In the Matter of the Estate of Lois L. Hord, Deceased. In the Matter of the Carl R. Hord Trust Anne T. Walsh, Kathryn Trabert, Gary R. Shuck, Donald C. Shuck, Willis E. Shuck, and John Daly vs. Larry Waugh, Executor of the Lois Hord Estate and Trustee of the Carl R. Hord Trust

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF IOWA
No. 11–0935
Filed June 21, 2013
IN THE MATTER OF THE ESTATE OF LOIS L. HORD, Deceased.
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IN THE MATTER OF THE CARL R. HORD TRUST
ANNE T. WALSH, KATHRYN TRABERT, GARY R. SHUCK, DONALD C.
SHUCK, WILLIS E. SHUCK, and JOHN DALY,
Appellants,
vs.
LARRY WAUGH, Executor of the LOIS HORD ESTATE and Trustee of the
CARL R. HORD TRUST,
Appellee.
On review from the Iowa Court of Appeals.
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Monona County, James D.
Scott, Judge.
The remainder beneficiaries of a will seek further review of a court
of appeals decision invalidating their interests. DECISION OF COURT
OF APPEALS VACATED; DISTRICT COURT JUDGMENT AFFIRMED.
Christine B. Long and Amy R. Teas of Bradshaw, Fowler, Proctor &
Fairgrave, P.C., Des Moines, for appellants.
Patrick L. Sealey, Joel D. Vos, and Allyson C. Dirksen of Heidman
Law Firm, L.L.P., Sioux City, for appellee.

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APPEL, Justice.
In this case, we must consider whether remainder beneficiaries
may enforce the terms of a spendthrift trust against the trustee when the
remainder beneficiaries previously purported to convey what was at the
time a future interest in real estate held by the trust. For the reasons
expressed below, we hold that the applicable statute of limitations bars
the remainder beneficiaries from enforcing the terms of the spendthrift
clause of the decedent’s will. As a result, we vacate the decision of the
court of appeals and affirm the judgment of the district court.
I. Background Facts and Prior Proceedings.
Carl and Lois Hord were husband and wife. They did not have
children. The couple owned approximately 210 acres of farmland in
Monona County as tenants in common. Carl died testate on June 18,
1992. His will was admitted to probate in the Monona County District
Court on June 30.
Article VI of Carl’s will created the Carl R. Hord Trust and directed
that the residue of his estate, which consisted only of his undivided one-
half interest in the farmland, be placed in it. Article VI named Lois and
Larry Waugh, a longtime family friend and tenant on the farm, to serve
as trustees. Article VI also named Lois as a life beneficiary of the trust
and directed that, upon her death, the farmland would pass in equal
shares to the couple’s niece and five nephews.
Article VI also contained a spendthrift clause. Specifically, the
spendthrift clause stated:
No interest, under this Article, shall be transferable,
assignable, or become subject to any encumbrances by any
beneficiary, nor shall such interest be subject to the claims
of any creditors of any beneficiary prior to the actual
distribution by the Trustees to the beneficiary.

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On May 20, 1993, the attorney for the Carl R. Hord Trust sent a
letter to five of the six remainder beneficiaries of the trust. The letter
informed them that the present value of their individual interests was
$12,471.16 and that Lois, though not required to by law, had paid the
$1247.12 inheritance tax owed by each of them. The letter also indicated
the attorney’s belief that Lois had spoken to each of the remainder
beneficiaries about the possibility each might relinquish his or her
interest in the farmland to Lois. Finally, the letter indicated Lois would
not expect reimbursement for the amount of the inheritance tax if they
transferred their interests to her.
Without consulting attorneys or reviewing Carl’s will, five of the six
remainder beneficiaries, Mary Ann Trabert, Gary Shuck, Donald Shuck,
Willis Shuck, and John Daly, executed quitclaim deeds to Lois in
September and October, which she promptly recorded. Waugh had no
knowledge of Lois’s correspondence with the five remainder beneficiaries
or that they transferred their interests to Lois. The only duty Waugh
performed as trustee was to petition for relief from filing intermediate
reports. He did not read the terms of the trust until 2009, when Lois
died.
Lois’s will bequeathed her entire interest in the farmland to
Waugh, including the remainder interests acquired from her niece and
nephews.1 Her will also appointed Waugh to serve as the executor of her
estate. At the time, the value of Lois’s interest in the farmland was
$789,000. The niece and nephews received little from Lois’s estate.
There is nothing in the record to show that Waugh, acting as trustee of
the Carl R. Hord Trust, conveyed the farmland to Lois’s estate upon her
death or to himself, as beneficiary under Lois’s will.
1Waugh paid inheritance tax of $117,639.

