State of Iowa v. Tommy Quinn Jr.

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA

No. 22-1734
Filed April 10, 2024

STATE OF IOWA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,

vs.

TOMMY QUINN JR.,
Defendant-Appellant.
________________________________________________________________

Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Scott County, Christine Dalton,

Judge.

A defendant appeals the waiver of his right to counsel. AFFIRMED.

Cathleen J. Siebrecht of Siebrecht Law Firm, Pleasant Hill, for appellant.

Brenna Bird, Attorney General, and Thomas J. Ogden, Assistant Attorney

General, for appellee.

Considered by Bower, C.J., and Greer and Chicchelly, JJ.
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BOWER, Chief Judge.

Tommy Quinn Jr. appeals his conviction for assault causing bodily injury,

alleging his waiver of counsel was not knowing and intelligent as required by the

Sixth Amendment. 1 Because the court engaged in a meaningful colloquy with

Quinn regarding his desire to waive counsel and proceed with standby counsel,

we affirm.

I. Background Facts and Proceedings

In the early-morning hours of December 19, 2021, Quinn was involved in a

fight with his paramour, Decembra Roberts. The specific details regarding the

altercation that led to the arrest are not at issue on appeal. Quinn was

subsequently arrested and charged with assault causing bodily injury. Quinn

entered a plea of not guilty.

On the day of the pretrial conference, Quinn requested court-appointed

counsel. The district court appointed the state public defender to represent Quinn

and specifically noted the appointment was for “stand by counsel.” The originally

appointed counsel withdrew due to an excessive caseload, and the court

appointed another attorney to represent Quinn. The trial was then rescheduled

from April 2022 to August 15, 2022.

Quinn’s newly appointed attorney filed a motion to withdraw as counsel at

the final pretrial conference on August 11, 2022. In the motion to withdraw, counsel

1
To the extent Quinn claims his rights under the Iowa Constitution were also
violated, he has not argued article 1, section 10 of the Iowa Constitution should be
interpreted differently than the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution,
so “we construe the provisions identically.” State v. Shipley, 757 N.W.2d 228, 234
(Iowa 2008).
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highlighted Quinn’s reluctance to discuss his case as the primary reason for the

request. On the day of trial, the court discussed on the record with Quinn his desire

to represent himself. The court had the following exchange concerning Quinn’s

request to proceed pro se or with standby counsel:

Q. [COURT] It looks like the motion to withdraw was filed on
Thursday. Was that at your request; did you want her to withdraw?
A. [QUINN]: Yes, I did.
Q. Have you talked to her since and changed your mind at all?
A. No, I have not.
Q. Okay, so why do you want to fire your attorney?
A. Well, I didn’t hire one even to begin with. But I just want to
get up here, plead my case, and if I go to jail, I go to jail.

The court then explained to Quinn the benefit of an attorney at trial and

available options:

Q. Okay. Well, you’ve asked to have a trial, so the State is
going to have to prove the case against you beyond a reasonable
doubt.
A. Yes, understandable.
Q. They’ll probably call witnesses. They may even have some
exhibits, you know, pictures or videos or some hard evidence of
some sort. And attorneys are handy to know what to object to and
what not to object to. That is testimony, like hearsay is sometimes
hard to identify. Some people have no problems, but some of it is a
little harder to identify right off the bat, and attorneys can often see
that as it’s coming in and object before it comes in. You have really
three choices. You can have the attorney represent you. You can
have the attorney not represent you. But there’s a third choice that’s
in between the two, and that’s where you have an attorney but they
are called standby counsel. So they would stand by you or sit by
you, and if you had a question of if, like, there’s something
objectionable coming in, she’d probably tug on your sleeve and go—
A. I requested—in the very beginning I requested standby
counsel.
Q. Okay.

Quinn then explained he was confused with logistical aspects of the

proceedings on the day of trial but reaffirmed his desire for standby counsel to be

present.
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A. [QUINN] But when I got here Thursday there was so much
confusion that it seemed like, that wasn’t on my part, that I just
rejected counsel period.
Q. Uh-huh. So you want standby counsel?
A. I requested it at the beginning, but—and then I got here
today, and I’m in courtroom 7 from a quarter till 1 until I go
somewhere else and go—
Q. We were going to have a jury trial in this room, but the
person ended up pleading, so they switched it to my calendar—
A. Understandable but—
Q. —and then they moved you. Okay.
A. There was just so much confusion going on, I—I figured if
I’m going to be confused, I would rather confuse myself.
Q. Okay. All we did was move the courtroom—
A. But even before—
Q. —we would have looked upstairs—
A. Yes, I understand.
[COURT REPORTER] I can only take one person at a time.
Q. So did you want standby counsel; yes or no?
A. Yes, I’ll take it.

