State v. Slaninka

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

Docket No. 49060

STATE OF IDAHO, )
) Filed: February 2, 2023
Plaintiff-Respondent, )
) Melanie Gagnepain, Clerk
v. )
)
VINCENT M. SLANINKA, JR., )
)
Defendant-Appellant. )
)

Appeal from the District Court of the Fourth Judicial District, State of Idaho, Ada
County. Hon. Richard D. Greenwood, District Judge.

Judgment of conviction for trafficking in heroin, possession of a controlled
substance, and possession of drug paraphernalia, affirmed.

Eric D. Fredericksen, State Appellate Public Defender; Sally J. Cooley, Deputy
Appellate Public Defender, Boise, for appellant.

Hon. Raúl R. Labrador, Attorney General; Andrew V. Wake, Deputy Attorney
General, Boise, for respondent.
________________________________________________

LORELLO, Chief Judge
Vincent M. Slaninka, Jr. appeals from his judgment of conviction for trafficking in heroin,
possession of a controlled substance, and possession of drug paraphernalia. We affirm.
I.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
After receiving information from a confidential informant that Slaninka was transporting
controlled substances to a known drug dealer, an officer obtained a search warrant (the GPS
warrant) to place a GPS tracking device on a vehicle driven by Slaninka. Using information
gathered from monitoring the vehicle, the same officer obtained a warrant to search the vehicle
and Slaninka’s person (the search warrant). The next day, officers executed the search warrant
and arrested Slaninka. The searches of the vehicle and Slaninka’s person yielded over 28 grams

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of heroin, methamphetamine, a syringe, baggies, a spoon, and a pipe. The State charged Slaninka
with trafficking in heroin, I.C. § 37-2732B(a)(6)(C); possession of a controlled substance
(methamphetamine), I.C. § 37-2732(c); and possession of drug paraphernalia, I.C. § 37-2734A.
Slaninka filed a motion to suppress, contending the officers failed to provide Slaninka with
a copy of the search warrant and a property receipt as required by I.C.R. 41(e)(2). While his first
motion was pending, Slaninka filed a second motion to suppress, this time asserting that the
officer’s affidavits in support of the GPS warrant and search warrant contained material
misstatements and omitted material exculpatory information. As part of his second motion to
suppress, Slaninka requested an evidentiary hearing to challenge the veracity of evidence
contained in both affidavits. The district court held separate hearings for each motion and denied
them both.
On the morning of trial, Slaninka moved to continue the trial to allow him to file a third
motion to suppress.1 According to Slaninka, his third motion to suppress would assert that there
was not probable cause to issue the GPS warrant. As part of his motion to continue, Slaninka
asked the district court to “set a briefing schedule” for his proposed third motion to suppress. The
district court denied Slaninka’s motion to continue the trial. Ultimately, a jury found Slaninka
guilty of the charged offenses. Slaninka appeals.
II.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
The decision to deny or grant a motion for a continuance rests within the sound discretion
of the trial court. State v. Ransom, 124 Idaho 703, 706, 864 P.2d 149, 152 (1993). A decision
regarding a motion to extend the time to file a motion to suppress is also within the trial court’s
discretion. State v. Alanis, 109 Idaho 884, 888, 712 P.2d 585, 589 (1985). When a trial court’s
discretionary decision is reviewed on appeal, the appellate court conducts a multi-tiered inquiry to
determine whether the trial court: (1) correctly perceived the issue as one of discretion; (2) acted
within the boundaries of such discretion; (3) acted consistently with any legal standards applicable

1
According to the district court, Slaninka sent an email the weekend before trial “suggesting
that this motion was going to be made.” This email is not in the appellate record.

