Pickett v. State

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

Docket No. 48976

DENNIS JARED PICKETT, )
) Filed: December 16, 2022
Petitioner-Appellant, )
) Melanie Gagnepain, Clerk
v. )
) THIS IS AN UNPUBLISHED
STATE OF IDAHO, ) OPINION AND SHALL NOT
) BE CITED AS AUTHORITY
Respondent. )
)

Appeal from the District Court of the Fourth Judicial District, State of Idaho, Ada
County. Hon. Patrick J. Miller, District Judge.

Judgment of the district court summarily dismissing petition for post-conviction
relief, affirmed; district court order denying motion for discovery, affirmed.

Eric D. Fredericksen, State Appellate Public Defender; Brian R. Dickson, Deputy
Appellate Public Defender, Boise, for appellant.

Hon. Lawrence G. Wasden, Attorney General; Andrew V. Wake, Deputy Attorney
General, Boise, for respondent.
________________________________________________

GRATTON, Judge
Dennis Jared Pickett pled guilty to possession of a controlled substance with intent to
deliver, Idaho Code § 37-2732. Pickett appeals from the district court’s judgment summarily
dismissing his post-conviction petition and the district court’s order denying his motion for
discovery. For the reasons set forth below, we affirm.
I.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Officers obtained a search warrant for Pickett’s home and a court order to remove a minor
child. The officers decided not to execute the search warrant until the minor was safely removed.
However, while in the home to remove the child, Sergeant Bryngelson entered the master bedroom
and opened two drawers of a nightstand. Officer Rainford, who was not involved in the removal
of the child, obtained a second search warrant. After execution of the second search warrant,

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Pickett was arrested and charged with trafficking in heroin, possession with intent to deliver, injury
to a child, and possession of paraphernalia.
Officers found surveillance video on Pickett’s computer of Sergeant Bryngelson opening
the nightstand. The surveillance video was disclosed to Pickett’s counsel. Counsel filed a motion
to suppress evidence found pursuant to the second search warrant because the warrant application
failed to mention the search of the nightstand. Six days later, Pickett reached a plea agreement
with the State. Pursuant to the terms of the plea agreement, Pickett pled guilty to possession with
intent to deliver and the State dismissed the remaining counts and agreed not to file additional
charges and to recommend a fifteen-year sentence with three years determinate. The district court
accepted the plea and sentenced Pickett accordingly.
Pickett filed a pro se petition for post-conviction relief on the grounds: (1) his
constitutional rights against unreasonable search and seizure were violated; (2) new evidence
exists that requires vacation of his conviction; (3) law enforcement committed procedural
misconduct and withheld exculpatory evidence; and (4) his trial counsel was ineffective for failing
to further investigate the alleged police misconduct. Thereafter, Pickett was appointed counsel.
Counsel filed an amended petition correcting the caption and requested additional time to file a
substantive amended petition.
Pickett’s counsel also filed a motion requesting leave to conduct discovery alleging a need
to obtain copies of all documents and digital media associated with removal of the child from
Pickett’s home. The State opposed the discovery motion and filed a motion for summary dismissal
of Pickett’s post-conviction petition. Pickett’s counsel did not file a response. The district court
denied Pickett’s discovery motion and granted the State’s motion for summary dismissal. Pickett
appeals.
II.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
On appeal from an order of summary dismissal, we apply the same standards utilized by
the trial courts and examine whether the petitioner’s admissible evidence asserts facts which, if
true, would entitle the petitioner to relief. Ridgley v. State, 148 Idaho 671, 675, 227 P.3d 925, 929
(2010); Sheahan v. State, 146 Idaho 101, 104, 190 P.3d 920, 923 (Ct. App. 2008). Over questions
of law, we exercise free review. Rhoades v. State, 148 Idaho 247, 250, 220 P.3d 1066, 1069
(2009); Downing v. State, 136 Idaho 367, 370, 33 P.3d 841, 844 (Ct. App. 2001).

