Paul Michael Sloat v. State of Indiana

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 26A-CR-466 | October 16, 2026 	Page 1 of 15
Pursuant to Indiana Appellate Rule 65(E), the trial court and parties shall not take
any action in reliance upon this memorandum decision until it is certified.
MEMORANDUM DECISION
Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), this Memorandum Decision is not
binding precedent for any court and may be cited only for persuasive value
or to establish res judicata, collateral estoppel, or law of the case.
I N 	T H E
Court of Appeals of Indiana
Paul M. Sloat,
Appellant-Defendant
v.
State of Indiana,
Appellee-Plaintiff
October 16, 2026
Court of Appeals Case No.
26A-CR-466
Appeal from the Lake Superior Court
The Honorable Gina L. Jones, Judge
Trial Court Cause No.
45G03-2208-F1-000028
Memorandum Decision by Judge Felix

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Chief Judge Tavitas and Judge Bradford concur.
Felix, Judge.
Statement of the Case
[1] 	After Donald Munson clipped Paul Sloat’s mirror on the road, Sloat followed
him to a stoplight and shot him in the chest. Sloat was charged with and
convicted of attempted murder. Sloat now appeals and raises several issues,
which we restate as the following two:
1. 	Whether the trial court’s jury instructions constitute reversible error; and
2. 	Whether the State presented sufficient evidence to support Sloat’s
conviction.
[2] 	We affirm.
Facts and Procedural History
[3] 	At approximately 8:00 a.m. on August 29, 2022, Sloat was driving his father
Robert to work in Gary, Indiana. Munson was driving a semi-truck behind
them. As Sloat slowed his vehicle to make a left turn, Munson passed Sloat on
the right and clipped Sloat’s passenger side-view mirror.
[4] 	Robert told Sloat to get Munson’s license plate number, so Sloat turned back
onto the road in pursuit. When Munson stopped at an intersection shortly
thereafter, Sloat parked behind him and honked aggressively. Robert exited the
vehicle, walked up to Munson’s driver’s side window, and yelled about

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Munson knocking his “f[*]cking mirror off.” State’s Ex. 85 at 4:17–4:27. Sloat
then exited the vehicle, chambering a round in his .45 caliber handgun as he
approached the side of Munson’s truck.
[5] 	When Sloat reached the cabin, Robert was beside him and adjacent to the
truck’s headlights. Sloat tried to yank open the driver’s side door, and Munson
began to drive away. Robert then moved in front of the truck with his arms
against the grill as if to hold it back. At the same time, Sloat reached up toward
the driver’s side window and fired one shot into the cabin, striking Munson in
the chest. As the truck pulled farther away, Sloat fired repeatedly in the cabin’s
direction while keeping pace with the truck. After emptying his magazine,
Sloat walked back toward his vehicle and drove home. Munson survived his
injuries.
[6] 	The State charged Sloat with attempted murder as a Level 1 felony1 and several
other offenses. At trial, the State presented videos recorded by nearby
businesses that clearly captured Sloat’s confrontation with Munson. Sloat
testified and claimed that he acted in defense of Robert. According to Sloat, he
fired his weapon because he “panicked and thought [his] dad was going to get
run over by a semi.” Tr. Vol. IV at 215. Sloat was not “trying to shoot”
Munson but was instead aiming at “the truck, in general” because he “wanted it
1 Ind. Code §§ 35-42-1-1(1), 35-41-5-1(a).

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to stop.” Id. at 208. The State argued in response that Sloat did “not even
look[] back” at Robert after he fired his weapon. Tr. Vol. V at 55.
[7] 	The jury found Sloat guilty as charged. Due to double jeopardy concerns, the
trial court entered a conviction on only the attempted murder count. Sloat was
sentenced to 25 years, with 20 years executed at the Indiana Department of
Correction, 2 years on community corrections, and 3 years suspended to
probation. This appeal ensued.
Discussion and Decision
1. The Trial Court’s Jury Instructions Do Not Constitute Reversible
Error
[8] 	Sloat challenges several of the trial court’s decisions regarding jury instructions.
Specifically, Sloat argues (a) the trial court erred by refusing to instruct the jury
on criminal recklessness as a lesser included offense; and (b) the trial court
misstated the law in its instructions on specific intent, self-defense, and the
State’s burden of proof. We address each argument in turn.
a. Refusal to Instruct on Criminal Recklessness as a Lesser Included
Offense
[9] 	Sloat first challenges the trial court’s refusal to instruct the jury on criminal
recklessness as a lesser included offense. Sloat has waived this challenge. First,
the “[f]ailure to tender an instruction results in waiver of the issue for review.”
Baker v. State, 948 N.E.2d 1169, 1178 (Ind. 2011) (alteration in original)
(quoting Ortiz v. State, 766 N.E.2d 370, 375 (Ind. 2002)). “[A] tendered

