code § 4.5 (“A statute is presumed to be prospective in its operation

unless expressly made retrospective.”). Since the 2022 amendment, section

321.231(4) deals expressly with PIT maneuvers and reads “[a] peace officer

operating an authorized emergency vehicle may execute a [PIT] if such execution

is reasonable under the circumstances . . . . This subsection shall not be construed

to limit a peace officer’s objectively reasonable use of force in connection with a

pursuit.” We agree that this section cannot apply retroactively to this case. But

even so, did Iowa Code section 321.231 (2019) operate as an express statute

governing this claim when it did not specifically include the emergency PIT action?

We think not.

As the district court saw it, because the language in section 321.231(4)

(Supp. 2022) related to PIT maneuvers came after the conduct giving rise to this

action—the execution of the PIT maneuver on June 2, 2019—there was not an
13

express statute that applied to remove the immunity provided under chapter 670.

The district court stated in its written ruling:

However, despite the applicability of section 321.231, the
Court, upon examination of that statutory provision, finds that it was
not, at least in June of 2019, “an express statute dealing with such
claims” as are enumerated in section 670.4(1). Rather,
section 321.231 (at that time) merely provided that the driver of an
authorized emergency vehicle, under the circumstances set forth,
“may exercise the privileges set forth in this section,” which privileges
consist of a listing of various traffic regulations which the driver is
authorized to disregard, and also includes a statement (in subsection
(5)), that the granting of these privileges does not abrogate the duty
of due care, which falls far short of rendering section 321.231 an
“express statute dealing with such claims” as are enumerated in
section 670.4(1) as Plaintiff urges.
The Court acknowledges, without so finding, that after the
2022 amendment to section 321.231, the current statute may well be
“an express statute dealing with such claims” as are enumerated in
section 670.4(1), but finds that as the statute existed in June of 2019
it was not such an express statute and therefore it does not preempt
any immunity imposed by section 670.4(1).

We turn back to the immunity section utilized in the district court’s decision.

See Adams v. City of Des Moines, 629 N.W.2d 367, 370–71 (Iowa 2001)

(analyzing the “emergency response” exemption).6 Emergency response involving

“a high-speed chase of a fleeing criminal suspect falls within the . . . broad definition

of an emergency response.” Cubit ex rel. Cubit v. Mahaska Cnty., No. 02-1478,

2003 WL 21920399, at *2 (Iowa Ct. App. Aug. 13, 2003). Likewise, the emergency

6 At the time Adams was decided, the emergency response exemption was
contained in Iowa Code section 670.4(11) (2001). However, the language is
identical to section 670.4(1)(k) in the 2022 Code. The subsections were
renumbered in 2013. See 2013 Iowa Acts ch. 30, § 196. Likewise, Adams refers
to the emergency response “exemption.” 629 N.W.2d at 370–71. We recognize
that this is also called the emergency response “exception.” Keystone Elec., 586
N.W.2d at 346. However, we stick with the terminology from Adams and other
cases. See, e.g., Kershner v. City of Burlington, 618 N.W.2d 340, 343 (Iowa 2000)
(including the heading “[i]mmunity under Iowa Code section 670.4(11), the
emergency response exemption”).
14

response exemption still applies even if a municipal department fails to follow its

own internal policy. See Kershner, 618 N.W.2d at 345–46 (“We also find no

evidence that the city, by adoption of the written . . . policy, intended to impose on

itself or its employees a mandatory duty of care toward persons within the city so

as to provide a basis of civil liability for damages . . . .”). Regarding claims over

Officer Eral’s and Chief Mueller’s personal liability, “[a]ll officers and employees of

municipalities are not personally liable for claims which are exempted under

section 670.4 . . . .” Iowa Code § 670.12 (2019).

We believe the district court’s analysis comports with our statutory

construction rules as well. See Jahnke v. Inc. City of Des Moines, 191 N.W.2d

780, 787 (Iowa 1971) (“In discovering [the legislative] intent, we consider the

language used, the purposes to be served and the evil sought to be remedied. We

assume the legislature knew the existing state of the law and prior judicial

interpretations of similar statutory provisions.”). If the language of section 321.231

was to address the application of immunity for all behaviors involved during an

emergency response, it would make no sense for the legislature to retain

section 670.4(1)(k). And section 321.231 would expressly state that instead of

setting out specific “express” actions that are applicable under the statute.

Because Christiansen’s claim arose from an emergency response but, in

particular, from the decision to utilize the PIT maneuver, the alleged tortious action

was not from the specific list of when officers are entitled to a “special privilege”

under the 2019 statute, so there was no statute expressly “dealing with such

claims.” “The statute [section 321.231] sets forth certain exceptions from the rule

of the road that drivers of emergency vehicles may exercise when responding to
15

emergency calls.” McClellan, 2019 WL 2375244, at *3; cf. City of Cedar Rapids v.

Moses, 223 N.W.2d 263, 268 (Iowa 1974) (applying the exemptions granting

special driving privileges to the operation of emergency vehicles applicable at that

time to specifically named operations of the emergency vehicle and, because

traveling left of the centerline was not specifically stated, concluding the officer’s

conduct in doing so was not part of the specific exemption for liability). But none

of those listed exceptions related to the use of a PIT maneuver, and so the

Defendants cannot be held liable “to the extent liability may be imposed by” section

321.231. Thus, the Defendants were exempt from liability for “[a] claim based upon

or arising out of an act or omission in connection with an emergency response”

under section 670.4(1)(k) and as to the personal liability of Officer Eral; his actions

in responding to the emergency are likewise covered by the immunity offered

under sections 670.4(1)(k) and 670.12. The district court correctly dismissed

Christiansen’s common law negligence claim against Officer Eral.

C. Negligent Training and Supervision and Respondeat Superior

Claims.

Lastly, Christiansen argues that the district court should not have dismissed

his remaining claims against Chief Mueller and the City. He conceded at oral

argument that if the district court was correct, Christiansen’s claims against these

other defendants are not viable. But, in the absence of state constitutional

violations and, as we have already found that the emergency response exemption

shields against tort liability, Christiansen’s negligent training and supervision and

respondeat superior claims necessarily fail as well; the district court did not err in

concluding the same. Iowa Code §§ 670.4(1)(k), .12; Schoff v. Combined Ins. Co.
16

of Am., 604 N.W.2d 43, 53 (Iowa 1999) (“[A]n employer cannot be held liable for

negligent supervision or training where the conduct that proper supervision and

training would have avoided is not actionable against the employee.”); Dickens v.

Assoc’d Anesthesiologists, P.C., 709 N.W.2d 122, 125 (Iowa 2006) (finding that

under respondeat superior “the employer is vicariously liable for the negligent acts

of its employees” only).

IV. Conclusion.

We conclude that Burnett bars recovery for Christiansen’s constitutional tort

claims. As for his common law tort claims, the district court properly ruled that

Officer Eral’s actions are exempted from liability under the emergency response

exemption and, as the underlying claim fails, Christiansen’s negligent training and

supervision and respondeat superior claims do not survive. We affirm the district

court’s dismissal of all claims for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be

granted.

AFFIRMED.