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Whether to authorize discovery is a matter directed to the discretion of the court.
Raudebaugh v. State, 135 Idaho 602, 605, 21 P.3d 924, 927 (2001). When a district court’s
discretionary decision is reviewed on appeal, the appellate court conducts a multi-tiered inquiry to
determine whether the district court: (1) correctly perceived the issue as one of discretion;
(2) acted within the boundaries of such discretion; (3) acted consistently with any legal standards
applicable to the specific choices before it; and (4) reached its decision by an exercise of reason.
Lunneborg v. My Fun Life, 163 Idaho 856, 863, 421 P.3d 187, 194 (2018).
III.
ANALYSIS
Pickett argues that the district court erroneously granted the State’s motion for summary
dismissal of his post-conviction petition and violated Pickett’s rights to due process by
simultaneously denying Pickett’s motion for discovery.
A. Summary Dismissal
Pickett challenges the district court’s summary dismissal of his post-conviction petition in
which he raised, in relevant part, a direct constitutional claim of violation of his right to be free
from unreasonable searches and seizures under Article I, Section 17 of the Idaho Constitution.
The scope of post-conviction relief is limited. Knutsen v. State, 144 Idaho 433, 438, 163
P.3d 222, 227 (Ct. App. 2007). A petition for post-conviction relief is not a substitute for an
appeal. I.C. § 19-4901(b). A claim or issue that was or could have been raised on appeal may not
be considered in post-conviction proceedings. Id.; Mendiola v. State, 150 Idaho 345, 348-49, 247
P.3d 210, 213-14 (Ct. App. 2010).
The district court summarily dismissed Pickett’s claim because Pickett could have raised
it on direct appeal. Pickett argues that the district court’s decision reflects a fundamental
misunderstanding of Pickett’s unconditional guilty plea. In the guilty plea questionnaire, Pickett
indicated that he retained his ability to appeal the judgment of conviction and sentence, but that he
was not reserving the right to raise any pretrial issues, including the search issue. Pickett alleges
that he could not have raised this issue on appeal because he pled guilty only six days after the
motion was filed, precluding the district court from ruling on his motion to suppress.
The State argues that Pickett’s search claim is precisely the sort of claim that should be
raised in the trial court and challenged on direct appeal. The State points out Pickett could have
waited for the district court to resolve his motion and pursued the issue on direct appeal if the

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ruling was adverse. The State argues that even if Pickett is correct that the suppression issue could
not have been raised on direct appeal, such that the procedural bar set forth in I.C. § 19-4901 does
not apply, the district court properly dismissed the claim as it was waived by Pickett’s
unconditional plea.
We agree that Pickett’s claim could have been raised on direct appeal. Pickett did not
waive his right to appeal, but he did expressly waive any right to raise an issue regarding the search.
Pickett did so to take advantage of the plea agreement. That Pickett chose to forgo pursuit of the
search issue on direct appeal does not, under the circumstances, mean that he could not have done
otherwise. A petition for post-conviction relief is not a substitute for remedies or direct appeal
available in the criminal case. Black v. State, 165 Idaho 100, 105, 439 P.3d 1272, 1277 (Ct. App.
2019). Pickett’s express waiver of his search claim incident to his guilty plea does not operate as
a reservation of such claims for post-conviction or as a bypass of the rule that post-conviction does
not substitute for direct appeal. Pickett could have pursued his claim through direct appeal, but
chose not to.
As an alternative ground for dismissal, the State argues that, under I.C. § 19-4908 and
Idaho case law, any ground for relief knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently waived in the
proceeding resulting in conviction or sentence cannot form the basis for post-conviction relief.
The State relies on Stone v. State, 108 Idaho 822, 826, 702 P.2d 860, 864 (Ct. App. 1985) for the
proposition that Pickett could not pursue his unlawful search claim in a post-conviction proceeding
because a valid guilty plea waives all non-jurisdictional defects and defenses and an alleged illegal
search and seizure does not affect the validity of a conviction based upon a knowing and voluntary
guilty plea. In Stone, after rejecting Stone’s claim that his plea was not voluntary, this Court held
that Stone could not pursue his unlawful search claim in post-conviction because a valid plea
waives all non-jurisdictional defects and defenses and an alleged illegal search and seizure does
not affect the validity of a conviction based upon a knowing and voluntary guilty plea. Id. We
agree that, as in Stone, Pickett waived his search claim by his voluntary guilty plea. The district
court did not err in summarily dismissing Pickett’s post-conviction claim.
B. Discovery
Pickett claims that the district court deprived him of due process and a meaningful
opportunity to respond to the motion for summary dismissal by denying his motion for discovery
at the same time it dismissed the petition for post-conviction relief. Procedural due process

