In re T.H.

2026 IL App (4th) 260592-U
NO. 4-26-0592
IN THE APPELLATE COURT
OF ILLINOIS
FOURTH DISTRICT
In re T.H., a Minor
(The People of the State of Illinois,
Petitioner-Appellee,
v.
Hayden H.,
Respondent-Appellant).
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Appeal from the
Circuit Court of
Tazewell County
No. 23JA217
Honorable
Katherine G. P. Legge,
Judge Presiding.
JUSTICE DOHERTY delivered the judgment of the court.
Justices Lannerd and Knecht concurred in the judgment.
ORDER
¶ 1 Held: The trial court’s order terminating respondent’s parental rights was not void
ab initio because the court had personal jurisdiction over him and he received
adequate notice.
¶ 2 Following hearings conducted in April and May 2026, the trial court terminated
respondent Hayden H.’s parental rights to his minor child, T.H. Respondent now appeals,
challenging whether the court’s order terminating his parental rights was void ab initio for lack of
personal jurisdiction and failure to given him adequate notice. We affirm.
¶ 3 I. BACKGROUND
¶ 4 Tracy F. gave birth to T.H. in November 2023. A hotline report was made to the
Illinois Department of Children and Family Services (DCFS) because Tracy F. had previously
been found an unfit parent, and her parental rights as to two other children had been terminated in
two other Tazewell County cases.
FILED
October 13, 2026
Carla Bender
4th District Appellate
Court, IL
NOTICE
This Order was filed under
Supreme Court Rule 23 and is
not precedent except in the
limited circumstances allowed
under Rule 23(e)(1).

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¶ 5 Respondent had been in a relationship with Tracy F. since March 2023. At various
times, he had lived with Tracy F., her mother, and the other two children over whom Tracy F. had
lost custody. When T.H. was born, respondent executed a voluntary acknowledgement of paternity
(VAP).
¶ 6 On December 4, 2023, DCFS filed a shelter care petition alleging that T.H. was
neglected, and a temporary custody hearing was held that afternoon. Respondent was present, and
the trial court found that he had received notice. The court found probable cause existed to remove
T.H. from the home and place temporary custody with DCFS. The court ordered that if
respondent’s toxicology screen came back negative, then he “may be allowed” to live with the
foster parent/paternal grandmother and T.H. at DCFS’s discretion. The court also appointed
counsel for respondent. The next hearing was set for December 27, 2023.
¶ 7 Because respondent’s appearance at various court dates throughout the life of the
case is relevant to his notice argument, we summarize those court dates in detail.
¶ 8 On December 27, 2023, respondent was present with his attorney and was ordered
to file an answer. The alleged putative father, Bryce O., was ordered to comply with DNA testing.
The matter was continued to February 14, 2024, for DNA review.
¶ 9 At the February 14, 2024, DNA review hearing, the trial court found that Bryce O.
was not T.H.’s legal father due to the results of DNA testing. Respondent was found to be the legal
father based upon his VAP and was ordered to file an answer within 14 days. The matter was
continued to March 20, 2024, for adjudication or disposition. Respondent filed a verified answer
to the petition soon thereafter.
¶ 10 On March 20, 2024, the matter proceeded to an adjudicatory hearing, which
respondent attended with his attorney. The trial court found that a factual basis existed and

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concluded that T.H. was an abused or neglected minor (705 ILCS 405/2-3(1)(b) (West 2024)). The
court found that Tracy F. was responsible for the abuse or neglect. A dispositional order was
entered, finding that it was in T.H.’s best interest that he be made a ward of the court. Tracy F.
was found unfit, while respondent was found to be fit, and custody and guardianship were placed
with him. A permanency hearing was scheduled for May 29, 2024.
¶ 11 On May 29, 2024, respondent was present with his attorney. The trial court found
that the appropriate permanency goal was to remain home with respondent. The court found that
respondent had made reasonable efforts and reasonable progress toward T.H.’s return home.
Custody and guardianship of T.H. was ordered to remain with respondent. The permanency review
hearing was continued to August 28, 2024.
¶ 12 Respondent and his attorney appeared on August 28, 2024. The permanency review
hearing was continued to September 25, 2024, to allow Tracy F.’s new counsel to be brought up
to speed. Respondent again appeared with his attorney on September 25, but the permanency
review hearing was continued by agreement to January 15, 2025, because Tracy F. had entered a
rehabilitation facility.
¶ 13 On December 3, 2024, the State filed a new shelter care petition, asking that T.H.
be adjudicated a ward of the trial court and placed in shelter care because he was neglected and in
an environment injurious to his welfare because of an alleged incident involving respondent. A
traffic stop was conducted while respondent was driving a vehicle with T.H. and a female
passenger who had three active warrants for failure to appear on unlawful possession of
methamphetamine charges. Respondent was found to have a loaded gun in his waistband and a
bag of cannabis in the glove box. Respondent was arrested at the time, and his mother, Debbie H.,
took custody of T.H.