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Following Lois’s death, the remainder beneficiaries obtained copies
of Carl’s will and, for the first time, learned of the spendthrift clause.
The remainder beneficiaries filed a petition for construction and
interpretation of the Carl R. Hord Trust on September 9, 2010. They also
intervened in the probate action regarding Lois Hord’s estate. The
remainder beneficiaries argued the spendthrift clause rendered their
assignments and quitclaim deeds void, that they did not have interests to
convey at the time of the assignments and quitclaim deeds, and that
Waugh, acting as trustee, breached his fiduciary duties to them by
refusing to carry out the terms of the trust, by failing to administer the
trust solely in the interest of the beneficiaries, and by engaging in self-
dealing.
On April 21, 2011, citing the Restatement (Second) of Trusts and
the Restatement (Third) of Trusts, the probate court concluded the
remainder beneficiaries’ assignments were revocable until the property
was distributed from the Carl R. Hord Trust to Lois’s estate. The probate
court then held that the remainder beneficiaries’ right to revoke their
assignments terminated at Lois’s death because equitable title
immediately passed to Lois’s estate upon the termination of the life
estate. In addition, the probate court concluded the ten-year statute of
limitations contained in Iowa Code section 614.17A did not bar the
action because the remainder beneficiaries’ cause of action did not arise
until the termination of the life estate upon Lois’s death.
On May 6, two of the remainder beneficiaries, Anne Walsh and
Kathryn Trabert, the descendants of Mary Ann Trabert,2 filed a motion to
enlarge findings of fact and conclusions of law or in the alternative
2Mary Ann Trabert died in 2004.

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motion for a new trial. The district court denied the motions on May 16.
The remainder beneficiaries appealed on June 13.
We transferred the case to the court of appeals. The court of
appeals reversed the district court. The court of appeals held the
spendthrift clause operated to prohibit any transfer or assignment by the
remainder beneficiaries of their rights to future payment from the trust
and, as a result, their transfers were invalid. The court of appeals also
rejected Waugh’s defenses based upon the ten-year statute of limitations
contained in Iowa Code section 614.17A. We granted further review.
II. Scope of Review.
Because this is not an action to set aside or contest a will, for the
involuntary appointment of a guardian or conservator, or for the
establishment of a contested claim, this probate matter, in which the
court is asked to construe the effect of a spendthrift clause to determine
whether it protects the assets of a trust from transfer or assignment by
the remainder beneficiaries, is an equitable proceeding. See Iowa Code
§ 633.33 (2011). Accordingly, we review this action de novo. Iowa R.
App. P. 6.907; In re Estate of Serovy, 711 N.W.2d 290, 293 (Iowa 2006).
We give weight to the factual findings of the district court, but we are not
bound to follow them. In re Estate of Roethler, 801 N.W.2d 833, 837
(Iowa 2011).
III. Timeliness of Appeal.
Waugh3 challenges the timeliness of the remainder beneficiaries’
appeal. Waugh points out that the district court entered its findings of
fact, conclusions of law, and declaratory judgment on April 21, 2011. On
May 6, two of the remainder beneficiaries, Anne Walsh and Kathryn
3Waugh is the trustee of the Charles R. Hord Trust, the executor of Lois’s estate,
and the beneficiary under Lois’s will. In this appeal, Waugh has filed a consolidated
brief presenting argument in all three of his capacities.