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to the specific choices before it; and (4) reached its decision by an exercise of reason. State v.
Herrera, 164 Idaho 261, 270, 429 P.3d 149, 158 (2018).
III.
ANALYSIS
Slaninka asserts the district court violated his procedural “due process right to be heard on
his suppression issue” and that the district court erred in denying his motion to continue to allow
him to file a third motion to suppress. The State responds that Slaninka has failed to show a
procedural due process violation or error in the district court’s denial of his motion to continue.
We hold that Slaninka has failed to show either a due process violation or an abuse of discretion
in the denial of his motion to suppress.
A. Procedural Due Process as Fundamental Error
Slaninka asserts the “district court deprived [him] of due process because he was not given
the opportunity to be heard in a meaningful manner” on his proposed third motion to suppress.
Slaninka acknowledges that he did not assert a procedural due process violation to the district
court, but asserts that the district court’s actions amounted to fundamental error. The State
responds that the district court did not violate Slaninka’s procedural due process rights and that he
has failed to establish fundamental error.
As Slaninka acknowledges, he did not assert a procedural due process violation to the
district court. Where a procedural due process violation was not raised to the trial court, this Court
may only reverse when the asserted procedural due process violation constitutes fundamental error.
See State v. Miller, 165 Idaho 115, 119, 443 P.3d 129, 133 (2019). In order to obtain relief under
the fundamental error doctrine, the defendant must demonstrate three things. First, the defendant
must show that one or more of the defendant’s unwaived constitutional rights were violated. Id.
Second, the error must be clear and obvious, meaning the record must demonstrate evidence of the
error and evidence as to whether or not trial counsel made a tactical decision in relation to the
challenged action or inaction. Id. Third, the defendant must demonstrate that the error affected
the defendant’s substantial rights, which means the error identified in the first and second prongs
of the test actually affected the outcome of the trial. Id. at 119-20, 443 P.3d at 133-34.
In addressing the first prong of the analysis, we determine whether the district court’s
actions denied one of Slaninka’s unwaived constitutional rights. Slaninka asserts a “violation of

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his rights under the Due Process Clauses of the Idaho Constitution and the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments to the United States Constitution.” More specifically, Slaninka argues that, “where
there exists a procedure for holding suppression hearings, he was entitled to the concomitant due
process protections in that procedure,” which he contends he did not receive because he was “not
given the opportunity to be heard in a meaningful manner” on his request to suppress evidence
based on an alleged lack of probable cause for the search warrant. The right to procedural due
process requires that, when a constitutionally protected interest is at stake, a person involved in
the judicial process be given meaningful notice and a meaningful opportunity to be heard and that
judicial proceedings be fundamentally fair. State v. Blair, 149 Idaho 720, 722, 239 P.3d 825, 827
(Ct. App. 2010). Procedural due process is not a rigid concept but, rather, it is flexible and calls
for such procedural protections as the particular situation demands. Id.
A state’s criminal procedural rule can satisfy the requirements of due process. See
Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197, 201-02 (1977). Generally, a state’s criminal procedural rule
is “not subject to proscription under the Due Process Clause unless ‘it offends some principle of
justice so rooted in the traditions and conscience of our people as to be ranked as fundamental.’”
Id. (quoting Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 523 (1958)). “Substantial deference” is given to the
“legislative judgment” underlying a state’s criminal procedural rule “because the States have
considerable expertise in matters of criminal procedure and the criminal process is grounded in
centuries of common-law tradition.” Medina v. California, 505 U.S. 437, 445-46 (1992). Idaho
Criminal Rule 12(d) requires a motion to suppress to be filed within twenty-eight days after the
entry of a not guilty plea or seven days before trial, whichever is earlier. A trial court may shorten
or enlarge the time to file a motion and, for good cause shown or for excusable neglect, may relieve
a party of failure to comply with the time requirements of the rule. I.C.R. 12(d).
On appeal, Slaninka does not assert that the process provided by I.C.R. 12(d) fails to
provide due process under the test articulated in Patterson. Consequently, if Slaninka was afforded
the process outlined in I.C.R. 12(d), then he has failed to show a violation of his due process rights.
Slaninka entered a not guilty plea on February 9, 2021, and his trial commenced July 13,
2021. Applying the default deadline, this meant Slaninka had until March 9, 2021, to file a motion
to suppress. See I.C.R. 12(d). The district court’s scheduling order, however, extended the
deadline. The scheduling order required all motions to suppress to be filed “no later than fourteen

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(14) days after the compliance date set for discovery,” absent good cause to extend the deadline.
(Bolding and underlining omitted). The discovery compliance date was initially April 12, 2021,
but, after the State filed a motion to extend, the district court reset the compliance date for
discovery to April 30, 2021. This meant Slaninka had until May 14, 2021, to file a motion to
suppress, which was over two months beyond the default deadline provided by I.C.R. 12(d). Thus,
the district court gave Slaninka an opportunity to file a motion to suppress that was over three
times the default period.
Slaninka did not, however, file any of his motions to suppress within the May 14, 2021,
deadline. Slaninka filed his first motion to suppress on May 17, 2021, and his second motion to
suppress on June 24, 2021. The State did not object to these motions as untimely and the district
court ruled on the merits of both motions. By not enforcing the scheduling order’s deadline, the
district court effectively gave Slaninka additional opportunities to file a motion to suppress.
Because the default period in I.C.R. 12(d) is given “substantial deference” as it concerns due
process (a deference Slaninka does not challenge on appeal), these additional windows of time
afforded Slaninka more opportunity than required as a matter of due process.
On the morning of trial, Slaninka’s counsel represented that he and Slaninka had previously
“discussed the possibility of a potentially--just a general challenge to the probable cause” but that
counsel “was not able to put that together in the timeframe” because he was pursuing other aspects
of the case. Defense counsel did not explain why he did not move to extend the time to file an
additional motion to suppress, which was a procedural avenue available under I.C.R. 12(d). In
short, the record shows that Slaninka was afforded ample opportunity to file a timely motion to
suppress or, in the alternative, to move to extend the time to file but failed to take advantage of
these opportunities.
Regarding his third motion to suppress, Slaninka asserts on appeal that he raised a general
lack of probable cause in his brief in support of his second motion to suppress but the district court
failed to rule on that issue because the district court did not agree that Slaninka’s second motion
to suppress had done so. Slaninka asserts that the district court’s “refusal to hear his motion to
suppress” violated his right to due process. In other words, Slaninka contends that the district
court’s assessment that Slaninka’s second motion to suppress did not challenge the sufficiency of
probable cause for the search warrant was a due process violation. This argument lacks merit. As

