Ja'Que Mason v. State of Indiana

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 25A-CR-2382 | October 15, 2026 	Page 1 of 18
Pursuant to Indiana Appellate Rule 65(E), the trial court and parties shall not take
any action in reliance upon this memorandum decision until it is certified.
MEMORANDUM DECISION
Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), this Memorandum Decision is not
binding precedent for any court and may be cited only for persuasive value
or to establish res judicata, collateral estoppel, or law of the case.
I N 	T H E
Court of Appeals of Indiana
Ja’Que Mason,
Appellant-Defendant
v.
State of Indiana,
Appellee-Plaintiff
October 15, 2026
Court of Appeals Case No.
25A-CR-2382
Appeal from the Marion Superior Court
The Honorable Marie Kern, Judge
Trial Court Cause No.
49D28-2310-MR-30563
Memorandum Decision by Judge Altice
Judges Vaidik and Foley concur.

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Altice, Judge.
Case Summary
[1] 	Ja’Que Mason appeals his conviction for murder following a jury trial. He
presents the following restated issues for review:
1. 	Did the trial court abuse its discretion when instructing the
jury about self-defense?
2. 	Did the trial court abuse its discretion by striking Mason’s
testimony that he had a right to have a gun at the time of the
shooting?
3. 	Did the trial court abuse its discretion when it refused
Mason’s request for public funds for an expert witness?
4. 	Was it error to award a partial rather than full day of good
time credit?
[2] 	We affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand.
Facts & Procedural History
[3] 	On the evening of October 20, 2023, Mason drove to Broad Ripple, where he
spent time with friends drinking at two bars. He left around 1:00 a.m. and drove
back to the northwest side of Indianapolis with two friends, Bianca and
Demetrius. They stopped at Jack’s Liquor, where Mason and Bianca went into
the store without making a purchase and then talked in the parking lot while
standing near the passenger side of Mason’s car. Demetrius remained inside the

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car, sitting in the back seat and talking with them at times through his open
window.
[4] 	At about 1:25 a.m., Abel Ramos Utuy pulled his car very quickly into an
adjacent parking space, close to where Mason and Bianca were standing. They
had to move closer to Mason’s car to get out of the way. Mason and Utuy did
not know each other, and Utuy was not a strong English speaker. Utuy was on
his phone when he got out of his car and walked directly into the store without
acknowledging Mason or Bianca. Moments later, Bianca went into the store,
and Mason returned to the driver’s seat of his vehicle, where he and Demetrius
talked while waiting for Bianca.
[5] 	After making a purchase, Utuy walked out of the store at about 1:28 a.m.
Within the next minute, he was shot six times by Mason. There is video of the
shooting from two angles but no audio. The video shows that on exiting the
store, Utuy went directly to his own car and began to unlock and open the
driver’s side door. While doing this, his attention turned to the rear passenger
window of Mason’s car. Utuy placed his purchase on the driver’s seat and then
walked over to Mason’s car, leaving his door open.
[6] 	While standing near the passenger side of Mason’s car, Utuy seemingly
communicated with both Demetruis and Mason through the open passenger
windows. Utuy was intoxicated, and he inquired, in broken English, whether
they had said something to him. Utuy was unarmed and did not curse or make

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any verbal threats to Mason or Demetruis. He had his keys in his right hand
and his wallet and phone in his left hand.
[7] 	During the brief encounter, Mason placed his right hand on a 9mm semi-
automatic pistol with a thirty-round magazine that was between the center
console and the driver’s seat. Utuy looked at Mason and, according to Mason,
“probably assumed” that Mason had a pistol. Confidential Exhibits Vol. II at 4,
State’s Ex. 101 at 17:30. Things sped up at that point, with Utuy saying “okay,
okay, okay” while reaching behind his back, partially lifting his shirt, and then
returning to his car, opening the door further, and reaching inside with his right
arm. Id. at 16:52. Meanwhile, Mason raised his pistol and, quickly looking in
the other direction and then back at Utuy, fired seven times in rapid succession,
striking Utuy six times—once in each arm, once in each thigh, and twice in the
back. Upon being shot in the back, Utuy fell to the ground.
[8] 	During the shooting, Mason opened his door with his other hand and exited the
car, backing away with his pistol extended toward Utuy. Thereafter, he calmly
glanced at Utuy on the ground before putting his pistol in his jacket pocket and
meeting Bianca as she exited the store. He told her that they needed to go, so
they walked back to his car and got in. Mason drove them away from the scene
without calling 911 or rendering aide to Utuy.
[9] 	Police arrived at the scene minutes later. Utuy was lying on the ground, still
conscious but unable to communicate. Later that day he died at the hospital
from his injuries.

