In re the Marriage of Shannon

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA

No. 23-0657
Filed July 3, 2024

IN RE THE MARRIAGE OF KARA JO SHANNON
AND CHRISTOPHER PATRICK SHANNON

Upon the Petition of
KARA JO SHANNON,
Petitioner-Appellant,

And Concerning
CHRISTOPHER PATRICK SHANNON,
Respondent-Appellee.
________________________________________________________________

Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Floyd County, Gregg R. Rosenbladt,

Judge.

A petitioner appeals from the physical care, child support, and property-

division provisions of a marriage dissolution decree. AFFIRMED AS MODIFIED.

Kevin D. Engels of Correll, Sheerer, Benson, Engels, Galles & Demro, PLC,

Cedar Falls, for appellant.

Rebecca A. Feiereisen of Trent Law Firm, PLC, Cedar Falls, for appellee.

Considered by Schumacher, P.J., Langholz, J., and Bower, S.J.*

*Senior judge assigned by order pursuant to Iowa Code section 602.9206

(2024).
2

LANGHOLZ, Judge.

Kara Shannon appeals from the decree dissolving her marriage with

Christopher Shannon. She argues that the district court should have placed their

children in her physical care rather than granting joint physical care to both parents.

She alternatively contends that the split of parenting time set by the court should

be considered placement in her physical care rather than joint physical care

because she has care for four overnights while Chris has only three overnights.

And so for either reason, she contends she should receive child support from Chris

rather than owing it to him. Finally, Kara challenges the district court’s property

and debt division. She contends that the court incorrectly found that Chris has a

personal loan from his mother, incorrectly valued his Discover-credit-card debt,

and made an inequitable division when it assigned four debts totaling $21,760 to

her without adjusting Chris’s equalization payment.

On our de novo review, giving the district court’s thoughtful decision due

deference, we agree that awarding joint physical care serves the best interests of

the children. And the joint-physical-care label is appropriate for the roughly equal

parenting schedule here. So Kara’s challenge to the child support calculation on

that basis fails. We also agree with the district court’s fact findings on the existence

of the personal loan and the amount of the Discover-credit-card debt. But Kara is

correct that property and debt division is inequitable given the parties’

circumstances because it is unequal. We thus increase Chris’s equalization

payment to Kara by $5347.50 to a modified amount of $10,654.50. We decline to

award appellate attorney fees to Chris.
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I. Background Facts and Proceedings

Kara and Chris Shannon married in 2003. They have four children, three

of whom are still minors.1 Their children have been successful academically and

active in extracurricular sports and music activities. And both parents have played

major roles in their children’s lives, transporting them to school, taking them to

appointments, volunteering as sports coaches, and attending their many events.

Kara works in education and obtained a master’s degree in the field in 2013.

She has flexible hours and her summers off, allowing her to spend much time

caring for the children. As of trial, her annual income was about $80,000.

Chris held different jobs during the parties’ marriage, such as a marketing

position with a newspaper and working for the Postal Service. Shortly before trial

he took a new job with a distribution center that requires him to work from 3:00 pm

to 1:00 am, Saturday through Tuesday. His income was about $50,000.

Kara and Chris separated in 2019 while living in Charles City. Kara and the

children moved out of the family home to another residence in Charles City. She

decided on the care schedule for the children—over Chris’s objections seeking

more parenting time—letting him visit one night a week and keep the children in

his care on alternating weekends.

In the summer of 2021, Kara petitioned for dissolution of their marriage and

moved with the children from Charles City to Readlyn. Chris stayed in Charles

City until their house sold in 2022. Then he also moved to Readlyn, where he still

resided at the time of trial.

1 At the time of the decree, their oldest child was also still a minor. But he is now
an adult and no longer subject to the decree.
4

Kara sought to have their children placed in her physical care with visitation

for Chris one weekday and every other weekend. On the other hand, Chris

requested joint physical care. The parties also disputed the proper calculation of

child support and the valuation and division of their assets and many debts.