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instruction is necessary to preserve error because, without the substance of an
instruction upon which to rule, the trial court has not been given a reasonable
opportunity to consider and implement the request.” Ortiz, 766 N.E.2d at 375
(alteration in original) (quoting Mitchell v. State, 742 N.E.2d 953, 955 (Ind.
2001)). The absence of a tendered instruction is particularly significant here
because under the statute governing criminal recklessness, various types of
conduct can constitute the offense and render it either a Level 5 or Level 6
felony. See Ind. Code § 35-42-2-2. Sloat does not indicate which conduct and
which level felony should have been included in the trial court’s instruction.
[10] 	Second, having reviewed Sloat’s argument, it is not supported by “cogent
reasoning,” as required by Indiana Appellate Rule 46(A)(8)(a). The purpose of
our appellate rules—especially Appellate Rule 46 governing the content of
briefs—“is to aid and expedite review and to relieve the appellate court of the burden
of searching the record and briefing the case.” Miller v. Patel, 212 N.E.3d 639, 657
(Ind. 2023) (emphasis added) (quoting Dridi v. Cole Kline LLC, 172 N.E.3d 361,
364 (Ind. Ct. App. 2021)). Although we have a well-established preference for
deciding cases on their merits, we will not address an issue if a procedural
violation is “sufficiently substantial to impede our consideration of the issue
raised.” Pierce v. State, 29 N.E.3d 1258, 1267 (Ind. 2015) (quoting Guardiola v.
State, 375 N.E.2d 1105, 1107 (Ind. 1978)).
[11] 	Sloat’s argument is not cogent because, as mentioned above, he does not
explain which conduct and which level felony under the criminal recklessness
statute should have been included in the instruction he sought. Additionally,

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Sloat argues that we should conclude criminal recklessness is “included as
charged” in the attempted murder count, Appellant’s Br. at 15, but he discusses
only the evidence presented at trial. When determining whether offenses are
included as charged, we “examine only the facts as presented on the face of the
charging instrument.” A.W. v. State, 229 N.E.3d 1060, 1067 (Ind. 2024)
(emphasis in original). To rule upon the merits of Sloat’s challenge, we would
need to “step in [his] shoes” and “fashion arguments on his behalf,” which we
will not do. Miller, 212 N.E.3d at 657 (quoting 	Dridi, 172 N.E.3d at 364).
Sloat has waived his argument regarding criminal recklessness.
b. Instructions on Specific Intent, Self-Defense, and the State’s
Burden of Proof
[12] 	Sloat next argues that the trial court’s instructions on specific intent, self-
defense, and the State’s burden of proof misstate the law. Ordinarily, we
review a trial court’s jury instructions for an abuse of discretion. Owen v. State,
210 N.E.3d 256, 267 (Ind. 2023). However, when the appellant argues that an
instruction incorrectly states the law, we apply a de novo standard of review.
Gammons v. State, 148 N.E.3d 301, 303 (Ind. 2020) (quoting Batchelor v. State,
119 N.E.3d 550, 554 (Ind. 2019)). An erroneous jury instruction is presumed to
be reversible error “unless the verdict would have been the same under a proper
instruction.” Id. (quoting Kane v. State, 976 N.E.2d 1228, 1232 (Ind. 2012)).
“[R]eversal is required, in other words, if the jury’s decision may have been
based upon an erroneous instruction.” Id. at 303–04 (quoting Hawkins v. State,
100 N.E.3d 313, 319 (Ind. Ct. App. 2018)).