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[10] 	Mason communicated with his parents after the shooting, and they contacted
the police around 4:30 a.m. He gave a voluntary statement to the police later
that morning. Mason claimed that Utuy appeared intoxicated and was hostile
and aggressive when he approached Mason’s car. Mason maintained that he
tried to diffuse the situation, but Utuy began “fumbling” and then reached for
something in his car, so Mason “let the rounds off.” Id. at 16:47, 16:54.
[11] 	On October 30, 2023, the State charged Mason with murder, alleging that he
knowingly killed Utuy. Mason filed a notice of self-defense and later a motion
with the trial court for public funds to hire an expert witness, Bruce A.
Champagne.
[12] 	On February 7, 2025, the trial court held a hearing on Mason’s request for
funds to retain Champagne, a former law enforcement officer. No witnesses
were called at the hearing; defense counsel simply summarized her position.
Counsel noted that jurors might question the fact that Utuy was shot so many
times, and Champagne would be able to “explain[] how the brain works when
there’s fear.” Supplemental Transcript Vol. II at 7. The State responded by noting
that Champagne could not testify as to Mason’s state of mind at the time of the
shooting, and it questioned whether he would qualify as an expert to testify in
the manner suggested by defense counsel. The trial court took the matter under
advisement and then, on February 13, 2025, issued an order denying the
motion. Mason filed a motion to reconsider, which was summarily denied.

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[13] 	Mason’s two-day jury trial commenced on July 28, 2025. The State presented
several witnesses and exhibits at trial, including Mason’s videotaped statement
to police following the shooting and the videos from the shooting. Mason then
testified in his own defense. He claimed that Utuy was “hostile” and “angry”
and appeared intoxicated as he approached Mason’s car, saying, “you want
something[?]” Transcript Vol. III at 74. Mason acknowledged that Utuy did not
curse or make threats, but Mason said he was concerned by Utuy’s “appearance
and body language.” Id. at 117. Mason claimed that he told Utuy that he did
not say anything and did not want any trouble. Mason testified that he first
touched his gun when Utuy was at the passenger door. He explained that he
subsequently thought Utuy was reaching for a gun behind his back and then
inside the car, so, out of fear and panic, he began shooting until Utuy was “no
longer a threat.” Id. at 78. Though he never saw Utuy with a gun, Mason
explained that he started shooting “before [Utuy] could turn around” and shoot
him. Id. at 108.
[14] 	During cross-examination, the following colloquy occurred between the State
and Mason:
Q This whole interaction was just basically a non-event, is that
fair?
A What do you mean by that?
Q Like this was just two people who went to a liquor store, right
and had just this very mild interaction in the parking lot.

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A Like are you trying to say like it was an interaction? Yeah, it
was definitely … an interaction, but it wasn’t like no argument or
nothing.
Q Right, okay and you’re the one who brought a gun to it?
A Yes, because I felt threatened.
Id. at 112. On redirect, defense counsel immediately asked: “And you had a
right to have a gun that day?” Id. at 113. The State objected to that question,
and the court sustained the objection and struck Mason’s response, disagreeing
with defense counsel’s argument that the State had opened the door. The court
explained that whether Mason legally possessed the gun was not at issue in the
case and had not been raised by the State.
[15] 	Before final instructions were given by the court, Mason objected to the
following self-defense instruction:
It is an issue whether the Defendant acted in self-defense.
A person may use reasonable force against another person to
protect himself from what he reasonable believes to be the
imminent use of unlawful force.
A person is justified in using deadly force, and does not have a
duty to retreat, only if he reasonably believes that deadly force is
necessary to prevent serious bodily injury to himself.
However, a person may not use force if:
He has willingly entered into a fight with another person or
started the fight, unless he withdraws from the fight and
communicates to the other person his intent to withdraw and

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the other person nevertheless continues or threatens to
continue the fight.
The State has the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt
that the Defendant did not act in self-defense.
Appendix Vol. II at 203 (emphasis added). Mason argued that the emphasized
portion above should be removed because the exception was not supported by
the evidence. That is, Mason contended that there was “no evidence in the
record there was a fight.” Transcript Vol. III at 122. The court gave the
instruction over Mason’s objection.
[16] 	The jury found Mason guilty of murder.1 Thereafter, the trial court sentenced
him to 50 years, with 45 executed and 5 suspended. The court awarded him a
total of 898.6 days credit.
[17] 	Mason now appeals. Additional information will be provided below as needed.
Discussion & Decision
1. Self-Defense Instruction
[18] 	Mason challenges the self-defense instruction that was given by the trial court
over his objection. He contends that the trial court abused its discretion by
1 The defense pursued an all-or-nothing strategy, so the jury was not instructed on any lesser included
offenses, such as voluntary manslaughter.

