Justin Michael Stickrod v. State of Iowa

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA

No. 22-2104
Filed May 22, 2024

JUSTIN MICHAEL STICKROD,
Applicant-Appellant,

vs.

STATE OF IOWA,
Respondent-Appellee.
________________________________________________________________

Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Monroe County, Myron Gookin,

Judge.

Justin Stickrod appeals the district court’s denial of his application for

postconviction relief. AFFIRMED.

Denise M. Gonyea of McKelvie Law Office, Grinnell, for appellant.

Brenna Bird, Attorney General, and Louis S. Sloven, Assistant Attorney

General, for appellee.

Considered by Greer, P.J., and Ahlers and Buller, JJ.
2

AHLERS, Judge.

Following a jury trial, Justin Stickrod was convicted of sexual abuse in the

first degree and child endangerment resulting in serious injury. Our court affirmed

his convictions on appeal. See generally State v. Stickrod, No. 17-0509, 2018 WL

1433065 (Iowa Ct. App. Mar. 21, 2018). Stickrod then filed an application for

postconviction relief. In the application, he raised multiple claims of ineffective

assistance of trial counsel. The district court rejected the claims and denied

Stickrod’s application.

Stickrod appeals. He raises only one issue on appeal. He argues his trial

counsel was ineffective for failing to move for a mistrial after statements made by

a prospective juror during jury selection.

During jury selection, Stickrod’s trial counsel questioned the jurors on their

beliefs about a defendant’s need to present a defense, trying to educate them

about which party bears the burden of proof. Trial counsel asked the prospective

jurors whether a defendant should have to put forth a defense, sparking a

conversation with one of the prospective jurors. The following back-and-forth

between defense counsel and the prospective juror occurred:

DEFENSE COUNSEL: I am not talking about this case. I am
talking generally. That’s my hypothetical.
PROSPECTIVE JUROR: We have to hear the evidence
before we decide what it is.
DEFENSE COUNSEL: I understand that[.] I am talking
hypothetically. We’re not talking about this case. Right?
PROSPECTIVE JUROR: He is guilty.
DEFENSE COUNSEL: Who is guilty?
PROSPECTIVE JUROR: Whoever done it. He confessed he
done it.
....
DEFENSE COUNSEL: What if he did not present a defense,
any evidence?
3

PROSPECTIVE JUROR: Somebody has evidence
somewhere, either the prosecution or the defendant.
DEFENSE COUNSEL: And, again, [sir], specifically I am
talking about the defendant.
PROSPECTIVE JUROR: He is guilty.
DEFENSE COUNSEL: And nothing could change your mind
about that?
PROSEPCTIVE JUROR: No.

Stickrod’s counsel moved to strike the prospective juror for cause, but the

court allowed the State to ask a few follow-up questions. In response to this

questioning, the prospective juror affirmed that he would wait to make a decision

about Stickrod’s guilt until after he had heard all the evidence and that he would

not consider Stickrod to be guilty simply because he did not present his own

evidence. After confirming that the prospective juror would be willing to follow the

law and the court’s instructions, the court denied Stickrod’s for-cause challenge.

Stickrod used a peremptory challenge to strike the prospective juror.

We review ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claims de novo. State v.

Zacarias, 958 N.W.2d 573, 580 (Iowa 2021). The United States and Iowa

Constitutions guarantee defendants effective assistance of counsel. U.S. Const.

amend. VI; Iowa Const. art. I, § 10; Nguyen v. State, 878 N.W.2d 744, 750 (Iowa

2016). Applicants claiming ineffective assistance of counsel must prove by a

preponderance of the evidence that (1) their trial counsel failed to perform an

essential duty and (2) that such failure resulted in prejudice, which is established

by showing a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s failure to perform an

essential duty, the result of the proceeding would have been different. Dempsey

v. State, 860 N.W.2d 860, 868 (Iowa 2015). We presume Stickrod’s trial counsel

performed competently, recognizing the range of sound trial strategies counsel
4

may have been pursuing. See State v. Ondayog, 722 N.W.2d 778, 785 (Iowa

2006). “[M]ere mistakes in judgment normally do not rise to the level of ineffective

assistance of counsel.” Anfinson v. State, 758 N.W.2d 496, 501 (Iowa 2008)

(alteration in original) (quoting Ledezma v. State, 626 N.W.2d 134, 143 (Iowa

2001)). Even if Stickrod can prove his trial counsel breached an essential duty, he

must still prove prejudice by showing there is a reasonable likelihood the result of

his trial would have been different without counsel’s error. See State v. Thorndike,

860 N.W.2d 316, 320 (Iowa 2015). “If the claim lacks prejudice, it can be decided

on that ground alone without deciding whether the attorney performed deficiently.”

Sothman v. State, 967 N.W.2d 512, 522 (Iowa 2021) (quoting Ledezma, 626

N.W.2d at 142).

We exercise our discretion to decide this case on the prejudice prong.

Stickrod has failed to establish prejudice from trial counsel’s failure to request a

mistrial because Stickrod fails to explain how the outcome would have been

different if a mistrial had been granted and he was tried before a different jury.

