STATE OF LOUISIANA vs. versus DAVID JEANJACQUES

STATE OF LOUISIANA
VERSUS
DAVID JEANJACQUES
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NO. 2026-K-0648
COURT OF APPEAL
FOURTH CIRCUIT
STATE OF LOUISIANA
APPLICATION FOR WRITS DIRECTED TO
CRIMINAL DISTRICT COURT ORLEANS PARISH
NO. 568-409, SECTION “DIVISION G”
Hon. Nandi Campbell, Judge
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Judge Paula A. Brown
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(Court composed of Judge Joy Cossich Lobrano, Judge Sandra Cabrina Jenkins,
Judge Paula A. Brown)
LOBRANO, J., CONCURS IN THE RESULT
JENKINS, J., DISSENTS AND ASSIGNS REASONS
Liz Murrill
Louisiana Attorney General
Vallon Hicks
Heather Hendrix
J. Taylor Gray
Assistant Attorneys General
Louisiana Department of Justice
P.O. Box 94005
Baton Rouge, Louisiana 70804-9095
COUNSEL FOR STATE/RELATOR
Jerome W. Matthews, Jr.
Matthews Law Office, LLC
630 4th Street
Gretna LA 70053

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Gregory Q. Carter
The G. Carter Law Firm, LLC
1100 Poydras Street, Suite 2990
New Orleans, LA 70163
COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANT/RESPONDENT
WRIT GRANTED;
JUDGMENT REVERSED;
REMANDED
OCTOBER 21, 2026

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Relator, State of Louisiana (“State”), seeks review of the district court’s
August 10, 2026 judgment which overruled its objection to the consideration of
Defendant/Respondent’s, David Jeanjacques (“Defendant”), motion to waive jury
trial. For the reasons that follow, we reverse the district court’s August 10, 2026
ruling and remand the matter for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
On December 18, 2025, the State, through the Attorney General acting as
district attorney ad hoc for the Parish of Orleans, filed a bill of information
charging Defendant with the following offenses, to wit: one count each of
transactions involving proceeds from drug offenses, a violation of La. R.S.
40:1041; attempted possession with intent to distribute a controlled dangerous
substance, to wit: Carisoprodol, a violation of La. R.S. 40:(27)967(B)(1)(b); and
conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute a controlled dangerous substance, to
wit: Carisoprodol, a violation of La. R.S. 40:(26)967(B)(1)(b). Defendant pled not
guilty to all charges.
On January 23, 2026, Defendant filed an omnibus motion, which, after a
hearing on the motions, the district court denied Defendant’s motion to suppress
PAB

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but found no probable cause for the conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute
Carisoprodol charge. Thereafter, the district court set a trial date of August 10,
2026.
On June 16, 2026, Defendant filed a Motion to Waive Jury Trial and
Election of Trial by Judge. On August 10, 2026, the date of trial, Defendant orally
reasserted his written June 16, 2026 motion to waive jury trial. The State objected.
The State argued that the district court lacked jurisdiction to consider the motion
because La. C.Cr.P. art. 780(B)(2)—which became effective on August 1, 2026—
required such motions to be immediately randomly reassigned amongst the judges
assigned to hear criminal matters. The district court overruled the State’s objection
and granted Defendant’s motion to waive jury trial. The district court then set a
new trial date of October 23, 2026.
The State filed notice of intent to seek supervisory review and timely filed
the present writ application.
DISCUSSION
In its sole assignment of error, the State contends that La. C.Cr.P. art.
780(B)(2), as amended, was in effect at the time the district court heard
Defendant’s motion to waive jury trial; therefore, the State insists, the district court
was without authority to preside over the motion, and erred by doing so.
Notwithstanding that the original motion to waive jury trial was filed before the
effective date of the amended article, the State urges that because the amendment
was procedural, its effect was retroactive.
“The issue of whether an amendment to a law is to be applied prospectively
or retroactively presents a legal question, which appellate courts review de novo to
simply determine whether the district court was legally correct or legally incorrect

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without deference to the legal conclusions of the lower court.” Parria v. La.
Citizens Prop. Ins. Corp., 24-0263, p. 4 (La. App. 1 Cir. 11/13/24), 405 So.3d
1012, 1015-16 (citing Jackson v. BASF Corp., 04-2777, p. 3 (La. App. 1st Cir.
11/4/05), 927 So.2d 412, 415).
Under La. Const. Art. I, § 17(a), “[e]xcept in capital cases, a defendant may
knowingly and intelligently waive his right to a trial by jury but no later than forty-
five days prior to the trial date and the waiver shall be irrevocable.” The
constitutional provision has been codified in La. C.Cr.P. art. 780(B).
Prior to the amendment at issue herein, La. C.Cr.P. art. 780(B) stated the
following:
The defendant shall exercise his right to waive trial by jury in
accordance with Article I, Section 17 of the Constitution of Louisiana.
The waiver shall be by written motion filed in the district court not
later than forty-five days prior to the date the case is set for trial. The
motion shall be signed by the defendant and shall also be signed by
the defendant’s counsel unless the defendant has waived his right to
counsel.
La. C.Cr.P. art. 780(B) was amended, in pertinent part, by Acts 2026, No.
541. The amendment—which became effective on August 1, 2026—added
Subsection (2) to the article to provide as follows:
If a defendant files a motion pursuant to this Paragraph in a district
court with three or more judges who are assigned criminal matters
within respective divisions or sections, the case shall be randomly
reassigned among the remaining judges who are assigned criminal
matters within all divisions or sections immediately following the
filing of the motion.
This Court recently explained in State v. Darlak:
“[A] criminal statute, like all other statutes, should be interpreted so as
to be in harmony with and to preserve and effectuate the manifest
intent of the legislature; an interpretation should be avoided which
would operate to defeat the object and purpose of the statute.” [State
v.] Taylor, 2012-0345, p. 30, [(La. App. 4 Cir. 6/26/13)]118 So.3d
[65,] 83 (quoting State v. Shaw, 2006-2467, pp. 14-15 (La. 11/27/07),