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instructing the jury that he could not use force to protect himself if he entered
into or started a fight with Utuy.
[19] 	“The purpose of a jury instruction is to inform the jury of the law applicable to
the facts without misleading the jury and to enable it to comprehend the case
clearly and arrive at a just, fair, and correct verdict.” Ramirez v. State, 174
N.E.3d 181, 199 (Ind. 2021) (internal quotations omitted). “Instructing the jury
is a matter within the discretion of the trial court, and we’ll reverse only if
there’s an abuse of that discretion.” Cardosi v. State, 128 N.E.3d 1277, 1284
(Ind. 2019).
An abuse of discretion arises when the instruction is erroneous
and the instructions taken as a whole misstate the law or
otherwise mislead the jury. When evaluating the jury instructions
on appeal this Court looks to whether the tendered instructions
correctly state the law, whether there is evidence in the record to
support giving the instruction, and whether the substance of the
[] instruction is covered by other instructions.
Isom v. State, 31 N.E.3d 469, 484-85 (Ind. 2015) (internal quotations and
citations omitted). Moreover, an instructional error will result in reversal only
where “we cannot say with complete confidence that a reasonable jury would
have rendered a guilty verdict had the instruction not been given.” Ramirez, 174
N.E.3d at 200 (internal quotations omitted).
[20] 	To prevail on a claim of self-defense involving deadly force, a defendant must
(1) have been in a place where he had a right to be; (2) not have provoked,
instigated, or participated willingly in the violence; and (3) had a reasonable

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fear of death or great bodily harm. See Hall v. State, 166 N.E.3d 406, 412-13
(Ind. Ct. App. 2021). The challenged portion of the instruction dealt with this
second element and, particularly, Ind. Code § 35-41-3-2(g)(3), which provides
an exception to the defense where “the person entered into combat with
another person or is the initial aggressor unless the person withdraws from the
encounter and communicates to the other person the intent to do so and the
other person nevertheless continues or threatens to continue unlawful action.”
[21] 	Mason argues, as he did below, that the “fight” portion of the instruction was
not supported by the evidence at trial.2 He notes that the trial court
acknowledged at one point while discussing the instruction that “the evidence
as to what the actual communications were between the individuals is murky.”
Transcript Vol. III at 124. Mason also directs us to his own testimony that he
said nothing to Utuy before Utuy came over to Mason’s car.
[22] 	We do not agree with Mason that there is a complete lack of evidence in this
case of him engaging in a mutual fight or starting a fight with Utuy. The jury
2 Mason also argues that the instruction was an incorrect statement of the law, as the self-defense statute uses
the term “combat” while the jury instruction, based on Indiana Pattern Jury Instruction 10.0300, used the
term “fight.” I.C. § 35-41-3-2(g)(3); Appendix Vol. II at 203. Mason asserts that “use of the milder-sounding
‘fight’” “impermissibly broadens the exception thereby diluting the robustness of self-defense in Indiana’s
statute.” Appellant’s Brief at 15, 16. He did not raise this basis in his objection below, so we do not address it.
See Orta v. State, 940 N.E.2d 370, 377 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011) (“Because Orta raised a ground for challenging the
instruction on appeal that was not raised before the trial court, we conclude that Orta has waived this issue
for appellate review.”), trans. denied.

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could view the video and determine that Utuy was minding his own business
until someone in Mason’s car gained his attention in some manner.3 That might
have been Mason’s passenger, Demetrius, but the video shows that Utuy then
came over, unarmed, and engaged verbally with both Mason and Demetrius.
Further, the video does not necessarily support Mason’s claim that Utuy was
hostile or angry during the brief encounter; it is just as likely that Utuy was
merely curious about why they were focused on him. And it was not until
Mason reached for his gun, which he agrees Utuy likely suspected he was
doing, that Utuy reacted by fumbling and reaching behind his back and then
into his own car. As Mason introduced his gun into the otherwise uneventful
interaction, there is evidence that he was the initial aggressor and did not act
without fault. See Barroso v. State, 23A-CR-264, at *3 (Ind. Ct. App. Jan. 26,
2023) (mem.) (“Here, a reasonable person could have found that Barroso was
the initial aggressor or a mutual combatant because he introduced the presence
of a firearm into the situation, which transformed it to one where serious bodily
injury was a possibility.”), trans. denied; cf. Henson v. State, 786 N.E.2d 274, 278
(Ind. 2003) (concluding that defendant did not “act without fault” where the
initial confrontation, for which he feared violent retribution, was provoked by
defendant’s cursing and threatening bodily harm to the victims minutes earlier).
In sum, the trial court did not abuse its discretion by deciding that the evidence
supported giving the challenged portion of the self-defense instruction.
3 We note that it appears like Mason motioned to Demetruis as Utuy was coming out of the store.