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i. 	Specific Intent
[13] 	A conviction for attempted murder requires proof of “specific intent” to kill.
I.C. §§ 35-42-1-1(1), 35-41-5-1(a); Rosales v. State, 23 N.E.3d 8, 12 (Ind. 2015)
(quoting Hopkins v. State, 759 N.E.2d 633, 637 (Ind. 2001)). The trial court’s
specific intent instruction provided in relevant part that “intent to kill may be
inferred from the use of a deadly weapon in a manner reasonably calculated to
cause death or great bodily harm.” Appellant’s App. Vol. II at 73. Sloat argues
that the instruction misstates the law because it could “mislead” the jury to
“misconstrue that proof of . . . intent to cause great bodily harm would suffice
for the offense of attempted murder,” Appellant’s Br. at 18, and “relieve[] the
jury of its obligation to find that [he] acted with the requisite specific intent to
kill Munson,” id. at 19.
[14] 	In Bethel v. State, the Indiana Supreme Court found “no error” in an instruction
using nearly identical language as the one here. 730 N.E.2d 1242, 1246 (Ind.
2000) (rejecting contention that the trial court erred by giving an instruction
“permitting the jury to infer intent to commit murder from the use of a deadly
weapon in a manner likely to cause death or great bodily injury.”) The
instruction does not invite the jury to substitute proof of intent to cause great
bodily harm for proof of intent to kill. Rather, the instruction invites the jury
“to consider the use of a deadly weapon and all of the attendant
circumstances,” which is “necessarily the focus” in attempted murder cases that
involve “‘inherent ambiguity’ and turn upon intent.” Reese v. State, 939 N.E.2d

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695, 701 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011) (citing Hopkins, 759 N.E.2d at 637), trans. denied.
The trial court did not err in giving this instruction.
ii. Self-Defense
[15] 	Indiana’s self-defense statute provides that a person is justified in using deadly
force and has no duty to retreat if the person “reasonably believes that that force
is necessary to prevent serious bodily injury to the person or a third person or
the commission of a forcible felony.” I.C. § 35-41-3-2(c). A “forcible felony” is
“a felony that involves the use or threat of force against a human being, or in
which there is imminent danger of bodily injury to a human being.” I.C. § 35-
31.5-2-138.
[16] 	The trial court’s self-defense instruction closely tracked the self-defense statute,
stating that a person is justified in using deadly force if the person “reasonably
believes that deadly force is necessary to prevent serious bodily injury to himself
or a third person,” Appellant’s App. Vol. II at 81. The instruction, however,
did not mention the prevention of a forcible felony. Sloat claims this is error.
[17] 	As an initial matter, a jury instruction need not exactly track the language of a
relevant statute as long as it “correctly inform[s] the jury of the law.” Ramirez v.
State, 174 N.E.3d 181, 199 (Ind. 2021). And the pattern jury instruction for self-
defense places the forcible felony language in brackets, see Ind. Pattern Crim.

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Jury Inst. 10.0300,2 which generally means the language “is left to the
discretion of the trial court for tailoring to the facts of a particular case,” LaPorte
Cmty. Sch. Corp. v. Rosales, 963 N.E.2d 520, 524 (Ind. 2012).
[18] 	Even if the self-defense instruction misstated the law, any error would be
harmless. The “forcible felony” language in the self-defense statute expands the
scope of permissible defensive acts from (1) those taken to “prevent serious
bodily injury” to the person or a third person, I.C. § 35-41-3-2(c), to (2) those
taken to prevent a specific class of felonies involving “the use or threat of force
against a human being, or in which there is imminent danger of bodily injury to
a human being,” I.C. § 35-31.5-2-138.
[19] 	Sloat claimed he fired his weapon because he “thought [his] dad was going to
get run over by a semi.” Tr. Vol. IV at 215. This situation clearly contemplates
a use of force that could cause “serious bodily injury,” so it was covered by the
trial court’s instruction notwithstanding the absence of “forcible felony”
language. If the jury believed that Sloat acted only to prevent Robert from
being run over, the instruction as given left the jury ample room to so find. Any
error in the trial court’s instruction does not amount to reversible error.
2 The pattern jury instruction provides as follows: “A person is justified in using deadly force, and does not
have a duty to retreat, only if he/she reasonably believes that deadly force is necessary [to prevent serious
bodily injury to himself/herself or a third person] [to prevent the commission of a forcible felony].” Ind.
Pattern Crim. Jury Inst. 10.0300.

