Walters v. Ogle County Sheriff Office

2026 IL App (4th) 250793-U
NO. 4-25-0793
IN THE APPELLATE COURT
OF ILLINOIS
FOURTH DISTRICT
BRADLEY WALTERS,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
THE OGLE COUNTY SHERIFF’S OFFICE,
Defendant-Appellee.
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Appeal from the
Circuit Court of
Ogle County
No. 24LA27
Honorable
Clayton L. Lindsey,
Judge Presiding.
JUSTICE VANCIL delivered the judgment of the court.
Justices Doherty and Cavanagh concurred in the judgment.
ORDER
¶ 1 Held: The appellate court affirmed the trial court’s dismissal of plaintiff’s complaint
under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) (5 ILCS 140/1 et seq. (West
2024)).
¶ 2 In August 2024, plaintiff, Bradley Walters, filed a complaint pursuant to the
Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) (5 ILCS 140/1 et seq. (West 2024)) against defendant, the
Ogle County Sheriff’s Office (Sheriff’s Office). Plaintiff alleged the Sheriff’s Office failed to
comply with FOIA requests and sought civil penalties. The Sheriff’s Office filed a motion to
dismiss the complaint. In May 2025, the trial court dismissed plaintiff’s complaint.
¶ 3 On appeal, plaintiff argues the trial court erred in dismissing his complaint and
denying him civil penalties. We affirm.
¶ 4 I. BACKGROUND
¶ 5 On August 27, 2024, plaintiff filed a complaint related to FOIA requests
FILED
October 13, 2026
Carla Bender
4th District Appellate
Court, IL
NOTICE
This Order was filed under
Supreme Court Rule 23 and is
not precedent except in the
limited circumstances allowed
under Rule 23(e)(1).

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submitted to the Sheriff’s Office.
¶ 6 A. Plaintiff’s Complaint
¶ 7 Count I of the complaint alleged plaintiff filed a FOIA request on May 21, 2024,
requesting (1) a printed copy of the Federal Performance-Based Detention Standards (Federal
Detention Standards) and (2) a printed copy of the “Core Detention Standards.” Plaintiff’s FOIA
requests were attached to the complaint. Plaintiff also attached to the complaint a copy of a
“Modification of Intergovernmental Agreement” between the United States Marshal’s Service
(U.S. Marshals) and the Ogle County jail effective February 1, 2022. The agreement stated,
“Federal prisoners shall be housed in a manner consistent with the [Federal Detention Standards]
***. These standards are set forth in Form USM-218 (provided as an attachment to this
modification).” The agreement provided a web address where the Federal Detention Standards
could be found.
¶ 8 On May 28, 2024, the Sheriff’s Office responded to plaintiff’s request, and the
response was attached to the complaint. The response stated:
“After reviewing what documents we have for the above mentioned
information, the Ogle County Sheriff’s Office has no record pertaining to the
above referenced information. These Standards are provided through the Federal
Government, not the Ogle County Sheriff’s Office.”
¶ 9 Plaintiff alleged he submitted a request using the inmate kiosk system, which
confirmed the Federal Detention Standards were used for federal detainees. Plaintiff then filed a
federal Freedom of Information Act (5 U.S.C. § 552 (2018)) request with the National Archives
and was provided a copy of the Federal Detention Standards.
¶ 10 Plaintiff contended the Sheriff’s Office violated FOIA by not providing the

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documents. He argued the Sheriff’s Office possessed the Federal Detention Standards because it
had been “ ‘prepared for’ ” the agreement with the U.S. Marshals and was “ ‘used by’ ” officers
in the jail. Plaintiff also asserted the Sheriff’s Office’s response violated FOIA by not including
information on the right to review by the Public Access Counselor.
¶ 11 Count II alleged plaintiff filed two FOIA requests with defendant requesting
copies of (1) the “ ‘Inmate Handbook dated 5/28/24’ ” and (2) “ ‘all documents submitted to the
U.S. Marshals Service regarding [his] medical appointment with Dr. Norem, on or about the date
of 5/15/24.’ ” Plaintiff attached the Sheriff’s Office’s response, dated July 11, 2024, to these
requests, which stated the following:
“As stated in the previous response letter dated 6/26/2024, this public
body is treating each aforementioned request as a request under subsection (g) of
Section 2 of [FOIA]. As such, please be advised that this public body does not
require any additional time to provide the requested records listed in each of the
aforementioned FOIA requests. However, copy fees in the estimated amount of
$10.05 must be paid in full before the process of copying the requested documents
will occur, as this public body has provided you with copies of requested records
for previous FOIA requests, free of charge, in an amount that far exceeds the 50
free pages listed in subsection (b) of Section 6 of [FOIA]. The documents for the
FOIA requests received on 6/18/2024 will be provided upon receipt of payment in
the amount of $10.05, for copy fees.”
¶ 12 Plaintiff contended the Sheriff’s Office violated FOIA by charging him fees for
the requested documents.
¶ 13 As to both counts, plaintiff alleged the Sheriff’s Office “purposely and