Stickrod has not pointed to anything in the record suggesting other prospective

jurors shared the possible confusion expressed by the prospective juror at issue

regarding whether Stickrod had confessed or what the evidence against him would

be. At the time of the statement that “he confessed,” the lawyers had been

speaking to all prospective jurors in the hypothetical and, after the statement,

defense counsel continued to clarify that the discussion was not about Stickrod but

rather a hypothetical defendant. By the time of the exchange with the prospective

juror at issue, defense counsel had already discussed with all the prospective

jurors that Stickrod was presumed innocent until proved guilty and that it was the
5

State’s burden to prove Stickrod’s guilt. Both concepts were also briefly touched

on afterward. The statement that Stickrod was guilty and had confessed was

bookended by statements from the prospective juror at issue that he would have

to hear all the evidence before finding Stickrod guilty or not guilty and that he would

not necessarily find Stickrod guilty. These statements negate the concern that

other prospective jurors would somehow believe that Stickrod had confessed

based on the statements by the prospective juror at issue. Finally, when the

prosecutor followed up, the prospective juror at issue ended the dialogue by saying

it was taking too long to pick jurors, informing the rest of the prospective jurors that

impatience drove the statements by the prospective juror at issue. Thus, Stickrod

fails to show any confusion about the burden of proof or presumption of innocence

by other prospective jurors or that any other prospective jurors took the statements

by the prospective juror at issue to mean that Stickrod had confessed. See State

v. Neuendorf, 509 N.W.2d 743, 747 (Iowa 1993) (“Any claim that the jury that did

serve in the case was not impartial must be based on matters that appear of

record.”).

Moreover, the overwhelming evidence against Stickrod convinces us that a

new jury would still have found him guilty.1 In its opinion on direct appeal, this

court summarized the evidence presented at trial:

1 We note that State’s exhibits 15‒22 are missing from the underlying criminal

record submitted to our court. These exhibits are photographs, the contents of
which were described during the trial. The parties have not made these exhibits
an issue in this postconviction-relief proceeding, nor have they made any reference
or citation to them in their briefs. To avoid further delaying Stickrod’s appeal, and
because we are aware of what the photographs depict from our review of the trial
transcript, we have chosen to decide the appeal despite the absence of these
exhibits in our record.
6

On February 4, 2016, Stickrod was home alone with his two-
month-old daughter for approximately two and one-half hours while
his wife went to a doctor appointment and ran errands. Stickrod was
asleep or passed out when she returned. The baby was in a swing
wearing only a diaper and was crying in an unusual way. The mother
discovered blood in the infant’s diaper. She attempted to wake
Stickrod but was unable to do so. The mother took the child to the
county hospital.
Registered nurse Christine Arauco was the first person to
examine the baby girl, observing the child exhibited “mild distress”
whimpering and crying. Nurse practitioner Nicole Topliff noted the
child’s “vaginal opening was gaping” and bleeding. Nurses observed
tearing, bruising, redness, swelling, and a small amount of stool in
the vaginal area. The child’s mother testified a nurse informed her
that the child had been sexually abused. Law enforcement was
called.
The child was transported by ambulance to Blank’s [sic]
Children’s Hospital. Sexual assault nurse examiner Shannon
Knudsen and Dr. Kenneth McCann examined the baby upon arrival
at Blank and observed redness, swelling, bruising, and bleeding of
the external genitalia with bilateral lacerations of the hymen and
posterior fourchette. They also observed stool in the vaginal
vault. . . . Both the nurse and doctor opined the child’s injuries
resulted from inflicted trauma.
[With the child u]nder anesthesia, Dr. Onyebuchi Ukabiala, a
pediatric surgeon, was able to examine the child’s injuries further.
Dr. Ukabiala testified the bridge of tissue between the anal and
vaginal openings was “completely disrupted. It was torn. It was
blown apart.” . . .
....
Both Doctors Ukabiala and McCann opined the baby’s injuries
were caused by forcible attempted penetration.
....
Stickrod and the mother were the only caretakers on the day
of the injury. Stickrod was solely responsible for the child’s care
when the bloody diaper was first observed. Stickrod was sitting on
the sofa with the child when the mother left to run some errands.
When the mother returned she heard the child crying and Stickrod
was either passed out or asleep in bed. Medical testimony reflected
the injuries were from inflicted trauma.

Stickrod, 2018 WL 1433065, at *1‒3 (footnote omitted). Because Stickrod had

challenged his counsel’s failure to object to DNA evidence presented at trial on

direct appeal, the above account leaves out the fact that upon Stickrod’s arrest
7

later the same day, the police took his clothing and sent his underwear to the Iowa

Division of Criminal Investigation (DCI) crime lab for forensic testing. A DCI

technician testified to finding the child’s DNA inside the fly area of Stickrod’s

underwear. Even without considering the incriminating DNA evidence, our court

has already concluded there is “not a substantial likelihood of a different result.”

Id. at *3. Stickrod has not established any reasonable probability of a different

result at a second trial, so he has failed to show prejudice.

Stickrod failed to demonstrate any prejudice caused by his trial counsel’s

failure to move for a mistrial. As there is no substantial likelihood that a different

jury would come to a different result, we affirm.

AFFIRMED.