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969 So.2d 1233, 1242). Where the words of a statute are clear and free
from ambiguity, the words are not to be ignored “under the pretext of
pursuing its spirit.” La. R.S. 1:4. Our Supreme Court has relied on La.
C.C. art. 6 for a determination as to whether an amended provision of
the Louisiana Criminal Code should be applied retroactively. State v.
Washington, 2002-2196 (La. 9/13/02), 830 So.2d 288. “In the absence
of contrary legislative expression, substantive laws apply
prospectively only. Procedural and interpretative laws apply both
prospectively and retroactively, unless there is a legislative expression
to the contrary.” La. C.C. art. 6. “A two-fold inquiry is required by La.
C.C. art. 6 in deciding whether a law should be applied retroactively.”
Washington, 2002-2196, p. 2, 830 So.2d at 290. It must first be
determined whether the enactment expresses legislative intent as to
the retrospective or prospective application of the statute. Id. If such
intent is expressed, the inquiry ends. Id.
25-0267, p. 8 (La. App. 4 Cir. 6/22/26), ___ So.3d ___, ____, 2026 WL 1784726,
at *4.
In State v. Washington, 02-2196, p. 3 (La. 9/13/02), 830 So.2d 288, 290, the
Supreme Court further explained the three types of law:
Substantive laws are laws that impose new duties, obligations or
responsibilities upon parties, or laws that establish new rules, rights
and duties or change existing ones. Interpretive laws are those which
clarify the meaning of a statute and are deemed to relate back to the
time that the law was originally enacted. Procedural laws prescribe a
method for enforcing a substantive right and relate to the form of the
proceeding or the operation of laws. (citation omitted).
A review of the legislative acts surrounding the amendment to article 780 reveals
that the Legislature was silent as to its retroactive or prospective nature. Both
parties agree that the amendment was procedural in nature; therefore, pursuant to
La. C.C. art. 6, the article is applied both retroactively and prospectively. “The
Legislature is free, within constitutional confines, to give its enactments retroactive
effect.” Parria at p.5, 405 So.3d at 1016. It must be noted, however, that
“[r]etroactive application of new legislation is constitutionally permissible only if
it does not result in impairment of the obligations of contracts or in divestiture of
vested rights.” Id. (citation omitted).

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In the case sub judice, Defendant’s vested right is the statutory right to
waive trial by jury, which was not disturbed by the amendment now requiring the
procedural step of reallotment of the case to another division.1 As this Court
pronounced in Doe v. Jesuit High School of New Orleans, “[o]ur jurisprudence is
well-settled that ‘no one has any vested right in any given mode of procedure.’”
21-0284, pp. 7-8 (La. App. 4 Cir. 11/10/21), 331 So.3d 426, 432 (citing Sawicki v.
K/S Stavanger Prince, 01-0528, p. 10 (La. 12/7/01), 802 So.2d 598, 604-05.
“Because the statute addresses the mode or means of the trial, it is a procedural
matter, which does not affect any vested rights, and, therefore, may be applied
retroactively.” Blanchard v. City Parish of East Baton Rouge, 95-2011, p. 13 (La.
App. 1 Cir. 4/30/96), 674 So.2d 317, 325 (citations omitted). Moreover, “[a]
criminal defendant does not have the right to have his case heard by a particular
judge . . . and is not denied due process as a result of an error in a particular judge's
selection unless he can point to some resulting prejudice.” State v. Cooper, 10-
2344, pp. 20-21 (La. 11/16/10), 50 So.3d 115, 131 (citation omitted). To conclude
that the previous version of La. C.Cr.P. art. 780 is controlling because the motion
to waive trial by jury was filed before the amendment became effective, renders
La. C.C. art. 6 meaningless. The only way for retroactivity to apply is if all
pending, but undecided, motions are subject to the procedural amendment. To
hold that all such motions are only subject to the amended version if filed on or
after the August 1, 2026 effective date is to apply prospective application only.
DECREE
1 Cf. State of La. v. Clyde Madere, unpub. 26-426 (La. App. 5 Cir. 9/29/26), 2026 WL 2924606,
writ denied, stay denied sub nom State v. Madere, 26-01288 (La. 10/5/26), 2026 WL 3000044
(Mem), wherein the Fifth Circuit Court found that La. C.Cr.P. art. 780 B(2) was not to be
retroactively applied to a motion to waive jury trial that had been filed and granted in April
2026, months prior to the August 1, 2026 effective date.

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For the foregoing reasons, we grant the State’s writ application, reverse the
district court’s August 10, 2026 ruling and remand the matter for further
proceedings consistent with this opinion.
WRIT GRANTED;
JUDGMENT REVERSED;
REMANDED

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