After an October 2022 bench trial, the district court issued a decree

dissolving the parties’ marriage. The court awarded Kara and Chris joint legal

custody and joint physical care of the children. It reasoned that the case presents

“an ideal situation for shared physical care,” explaining, “[t]he parenting skills are

present. The experience with the children is present with each parent. The parents

reside close to one another. The parents have sufficient communication skills and

a sufficient concept of coparenting.” The court thus concluded that the parties

“should split parenting time with the children as evenly as possible,” and to

accommodate Chris’s work schedule, set Chris’s parenting time for Wednesday

morning through Saturday midday, while Kara had the children the rest of the

week. And given its joint-physical-care placement, the court calculated the parties’

child-support obligation based on the offset method under Iowa Court Rule 9.14(3),

ordering Kara to pay Chris child support in gradually decreasing amounts.

The court also divided the parties’ marital assets and debts, attempting to

ensure an equal balance between the parties. Because the court concluded that

its division left Chris with a slightly greater value, it ordered Chris to pay Kara a

$3307 equalization payment to balance the division. The court did not award

spousal support or attorney fees to either party.

Both parties moved to amend or enlarge the decree’s property division—

among other provisions—under Iowa Rule of Civil Procedure 1.904(2). As relevant
5

here, Chris argued that the district court incorrectly divided his $15,000 share of

the equity from the sale of their Charles City home when Kara had already received

her $15,000 from the proceeds of that sale outside the property division. And he

asked the court to award a $500 trailer to Kara—as she had testified during trial

she would accept—and adjust their valuations accordingly.

Kara agreed with Chris on both those points. But she also argued that the

court overlooked $21,760 of her credit-card debts and two of Chris’s life insurance

policies worth $4435 that were not included in the division. And she contended

that one of Chris’s credit-card debts in the division improperly included $4000 used

to pay Chris’s attorney fees that should be excluded. She thus contended that

recalculating the division to account for these errors warranted an increased

equalization payment to her. In response, Chris agreed to resolving each of those

property-division issues as proposed by Kara, while contesting other parts of the

motion that are no longer relevant on appeal.

The court granted the motions in part. It assigned the credit-card debts and

the trailer to Kara but did not adjust the equalization payment to account for those

changes in the division. It also recognized Chris’s agreement to remove the $4000

in attorney fees from his assigned debt as requested by Kara and modified the

order accordingly. The court did not address Kara’s uncontested request to

include Chris’s life insurance policies in his asset valuation or Chris’s uncontested

request to correct the redundant division of his $15,000 in equity from the sale of

their Charles City home.

Kara now appeals. And Chris seeks an award of appellate attorney fees.
6

II. Physical Care

Kara first challenges the district court’s decision to place the children in the

parties’ joint physical care rather than in her physical care alone with only visitation

for Chris. She argues that the children’s success academically and socially while

mainly in her care during the three-year period of separation before the decree and

the parties’ difficulty communicating shows it is in the children’s best interests to

place them in her care permanently.

We review the district court’s physical-care placement de novo. See In re

Marriage of Fennelly & Breckenfelder, 737 N.W.2d 97, 100 (Iowa 2007). But a

district court “is greatly helped in making a wise decision about the parties by

listening to them and watching them in person,” while we are limited to the cold,

printed record and thus “denied the impression created by the demeanor of each

and every witness.” In re Marriage of Vrban, 359 N.W.2d 420, 423 (Iowa 1984)

(cleaned up). So we give weight to a district court’s fact findings—especially those

based on credibility determinations—even though they are not binding on us. See

id.; Iowa R. App. P. 6.904(3)(g).

Our overriding consideration is the best interests of the children, not the

“perceived fairness to the spouses.” In re Marriage of Hansen, 733 N.W.2d

683, 695 (Iowa 2007); Iowa Code § 598.41(3) (2021). The factors in Iowa Code

section 598.41(3) and In re Marriage of Winter, 223 N.W.2d 165, 166–67 (Iowa

1974), guide us in discerning the best interests. See Fennelly, 737 N.W.2d at 101.

And our goal “is to place the children in the environment most likely to bring them

to health, both physically and mentally, and to social maturity.” Hansen, 733

N.W.2d at 695.
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Joint physical care is neither favored nor disfavored. See id. at 700. It may

be awarded “upon the request of either parent” when the court awards joint legal

custody. Iowa Code § 598.41(5). And the most important factors in considering

whether it is in the children’s best interests are often the “overriding interest in

stability and continuity, the degree of communication and mutual respect, the

degree of discord and conflict prior to dissolution, and the extent to which the

parties agree on matters involving routine care.” Hansen, 733 N.W.2d at 700.

