PAULA TAYLOR & Another v. BOSTON TEACHERS UNION, LOCAL 66, AFT MASSACHUSETTS, AFL-CIO.

NOTICE: Summary decisions issued by the Appeals Court pursuant to M.A.C. Rule
23.0, as appearing in 97 Mass. App. Ct. 1017 (2020) (formerly known as rule 1:28,
as amended by 73 Mass. App. Ct. 1001 [2009]), are primarily directed to the parties
and, therefore, may not fully address the facts of the case or the panel's
decisional rationale. Moreover, such decisions are not circulated to the entire
court and, therefore, represent only the views of the panel that decided the case.
A summary decision pursuant to rule 23.0 or rule 1:28 issued after February 25,
2008, may be cited for its persuasive value but, because of the limitations noted
above, not as binding precedent. See Chace v. Curran, 71 Mass. App. Ct. 258, 260
n.4 (2008).

COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS

APPEALS COURT

23-P-419

PAULA TAYLOR & another1

vs.

BOSTON TEACHERS UNION, LOCAL 66, AFT MASSACHUSETTS, AFL-CIO.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 23.0

The plaintiffs, Paula Taylor and John Daley, both members

of the Boston Teachers Union (BTU or defendant), appeal from a

judgment of the Superior Court dismissing their complaint

seeking declaratory relief pursuant to G. L. c. 231A, § 1. We

affirm.

Background. Taking the plaintiffs' well-pleaded

allegations as true, at a February 9, 2022 monthly union

membership meeting a draft memorandum of agreement (MOA) between

the Boston Public Schools and the BTU was presented to the

attending membership for a vote. "The [February 2022] MOA,

among other things, divided the workforce into 'verified' and

'non-verified' employees depending upon which medical treatments

1 John Daley.
they preferred," and further provided for the imposition of

unpaid leave for "'non-verified' employees based upon [certain]

contingencies." The February 2022 MOA also purported to reduce

compensation for employees "who used sick days as compensation

during unpaid leave." The union membership voted in favor of

the February 2022 MOA.

On February 14, 2022, the plaintiffs filed a complaint

against the defendant alleging that the defendant conducted a

vote on the February 2022 MOA in violation of notice and voting

requirements of the union bylaws. Article X of the BTU's bylaws

provides that "[a]ny motion which alters or amends our

collective bargaining agreement shall require the same notice to

the membership as a constitutional amendment." Article X

further provides that proposed amendments to the bylaws "[s]hall

be announced to the membership in writing at least fifteen (15)

days in advance of the next meeting of the membership," and that

proposed amendments "shall become part of the Bylaws of the

[union] by two-thirds (2/3) vote of those present and voting in

favor."

The plaintiffs argue that the above-referenced provisions

of the February 2022 MOA "substantially altered the rights and

obligations of the members under the union's Collective

Bargaining Agreement [CBA]," thus triggering the Article X bylaw

provisions requiring fifteen days advance written notice and a

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two-thirds supermajority vote. The plaintiffs claim that by

failing to give that required notice and failing to require a

supermajority vote, the defendant breached the bylaws and

proceeded on an unlawful basis without the authority of union

membership. Accordingly, the plaintiffs seek a declaration that

the defendant's actions violated the bylaws and are unlawful.

The defendant moved to dismiss the complaint on the basis

that, inter alia, paragraph 19 of the February 2022 MOA requires

the "approval of the Boston School Committee" (BSC) to become

effective, and the BSC has never voted on or approved the

February 2022 MOA. Consequently, the defendant argued, the

request for declaratory relief was not ripe for adjudication as

there was no actual controversy within the meaning of G. L.

c. 231A. The plaintiffs filed an opposition to the motion to

dismiss and subsequently filed a motion to supplement the

pleadings pursuant to Mass. R. Civ. P. 15 (d), 365 Mass. 761

(1974). The motion to supplement sought, in essence, to amend

the complaint to include allegations regarding a subsequent

September 6, 2022 MOA that contained a requirement for union

members to "verify their vaccination status" and in some

circumstances submit to an unspecified "COVID-19 screening

test." The plaintiffs maintained that certain provisions of the

September 2022 MOA likewise altered or amended rights and

obligations in the CBA and were thus subject to the notice and

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supermajority provisions of Article X of the bylaws and likewise

were unlawful. The defendant filed an opposition to the motion

to supplement arguing that the September 2022 MOA did not alter

the terms and conditions of employment for union members. On

January 31, 2023, a Superior Court judge allowed the defendant's

motion to dismiss and denied the plaintiffs' motion to

supplement. This appeal ensued.

Discussion. We review the allowance of a motion to dismiss

de novo, accepting the allegations in the complaint as true and

drawing all reasonable inferences in the plaintiff's favor. See

Curtis v. Herb Chambers I-95, Inc., 458 Mass. 674, 676 (2011).