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maliciously with deliberate indifference denied the Plaintiff’s FOIA request to hide documents
concerning the Plaintiff.” Plaintiff also alleged a violation of his civil rights and the conditions in
which he was held in the Ogle County jail.
¶ 14 Plaintiff requested (1) declaratory relief that the Sheriff’s Office “violated the
Plaintiff’s rights under the Constitution and Illinois law,” (2) punitive damages in the amount of
$50,000, (3) a civil penalty in the amount of $5,000 pursuant to section 11(j) of FOIA (5 ILCS
140/11(j) (West 2024)), and (4) recovery of his costs in filing this action.
¶ 15 B. Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss
¶ 16 The Sheriff’s Office filed a motion to dismiss plaintiff’s complaint pursuant to
section 2-615 of the Code of Civil Procedure (Code) (735 ILCS 5/2-615 (West 2024)). It argued
plaintiff failed to plead facts upon which relief can be granted.
¶ 17 The Sheriff’s Office argued, in count I, plaintiff requested records he was not
entitled to under FOIA. It pointed out the Federal Detention Standards and “Core Detention
Standards” were available online, and it did not maintain or prepare the records. The Sheriff’s
Office also noted the Ogle County Jail Inmate Handbook in count II was available to plaintiff in
the Ogle County jail’s library, and it had provided plaintiff with copies of his medical records in
Ogle County case No. 24-LA-19 pursuant to a court order.
¶ 18 As to both counts, the Sheriff’s Office argued plaintiff failed to comply with
section 2-603(b) of the Code (id. § 2-603(b)), which requires that “[e]ach separate cause of
action upon which a separate recovery might be had shall be stated in a separate count.” It argued
plaintiff “merely state[d] broad and conclusory statements throughout his Complaint. In no way
does his Complaint apprise the Defendant what exactly it is that the Plaintiff is seeking relief
from.” The Sheriff’s Office did acknowledge plaintiff’s argument it violated FOIA by attempting

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to charge plaintiff fees, but it contended plaintiff had previously filed 14 FOIA requests,
“resulting in over hundreds of uncharged pages, far exceeding the 50-page limit.”
¶ 19 Finally, the Sheriff’s Office argued that, insofar as plaintiff was attempting to
frame his complaint as a violation of his civil rights under Section 1983 of the federal Civil
Rights Act (42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2024)), Monell v. Department of Social Services of the City of
New York, 436 U.S. 664, 694 (1978), required he demonstrate a custom or policy of the Sheriff’s
Office led to a violation of his civil rights. The Sheriff’s Office argued, “Plaintiff’s conclusory
allegations do not contain any facts to even help identify the claims that he attempts to make, let
alone any that rise to the standard required to state such claims.”
¶ 20 C. The Trial Court’s Ruling
¶ 21 Plaintiff filed a response to the Sheriff’s Office motion to dismiss, which included
a motion for summary judgment. In response, the Sheriff’s Office noted, among other points,
plaintiff included additional facts in his response that were not included in the original complaint
and should be disregarded.
¶ 22 At a hearing on May 16, 2025, after oral argument, plaintiff tendered written
argument to the trial court and defense counsel, and the court granted the Sheriff’s Office an
opportunity to respond and took the matter under advisement. (We note, no transcript of the
hearing is included in the record on appeal.)
¶ 23 In its response, the Sheriff’s Office observed plaintiff had received all requested
records or the records were available to him in the Ogle County jail library system, and his
complaint was therefore moot. The Sheriff’s Office also reiterated its argument it was entitled to
charge plaintiff fees for requested documents, as it had already provided plaintiff with more than
50 free pages in his prior FOIA requests.