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¶ 14 On December 3, 2024, the State filed an emergency motion to find respondent unfit.
Notice of the emergency hearing was sent to respondent’s attorney.
¶ 15 On December 4, 2024, respondent appeared with his attorney. The trial court found
that probable cause existed based on the facts alleged in the petition and ordered that temporary
custody of T.H. be given to the guardianship administrator of DCFS, with the right to determine
placement. The matter was continued to December 13, 2024, for rehearing on the shelter care
petition. In open court, respondent was provided with a copy of the petition and a notice of his
rights. Respondent voluntarily consented to a default on the facts alleged in the petition.
¶ 16 Respondent and his attorney appeared before the trial court on December 10, 2024.
On the court’s motion, the matter was continued to December 11, 2024, and the December 13,
2024, rehearing was vacated. Respondent again appeared with his attorney on December 11, 2024.
The court found that no additional shelter care hearings were required, and the matter was set over
to January 15, 2025, for first appearance on answers.
¶ 17 On January 15, 2025, respondent and his attorney appeared before the trial court.
The court found that respondent had consented to default on the shelter care petition. The matter
was continued for entry of adjudication and disposition to March 12, 2025.
¶ 18 On March 12, 2025, respondent again appeared with his attorney. The trial court
found that Tracy F. stipulated to the factual basis of the shelter care petition and respondent
consented to default. The court found that T.H. was an abused or neglected minor because he was
in an environment that was injurious to his welfare (705 ILCS 405/2-3(1)(b) (West 2024)). A
dispositional order was simultaneously entered, finding that it was in the best interest of T.H. to
be made a ward of the court. Both Tracy F. and respondent were found unfit. The guardianship
administrator was given custody and guardianship of T.H., with the right to place him. The matter

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was set for permanency hearing on June 25, 2025.
¶ 19 On June 25, 2025, respondent and his attorney appeared before the trial court. The
court found respondent had not made reasonable efforts or reasonable progress toward a return
home, so he was found unfit. The permanency review hearing was continued to October 29, 2025.
The parties were ordered to cooperate with DCFS or “risk termination of their parental rights.”
¶ 20 On October 29, 2025, respondent again appeared before the trial court with his
attorney. The court found respondent had not made reasonable efforts or reasonable progress
toward return home and was again found unfit. The permanency review hearing was continued to
March 4, 2026, and the parties were again ordered to cooperate with DCFS or “risk termination of
their parental rights.”
¶ 21 Respondent and his attorney appeared before the trial court on March 4, 2026. The
court found respondent unfit because had had missed drug tests and scheduled visitation times and
had made no progress toward T.H.’s return home. The matter was set for first appearance to
terminate parental rights to April 8, 2026. The court specifically admonished respondent and Tracy
F. concerning the process for termination and their rights. The court also told the parties that if
they failed to appear on April 8, 2026, that it “would constitute a waiver of any of the rights that
you have.”
¶ 22 On March 23, 2026, the State filed a petition to terminate the parental rights of
Tracy F. and respondent. The petition was mailed and hand-delivered to respondent’s attorney,
and a summons was issued to respondent. That summons was returned as served on Debbie H. at
her workplace in Bellevue, Illinois.
¶ 23 On April 8, 2026, respondent did not appear, but his attorney did. The trial court
found that it had jurisdiction over respondent via abode service and that he was in default.

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Respondent’s attorney indicated that she had “[N]o objection” to the default. The court ordered
that the prove-up and best interest hearings be set for May 6, 2026.
¶ 24 On April 10, 2026, the State filed a supplemental petition to terminate parental
rights. The petition was mailed and hand-delivered to respondent’s attorney.
¶ 25 On May 6, 2026, respondent again did not appear, but his attorney did. The trial
court found that the allegations in both the petition and supplemental petition seeking to terminate
respondent’s parental rights were proven by clear and convincing evidence. The court proceeded
with a best interest hearing and heard testimony from Debbie H. She testified that she was served
with the papers for the petition to terminate while she was at her workplace. She said she contacted
respondent and gave him the paperwork. Debbie H. discussed the termination hearing with
respondent and offered to give respondent a ride. Debbie H. acknowledged that respondent was
aware of the scheduled hearing.
¶ 26 At the end of the best interest hearing, respondent’s attorney challenged the validity
of service on respondent because Debbie H. accepted service for him at her workplace, which was
not respondent’s abode. The trial court reopened the evidence for additional testimony from
Debbie H. When questioned by the court, Debbie H. testified as follows:
“Q. So just to be abundantly clear, you talked to Hayden about the petition,
like, he knew he has a Petition to Terminate Parental Rights?
A. Yes, yes.
Q. And he knew that there was hearing on it?
A. Correct.
Q. And he knew that hearing was today?
A. Yes, correct.