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Talbot, filed their combined motion. The district court denied the motion
on May 16.
The remainder beneficiaries filed their notice of appeal on June 13.
According to Waugh, the notice of appeal was untimely. Waugh asserts
that the motion filed by the remainder beneficiaries amounted to nothing
more than a rehash of legal issues and that, as a result, it was not a
valid rule 1.904(2) motion and did not toll the time for appeal. See
Explore Info. Servs. v. Ct. Info. Sys., 636 N.W.2d 50, 57 (Iowa 2001);
Bellach v. IMT Ins. Co., 573 N.W.2d 903, 905 (Iowa 1998); Beck v.
Fleener, 376 N.W.2d 594, 596 (Iowa 1985); see also Iowa R. Civ. P.
1.904(2). To the extent the motion requested a new trial under Iowa Rule
of Civil Procedure 1.1004, Waugh argues that while the prayer for relief
essentially tacked on a request for a new trial, the motion did not specify
any grounds for relief and, as a result, the tolling provisions of rule
6.101(1)(b) do not apply. See Iowa R. App. P. 6.101(1)(b) (generally
requiring appeals in cases other than those involving the termination of
parental rights or children in need of assistance to be filed within thirty
days following the filing of the final order or judgment).
The remainder beneficiaries respond by asserting that their rule
1.904(2) motion did not simply rehash legal issues. They point out that
the rule 1.904(2) motion asked the court to rule on the question of
whether there was a valid distinction to be made between remainder
beneficiaries who personally executed assignments and quitclaim deeds
and Anne Walsh and Kathryn Trabert, who were survivors of Mary Ann
Trabert and not involved in any transaction of any kind with Lois related
to the trust prior to her death.
In the alternative, the remainder beneficiaries argue the motion
was a valid motion for a new trial. According to the remainder

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beneficiaries, the motion for a new trial raised a number of issues,
including the claims related to Waugh’s breach of fiduciary duty and the
court’s failure to distinguish between the descendants of Mary Ann
Trabert and the other beneficiaries of the trust.
Upon review of the record, we conclude that the remainder
beneficiaries filed a timely appeal. With respect to rule 1.904(2), we note
the trial court did not explicitly rule on the question of whether the
descendants of Mary Ann Trabert should be treated differently than the
other remainder beneficiaries. We conclude that on this issue, the
motion did seek expanded findings and conclusions. As a result, the
period for appeal was extended by the filing of the motion and this appeal
is timely.
IV. Statute of Limitations.
A. Introduction. The dispositive issue in this case is whether
Iowa Code section 614.17A bars the remainder beneficiaries from
enforcing the terms of the trust. Section 614.17A prohibits actions “to
recover or establish an interest in or claim to real estate” if:
a. The action is based upon a claim arising more than
ten years earlier or existing for more than ten years.
b. The action is against the holder of the record title to
the real estate in possession.
c. The holder of the record title to the real estate in
possession and the holder’s immediate or remote grants are
shown by the record to have held chain of title to the real
estate for more than ten years.
Iowa Code § 614.17A(1). The statute further provides that if a claimant
files a statement describing the real estate, setting forth the nature and
extent of the claimed interest, and setting forth the facts giving rise to the
claim, the limitations period is extended for an additional ten years. Id.

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§ 614.17A(2). Accordingly, the statute bars actions to recover or
establish interests in or claims to real estate in two situations: if the
claim arose more than ten years previously, see id. § 614.17A(1)(a), or if
a ten-year extension period expired without the claimant filing a
statement triggering an additional ten-year extension, id. § 614.17A(2).
B. Positions of the Parties. The remainder beneficiaries do not
claim they took any action to extend the statute of limitations in this
case. The key statute of limitations question is thus whether the
remainder beneficiaries’ claims arose or existed more than ten years
prior to the time they filed this action. See id. § 614.17A(1)(a).
Waugh asserts that because the remainder beneficiaries’
assignments and quitclaim deeds were executed and delivered in 1993,
they were required under section 614.17A(1) to bring any action
challenging them by 2003. According to Waugh, the question of when
the statute of limitations begins to run is controlled by when the interest
was created, not when it became a current possessory interest.
The remainder beneficiaries argue their claims arose upon Lois’s
death in 2009 because the conveyances and quitclaim deeds were void as
violations of the spendthrift clause in Carl’s will and because Waugh was
not obligated to distribute the farmland until Lois died. According to the
remainder beneficiaries, their cause of action arose only when Waugh
became obligated by the terms of the trust to distribute the farmland to
them. Under their reasoning, the statute would not bar the action.
C. Discussion. Iowa Code section 614.17A is a marketable title
statute that applies to real estate claims maintained after July 1, 1992.
Its predecessor statute has been described as the pioneering marketable
title provision in the country. Chi. & N.W. Ry. v. City of Osage, 176
N.W.2d 788, 793 (Iowa 1970); Tesdell v. Hanes, 248 Iowa 742, 747, 82