Like the district court, we agree that joint physical care is in the children’s

best interests. The district court found both parents are very involved in their

children’s robust lives—sacrificing time and energy to actively participate and be

present. We agree. Kara and Chris have strong parenting skills and have taken

big roles in their kids’ academic and extracurricular lives, guiding them along and

pushing them to be well-rounded individuals. This was so for Chris even though

Kara unilaterally limited the time the children could stay with him in his care

overnight—and thus we give little weight to the informal parenting schedule used

during their separation. Since each parent is a suitable physical custodian for the

children, a stable continuation of them both having important roles in the caretaking

is in the children’s best interests. “[L]ong-term, successful, joint care is a significant

factor in considering the viability of joint physical care after” dissolution. Id. at 697.

True, the parties’ degree of conflict and their ability to communicate and

show mutual respect weighs less strongly in favor of joint physical care. Both

parties testified that their communication is challenging and at times strained.

Chris prefers texting to phone calls to keep the conversation from divulging into

insults. Kara rated the parties’ communication abilities as low.
8

But the court found that their communication skills were improving as they

transitioned from separated spouses to co-parents. And the district court

applauded the parties for not spending “excessive time criticizing and attacking the

other party” during the trial to make themselves appear better suited. “[T]ension

between the parents is not alone sufficient to demonstrate [shared physical care]

will not work.” In re Marriage of Bolin, 336 N.W.2d 441, 446 (Iowa 1983). The

parties’ previous troubles in communication do not rise above the “usual acrimony

that accompanies a divorce.” In re Marriage of Ertmann, 376 N.W.2d 918, 920

(Iowa Ct. App. 1985). We find the current communication and level of respect

between the parties not to be a substantial impediment to shared physical care.

Finally, both parents appear to be on the same page as to parenting style.

They participate in and encourage their children’s wide-ranging extracurricular

ventures. They worked together on school registrations and also both agreed to

pursue medical care for a child.

In sum, we agree with the district court’s assessment that the circumstances

here present “an ideal situation for shared physical care.” We thus affirm the

district court’s placement of the children in their joint physical care.

III. Child Support Calculation Based on Joint Physical Care

Kara next argues that the district court erred in calculating the parties’ child-

support obligations based on the offset method for cases involving joint physical

care under Iowa Court Rule 9.14(3). She first contends that applying this rule was

in error because the court should not have placed the children in the parties’ joint

physical care. But that argument fails because we have affirmed the joint-physical-

care placement.
9

Kara also contends that the parties’ physical-care arrangement is not really

joint physical care—and “is actually one where Kara is awarded primary physical

care of the children, subject to extraordinary visitation for Chris.” True, the care

schedule ordered by the court is not precisely equal—the children are generally in

Kara’s care four nights a week and Chris’s three nights a week. But this matters

not. While a joint-physical-care award should provide “roughly equal” time in each

parent’s care, “it does not require that residential arrangements be determined with

mathematical precision.” In re Seay, 746 N.W.2d 833, 835–36 (Iowa 2008)

(cleaned up). The critical difference between an award of joint physical care to

both parents and an award of physical care to one parent with visitation for the

other is that “neither parent has physical care rights superior to those of the other

parent.” Iowa Code § 598.1(4); see Seay, 746 N.W.2d at 835–36 (noting that “joint

physical care does require equal responsibility on routine, daily decision-making”).

And so, when the court awards joint physical care, the court must apply the offset

method for calculating child support under Iowa Court Rule 9.14, even if the

parenting schedule is not precisely equal. See Seay, 746 N.W.2d at 836.

Here, there is no question from the text of the decree that the district court

ordered joint physical care rather than awarding physical care to Kara and

visitation to Chris.2 See In re Marriage of Brown, 778 N.W.2d 47, 50–51 (Iowa Ct.

2 The district court’s decree—like many opinions and briefs—uses the term “shared

physical care” rather than the statutory term “joint physical care.” See Iowa Code
§§ 598.1(4), .41(5). But the terms are often used synonymously—as the district
court’s analysis makes clear it did here. See In re Marriage of Ferguson,
No. 21-0952, 2022 WL 1486508, at *2 n.1 (Iowa Ct. App. May 11, 2022); In re
Marriage of Diercks, No. 21-0869, 2022 WL 951047, at *1 n.2 (Iowa Ct. App.
Mar. 30, 2022).
10

App. 2009). And the care schedule is roughly equal even though not precisely so.