"[W]e look beyond the conclusory allegations in the complaint

and focus on whether the factual allegations plausibly suggest

an entitlement to relief." Id., citing Iannacchino v. Ford

Motor Co., 451 Mass. 623, 635-636 (2008).

With respect to declaratory judgment actions, G. L. c. 231A

"expressly requires that the pleadings set forth specifically

some actual controversy." Penal Insts. Comm'r for Suffolk Co.

v. Commissioner of Correction, 382 Mass. 527, 530-531 (1981),

citing G. L. c. 231A, §§ 1, 9. "Such proceedings are concerned

with the resolution of real, not hypothetical, controversies;

the declaration issued is intended to have an immediate impact

on the rights of the parties." Id. at 531, quoting

Massachusetts Ass'n of Independent Ins. Agents & Brokers, Inc.

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v. Commissioner of Ins., 373 Mass. 290, 292 (1977). "Conclusory

allegations as to official duties or potential future conflicts

will not do." Penal Insts. Comm'r for Suffolk Co., supra. With

these principles in mind, we address the plaintiffs' claims on

appeal.

As to the February 2022 MOA, there is no dispute that it

was never approved by the BSC and never went into effect. As a

result, these circumstances present a hypothetical controversy

where the declaration sought by the plaintiffs -- i.e., that the

MOA not in effect is nonetheless unlawful -- would not have an

"immediate impact" on the rights of the parties. Massachusetts

Ass'n of Independent Ins. Agents & Brokers, 373 Mass. at 292.

Plaintiffs' argument would also fail because "[a] party has

standing pursuant to G. L. c. 231A where the defendant has

violated some duty owed to the plaintiff[s] . . . and where the

plaintiffs can allege an injury within the area of concern of

the statute or regulatory scheme" (quotations omitted). Service

Employees Int'l Union, Local 509 v. Department of Mental Health,

469 Mass. 323, 328 (2014). Here, for the reasons stated above,

the plaintiffs do not allege a cognizable injury within the

meaning of c. 231A. "[U]ntil the defendant[] decide[s] upon

definite action with some finality, declaratory relief is

premature." McCaffrey v. School Comm. of Haverhill, 352 Mass.

516, 518-519 (1967). In addition, "[i]t is settled that G. L.

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c. 231A does not provide an independent statutory basis for

standing." Enos v. Secretary of Envtl. Affairs, 432 Mass. 132,

135 (2000). A plaintiff seeking declaratory relief must

"demonstrate not only the existence of an actual controversy but

also the requisite legal standing to secure its resolution"

(quotation omitted). Entergy Nuclear Generation Co. v.

Department of Envtl. Protection, 459 Mass. 319, 326 (2011). "To

have standing in any capacity, a [plaintiff] must show that the

challenged action has caused the [plaintiff] injury." Sudbury

v. Massachusetts Bay Transp. Auth., 485 Mass. 774, 779 (2020).

Here, the plaintiffs have not been injured by the defendant's

alleged failure to abide by the notice and supermajority

provisions of the bylaws, because, again, the February 2022 MOA

never took effect. Accordingly, the motion to dismiss was

properly allowed.

As to the September 2022 MOA, it appears that there is

nothing in the record before us that indicates that it went into

effect. Thus, for the reasons delineated above, the plaintiffs

fail to satisfy the actual controversy requirement of c. 231A.2

Even assuming, arguendo, that the September 2022 MOA did go into

2 There were representations by the parties at oral argument
that the September 2022 MOA went into effect, but, of course, we
are bound by the record before us. In any event, for the
reasons discussed infra, the claim is also unavailing on the
merits.

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effect, the judge did not abuse his discretion in denying the

motion to supplement the complaint to include allegations

regarding the September 2022 MOA. See Chang v. Winklevoss, 95

Mass. App. Ct. 202, 212 (2019) (denial of motion to amend

complaint reviewed for abuse of discretion). As the judge

found, the plaintiffs did not show how the September 2022 MOA

alters or changes any preexisting term or condition of

employment contained in the CBA, and thus "amending the

complaint would be futile" and would "not survive a motion to

dismiss for failure to state a claim." Id. On the record

before us, we cannot say that the judge made "a clear error of

judgment in weighing the factors relevant to the decision . . .

such that the decision falls outside the range of reasonable

7
alternatives" (quotation omitted). L.L. v. Commonwealth, 470

Mass. 169, 185 n.27 (2014).3

Judgment affirmed.

By the Court (Neyman,
Hershfang & Hodgens, JJ.4),

Clerk

Entered: July 30, 2024.

3 We also note that the present litigation appears to be
moot. See generally Lynn v. Murrell, 489 Mass. 579, 582-583
(2022). The plaintiffs respond that the mootness doctrine
should not apply because the present case is not about the
coronavirus, but about essential issues of organizational
governance. Although there is some force to the plaintiffs'
claim, we are not persuaded to alter the result we reach for the
reasons already discussed herein.

4 The panelists are listed in order of seniority.

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