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¶ 24 On May 28, 2025, the trial court filed a written decision granting the Sheriff’s
Office’s motion to dismiss. The court found plaintiff’s complaint to be “confusing at best” and
that it failed to allege how the Sheriff’s Office’s responses to his FOIA requests violated FOIA
or “caused harm or damages” to plaintiff. Further, the court found plaintiff only made conclusory
allegations the Sheriff’s Office willfully and intentionally failed to comply with FOIA. The court
also stated plaintiff’s claims, “if any, [were] under the Illinois FOIA, not a Section 1983 claim
for civil rights violation.”
¶ 25 The trial court determined plaintiff’s complaint should be dismissed with
prejudice. The court found plaintiff had received all of the documents he requested, making his
requests pursuant to FOIA moot. The court also determined the Sheriff’s Office’s responses did
not amount to “ ‘willful or intentional’ failure to comply” with FOIA, so no civil penalty was
available. Finally, the court noted a federal court had ruled the Federal Detention Standards did
not “give an inmate a private right of action to enforce the standards against the [Sheriff’s
Office].”
¶ 26 Plaintiff filed a motion to reconsider and requested the opportunity to file an
amended complaint. Plaintiff also alleged he had not received a copy of the inmate handbook
from May 28, 2024, as mentioned in count II of his complaint.
¶ 27 After a hearing on July 28, 2025, the trial court denied plaintiff’s motion.
¶ 28 This appeal followed.
¶ 29 II. ANALYSIS
¶ 30 On appeal, plaintiff argues the trial court erred in granting the Sheriff’s Office’s
motion to dismiss his complaint, as the Sheriff’s Office violated FOIA by (1) not providing a
copy of the Federal Detention Standards and (2) requesting copying fees before providing him

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with copies of his medical records and the Ogle County Jail Inmate Handbook. Plaintiff also
contends he is entitled to civil penalties in relation to each of his FOIA requests.
¶ 31 A. Dismissal Pursuant to Section 2-615
¶ 32 Plaintiff’s amended complaint was dismissed under section 2-615 of the Code
(735 ILCS 5/2-615 (West 2024)). A motion to dismiss under section 2-615 attacks the legal
sufficiency of the complaint. Grant v. State, 2018 IL App (4th) 170920, ¶ 12. When a section 2-
615 motion to dismiss is filed, the movant argues the facts pleaded by the plaintiff do not state a
cause of action. Id.
¶ 33 When considering the sufficiency of a complaint on review, we construe its
allegations “in the light most favorable to the plaintiff” and “accept as true all well-pleaded facts
and all reasonable inferences that may be drawn from those facts.” Marshall v. Burger King
Corp., 222 Ill. 2d 422, 429 (2006). A trial court’s ruling on a motion to dismiss pursuant to
section 2-615 “may not consider facts outside the four corners of the complaint.” Liddle v. Salem
School District. No. 600, 249 Ill. App. 3d 768, 770 (1993). “A complaint should be dismissed
under section 2-615 only if it is clearly apparent from the pleadings that no set of facts can be
proved that would entitle the plaintiff to recovery.” Grant, 2018 IL App (4th) 170920, ¶ 12.
¶ 34 Our review of an order granting a section 2-615 motion to dismiss is de novo. Id.
Ultimately, “[w]e may affirm an order dismissing a complaint on any basis supported by the
record, regardless of the trial court’s reasoning.” Kucinsky v. Pfister, 2020 IL App (3d) 170719,
¶ 34.
¶ 35 B. FOIA
¶ 36 FOIA governs the inspection of public records. 5 ILCS 140/1.2 (West 2024). The
purpose of FOIA “is ‘to open governmental records to the light of public scrutiny.’ ” Watkins v.

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McCarthy, 2012 IL App (1st) 100632, ¶ 14 (quoting Bowie v. Evanston Community
Consolidated School District No. 65, 128 Ill. 2d 373, 378 (1989)). Under FOIA, public records
are presumed to be open and accessible. Hosey v. City of Joliet, 2019 IL App (3d) 180118, ¶ 9.
FOIA must be liberally construed to achieve that goal. Id.
¶ 37 Unless subject to exemption, “[e]ach public body shall make available to any
person for inspection or copying all public records.” 5 ILCS 140/3(a) (West 2024). A FOIA
request must “reasonably identify a public record and not general data, information, or statistics.”
Chicago Tribune Co. v. Department of Financial & Professional Regulation, 2014 IL App (4th)
130427, ¶ 33. “When a public body receives a proper request for information, it must comply
with that request unless one of the narrow statutory exemptions applies.” Lieber v. Board of
Trustees of Southern Illinois University, 176 Ill. 2d 401, 407 (1997). FOIA does not create an
independent duty upon a public body to maintain or prepare a public record that it is not already
legally required to keep, and “[t]he nonexistence of requested documents is a cognizable
affirmative defense” to a FOIA claim. (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Barner v. Fairburn,
2019 IL App (3d) 180742, ¶ 12.
¶ 38 FOIA allows civil penalties when an agency’s failure to comply is willful or
intentional. 5 ILCS 140/11(j) (West 2024). “ ‘[T]o warrant the imposition of a civil penalty
under section 11(j), the public body not only must have intentionally failed to comply with the
FOIA but must have done so deliberately, by design, and with a dishonest purpose.’ ” Edgar
County Watchdogs v. Joliet Township, 2023 IL App (3d) 210520, ¶ 30 (quoting Williams v.
Bruscato, 2021 IL App (2d) 190971, ¶ 14).
¶ 39 “[O]nce a public body provides the information requested under FOIA, even after
a lengthy delay, the controversy over the public body’s production of [those] documents ceases