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noted, I.C.R. 12(d) afforded the due process required to be heard on a motion to suppress and
Slaninka failed to comply with the requirements of that rule from the outset. That he later
disagreed with the district court on whether his second motion encompassed his general inadequate
probable cause claim does not equate to a due process violation.
Moreover, the record supports the district court’s assessment that Slaninka’s second motion
to suppress did not include a general challenge to the probable cause provided in support of the
search warrant. In applying for the search warrant, the officer averred that, “due to the numerous
stops and quick stay-time” in a certain area, “it is plausible Slaninka drove to the area to make a
quick drug-run/heroin pick-up.” In his second motion to suppress, Slaninka argued that the
officer’s averment “that it is plausible that [Slaninka] was doing drug runs is conjecture and falls
short of probable cause.” Although Slaninka used the words “probable cause” in his second
motion, his argument must be viewed in the larger context of his second motion, which requested
an evidentiary hearing to challenge the veracity of evidence contained in the affidavits pursuant to
Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154 (1978). A defendant is entitled to an evidentiary hearing under
Franks to challenge the veracity of evidence used by officers to obtain a search warrant if the
defendant makes a substantial preliminary showing that the evidence included an intentionally
false statement or a statement made with reckless disregard for the truth. Id. at 155-56. The right
to a Franks hearing also extends to deliberate or reckless omissions of material exculpatory
information. State v. Guzman, 122 Idaho 981, 983-84, 842 P.2d 660, 662-63 (1992). If the
defendant successfully shows inclusion of a false statement or omission of exculpatory
information, the trial court must then examine whether the remaining information in the affidavit
is sufficient to establish probable cause absent the false statement or with the addition of the
exculpatory information. See Franks, 438 U.S. at 156; Guzman, 122 Idaho at 983-84, 842 P.2d at
662-63. The second step of a Franks analysis (reviewing the sufficiency of probable cause after
removing or adding information to an affidavit) is distinct from addressing a general challenge to
probable cause. See Guzman, 122 Idaho at 984, 842 P.2d at 663 (holding that trial court correctly
concluded that there was no probable cause under the “totality of the circumstances” after rejecting
a Franks challenge).

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In his brief to the district court, Slaninka asserted the officer included false statements2 and
omitted exculpatory information and argued that, “absent either [the] misstatements or the
omissions, there is a substantial probability that the warrants would not have been issued.” Viewed
in this context, Slaninka’s argument (that one averment by the officer “falls short of probable
cause”) focused on the second part of a Franks analysis, which is whether the remaining
information suffices to show probable cause. It is also notable that Slaninka’s argument asserted
that a single averment by the officer did not provide probable cause, not that all the information
(including the allegedly false statements) was insufficient to establish probable cause.
Consequently, as concluded by the district court, Slaninka did not assert a general attack on
probable cause in his brief in support of his second motion to suppress.
Next, Slaninka asserts he raised a general attack on probable cause at the hearing on the
second motion to suppress and that the district court violated his due process rights by not
addressing the issue. At the hearing, Slaninka argued that the information from the confidential
informant was largely uncorroborated. Upon hearing Slaninka’s argument, the district court
remarked, “Well, you haven’t raised the issue of insufficiency of probable cause prior to just now.”
As discussed above, the district court’s observation was correct. Ultimately, the district court did
not address Slaninka’s general attack on probable cause. Again, a general attack on the sufficiency
of probable cause is distinct from a Franks challenge. In essence, Slaninka’s new argument
constituted an additional motion to suppress. Because this hearing occurred on July 6, 2021,
Slaninka’s new motion to suppress was untimely. The district court’s comment that Slaninka had
not raised the issue until “just now” indicates that the district court (to the extent its inaction can
be construed as one of the district court’s “decisions,” as Slaninka characterizes it) implicitly
denied the new motion to suppress because it was untimely. This was consistent with the district
court’s subsequent denial of Slaninka’s motion to continue raised on the morning of trial, in which
the district court found that his proposed third motion to suppress would be untimely. Denying a
motion to suppress because it is untimely is permitted by I.C.R. 12(d), and Slaninka does not argue
on appeal that the procedure provided in I.C.R. 12(d) violates due process.

