State of Iowa v. John Robert West

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA

No. 23-0973
Filed May 8, 2024

STATE OF IOWA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,

vs.

JOHN ROBERT WEST,
Defendant-Appellant.
________________________________________________________________

Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Muscatine County,

Henry W. Latham II, Judge.

A defendant appeals a conviction for false imprisonment and sentences

requiring him to complete sex offender treatment while in prison. CONVICTIONS

AFFIRMED AND SENTENCES VACATED IN PART.

Martha J. Lucey, State Appellate Defender, and Rachel C. Regenold,

Assistant Appellate Defender, for appellant.

Brenna Bird, Attorney General, and Katherine Wenman, Assistant Attorney

General, for appellee.

Considered by Tabor, P.J., and Badding and Buller, JJ.
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BADDING, Judge.

“I wanted to go home,” is what thirteen-year-old A.B. said when John West

was sexually abusing him in a locked motel room. A jury convicted West of third-

degree sexual abuse, lascivious acts with a child, and false imprisonment. He was

sentenced to a total term of imprisonment not to exceed twenty-one years and

ordered to complete sex offender treatment. West appeals, challenging the

sufficiency of the evidence supporting the confinement element of his conviction

for false imprisonment and claiming the district court “lacked authority to order sex

offender treatment.”

I. Sufficiency of the Evidence

We review West’s first claim for correction of errors at law, giving high

deference to the verdict. See State v. Burns, 988 N.W.2d 352, 370 (Iowa 2023).

“The jury’s verdict binds this court if the verdict is supported by substantial

evidence,” which is “evidence sufficient to convince a rational trier of fact the

defendant is guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.” State v. Jones, 967 N.W.2d 336,

339 (Iowa 2021). “In determining whether the jury’s verdict is supported by

substantial evidence, we view the evidence in the light most favorable to the State,

including all legitimate inferences and presumptions that may fairly and reasonably

be deduced from the record evidence.” Id. (citation omitted).

The record shows that A.B.’s weekend with West started with a lie. West is

an over-the-road truck driver. On his weeks off, West would stay at a motel and

spend time volunteering at a mission. A.B.’s family volunteered there too. West

befriended A.B. and his mother, eventually convincing her to let A.B. work with him

on his son’s farm for a weekend. Because A.B. wanted to earn some money, his
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mother agreed. But West’s son didn’t own a farm. Instead, West picked A.B. up

from the mission on a Friday evening after school and took the child to his motel

room. The first night, West and A.B. ordered pizza and watched a movie. The

next day, A.B. asked West if they were going to work, but West told him that it was

too muddy. So they ran some errands and watched football. When A.B. woke up

Sunday morning, his cell phone was missing. He had been using it to stay in

contact with his mother. West claimed that he didn’t know where it was, even

though they were the only two in the room.

That evening, A.B. was watching television when West told him to take a

shower. When A.B. was done, West had him put a towel down on one of the beds.

He then told A.B. to get baby oil and a hand towel from one of West’s bags. After

asking A.B., “Do you trust me?” West had the child lay down naked on the towel.

West rubbed the oil all over A.B.’s body, including his “penis and . . . balls.” A.B.

was scared and crying loudly, telling West that he wanted to go home. Concerned

about the noise, West told A.B. to stop crying or he would beat him. A.B. cried

louder, hoping that others at the motel would hear him. West promised to take

A.B. home but told him to wash the baby oil off first.

A.B. went into the bathroom and locked the door. He showered and put his

clothes on. When he came out of the bathroom, A.B. saw that the door to the

motel room was locked, with the chain on the door. West then told A.B. that

“whatever happened in the room stayed in the room.” Even though he felt trapped,

A.B. began to gather his things together. He asked West for his phone again, and

West threw it at him. Once he had his phone back, A.B. grabbed his bag and

unlocked the door with shaking hands. He ran outside and called his mom, crying,
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“[M]om, please come get me, mom, please come get me, I want to come home, I

want to come home.” West followed A.B. outside, but the child ran to a nearby

business to wait for his mom. Once they were back home, A.B. told his mom what

happened. The family confronted West at the mission the next day, and the police

were called.

During his interview with the police, West said that A.B. spent the weekend

with him to work at a friend’s sawmill. When the detectives questioned that story,

West admitted it was a lie to make himself “look better.” West denied touching

A.B. and claimed the child became “upset just out of the blue and decided to leave

on Sunday.” West’s story evolved at trial, where he testified that A.B. “went

ballistic” after he expressed concern about A.B.’s father using drugs and “that [the

Iowa Department of Health and Human Services] could get involved in the case if

they ever found out.” He thought A.B. made up the sexual abuse as retaliation

against him.

The jury didn’t believe West and convicted him of third-degree sexual

abuse, lascivious acts with a child, and false imprisonment. West only challenges

the sufficiency of the evidence on the “confinement” element of his false-

imprisonment conviction. For that count, the jury was instructed the State was

required to prove:

1. On or about January 16, 2022, the defendant
intentionally confined A.B.
2. A.B. was confined against his will.
3. The defendant did not have a reasonable belief that he
had a right or authority to confine A.B.

Accord Iowa Code § 710.7 (2022). The jury was further instructed that
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[c]onfinement requires more than what is included in the commission
of the crime of Sexual Abuse in the Third Degree and Lascivious Acts
with a Child.
A person is “confined” when his freedom to move about is
substantially restricted by force, threat, or deception. The person
may be confined either in the place where the restriction began or in
a place to which he has been removed.
In determining whether confinement exists, you may consider
whether:
1. The risk of harm to A.B. was substantially increased.
2. The risk of detection was significantly reduced.
3. Escape was made significantly easier.[1]

West argues that any confinement A.B. experienced in the motel room “was

incidental to the commission of sexual abuse and lascivious acts.” More

specifically, West contends that because A.B. “was able to get up and get dressed

and leave the motel with his belongings,” any force or threats described at trial

“were incidental to the abuse,” and he “in no way prevented” A.B. from leaving.