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2. Exclusion of Testimony
[23] 	Mason next contends that the trial court abused its discretion by striking his
testimony that he had a right to have a gun that day. He reasons that the self-
defense statute precludes use of force by those committing a crime and thus
evidence that he lawfully possessed the handgun was relevant to his defense.
[24] 	Under Ind. Evidence Rule 401, evidence is relevant if it has “any tendency” to
prove or disprove a consequential fact. Snow v. State, 77 N.E.3d 173, 177 (Ind.
2017). A trial court enjoys “wide discretion” in determining whether this “low
bar” is cleared. Id. As our Supreme Court has observed, often relevancy
determinations can be resolved either way and, in such cases, we should not
meddle from the “far corner of the upper deck” with the trial court’s decision.
Id. (quoting State v. Keck, 4 N.E.3d 1180, 1185 (Ind. 2014)).
[25] 	Here, Mason points out that I.C. § 35-41-3-2(g)(1) provides that “a person is not
justified in using force if [he] is committing … a crime[.]”4 He concedes,
however, that the self-defense instruction given to the jury did not include this
exception. We would add that the State did not mention this exception or ever
suggest to the jury that Mason was unlawfully carrying the gun. The point of
4 Recognizing that a literal application of this statutory provision can lead to absurd results, our Supreme
Court has required that there be an immediate and causal connection between the crime and the
confrontation for the exception to apply. See Gammons v. State, 148 N.E.3d 301, 302 (Ind. 2020). In other
words, even if an individual is illegally carrying a gun, he is still entitled to use it to defend himself if the
carrying of the gun is not immediately and causally connected to the confrontation. See id. at 304-05.

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the State’s cross-examination was that Mason introduced a gun into the
interaction with Utuy. This fact was true regardless of whether the gun was
legally carried by Mason.
[26] 	The trial court determined that whether Mason was allowed to carry a handgun
under Indiana law was never put into issue and was irrelevant. This was not an
abuse of discretion.
3. Funds for Expert
[27] 	The trial court denied Mason’s request for public funds to retain Champagne,
whose expert services were claimed to be necessary to prepare and present an
adequate defense. Mason argues that the trial court abused its discretion by
refusing to authorize this expenditure.
[28] 	A trial court’s decision to grant or deny public funds to an indigent defendant
for an expert witness is committed to the sound discretion of the trial court.
Schuck v. State, 53 N.E.3d 571, 574 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016). “A court is not
required to fund any and all experts the defense believes might be helpful.” Id.
“Instead, the central inquiries are whether the services are necessary to provide
an adequate defense and whether the defendant specifies precisely how he
would benefit from the requested expert services.” Id. (internal quotations
omitted). The burden falls on the defendant to establish his need for the expert.
Kocielko v. State, 938 N.E.2d 243, 254 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010), reh’g granted on other
grounds, 943 N.E.2d 1282 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011), trans. denied.

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[29] 	We have recognized a non-exhaustive list of factors to guide trial courts in
making this determination:
(1) whether the services would bear on an issue generally
regarded to be within the common experience of the average
person, or on one for which an expert opinion would be
necessary; (2) whether the requested expert services could
nonetheless be performed by counsel; (3) whether the proposed
expert could demonstrate that which the defendant desires from
the expert; (4) whether the purpose for the expert appears to be
only exploratory; (5) whether the expert services will go toward
answering a substantial question in the case or simply an
ancillary one; (6) the seriousness of the charge; (7) whether the
State is relying upon an expert and expending substantial
resources on the case; (8) whether a defendant with monetary
resources would choose to hire such an expert; (9) the costs of the
expert services; (10) the timeliness of the request for the expert
and whether it was made in good faith; and (11) whether there is
cumulative evidence of the defendant’s guilt.
Schuck, 53 N.E.3d at 574-75 (quoting Kocielko, 938 N.E.2d at 254-55). “Even
where there are factors present militating toward appointment of an expert …
the factors may be insufficient to require the trial court to approve the hiring of
an expert at public expense.” Kocielko, 938 N.E.2d at 255.
[30] 	The information provided by Mason to the trial court, both in the motion and
at the hearing, in support of the request for funds was exceedingly slim. When
the trial court queried about what admissible evidence Champagne would be
able to provide at trial, defense counsel responded:
[A]t this point it’s kind of a balancing act. I don’t want to exactly
disclose everything, but I understand I have a burden, but the