The court then engaged in discussions with Quinn regarding his ability to

represent himself at trial. Quinn reassured the court of his ability and desire to

represent himself based on his background studying to be a paralegal and his

perception of court-appointed attorneys who had represented him in the past.

Further, Quinn shared he has an associate’s degree and runs his own business.

During the trial, Quinn was articulate; well-reasoned in his answers; and

knowledgeable about the trial process, his rights and responsibilities, and his

defense. Following the bench trial, the court found Quinn guilty of assault causing

bodily injury. On appeal, Quinn requests a new trial on grounds the court did not

determine he made a knowing and intelligent waiver of his right to counsel.

II. Standard of Review

We review de novo a defendant’s claim their Sixth Amendment right to

counsel was violated. State v. Martin, 608 N.W.2d 445, 449 (Iowa 2000).
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III. Discussion

On appeal, Quinn contends the district court failed to establish his decision

to represent himself at trial was knowing, voluntary, and intelligent.

The Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution affords a defendant

a right of self-representation. State v. Rater, 568 N.W.2d 655, 658 (Iowa 1997).

“[T]he right of self-representation is not effective until asserted.” Id. “[B]efore a

trial court honors an accused’s request to waive the right to counsel, it must satisfy

itself the defendant’s election is voluntary, knowing, and intelligent.” State v.

Stephenson, 608 N.W.2d 778, 782 (Iowa 2000). The court must engage in a

“meaningful colloquy” to determine whether a waiver of counsel is “competent and

intelligent.” State v. Cooley, 608 N.W.2d 9, 15 (Iowa 2000).

A sufficient colloquy will necessarily discuss “the nature of the charges, the

statutory offenses included within them, the range of allowable punishments

thereunder, possible defenses to the charges and circumstances in mitigation

thereof, and all other facts essential to a broad understanding of the whole matter.”

Id. In addition, the defendant must be “admonished as to the usefulness of an

attorney at that particular proceeding and, made cognizant of the danger in

continuing without counsel.” Id.

In this case the court conducted a sufficient, meaningful colloquy to ensure

Quinn knowingly waived his right to counsel. See id. The court discussed with

Quinn his reason for asking his attorney to withdraw. The court then discussed

with Quinn the usefulness of an attorney and presented his options of having an

attorney, having standby counsel, or proceeding pro se. See id. During the

discussion, the court inquired about Quinn’s age, education level, and occupation.
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Furthermore, the court engaged in discussion with Quinn prior to the start of trial

regarding the nature of the charges, including the lesser-included charges, and a

plea offer, which Quinn rejected. This inquiry by the court is ample to determine

Quinn knowingly and intelligently waived his right to counsel.

Quinn points to his confusion regarding what courtroom his trial would be in

to support his claim his decision to waive counsel was not done knowingly and

intelligently. During the dialogue where Quinn discussed his confusion about

which courtroom the case would be tried, Quinn stated he had requested standby

counsel since the beginning of the proceedings and then later reaffirmed his desire

for standby counsel when asked directly by the court, further showing his waiver

was knowing and voluntary.

Quinn also argues the appointment of standby counsel is insufficient to

satisfy his Sixth Amendment right to counsel when it has been violated. Quinn

relies on our supreme court’s holding in Rater, which held, “the appointment of

stand-by counsel is insufficient to satisfy the Sixth Amendment right to counsel

when the court has failed to conduct an inquiry to ensure the defendant’s waiver

of that right was knowing and intelligent.” 568 N.W.2d at 661. However, Rater is

distinguishable from the present case. In Rater, there was no colloquy between

the court and the defendant advising defendant he was entitled to counsel or

warning defendant of the risks of self-representation. Id. at 659. Here, as

discussed above, the district court engaged in a meaningful colloquy. See Cooley,

608 N.W.2d at 15. Furthermore, in Rater the defendant never made it clear he

wanted to represent himself, instead he repeatedly told the court he felt unqualified

to represent himself. Rater, 568 N.W.2d at 661–62. Here, the defendant was
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initially appointed standby counsel, never changed his position regarding standby

counsel, and had standby counsel present at trial.

Upon review of the record, we determine the court properly decided Quinn’s

waiver of his right to counsel was knowing, voluntary, and intelligent. See Cooley,

608 N.W.2d at 14.

AFFIRMED.