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requires a process to ensure that the individual is not arbitrarily deprived of his rights in violation
of the state or federal constitutions. State v. Rhoades, 121 Idaho 63, 72, 822 P.2d 960, 969 (1991).
Idaho Code § 19-4906(b) requires notice and an opportunity to be heard prior to summary
dismissal, meaning the petitioner has a right to notice of the alleged defects in his petition and a
meaningful opportunity to correct or otherwise address those alleged defects. Saykhamchone v.
State, 127 Idaho 319, 322, 900 P.2d 795, 798 (1995).
When a petitioner believes discovery is necessary for acquisition of evidence to support a
claim for post-conviction relief, the petitioner must obtain authorization from the district court to
conduct discovery. Idaho Criminal Rule 39; Raudebaugh, 135 Idaho at 605, 21 P.3d at 927.
Discovery in a post-conviction action is not required unless necessary to protect a petitioner’s
substantial rights. Murphy v. State, 143 Idaho 139, 148, 139 P.3d 741, 750 (Ct. App. 2006);
Griffith v. State, 121 Idaho 371, 375, 825 P.2d 94, 98 (Ct. App. 1992). Discovery may be denied
where the petitioner’s claims are nothing more than speculation, unsupported by any evidence.
Raudebaugh, 135 Idaho at 605, 21 P.3d at 927. Indeed, discovery may not be used to engage in
fishing expeditions, as post-conviction actions provide a forum for known grievances, not an
opportunity to search for them. Murphy, 143 Idaho at 148, 139 P.3d at 750.
Pickett argues the district court deprived him of due process when it simultaneously denied
his discovery motion and granted the State’s summary dismissal motion. Pickett relies on Smith
v. State, 146 Idaho 822, 203 P.3d 1221 (2009) for the proposition that a meaningful opportunity to
respond requires there not be lingering questions about whether the petitioner has all relevant
information. Pickett argues he did not have a meaningful opportunity to respond to the State’s
motion for summary dismissal because Pickett’s motion for discovery was not first decided such
that he could respond to the motion for summary dismissal accordingly.
The State argues Smith does not hold that a meaningful opportunity to be heard requires
certainty that the petitioner is in possession of all potentially relevant information. The State
further argues that Pickett was still obligated to respond to the motion even though he hoped he
could acquire additional evidence through discovery. We agree. Pickett does not contest that he
knew of and had the opportunity to respond to the alleged deficiencies in his petition and that he
knew what evidence was in the record. Pickett did not identify any specific information in the
discovery being sought that would help his claim. Moreover, Pickett does not contest the findings
by the district court that his counsel had much of what was requested in discovery. Pickett has not

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shown a lack of notice or opportunity to be heard implicating a due process violation. The timing
of the denial of the motion for discovery and the summary dismissal of the petition for post-
conviction relief has not been shown to actually have had any impact on Pickett’s ability to
respond. Further, the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion for discovery
on its merits.
IV.
CONCLUSION
The district court did not err when it denied Pickett’s motion for discovery and granted the
State’s motion for summary dismissal. The district court’s judgment dismissing Pickett’s petition
for post-conviction relief is affirmed.
Chief Judge LORELLO and Judge HUSKEY CONCUR.

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