Commonwealth v. Jeffrey Alicea.

NOTICE: Summary decisions issued by the Appeals Court pursuant to M.A.C. Rule
23.0, as appearing in 97 Mass. App. Ct. 1017 (2020) (formerly known as rule 1:28,
as amended by 73 Mass. App. Ct. 1001 [2009]), are primarily directed to the parties
and, therefore, may not fully address the facts of the case or the panel's
decisional rationale. Moreover, such decisions are not circulated to the entire
court and, therefore, represent only the views of the panel that decided the case.
A summary decision pursuant to rule 23.0 or rule 1:28 issued after February 25,
2008, may be cited for its persuasive value but, because of the limitations noted
above, not as binding precedent. See Chace v. Curran, 71 Mass. App. Ct. 258, 260
n.4 (2008).

COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS

APPEALS COURT

23-P-1400

COMMONWEALTH

vs.

JEFFREY ALICEA.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 23.0

The defendant moved to suppress statements he made during a

police interview, arguing that he was in custody when he made

the statements, yet the police failed to give him Miranda

warnings. A District Court judge allowed the motion, and the

Commonwealth filed this interlocutory appeal. As we conclude

that the defendant was in custody and so should have received

Miranda warnings, we affirm.

Background. We summarize the judge's factual findings,

which are uncontested, supplemented by our independent review of

the video recording of the police interview. See Commonwealth

v. Hart, 493 Mass. 130, 135 (2023).
On April 15, 2023, Springfield Police Lieutenant Brian

Elliott responded to a dispatch about a domestic violence

incident involving the defendant, at the time a Springfield

police officer working under Lieutenant Elliott's general

supervision. Lieutenant Elliott spoke to the complaining

witness, the defendant's girlfriend Fiona,1 who said that she and

the defendant had an argument while they were in his car.

According to Fiona, when she got out of the car, the defendant

picked her up, threw her down, and handcuffed her. Lieutenant

Elliott also spoke to Fiona's father, who said that he saw the

defendant "body slam[]" his daughter to the ground.

Lieutenant Elliott returned to the police station, where

the defendant was working an administrative role at the window.

Lieutenant Elliott told the defendant he needed to speak to him,

stating he was just at the defendant's house and needed to

figure out what happened. Because the defendant was working in

a semipublic area, Lieutenant Elliott led him through an office

and the booking area to the "OUI room."2 Sergeant Jason Sleeper

joined them in the room. All three removed their firearms

before entering.

1 A pseudonym.

2 Lieutenant Elliott testified that the OUI room was where
"you would be processed" "if you were to be brought in for
operating under the influence."

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The OUI room is small, approximately eight feet or ten feet

squared. The defendant sat in a chair, and Lieutenant Elliott

sat directly across from him. Sergeant Sleeper sat to the side.

Both Lieutenant Elliott and Sergeant Sleeper were between the

defendant and the door, which remained open.

Lieutenant Elliott began the interview by stating that he

responded to the defendant's home because of a 911 call about a

"domestic occurrence" involving the defendant and Fiona.

Lieutenant Elliott then stated twice, "She named you by name."

When he said he needed to hear the defendant's side of the

story, the defendant asked, "Do you want to hear like how it all

started?" Lieutenant Elliott replied, "I'm telling you I was

called there today relative to an incident of domestic assault.

That's why I'm having you speak to me. So now I'll hear from

you."

The defendant proceeded to describe his relationship with

Fiona, claiming that they had been fighting for a couple of

weeks and that on one occasion she had chased him while holding

a knife. After about two minutes, Lieutenant Elliott

interjected, "I want to talk to you about today" and "Bring me

to what happened today." Instead, the defendant began

describing another past incident during which Fiona had

allegedly choked him while trying to grab his phone. After

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about a minute, Lieutenant Elliott again interrupted and asked,

"What happened today?"

The defendant then described the events of that day.

According to his account, Fiona became upset at something he

said and tried to jump out of the car window while the car was

moving. The defendant grabbed her shirt and pulled her back in.

When she tried to jump out again, the defendant stopped the car,

and Fiona got out and walked away. Out of concern for her

safety, the defendant followed her and also called her father to

come pick her up. Eventually, the defendant tried to put

handcuffs on Fiona to calm her down. She reacted by throwing

her hands around and pushing back, causing them both to fall to

the ground.

At about thirteen minutes into the interview, Lieutenant

Elliott stated,

"So at this point, I'm going to stop you right here. . . .
I had a chance to speak to her, and I spoke to her dad.
And I have to hear the other half. I mean in domestics you
gotta hear both sides. But I've heard enough where I'm
going to stop you at this point. Ok? I'm going to
Mirandize you."

After administering Miranda warnings, Lieutenant Elliott went on

to explain why he was doing so, stating that the defendant had

corroborated Fiona's story by admitting that he put his hands on

her and tried to put her in handcuffs. The defendant was then

placed under arrest.