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N.W.2d 119, 122 (1957). Section 614.17A and its predecessors generally
bar actions based on claims arising or existing prior to a certain date if
the record title holder and his predecessors held a record chain of title
since the certain date and the claimant failed to preserve his claim by
filing a statement by another certain date. Iowa Code § 614.17A; Note,
The Mechanics of Iowa’s Marketable Title Legislation, 22 Drake L. Rev.
326, 326–30 (1973) [hereinafter The Mechanics of Iowa’s Marketable Title
Legislation] (explaining application of section 614.17). The marketable
title statutes grew out of efforts around the turn of the century by the
legislature and this court to give “stability and effect to record titles.”
Lewis M. Simes & Clarence B. Taylor, The Improvement of Conveyancing
by Legislation 306–09 (1960) [hereinafter Simes].
We addressed the issue of when a claim arose within the meaning
of Iowa Code section 614.17, which contains wording similar to Iowa
Code section 614.17A but applies to claims arising before 1980, in Lane
v. Travelers Insurance Co. of Hartford, 230 Iowa 973, 299 N.W. 553
(1941). In Lane, a testator who died in 1895 devised his farm to his son,
Patrick, for life, with the remainder to Patrick’s heirs. Id. at 974, 299
N.W. at 553. Patrick mortgaged the farm to Travelers Life Insurance
Company in 1926. Id. at 975, 299 N.W. at 554. In 1938, Travelers
foreclosed the mortgage, received a sheriff’s deed, and claimed full title to
the property. Id. At the same time, Patrick, along with his two minor
children, born in 1917 and 1919, filed suit to void the deed. Id. at 975,
977, 299 N.W. at 554–55.
We considered whether a predecessor to section 614.17 barred the
actions of the minors. Id. The statute barred any “ ‘action based upon
any claim arising or existing prior to January 1, 1920 . . . unless within
one year from and after July 4, 1931’ ” a statement describing the

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interest is filed. Id. at 976, 299 N.W. at 554 (quoting Iowa Code § 11024
(1939)). Travelers argued the claims of Patrick’s children, who held a
contingent remainder interest from their grandfather’s will, arose when
they were born, which triggered the limitations period. Patrick, citing
that he had yet to die, argued the claim of his sons to the land had yet to
arise or exist because their interests would not vest or become certain
until the termination of the life estate. Id. at 978, 299 N.W. at 555.
We held the claims of the two minor contingent remainder
beneficiaries arose or existed prior to 1920 and no written statement
contemplated by the statute was ever filed on their behalf. Thus, the
plain provisions of the statute barred the claims. Id. at 976, 978, 299
N.W. at 554–55. We noted a definitional distinction between a claim that
arises and a claim that accrues. Id. at 977, 299 N.W. at 555. We also
relied on precedent recognizing that contingent remainder beneficiaries
held protectable interests prior to the termination of the life estate and
recognizing that such interests could be conveyed. Id. at 978, 299 N.W.
at 555. Finally, we noted the legislature may not have intended the
result in the case, but nonetheless viewed our holding as stemming from
the “plain and unambiguous” language of the statute. Id. In addition,
we observed “that there can be little doubt of the desirability of statutes
giving greater effect and stability to record titles.” Id. at 978–99, 299
N.W. at 555.
Thus, the focus in Lane was on the date the remainder
beneficiaries’ claimed interest came into existence and not on the date a
cause of action accrued on their interest. We applied the rule of Lane in
Lytle v. Guilliams, 241 Iowa 523, 529, 41 N.W.2d 668, 672 (1950), where
we held section 614.17 barred the claims of the heirs of two remainder
beneficiaries. In Lytle, a decedent died in 1910. Id. at 524, 528 N.W.2d