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to exist,” and a plaintiff’s continued claim for the production of that information is moot. Roxana
Community Unit School District No. 1 v. Environmental Protection Agency, 2013 IL App (4th)
120825, ¶ 41; see Duncan Publishing, Inc. v. City of Chicago, 304 Ill. App. 3d 778, 782 (1999);
see also Turner v. Joliet Police Department, 2019 IL App (3d) 170819, ¶¶ 12-13 (affirming
dismissal of FOIA claim as moot under section 2-619(a)(9) of the Code (735 ILCS 5/2-619(a)(9)
(West 2016)) where the plaintiff had received the information he had requested from the Joliet
Police Department).
¶ 40 C. This Case
¶ 41 The Sheriff’s Office argues on appeal that plaintiff’s FOIA claims are moot, as he
has already received the requested documents.
¶ 42 An issue is moot when no actual controversy exists or where events occur making
it impossible for the reviewing court to grant relief. Commonwealth Edison Co. v. Illinois
Commerce Comm’n, 2016 IL 118129, ¶ 10. “ ‘As a general rule, courts of review in Illinois do
not decide moot questions, render advisory opinions, or consider issues where the result will not
be affected regardless of how those issues are decided.’ ” Id. (quoting In re Barbara H., 183 Ill.
2d 482, 491 (1998)). As a matter of justiciability, mootness is not a mere technicality; the
existence of a real, actual controversy is a prerequisite to the exercise of our jurisdiction. In re
Adoption of Walgreen, 186 Ill. 2d 362, 365 (1999).
¶ 43 Illinois case law establishes once an agency provides the documents requested,
even after a delay in violation of FOIA, the plaintiff’s “prayers seeking or concerning production
are moot.” Roxana School District, 2013 IL App (4th) 120825 ¶ 42. Although a plaintiff’s claim
for production of records and information may be moot where the plaintiff received the records
requested, motions which are “ ‘ancillary to the underlying action’ ” are not. Duncan Publishing,

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Inc., 304 Ill. App. 3d at 782. Ancillary issues under FOIA which may remain viable include a
request for attorney fees under section 11(i) (5 ILCS 140/11(i) (West 2024)) and a request for a
civil penalty under section 11(j) (id. § 11(j)). See Roxana School District, 2013 IL App (4th)
120825, ¶ 42.
¶ 44 1. Medical Records and Jail Handbook
¶ 45 Plaintiff acknowledged he received the requested medical records from the
Sheriff’s Office pursuant to a court order in Ogle County case No. 24-LA-24. Therefore, even if
the Sheriff’s Office had violated FOIA, there is no effectual relief we can grant plaintiff by
directing the Sheriff’s Office to produce the requested documents. We must dismiss plaintiff’s
argument for production of medical records as moot.
¶ 46 As for the jail handbook, the trial court’s order in this case states, “[Plaintiff]
acknowledged during oral argument that he has received the copy of the Ogle County Jail Inmate
Handbook making his request moot.” The record on appeal does not contain any transcripts,
bystander’s report, or agreed statement of facts. See Ill. S. Ct. R. 323 (eff. July 1, 2017). The
burden is on the appellant to provide a sufficiently complete record on appeal, and in the absence
of such a record, it will be presumed that the trial court’s orders had a sufficient factual basis and
were in conformity with the law. Foutch v. O’Bryant, 99 Ill. 2d 389, 391-92 (1984). Any doubts
arising from the incompleteness of the record will be construed against the appellant. Id. at 392.
Without a transcript to refute the court’s finding, we must presume plaintiff did acknowledge he
received the inmate handbook, and his claim is moot.
¶ 47 Although plaintiff received the records and the underlying actions for compliance
with FOIA are moot, we must still resolve the ancillary issues. See Roxana School District, 2013
IL App (4th) 120825, ¶ 42. Here, plaintiff is pro se and therefore has no attorney fees. Plaintiff