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Discussion. "Miranda warnings are required before police

conduct a custodial interrogation." Commonwealth v. Wardsworth,

482 Mass. 454, 480 (2019). At the suppression hearing, the

Commonwealth conceded that the defendant was subjected to

interrogation, but argued, as it does on appeal, that the

defendant failed to meet his burden of showing that he was in

custody. The judge disagreed, finding that the defendant was in

custody and that Miranda warnings should therefore have been

given before the interview. After "conduct[ing] an independent

review of [the judge's] ultimate findings and conclusions of

law," Hart, 493 Mass. at 135, quoting Commonwealth v. Tremblay,

480 Mass. 645, 652 (2018), we conclude that the judge correctly

resolved the question of custody.

To determine whether a person was in custody, "we ask

whether a reasonable person in [that person's] shoes would have

perceived the environment as coercive." Wardsworth, 482 Mass.

at 481. Four factors guide our determination: (1) "the place

of the interrogation"; (2) "whether the officers have conveyed

to the person being questioned any belief or opinion that that

person is a suspect"; (3) "the nature of the interrogation"; and

(4) whether "the person was free to end the interview" by

leaving or asking to leave. Commonwealth v. Groome, 435 Mass.

201, 211-212 (2001). We agree with the judge that these factors

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support a finding that the defendant was in custody when

Lieutenant Elliott questioned him.

First, a reasonable person in the defendant's shoes would

have perceived the place of the interrogation as coercive.

Lieutenant Elliott, the defendant's commanding officer, told the

defendant that he had been to the defendant's house and needed

to speak with him, and then led him through the station to a

small room. Although the door was open, Lieutenant Elliott and

Sergeant Sleeper, another superior officer, sat between the

defendant and the door, effectively blocking his exit. We do

not agree with the Commonwealth's assertion that this setting

was noncoercive because the defendant was "voluntarily present

at the police station." Unlike the defendants in Commonwealth

v. Rosa-Roman, 485 Mass. 617, 624 (2020), and Commonwealth v.

Amaral, 482 Mass. 496, 501 (2019), on which the Commonwealth

relies, the defendant did not go voluntarily to the police

station to be interviewed. Rather, he was there on his regular

work shift and pulled from his regular duties to be questioned

in a small room by two superior officers. These facts are

similar to those in Commonwealth v. Gallati, 40 Mass. App. Ct.

111, 112 (1996), where the defendant, a correction officer, was

questioned by a superior officer in the office of the deputy

superintendent of the correctional facility. Although the

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correctional facility was the defendant's workplace, we

concluded that "a reasonable person in the defendant's

circumstances would have perceived the setting isolating and

coercive," given that he "was escorted to the place of

interrogation by his superior" and "the setting was the office

of a superior officer to whom the defendant owed a duty of

obedience by training and organizational mandate." Id. at 113.

We conclude similarly here.

Second, from the outset of the interview, Lieutenant

Elliott conveyed to the defendant that he was a suspect.

Lieutenant Elliott began by saying that he responded to the

defendant's home for a "domestic occurrence" involving the

defendant and his girlfriend. Lieutenant Elliott then said

twice, "She named you by name," and reiterated that he was

having the defendant speak to him because he was called to the

defendant's house "relative to an incident of domestic assault."

Objectively viewed, these statements conveyed to the defendant

that Lieutenant Elliott suspected him of criminal activity. See

Commonwealth v. Earl, 102 Mass. App. Ct. 664, 673-674 (2023);

Gallati, 40 Mass. App. Ct. at 113-114.

Third, although Lieutenant Elliott's tone was not overly

aggressive, nor was the nature of the interrogation "informal

and influenced in its contours by the person being interviewed."

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Groome, 435 Mass. at 212. While the defendant was describing

past incidents between him and his girlfriend, Lieutenant

Elliott interrupted twice and told the defendant to focus on

what had occurred that day. Moreover, while the defendant was

giving his account, Lieutenant Elliott interjected numerous

questions such as, "Where was this?" and "Why did you phone her

father?" He also asked several follow-up questions about the

defendant's use of the handcuffs. The nature of this

questioning supports a finding that the setting was custodial.

See Gallati, 40 Mass. App. Ct. at 115 (nature of interrogation

supported finding of custody where "[t]here was no idle

conversation and the defendant in no way controlled the

parameters of the conversation").

Finally, a reasonable person would not have felt free to

end the interview by leaving or asking to leave. The

defendant's commanding officer had pulled him from his duties,

told him he needed to speak with him, and directed him to a

small room to be questioned about his possible involvement in a

crime; the commanding officer and another superior officer sat

between the defendant and the door; at no point did either of

the defendant's superiors tell him he could leave; and the

"interview terminated with an arrest." Groome, 435 Mass. at

212. We agree with the judge that a reasonable person in these

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circumstances would not have felt the freedom to leave. See

Gallati, 40 Mass. App. Ct. at 115 ("Given the nature of the

interrogation, its setting, and its focus on the defendant, we

conclude that a reasonable person in the defendant's

circumstances would not have determined he was free to leave

until his superior officer released him").

Considering all of these factors, we conclude that the

defendant was in custody and should have received Miranda

warnings prior to being questioned. The judge was thus correct

to allow the defendant's motion to suppress his statements.

Order allowing motion to
suppress affirmed.

By the Court (Shin, Grant &
Smyth, JJ.3),

Clerk

Entered: September 23, 2024.

3 The panelists are listed in order of seniority.

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