2
At the hearing on the second motion to suppress, Slaninka withdrew his allegation that the
officer included false statements.

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Slaninka has failed to show that the district court violated his right to due process. Because
Slaninka has failed to show a violation of an unwaived constitutional right, we do not address the
parties’ arguments on the remaining prongs of fundamental error.
B. Motion to Continue
Slaninka asserts the “district court erred in denying his motion for a continuance and/or his
motion to enlarge the time to file a motion to suppress” because, according to him, he showed
good cause. Slaninka asserts that the district court failed to exercise reason and did not act
consistently with the applicable legal standards. We hold that Slaninka has failed to show error.
The purpose of Slaninka’s motion to continue was to allow him to file a third motion to
suppress. As part of his motion, he asked the district court to set a “briefing schedule.” Because
his proposed third motion to suppress would have been untimely, Slaninka’s request for a briefing
schedule was an implicit motion to extend the time to file a motion to suppress. A trial court may
excuse a defendant’s failure to comply with the deadline to file a motion to suppress if the
defendant shows good cause or excusable neglect. I.C.R. 12(d). The burden of showing good
cause or excusable neglect rests with the defendant. See State v. Gleason, 130 Idaho 586, 591, 944
P.2d 721, 726 (Ct. App. 1997).
Slaninka asserts there was good cause because allowing him to be heard on his proposed
third motion to suppress would “avoid[] the unnecessary costs of post-conviction litigation.” A
trial court considering a motion to extend a filing deadline may consider the effect that its decision
would have on the efficient operation of the judicial system. State v. Irving, 118 Idaho 673, 675,
799 P.2d 471, 473 (Ct. App. 1990). Nevertheless, the district court was not obligated to weigh
judicial economy considerations above all else. If the interest of judicial economy to avoid post-
conviction actions required that extensions of time be granted under I.C.R. 12(d), the exception to
the deadline for pretrial motions would swallow the rule and defendants would lack incentive to
comply with the time limits of I.C.R. 12(d). Although a trial court can rely on considerations of
judicial economy in granting an extension, it is not required to do so. Consequently, Slaninka has
failed to show error in this regard.
Slaninka also asserts “there was no prejudice to the State” and that this supported good
cause. Slaninka, however, provides no authority that a lack of prejudice is relevant to a good cause
analysis under I.C.R. 12(d). A party forfeits an issue on appeal if either authority or argument is

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lacking. State v. Zichko, 129 Idaho 259, 263, 923 P.2d 966, 970 (1996). Due to Slaninka’s lack
of authority, we will not address this argument.
This leaves Slaninka’s assertions that the district court’s “decision effectively punished
[him] for his counsel’s late motion” and that the district court acted “inconsistently with the
applicable legal standards in failing to recognize the failure to timely file a suppression motion
was not due to any circumstances within [Slaninka’s] control.” Again, Slaninka presents no
authority that good cause is shown when the failure to timely file is due to counsel’s actions rather
than Slaninka’s and, thus, we need not consider this argument. See Zichko, 129 Idaho at 263, 923
P.2d at 970. In any event, the record shows that the district court considered the difficulties that
Slaninka’s counsel encountered. On the morning of trial, Slaninka’s counsel represented that he
“was not able to put [the proposed third motion to suppress] together in the [required] timeframe”
because counsel was pursuing other aspects of the case. The district court “recognize[d] that
counsel was working diligently on other legal matters involved” in the case. Despite this, the
district court denied the motion to continue because Slaninka had not shown there was “new
information recently available to [him] that would lead to” the proposed third motion to suppress
and the “original contents of the search warrant and affidavit” had been “available to [him] for
some time now.” This shows the district court exercised reason and acted consistently with the
applicable legal standards. Slaninka has failed to show the district court abused its discretion in
denying his motion to continue to permit a third motion to suppress.
IV.
CONCLUSION
Slaninka has failed to show the district court violated his procedural due process right or
abused its discretion in denying his motion to continue. Consequently, Slaninka’s judgment of
conviction for trafficking in heroin, possession of a controlled substance, and possession of drug
paraphernalia is affirmed.
Judge GRATTON and Judge BRAILSFORD, CONCUR.

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