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Q. All right. And that’s based on your direct conversations with him?
A. Correct.”
Based upon the testimony and this additional evidence elicited from Debbie H., the court
concluded that respondent was served, and “he knew about today because of her testimony. They
talked about it.” The court found, by a preponderance of evidence, that it was in the best interest
(705 ILCS 405/1-3 (West 2024)) of T.H. that the parental rights of both Tracy F. and respondent
be terminated.
¶ 27 On May 15, 2026, the order terminating parental rights was entered by the trial
court. This appeal followed.
¶ 28 II. ANALYSIS
¶ 29 On appeal, respondent argues that, because he was not validly served, the trial court
lacked personal jurisdiction over him and the order terminating his parental rights is, therefore,
void ab initio. He maintains that the State’s service of process on Debbie H. at her workplace was
improper and failed to establish personal jurisdiction over him. We review de novo the legal
question of whether the trial court obtained personal jurisdiction over respondent. In re A.M., 402
Ill. App. 3d 720, 723 (2010).
¶ 30 This case requires us to discuss two distinct but overlapping concepts: service and
notice. Service of process is a means of establishing personal jurisdiction over a party. In re M.W.,
232 Ill. 2d 408, 428 (2009). Notice is a matter of due process. In re C.R.H., 163 Ill. 2d 263, 268-
71 (1994), overruled on other grounds by M.W., 232 Ill. 2d at 426.As testament to the
interrelationship between the two concepts, it is also true that one purpose of service of process is
to provide notice that an action has been initiated. Charter Bank & Trust of Illinois v. Novak, 218
Ill. App. 3d 548, 552 (1991). However, while the two concepts may in some instances tread the

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same ground, it is important that our analysis be tailored to the requirements of each.
¶ 31 A. Service and Personal Jurisdiction
¶ 32 Any judgment rendered under circumstances where the trial court lacks personal
jurisdiction over a respondent is void ab initio for lack of jurisdiction over the respondent. M.W.,
232 Ill. 2d at 414. Personal jurisdiction over a party to a proceeding may be established by service
of process in accordance with statutory requirements. In re Marriage of Verdung, 126 Ill. 2d 542,
547 (1989). The Juvenile Court Act of 1987 (Act) provides the requirements for service of
summons:
“Service of a summons and petition shall be made by: (a) leaving a copy thereof
with the person summoned at least 3 days before the time stated therein for
appearance; (b) leaving a copy at the summoned person’s usual place of abode with
some person of the family or a person residing there, of the age of 10 years or
upwards, and informing that person of the contents thereof, provided the officer or
other person making service shall also send a copy of the summons in a sealed
envelope with postage fully prepaid, addressed to the person summoned at the
person’s usual place of abode, at least 3 days before the time stated therein for
appearance; or (c) leaving a copy thereof with the guardian or custodian of a minor,
at least 3 days before the time stated therein for appearance. If the guardian or
custodian is an agency of the State of Illinois, proper service may be made by
leaving a copy of the summons and petition with any administrative employee of
such agency designated by such agency to accept service of summons and petitions.
The certificate of the officer or affidavit of the person that the officer or person has

