J.H. v. N.F.

NOTICE: Summary decisions issued by the Appeals Court pursuant to M.A.C. Rule
23.0, as appearing in 97 Mass. App. Ct. 1017 (2020) (formerly known as rule 1:28,
as amended by 73 Mass. App. Ct. 1001 [2009]), are primarily directed to the parties
and, therefore, may not fully address the facts of the case or the panel's
decisional rationale. Moreover, such decisions are not circulated to the entire
court and, therefore, represent only the views of the panel that decided the case.
A summary decision pursuant to rule 23.0 or rule 1:28 issued after February 25,
2008, may be cited for its persuasive value but, because of the limitations noted
above, not as binding precedent. See Chace v. Curran, 71 Mass. App. Ct. 258, 260
n.4 (2008).

COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS

APPEALS COURT

23-P-709

J.H.

vs.

N.F.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 23.0

The defendant appeals from an order of a District Court

judge extending a harassment prevention order issued pursuant to

G. L. c. 258E (258E order or order) for ten years.1 He argues

that (1) the original order should be vacated, (2) the judge

abused his discretion in extending the order, and (3) he was not

given a meaningful opportunity to be heard. We affirm the

1The plaintiff filed a complaint for protection from
harassment on January 9, 2020. After a hearing, a judge issued
an ex parte 258E order. After being served with the order, the
defendant failed to appear for the extension hearing, and it was
extended until January 22, 2021. The defendant was again served
in hand with the extended order. An extension hearing was held
by videoconference on January 22, 2021, at which the defendant
did not appear, and the order was extended until January 20,
2023. The defendant was served in hand with the extended order.
extension of the 258E order but vacate so much of the order that

extended it for ten years. We remand the case to the District

Court to revise the extension period from ten years to two years

from January 20, 2023, and to schedule a further hearing for

January 20, 2025, with notice to both parties.

Discussion. 1. Original 258E order. The defendant first

argues that the original 258E order was improperly issued and

should be vacated because the plaintiff did not offer evidence

of three separate acts of harassment. See G. L. c. 258E, § 1.

However, because the defendant did not appeal from the issuance

of the original 258E order, that issue is not before us, and we

decline to address it. See Ginsberg v. Blacker, 67 Mass. App.

Ct. 139, 140 n.2 (2006).

2. 258E extension order. The defendant next claims that

the judge abused his discretion in both extending the order and

issuing it for ten years.

a. Allowance of extension. At an extension hearing, the

defendant is not permitted to challenge the evidence underlying

the original order, and the plaintiff is not required to

reestablish the facts sufficient to support the initial order.

See Iamele v. Asselin, 444 Mass. 734, 740 (2005). However, the

plaintiff must establish a continuing need for the order to

protect him from further harassment. See id. at 739. "It is

the totality of the conditions that exist at the time that the

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plaintiff seeks the extension, viewed in light of the initial

[258E order], that govern." Id. at 741. We give the judge's

credibility determinations "the utmost deference" (citation

omitted). Noelle N. v. Frasier F., 97 Mass. App. Ct. 660, 664

(2020).

Here, the judge considered both the plaintiff's original

affidavit and the supplemental affidavit filed the day of the

extension hearing. The judge heard testimony from both parties,

including that the defendant made telephone calls and sent

"notes" to staff at the plaintiff's place of work while the

order was in effect.2 The judge credited the plaintiff's

testimony including that he was still in fear of the defendant.

In addition, during the defendant's testimony, the defendant

lost his temper and swore at the judge. The judge properly

considered, among other factors, the evidence underlying the

initial order and "the parties' demeanor in court." Yasmin Y.

v. Queshon Q., 101 Mass. App. Ct. 252, 258 (2022), quoting

Iamele, 444 Mass. at 740. See Pike v. Maguire, 47 Mass. App.

Ct. 929, 930 (1999) (proper to consider defendant's agitated

2 The defendant's contention that the lack of direct contact
between the parties in the three years since the issuance of the
original order is evidence that the plaintiff was not in need of
continuing protection is unavailing, as "obedience alone is not
a ground for refusing an extension of the initial order."
Iamele, 444 Mass. at 738. Defendants subject to 258E orders are
expected to comply with them. See MacDonald v. Caruso, 467
Mass. 382, 388-389 (2014).

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conduct and emotionally charged statements at hearing). We

discern no "clear error of judgment in weighing the factors

relevant to the decision" (quotations and citations omitted),

L.L. v. Commonwealth, 470 Mass. 169, 185 n.27 (2014), and

conclude that the judge did not abuse his discretion in

extending the order.

b. Duration of order. Once a determination to extend a

258E order is made, the duration of the extended order must be

"reasonably necessary to protect the plaintiff" from future

harassment. G. L. c. 258E, § 3 (d). See Iamele, 444 Mass. at

737-738. Here, the judge did not make findings as to why an

extension of ten years was necessary, and the plaintiff's

testimony did not support such a duration. On this record, we

cannot conclude that ten years is a reasonably necessary period

to protect the plaintiff from further harassment. Cf. Moreno v.

Naranjo, 465 Mass. 1001, 1003 (2013). Accordingly, we vacate so

much of the order that extended it for ten years, and remand to

the District Court to revise the expiration date to two years

from January 20, 2023 (the last extension date).

3. Extension hearing. The defendant next argues that he

was deprived of a meaningful opportunity to be heard because he

was not able to cross-examine the plaintiff or offer evidence,

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and because he participated in the hearing remotely.3 An

extension hearing must comport with the requirements of due

process. See R.S. v. A.P.B., 95 Mass. App. Ct. 372, 373 n.4

(2019). This includes a meaningful opportunity to be heard, the

right to testify, the right to present evidence, and the right

to cross-examine witnesses. See Idris I. v. Hazel H., 100 Mass.

App. Ct. 784, 788 (2022). We review for an abuse of discretion

or other error of law. See Vera V. v. Seymour S., 98 Mass. App.

Ct. 315, 318 (2020).

Here, the judge told the defendant that he would have an

opportunity to present arguments and question the plaintiff.

Indeed, there is ample evidence in the record that the defendant

was afforded considerable time to present his case; however, the

defendant voluntarily left the hearing prior to its conclusion

and before questioning the plaintiff. It was the defendant's

own actions that prevented him from cross-examining the

plaintiff, and not a lack of fair hearing. There was no error.

Conclusion. We vacate so much of the January 20, 2023

extension order that granted a ten-year duration for the

3 As to his remote participation, the defendant argues that
appearing over videoconference while the plaintiff appeared in
person created a "fundamental asymmetry" in the proceeding.
While the defendant claimed the clerk's office informed him that
the hearing would be held by videoconference, the notice that he
was served in hand with indicated that the hearing was in person
at the District Court. Notwithstanding, the transcript reflects
that the defendant testified at length at the hearing.

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extension, and remand the case to the District Court to revise

the expiration date to two years from January 20, 2023, and to

schedule a further hearing for January 20, 2025, with notice to

both parties. The January 20, 2023 extension order is otherwise

affirmed.

So ordered.

By the Court (Blake, C.J.,
Ditkoff & D'Angelo, JJ.4),

Clerk

Entered: November 20, 2024.

4 The panelists are listed in order of seniority.

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