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victim was shot seven times. I believe some jurors may question
that…. In talking to Mr. Champagne, he explains how the brain
works when there’s fear. He explains and [the State] may very
well object, but I don’t believe that should deny the funds to me,
because again, he will explain – he explained a lot to me – just
the brain, the analysis[.]
Supplemental Transcript Vol. II at 7. The court then asked how Champagne could
“scientifically … testify as to how the brain works … if he is in fact not a
scientist,” and counsel responded that Champagne would submit his report and
analysis for a peer review, which counsel “believe[d]” would include scientists.
Id. at 8.
[31] 	At the hearing, the State noted concerns regarding Champagne’s qualifications
to testify as an expert to “the mechanisms behind a person’s state of mind” and
as to whether he would be “essentially testifying to an ultimate issue at trial.”
Id. at 10, 11. Further, the State argued that Mason had not established that
Champagne’s testimony was necessary for his defense, noting that defense
counsel would be “capable of cross-examining the witnesses and making
argument to the jury about these particular facts.” Id.
[32] 	In denying the requested funds, the trial court emphasized in its order that it
was Mason’s burden to demonstrate the need for the expert and to specify
precisely how he would benefit from the expert’s services. The order provided
further:

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4. The defendant has indicated the expert would testify regarding
the number of gunshots fired and the psychological effect of fear
on decision-making during a self-defense situation.
5. An expert may be able to testify as to how the brain works
when under fear, but the expert would not be permitted to testify
as to the Defendant’s state of mind at the time of the event or
how the Defendant’s brain works when under fear.
6. The defendant has not provided a sufficiently specific
explanation of how expert testimony would benefit his defense.
While counsel mentioned it could help explain the number of
shots fired, more details on how the expert could assist the jury
without treading on the ultimate issue of fact was not provided.
7. The defendant’s request for an expert in this matter appears to
be more exploratory in nature, rather than bearing on an issue for
which expert testimony would be necessary.
8. The defendant has not shown the expert’s testimony would
address a substantial question rather than an ancillary one.
9. The defendant has not clearly demonstrated expert services are
necessary to ensure an adequate defense, as required by the
standard established in case law.
10. Defense counsel was hesitant to provide more specific details
about how exactly the expert testimony would benefit the
defendant, citing a “balancing act” between explaining the need
and not disclosing too much.
11. While the defense argued the expert’s testimony would be
“absolutely relevant” and “absolutely necessary”, a clear, specific
explanation of how the expert would address a substantial
question in the case was not clearly provided.
12. While the potential penalty is severe in the event of a guilty
verdict, this alone is not sufficient to meet the burden to be met
by the defendant.

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13. The cost of the expert has been specified and considered by
the Court but is not a factor in the Court’s ultimate decision.
Appendix Vol. II at 139-40.
[33] 	The trial court thoroughly considered Mason’s request and determined that
Mason had not met his burden of establishing that Champagne’s services were
necessary for an adequate defense. On this record, we cannot say that this was
an abuse of discretion.
4. Credit Time
[34] 	Finally, Mason contends that the trial court erred by awarding a partial day,
rather than a full day, of credit time. The State concedes this error.
[35] 	Credit time is a matter of statutory right, and thus trial courts do not have
discretion in awarding or denying such credit. See Harding v. State, 27 N.E.3d
330, 331-32 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015). Pursuant to Ind. Code § 35-50-6-3.1(c),
Mason was entitled to “one (1) day of good time credit for every three (3)
calendar days or partial calendar days” for which he was confined awaiting trial
or sentencing. This statute refers to full days of good time credit, not tenths or
fractions of a day. Further, it is well established that credit time statutes, as
remedial legislation, should be liberally construed in favor of those intended to
benefit from the statutes. See Niccum v. State, 181 N.E.3d 993, 995 (Ind. Ct. App.
2021).
[36] 	Mason was confined for 674 days before sentencing, and the trial court awarded
him 224.6 days of good time credit (dividing 674 by 3). We agree with Mason

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and the State that the trial court should have rounded up the partial day and
credited Mason with 225 days of good time credit. Accordingly, we reverse on
this limited issue and remand with instructions for the trial court to amend the
sentencing order and award 225 days of good time credit.
[37] 	Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded with instructions.
Vaidik, J. and Foley J., concur.
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT
Talisha R. Griffin
Indianapolis, Indiana
Joel M. Schumm
Indianapolis, Indiana
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
Theodore E. Rokita
Indiana Attorney General
Daylon L. Welliver
Deputy Attorney General
Indianapolis, Indiana