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iii. State’s Burden of Proof
[20] 	Last, it is axiomatic that in a criminal trial, the State must prove each element
of the charged offense beyond a reasonable doubt. Batchelor v. State, 119 N.E.3d
550, 559 (Ind. 2019) (quoting In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 363 (1970)). But in
one of its instructions, the trial court stated, “To establish Attempted Murder,
the State may prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant must have
been acting with a specific intent to kill the victim.” Appellant’s App. Vol. II at
72 (emphasis added).
[21] 	Sloat recognizes that because he did not object to this instruction at trial, his
challenge thereto is waived and we may review the instruction only for
fundamental error. See Dunn v. State, 230 N.E.3d 910, 914 (Ind. 2024). “An
error is fundamental if it ‘made a fair trial impossible’ or constituted a ‘clearly
blatant violation of basic and elementary principles of due process that
presented an undeniable and substantial potential for harm.’” Id. (quoting
Miller v. State, 188 N.E.3d 871, 874 (Ind. 2022)). “When determining whether
an incorrect jury instruction amounts to fundamental error, ‘we look not to the
erroneous instruction in isolation, but in the context of all relevant information
given to the jury, including closing argument and other instructions.’” McKinley
v. State, 45 N.E.3d 25, 28 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015) (quoting Boesch v. State, 778
N.E.2d 1276, 1279 (Ind. 2002), reh’g denied), trans. denied. There is no
fundamental error “‘where all such information, considered as a whole, does
not mislead the jury as to a correct understanding of the law.’” Id. (quoting
Boesch, 778 N.E.2d at 1279).

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[22] 	Here, the trial court instructed the jury to consider all of its instructions
“together,” Appellant’s App. Vol. II at 56, and aside from the instruction Sloat
challenges, none of the other instructions suggested the State’s burden to prove
the offense beyond a reasonable doubt was anything less than mandatory. The
trial court included a lengthy final instruction specifically on the beyond-a-
reasonable-doubt standard that stated, “The burden is upon the State to prove
beyond a reasonable doubt that the Defendant is guilty of the crime charged. It
is a strict and heavy burden.” Appellant’s App. Vol. II at 88. A separate final
instruction stated, “To overcome the presumption of innocence, the State must
prove the Defendant guilty of each element of the crime charged, beyond a
reasonable doubt.” Id. at 89. The final instruction on the elements of
attempted murder stated, “Before you may convict the Defendant of Attempted
Murder, the State must have proved each of the following elements beyond a
reasonable doubt.” Id. at 71. The corresponding instructions in the preliminary
instructions included this same language. See id. at 37, 40, 52, 53. Although the
final instruction Sloat challenges erroneously used the word “may” in the
context of the State’s burden of proof, the corresponding preliminary instruction
appropriately used the word “must.” Compare id. at 72 with id. at 38.
[23] 	Moreover, in Sloat’s closing argument, he repeatedly emphasized the State’s
burden to prove its case beyond a reasonable doubt. See Tr. Vol. V at 56, 58,
63, 68–71. We are not persuaded that the jury was misled as to the law or
failed to hold the State to its burden of proof. The trial court’s error is not
fundamental and does not warrant reversal.

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2. The State Presented Sufficient Evidence to Support Sloat’s
Conviction for Attempted Murder
[24] 	Sloat next argues that the State presented insufficient evidence to support his
conviction for attempted murder. Our standard of review for such a claim is as
follows:
“A conviction is supported by sufficient evidence if ‘there is
substantial evidence of probative value supporting each element
of the offense such that a reasonable trier of fact could have
found the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.’” Hancz-
Barron v. State, 235 N.E.3d 1237, 1244 (Ind. 2024) (quoting Willis
v. State, 27 N.E.3d 1065, 1066 (Ind. 2015)). This Court reviews
only the evidence most favorable to the verdict and the
reasonable inferences therefrom, and will reverse only where it is
shown that “no reasonable fact-finder could find the elements of
the crime proven beyond a reasonable doubt.” [Teising v. State,
226 N.E.3d 780, 783 (Ind. 2024)].
Konkle v. State, 253 N.E.3d 1068, 1090–91 (Ind. 2025). We do not reweigh the
evidence or reassess witness credibility. Id. at 1090 (quoting Teising, 226
N.E.3d at 783).
[25] 	To convict Sloat of attempted murder, the State had to prove beyond a
reasonable doubt that Sloat, acting with specific intent to kill, engaged in
conduct that constituted a substantial step toward the commission of murder.
See I.C. §§ 35-42-1-1(1), 35-41-5-1(a); Rosales, 23 N.E.3d at 12 (quoting Hopkins,
759 N.E.2d at 637). Sloat argues only that the State failed to prove that he
acted with specific intent to kill Munson.