Thus, the court did not err in applying Iowa Court Rule 9.14(3)—indeed it was

required to do so. See Iowa Ct. R. 9.14(3) (“In cases of court-ordered joint (equally

shared) physical care, child support shall be calculated as shown below in the Joint

(Equally Shared) Physical Care Method of Child Support Computation grid.”);

Seay, 746 N.W.2d at 836. Kara has not argued—on appeal or in the district court—

for a departure from the guideline calculation. See Seay, 746 N.W.2d at 836

(explaining that guideline calculation “is presumptively valid but may be varied if

the district court makes written findings that application of the guidelines would be

unjust or inappropriate”). And so, we affirm the district court’s child-support award.

IV. Division of Property and Debt

Kara’s final three challenges to the decree are all to the court’s division of

the marital property and debts. In a dissolution decree, “[t]he court shall divide all

property, except inherited property or gifts received or expected by one party,

equitably between the parties.” Iowa Code § 598.21(5); see also In re Marriage of

Sullins, 715 N.W.2d 242, 247 (Iowa 2006) (“Iowa is an equitable distribution

state.”). This division must include the marital debts as well. See Sullins, 715

N.W.2d at 251. A court must decide what is equitable “in light of the particular

circumstances of the parties” and considering the factors in Iowa Code

section 598.21(5). Sullins, 715 N.W.2d at 247 (cleaned up). While an equal

division is not always required, “it is generally recognized that equality is often most

equitable.” In re Marriage of Kimbro, 826 N.W.2d 696, 703 (Iowa 2013) (cleaned

up).
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As with the other aspects of the dissolution decree, we review the property

division de novo. But we will only modify the district court’s division on appeal

“when there has been a failure to do equity.” Id. at 698 (cleaned up). And

“[o]rdinarily, a trial court’s valuation” of marriage property “will not be disturbed

when it is within the range of permissible evidence,” especially “when valuations

are accompanied by supporting credibility findings or corroborating evidence.”

Hansen, 733 N.W.2d at 703.

Kara first argues that the evidence does not support the district court’s

finding that Chris has a $15,000 personal loan from his mother. And true, Chris

presented no documentary evidence supporting the existence of this loan, did not

call his mother to testify, and testified that the amount of the loan was higher than

the amounts he first included on his affidavit of financial status or the pretrial

stipulation.3 But the district court believed Chris about the loan’s existence and

valued it at the lowest of the three claimed amounts. This is precisely the sort of

factfinding and credibility determination to which we defer even on our de novo

appellate review. See id. Chris testified, including under probing cross-

examination, about the loan’s existence and value. The district court relied on this.

And based on our review of the evidentiary record, we see no reason to disturb the

court’s findings on the existence or amount of this marital debt.

3 In the parties’ pretrial stipulation describing agreed and contested issues, Chris

listed the loan amount as $15,000 (and Kara disclaimed any knowledge of the
debt). In his affidavit of financial status, he claimed $19,000. And in his trial
testimony, he said it had increased to $25,000 due to additional expenses
supporting the children and paying the parties’ mortgages. Chris does not cross-
appeal the district court’s decision to value the loan at a lower amount.
12

Kara also challenges the district court’s valuation of Chris’s Discover-credit-

card debt. She contends that its value should be reduced by $4500 because the

district court relied on Chris’s trial testimony that his balance was $25,000 despite

a credit-card statement from eleven months before showing that the credit limit on

that card was only $20,500. But given the deference we give the district court’s

factual findings and credibility determinations, we see no reason to disturb this

valuation either.

Chris was repeatedly questioned by both his counsel and Kara’s about the

amount of this debt and confirmed that it was $25,000 and that he was “at the limit”

on that card. On cross-examination, Kara’s counsel even questioned Chris directly

about the credit-card statement, asking him whether his balance had really

increased from the balance listed there—roughly $18,000—to $25,000. Yet the

counsel did not ask about the credit limit—perhaps because he feared that rather

than impeaching Chris it would give Chris the chance to clarify that the credit limit

had increased sometime in those eleven months. In light of the district court’s

conclusion that Chris’s testimony was credible, it is reasonable to infer that the

credit limit did increase even without testimony from Chris that it did. The evidence

shows that both parties had to increase their debts because of the financial

challenges of their separation, the credit card was already nearly maxed out eleven

months before the testimony, and a $4500 credit-limit increase would likely not be

difficult to obtain. We thus reject Kara’s challenge to the district court’s valuation

of the Discover-credit-card debt.