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sent the copy pursuant to this Section is sufficient proof of service.” 705 ILCS
405/2-15(5) (West 2024).
¶ 33 The State does not argue that the petition for termination of respondent’s parental
rights was served on him in compliance with the statutory requirements. The evidence of record
suggests that respondent’s “usual place of abode” was not his mother’s residence. Moreover, even
if it were, service was not accomplished at that location, but by leaving summons with his mother
at her workplace.
¶ 34 That is not, however, the end of the inquiry, because personal jurisdiction over a
litigant may be established another way: “The appearance of *** a person named as a respondent
in a petition, in any proceeding under this Act shall constitute a waiver of service of summons and
submission to the jurisdiction of the court.” 705 ILCS 405/2-15(7) (West 2024).
¶ 35 Here, the record shows that respondent filed an answer to the shelter care petition
and voluntarily appeared, with counsel, for at least 14 hearings. We hold that, despite the lack of
valid service of process upon respondent, he voluntarily appeared and participated in the
proceedings before the trial court. Thus, the court properly exercised personal jurisdiction over
him. See A.M., 402 Ill. App. 3d at 724 (a father was not served with summons but appeared in
court four times, he voluntarily submitted to the personal jurisdiction of the court); see also In re
D.J.S., 308 Ill. App. 3d 291, 294 (1999) (respondent’s voluntary appearance at the initial hearing
in an abuse and neglect proceeding conferred personal jurisdiction in this matter); see also In re
L.M., 189 Ill. App. 3d 392, 397 (1989) (“Where a parent has appeared and participated in all
proceedings before the circuit court, and does not object to jurisdiction, she has waived the
formality of service of process and voluntarily submits to the jurisdiction of the court.”).

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¶ 36 Despite the trial court having personal jurisdiction over respondent during the initial
proceedings under the Act, respondent maintains that subsequent service of summons at the time
the State filed the termination petition was necessary to confer personal jurisdiction on the court
in order for it to rule on the petition. However, this argument has consistently been rejected. See
In re Haley D., 403 Ill. App. 370, 375 (2010) (jurisdiction over respondent does not need to be
reestablished once it has been established in an existing juvenile case); see also In re Abner P.,
347 Ill. App. 3d 903, 908 (2004) (“[T]the filing of a petition to terminate parental rights does not
initiate an entirely new proceeding within an existing case number” so as to require the reissuance
of a summons for a respondent who is already a party to the proceedings.); see also M.W., 232 Ill.
2d at 428-29 (“Thus, in a proceeding under the Juvenile Court Act, once personal jurisdiction over
a parent is obtained, that jurisdiction continues until the matter is resolved.”).
¶ 37 We hold that the trial court had personal jurisdiction over respondent prior to the
filing of the petition to terminate and maintained personal jurisdiction over him after the filing of
the petition.
¶ 38 B. Adequate Notice
¶ 39 Even though the trial court had personal jurisdiction over respondent, our analysis
does not end there. We must also address whether respondent had sufficient notice of the content
of the termination petition and any hearings on the termination petition so as to comply with the
requirement of procedural due process. Haley D., 403 Ill. App. 3d at 376.
¶ 40 Proceedings involving the termination of parental rights must comply with the
fundamental requirement of due process that parents receive adequate notice of all proceedings.
A.M., 402, Ill. App. 3d at 723-24. Pursuant to section 2-15(3) of the Act, adequate notice of a
motion terminating parental rights is governed by Illinois Supreme Court Rule 11 (eff. Oct. 1,

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2024). 705 ILCS 405/2-15(3) (West 2024). Rule 11 allows for service upon a party’s attorney of
record or upon the party themself. Ill. S. Ct. R. 11 (eff. Oct. 1, 2024).
¶ 41 In reviewing the record, it established that respondent was provided adequate notice
of the termination petition and the hearing to satisfy due process requirements. The petition to
terminate respondent’s parental rights was filed on March 23, 2026. The record shows that
respondent’s attorney was served by hand delivery and United States mail with a copy of the
petition. See Ill. S. Ct. R. 11(c)(2)(i)-(iii) (eff. Oct. 1, 2024). These facts alone would satisfy the
Rule 11 requirement that service of the petition be made upon a party’s attorney of record. See Ill.
S. Ct. R. 11(a), (c)(2)(i)-(iii) (eff Oct. 1, 2024).
¶ 42 The record also established that respondent received actual notice of the termination
petition and subsequent hearings. See Ill. S. Ct. R. 11(c)(2)(i) (eff. Oct. 1, 2024). Debbie H. clearly
testified under oath that she was served with the petition to terminate respondent’s parental rights.
She confirmed that respondent picked up the petition, that they discussed the petition, and that she
had gone so far as to offer respondent a ride to the hearing.
¶ 43 Here, we conclude that respondent received adequate notice of the content of the
termination petition and the hearing to satisfy all of his statutory and constitutional due process
rights in compliance with the Act and Rule 11. See 705 ILCS 405/2-15(3) (West 2024); Ill. S. Ct.
R. 11 (eff. Oct. 1, 2024).
¶ 44 III. CONCLUSION
¶ 45 Based upon our review of the record and all of the arguments presented, we cannot
conclude that the order terminating respondent’s parental rights is void ab initio. Consequently,
for the reasons stated, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.
¶ 46 Affirmed.

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