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[26] 	“Intent to kill may be inferred from the nature of the attack and the
circumstances surrounding the crime.” Kiefer v. State, 761 N.E.2d 802, 805
(Ind. 2002) (citing Nunn v. State, 601 N.E.2d 334 (Ind. 1992)). The “use of a
deadly weapon in a manner likely to cause death or serious injury” is a
paradigmatic situation from which intent to kill may be inferred. Henley v. State,
881 N.E.2d 639, 652 (Ind. 2008) (citing Wilson v. State, 697 N.E.2d 466, 476
(Ind. 1998)). This is particularly so when the defendant “fir[es] a gun in the
direction of an individual.” Id. (citing Jones v. State, 536 N.E.2d 267, 270 (Ind.
1989), reh’g denied).
[27] 	Here, Sloat chambered a round in his firearm immediately upon exiting his
vehicle. After failing to open Munson’s cabin door, Sloat reached upward and
fired directly into the cabin through the window, shooting Munson in the chest.
Firing from such a “short distance away” supports a finding of intent to kill.
See Shelton v. State, 602 N.E.2d 1017, 1022 (Ind. 1992). As the truck pulled
away, Sloat fired every remaining round in his magazine at the cabin.
Although Sloat claimed he was trying to prevent the truck from running over
Robert, the State argues that Sloat did not even look back in Robert’s direction
before firing his first shot or as the truck accelerated away.
[28] 	Sloat relies on Kiefer v. State for his claim that the State presented insufficient
evidence of his intent. 761 N.E.2d 802. Kiefer is distinguishable. Robert Kiefer
had been practicing target shooting in his backyard when the victim walked by
his house. Id. at 804. Kiefer fired one shot close to the victim and stated
something to the effect of, “That kid must be scared now.” Id. The Indiana

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Supreme Court found insufficient evidence that Kiefer acted with specific intent
to kill because Kiefer did not know the victim, much less had “experienced
[any] problems with him previously”; Kiefer fired only a single shot despite the
victim pausing after hearing the blast; and witnesses testified that Kiefer was an
experienced marksman who deliberately aimed at a bush, tree, or trashcan close
to but some distance away from the victim. Id. at 806. The evidence showed
Kiefer “intended only to frighten,” not to kill. Id.
[29] 	Whereas Kiefer deliberately fired near the victim and had no motive to harm
him, here, after Munson clipped Sloat’s mirror, Sloat followed him to the
stoplight, left his car with his gun in his possession, chambered the gun before
getting to Munson’s driver side door, shot him in the chest, and fired every
round in his magazine. Although the State is not required to prove a motive to
kill, Sallee v. State, 51 N.E.3d 130, 134 (Ind. 2016) (citing Bunch v. State, 697
N.E.2d 1255, 1257 (Ind. 1998)), unlike in Kiefer, this episode of road rage
supplied one. The jury could infer from Sloat’s actions that he intended to kill
Munson. The State thus presented sufficient evidence to support Sloat’s
conviction for attempted murder.
Conclusion
[30] 	In sum, the trial court’s jury instructions do not constitute reversible error, and
the State presented sufficient evidence to support Sloat’s conviction. We
therefore affirm the trial court on all issues raised.
[31] 	Affirmed.

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Tavitas, C.J., and Bradford, J., concur.
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT
Mark Allen Bates
Renee M. Ortega
Office of the Lake County Public Defender
Appellate Division
Crown Point, Indiana
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
Theodore E. Rokita
Indiana Attorney General
Ellen H. Meilaender
Supervising Deputy Attorney General
Indianapolis, Indiana