Finally, Kara argues that the district court failed to equitably divide the

marital property and debts because in its post-trial-1.904 ruling, it assigned four
13

additional marital debts totaling $21,760 to her without adjusting Chris’s

equalization payment. She thus contends that the total division of property and

debts was unequal and inequitable. Chris defends the district court’s division by

contending essentially that it was close enough given the amount in dispute and

the total property division and by suggesting that Kara consented to take on the

debts in the pretrial stipulation.

We agree with Kara that she did not consent to the district court’s unequal

division in the pretrial stipulation, which stated “[t]he parties cannot agree as to a

division of assets” or “on the payment of their liabilities.” She only proposed taking

on the credit-card debts as a part of a division equal overall. We also agree that

on these facts, only an equal division of the parties’ property and debts is equitable.

See Kimbro, 826 N.W.2d at 704. And Kara is correct that the district court’s

reasoning in the original decree shows that it was also trying to divide all the

property and debts that it addressed equally between the parties. But the division

became lopsided—and thus inequitable given the parties’ circumstances—when

the court assigned $21,760 more in marital debts to Kara. Indeed, Chris did not

dispute Kara’s request in her 1.904 motion to adjust the property distribution to

account for these debts—“acknowledg[ing] the debts as [Kara] outlined and her

resolution of this issue.” So some modification of the property distribution and the

resulting equalization payment from Chris to Kara is warranted to do equity.

Yet we cannot agree with Kara that increasing Chris’s equalization payment

by $10,880 would be equitable. Such a division would still be unequal—and thus

inequitable here—just with the inequity falling on Chris rather than Kara. Both

parties agreed in their dueling 1.904 motions that the district court incorrectly split
14

Chris’s $15,000 share of the equity from the sale of their Charles City home when

the proceeds of that sale had already been divided between them, resulting in an

imbalance of $7500 in Kara’s favor. They agreed that the $500 trailer should be

awarded to Kara rather than Chris, resulting in another $250 imbalance in her

favor. And they agreed that the court had left out the division of Chris’s two life

insurance policies worth a total of $4435, resulting in an imbalance of $2217.50 in

his favor. Netting out all these amounts shows an imbalance of $5347.50 in Chris’s

favor in the division of assets and debts.4

The equalization payment owed by Chris to Kara in the original decree was

$3307. Accounting for the reduction in Chris’s credit-card debt by $4000 to remove

his payment for attorney fees made by the district court in its 1.904 ruling increases

his equalization payment to $5307. Adjusting for the total imbalances from Kara’s

credit card debts, the double-counted equity, and Chris’s life insurance policies

increases his payment another $5347.50 to $10,654.50. We find that the property

division ordered by the district court with a modified equalization payment from

Chris to Kara of $10,654.50 is an equitable distribution given the parties’

circumstances. And so we affirm the district court’s property division with this

modification.

4 We recognize that Chris focused his arguments on appeal entirely on defending

the district court’s property division. And unfortunately, he thus did not make an
alternative argument proposing how the division should be recalculated if we
disagreed with him and held—as we are—that the property division should be
equal. But given the requirement that the decree do equity and our acceptance of
Kara’s argument that only an equal division is equitable here, we cannot ignore the
parties’ concessions in their 1.904 motions and responses and blindly accept
Kara’s proposed division.
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V. Appellate Attorney Fees

Chris asks for an award of his appellate attorney fees. In dissolution cases,

appellate attorney fees are not awarded as “a matter of right, but rather rest in [our]

discretion.” Sullins, 715 N.W.2d at 255 (cleaned up). In exercising that discretion,

we consider “the needs of the party seeking the award, the ability of the other party

to pay, and the relative merits of the appeal.” Id. (cleaned up). We exercise our

discretion to deny Chris’s request for appellate attorney fees. Considering the

relative financial circumstances of the parties and Kara’s partial success on the

merits, it is appropriate for each party to pay their own attorney fees as they did in

the district court. Costs shall be assessed to Kara.

AFFIRMED AS MODIFIED.