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at 669. The decedent’s will gave his wife a life estate in his farmland,
with remainder interests to his three children. Id. at 524–25, 41 N.W.2d
at 669–70. The life beneficiary and one of the remainder beneficiaries
gave a mortgage on the property in 1928. Id. at 525, 41 N.W.2d at 669.
The mortgage was foreclosed in 1939, and Guilliams purchased the farm
at a sheriff’s sale. Id. The life beneficiary died in 1947. Id.
The heirs of two of the remainder beneficiaries filed an action in
1948 against the purchaser. Id. The purchaser asserted section 614.17
as a defense. Id. At the time, it provided that no action based upon a
claim existing prior to January 1, 1930, could be maintained against a
record title holder in possession unless the claimant had filed a
statement of his claim by July 4, 1944. Id. at 529, 41 N.W.2d at 671
(citing Iowa Code § 614.17 (1946)). Citing Lane, we noted the remainder
beneficiaries’ interests existed before 1930 and that they had not filed a
statement of their claim with the county recorder. Id. at 529, 41 N.W.2d
at 672. Ultimately, we held section 614.17 did not bar the action
because the purchaser’s chain of title did not meet the statutory
requirement. Id. However, citing Lane, we noted the statute would
otherwise have been applicable because the remainder beneficiaries’
interests existed before 1930 and they had not filed a statement of their
claim with the county recorder. Id.
Under Lane and Lytle, therefore, a claim under section 614.17
arises or exists on the date the instrument creating the interest was
recorded. Lytle, 241 Iowa at 529, 41 N.W.2d at 671; Lane, 230 Iowa at
978, 299 N.W. at 555; see also Simes at 315. Thus, for the purposes of
section 614.17, a claim involving a future interest arises or exists when
the interest appears of record, not when it vests, becomes possessory, or
becomes actionable. Simes at 315. Our decision as to when a claim

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arises under section 614.17 was criticized by at least one commentator,
but even that critic noted the decision represented “the maximum
sacrifice . . . to attain the simplified title and conveyancing procedure
envisioned by the [marketable title act].” Paul M. Basye, Trends &
Progress—The Marketable Title Acts, 47 Iowa L. Rev. 261, 270. Our
interpretation of section 614.17 has also been described as “interesting.”
Simes at 314. At least two other jurisdictions, Florida and Alabama,
have indicated a statute of limitations will run before a future interest
becomes possessory because the holder of a future interest can bring
suit to remove a cloud on title. 4 John A. Borron, Jr., Simes & Smith:
The Law of Future Interests § 1964, at 247 & nn.7–8 (3d ed. 2005); see
also Lewis v. Belk, 122 So. 413, 414 (Ala. 1929); Mullan v. Bank of Pasco
Cnty., 133 So. 323, 329 (Fla. 1931).
We think Lane and Lytle are controlling here. The real battle in
this case is not between the remainder beneficiaries and Waugh in his
role as trustee, but rather between the remainder beneficiaries and
Waugh in his role of executor of Lois’s estate. Both the remainder
beneficiaries and the estate claim interests in the disputed real estate.
Lois’s estate claims entitlement to the disputed real estate through the
recorded quitclaim deeds received from the remainder beneficiaries
seventeen years ago, while the remainder beneficiaries claim that the
recorded quitclaim deeds are void and that Iowa Code section 614.17A is
not implicated. Yet, Lois Hord’s claimed interest in the real estate has
been spread on the real estate records for more than ten years without
dispute. Under the circumstances, we believe that Iowa Code chapter
614.17A clears title to the real estate in favor of the estate of Lois Hord
because more than ten years have elapsed from the recording of the
quitclaim deeds.

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V. Conclusion.
For the reasons expressed above, the claims of the remainder
beneficiaries are barred by the applicable statute of limitations.
Accordingly, we vacate the decision of the court of appeals and affirm the
judgment of the district court.
DECISION OF COURT OF APPEALS VACATED; DISTRICT
COURT JUDGMENT AFFIRMED.

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