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also received a waiver of court fees. However, plaintiff requested a civil penalty, which remains
viable. Therefore, we turn to whether plaintiff sufficiently alleged the Sheriff’s Office willfully
and intentionally failed to comply with his FOIA request.
¶ 48 At issue is whether section 6(b) of FOIA (5 ILCS 140/6(b) (West 2024)), which
sets out the authority of public bodies to charge fees for the production of documents, is
modified by a request or a requester. Section 6(b) provides, in relevant part, the following:
“Except when a fee is otherwise fixed by statute, each public body may charge
fees reasonably calculated to reimburse its actual cost for reproducing and
certifying public records ***. No fees shall be charged for the first 50 pages of
black and white, letter or legal sized copies requested by a requester. The fee for
black and white, letter or legal sized copies shall not exceed 15 cents per page.”
Id.
Plaintiff argues he is entitled to 50 free pages per request. The Sheriff’s Office contends plaintiff,
as a single requester, is entitled to 50 free pages total, and the Sheriff’s Office is free to charge
plaintiff regardless of how many requests he has submitted.
¶ 49 We need not determine which interpretation of section 6(b) is correct. The
question is not whether the Sheriff’s Office correctly charged plaintiff copy fees, but rather
whether the Sheriff’s Office willfully and intentionally violated FOIA by charging plaintiff copy
fees. Here, we find the Sheriff’s Office’s interpretation of the fee provision was a good faith
reading of the provision, as evidenced by our sister district recently interpreting the statute under
the same reading in Walters v. McHenry County Sheriff’s Office, 2025 IL App (2d) 250071-U,
¶ 19. In that case, the Second District determined a plaintiff’s status as a single requester
controlled, and the public body was permitted to charge the plaintiff for copies after 50 pages

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regardless of how many separate and distinct requests he submitted. Id. We presume plaintiff is
aware of this decision by our sister district, as he was also the plaintiff in that case.
¶ 50 Because the Sheriff’s Office interpretation of the fee provision cannot be a willful
and intentional violation of FOIA regardless of the correct reading of section 6(b), plaintiff failed
to state a claim for a civil penalty, and the trial court correctly dismissed the request.
¶ 51 2. Federal Detention Standards
¶ 52 The Sheriff’s Office also argues plaintiff’s receipt of a copy of the Federal
Detention Standards from the National Archives, which matched his original request, renders his
request moot. We are hesitant to release a public body from its obligations under FOIA simply
because a plaintiff managed to find another source for the requested documents. As discussed,
“[t]he mootness doctrine is applied to FOIA claims once the requested records have been
produced.” Turner, 2019 Il App (3d) 170819, ¶ 12. However, we can find no case where the
mootness doctrine has been applied when the plaintiff received the documents from some source
other than the defendant. The broader implication that a public body should be excused for
failing to produce documents simply because a plaintiff managed to find someone else with the
requested information is untenable. We therefore turn to the merits.
¶ 53 Plaintiff requested the Sheriff’s Office produce a printed “copy of the [Federal
Detention Standards].” The Sheriff’s Office timely responded to plaintiff’s request stating the
Sheriff’s Office had “no record pertaining to the above referenced information” and informed
plaintiff the Federal Detention Standards were “provided through the Federal Government, not
the [Sheriff’s Office].” “The nonexistence of requested documents is a cognizable affirmative
defense” to a FOIA claim. (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Barner, 2019 IL App (3d) 180742,
¶ 12. The trial court determined the Sheriff’s Office’s response was accurate, as the documents

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would be “prepared, generated, promulgated and maintained by the federal government.”
¶ 54 On appeal, plaintiff points to the intergovernmental agreement between the U.S.
Marshals and the Sheriff’s Office for proof the Sheriff’s Office had obtained a copy of the
Federal Detention Standards, and thus the FOIA response was false. However, the
intergovernmental agreement never states the Federal Detention Standards were attached, only
that “Form USM-218” was provided as an attachment. The agreement continues to explain the
relevant portions of the Federal Detention Standards were “summarized in Form USM-218.”
Plaintiff had specifically requested a printed copy of the Federal Detention Standards, not any
records the Sheriff’s Office had relating to the Federal Detention Standards. A FOIA request
must “reasonably identify a public record” (Chicago Tribune Co., 2014 IL App (4th) 130427,
¶ 33), and we cannot find a public body failed to produce a document that was not requested.
Therefore, the trial court did not err in dismissing plaintiff’s complaint for production of the
Federal Detention Standards.
¶ 55 Plaintiff also requested civil penalties. Section 11(j) states a trial court may
impose civil penalties where it “determines that a public body willfully and intentionally failed to
comply with [FOIA].” 5 ILCS 140/11(j) (West 2024). It therefore follows that, where there has
been no violation of FOIA, there can be no civil penalties.
¶ 56 III. CONCLUSION
¶ 57 For the reasons stated, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.
¶ 58 Affirmed.

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