Upon viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the State, we reject these

arguments.

As the State asserts, “On Sunday night, A.B.’s movement was substantially

restricted to the motel room by West’s continuing deception.” The evidence

1 This definition of confinement comes from our supreme court’s opinion in State

v. Rich, 305 N.W.2d 729, 745 (Iowa 1981), which concluded that the terms
“confines” and “removes” in the kidnapping statute, Iowa Code section 710.1,
“require more than the confinement or removal that is an inherent incident of
commission of” the underlying crime. The State notes that although “the same
confinement definition has been used in the past for false imprisonment, see State
v. Sinder, 479 N.W.2d 622, 623–24 (Iowa Ct. App. 1991), the rationale for the
incidental rule” and its intensifiers does not apply to false imprisonment because,
unlike the statute criminalizing kidnapping, “false imprisonment already has
additional, built-in elements to prove beyond the underlying crimes.” Compare
Iowa Code § 710.1 with § 710.7. But, as the State recognizes, we need not reach
this issue because the unchallenged instructions became the law of the case. See
State v. Crawford, 974 N.W.2d 510, 521 (Iowa 2022). So we save that issue for
another day.
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showed that West took A.B.’s cell phone on Sunday morning, cutting off his ability

to contact his mother, who thought that he was busy working. See State v.

Sabasta, No. 13-0101, 2014 WL 4628943, at *2 (Iowa Ct. App. Sep. 17, 2014)

(noting that defendant “further isolated and confined” the victim by taking away her

cell phone); see also State v. Little, No. 10-1642, 2011 WL 5399202, at *1 (Iowa

Ct. App. Nov. 9, 2011) (concluding that a reasonable jury could have found that

defendant intended to confine the victim by, among other things, taking away the

victim’s “means of communication with the outside world”). During the abuse, A.B.

was naked and locked in the motel room with West, further increasing the risk of

harm and reducing the risk of detection. See State v. Griffin, 564 N.W.2d 370, 373

(Iowa 1997) (noting that by ordering the victim to take off her clothes before the

sexual assault, the kidnapper was able to keep her confined to the motel room,

which increased her risk of harm and lowered his chances of detection); State v.

Butts, No. 11-0069, 2011 WL 5867065, at *9 (Iowa Ct. App. Nov. 23, 2011) (finding

that the defendant’s actions in isolating a victim in an apartment with a locked door

reduced the risk that his actions would be detected). While West argues that

locking the door was a normal “security precaution most guests take,” our supreme

court recently reiterated, “evidence is not insubstantial merely because we may

draw different conclusions from it; the ultimate question is whether it supports the

finding actually made, not whether the evidence would support a different finding.”

State v. Brown, ____ N.W.3d ____, ____, 2024 WL 1684833, at *6 (Iowa 2024)

(cleaned up).

The period of confinement also exceeded the time it took West to sexually

abuse A.B. See State v. McGrew, 515 N.W.2d 36, 39 (Iowa 1994) (noting there is
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no minimum period of confinement). A.B. testified that West rubbed baby oil on

his private parts for about five to ten minutes, but an hour passed between the first

shower that West ordered him to take and the last. Cf. State v. Robinson, 859

N.W.2d 464, 478 (Iowa 2015) (noting the substantially-increased-risk-of-harm

prong may be satisfied if the “duration of confinement substantially exceeds that

of the underlying crime” and finding that was absent where there was only a “few

seconds of additional confinement” when the victim was dragged from the hallway

to the bedroom). During that hour, A.B. said that he felt trapped in the motel room.

West had threatened to beat him if he didn’t stop crying and told him that “whatever

happened in the room stayed in the room.” At some point—A.B. said it was outside

the motel room after he unlocked the door while West said it was inside—West

called a friend from the mission, who falsely told A.B. that his mother’s phone was

broken. A.B. knew this was a lie because he had already talked to his mother.

West then followed A.B. out of the motel room, telling him to get back inside, until

A.B. took off running.

Taken as a whole, this evidence was sufficient to convince a rational jury

beyond a reasonable doubt that A.B. was confined. We accordingly affirm West’s

conviction for false imprisonment.

II. Sentencing

West next claims, and the State agrees, that the district court exceeded its

authority by ordering him to complete sex offender treatment as part of its oral

pronouncement of sentences for his sexual abuse and lascivious acts convictions.

See State v. Gardner, No. 22-0422, 2023 WL 153509, at *2 (Iowa Ct. App.

Jan. 11, 2023) (agreeing with defendant that the court lacked statutory authority to
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order him to complete sex offender treatment while incarcerated); see also State

v. Smith, No. 18-2248, 2021 WL 1400772, at *3 (Iowa Ct. App. Apr. 14, 2021).

Although this directive was not repeated in the written sentencing order, the parties

also agree that when there is a discrepancy between the oral pronouncement of

sentence and the written judgment, the oral pronouncement controls. See State

v. Hess, 533 N.W.2d 525, 528 (Iowa 1995).

As a result, we vacate the district court’s order requiring West to complete

sex offender treatment as part of his sentences for third-degree sexual abuse and

lascivious acts with a child. We do not remand for entry of a corrected sentencing

order since the written judgment did not contain that directive.

CONVICTIONS AFFIRMED AND SENTENCES VACATED IN PART.