ADAM JAMES BRADLEY v. COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS & Others

NOTICE: Summary decisions issued by the Appeals Court pursuant to M.A.C. Rule
23.0, as appearing in 97 Mass. App. Ct. 1017 (2020) (formerly known as rule 1:28,
as amended by 73 Mass. App. Ct. 1001 [2009]), are primarily directed to the parties
and, therefore, may not fully address the facts of the case or the panel's
decisional rationale. Moreover, such decisions are not circulated to the entire
court and, therefore, represent only the views of the panel that decided the case.
A summary decision pursuant to rule 23.0 or rule 1:28 issued after February 25,
2008, may be cited for its persuasive value but, because of the limitations noted
above, not as binding precedent. See Chace v. Curran, 71 Mass. App. Ct. 258, 260
n.4 (2008).

COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS

APPEALS COURT

22-P-33

ADAM JAMES BRADLEY

vs.

COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS & others1

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 23.0

The plaintiff, Adam Bradley, appeals from a judgment

dismissing his complaint for failure to state a cognizable

claim. Mass. R. Civ. P. 12 (b) (6), 365 Mass. 754 (1974). The

fundamental basis for the dismissal was that Bradley's civil

claims, if successful, would provide grounds to collaterally

attack his 2017 conviction of murder in the first degree. Two

important decisions, Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994)

(applicable to Bradley's claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983), and

1Massachusetts State Police, David Marc Solet, Timothy F.
MacDougall, Eric Mitza, Cara Krysil, Anthony DeLucia, Troop Duty
Officer John Doe, and Marian T. Ryan, individually and in their
official capacities.
Tinsley v. Framingham, 485 Mass. 760 (2020) (applicable to

Bradley's various State law claims), establish that civil

actions may not be so employed -- that is, that Bradley may not

prosecute a civil action that would demonstrate the invalidity

of, or undermine, his prior criminal conviction. As we agree

that Heck and Tinsley dictate the dismissal of Bradley's claims,

we affirm the dismissal.

Background. In 2012, Quintin Koehler was shot and killed

in a home in Billerica. The subsequent criminal investigation

led to indictments charging the plaintiff Bradley and others

with Koehler's murder. In 2017, a jury convicted Bradley of

murder in the first degree. Bradley's direct appeal from his

conviction is pending in the Supreme Judicial Court.

Commonwealth v. Bradley, SJC-13159. Bradley remains in prison.

Bradley filed the complaint in this case in February 2019.2

The gist of the allegations is that during the murder

2 This is not the only civil complaint Bradley has filed
against State officers; there are at least two others. In
Bradley v. Turco, C.A. No. 1881CV02561 (filed August 2018),
Bradley sued the Commonwealth and multiple State officers,
generally based on alleged civil rights violations while Bradley
was incarcerated. In Bradley v. Frost, C.A. No. 1981CV00555
(filed February 2019), Bradley sued the Commonwealth, the town
of Billerica, and multiple State officers, based on alleged
assaults Bradley suffered during incarceration. See Bradley v.
Commonwealth, 104 Mass. App. Ct. 1109 (2024).
As a result of these actions, the defendants have argued,
as an alternative ground for dismissal, that Bradley has
improperly split his claims against these defendants and that
dismissal is required under Mass. R. Civ. P. 12 (b) (9), as

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investigation, two prosecutors and several Massachusetts State

Police officers destroyed exculpatory evidence and fabricated a

report concerning a fingerprint analysis of rubber gloves found

near the murder scene. The major DNA profile found on the

gloves was a statistical match to Bradley's DNA profile.

However, in his complaint in this case, Bradley alleges that

fingerprint testing of the gloves yielded only one fingerprint,

which was not his. Bradley further alleges that the report of

this fingerprint analysis was destroyed, and that an altered

report that showed no fingerprints on the gloves was produced in

discovery. Bradley also complains that several other

investigative reports, known as crime scene services section

reports, were not produced to him during discovery.

The complaint alleges violations of the Federal and

Massachusetts Constitutions and various State laws. More

specifically, Bradley claims that the defendants, members of the

State prosecutorial team, violated the Federal due process

clause by withholding material exculpatory evidence. See Brady

v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963); see also Commonwealth v.

Rodriguez-Nieves, 487 Mass. 171, 177 (2021) ("The Commonwealth

has a constitutional duty, grounded in the defendant's right to

amended, 450 Mass. 1403 (2008). As we conclude that dismissal
was appropriate under Tinsley, we do not reach the
Rule 12 (b) (9) issue.

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due process, to disclose in a timely manner material,

exculpatory evidence over which it has possession, custody, or

control"). The defendants are the Commonwealth of

Massachusetts, prosecutors, and members of the State Police who

were involved in the investigation of the murder, including

those who conducted the fingerprint tests, and allegedly

fabricated test results. The complaint includes Federal claims

under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, as well as State law claims under the

Massachusetts Civil Rights Act (MCRA), the Massachusetts Tort

Claims Act (MCTA), and common law claims including tortious

interference with contractual relations, as well as a claim for

declaratory relief.

As indicated, a Superior Court judge dismissed all of

Bradley's claims, citing in particular the doctrine of Tinsley,

which states that Bradley may not bring a civil action that can

be used to collaterally attack his criminal conviction. 485

Mass. at 766. Bradley appeals, arguing that his civil action is

not a collateral attack on his murder conviction and does not

meet the test set forth in Tinsley, supra, but instead seeks

tort damages for, among other things, emotional distress caused

by the defendants' wrongful acts.

Discussion. We agree that this case is controlled by the

decisions in Heck and Tinsley. In Heck, the plaintiff,

convicted of manslaughter in the death of his wife, filed suit

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under § 1983, alleging that various State officials "had engaged

in an 'unlawful . . . investigation' leading to petitioner's

arrest; 'knowingly destroyed' evidence 'which was exculpatory in

nature and could have proved [petitioner's] innocence'; and

caused 'an illegal and unlawful voice identification procedure'

to be used at petitioner's trial." 512 U.S. at 478-479. The

United States Supreme Court adopted the "hoary principle that

civil tort actions are not appropriate vehicles for challenging

the validity of outstanding criminal judgments." Id. at 486.

The Court accordingly held that § 1983 damages actions that

"necessarily require the plaintiff to prove the unlawfulness of

his conviction" must be dismissed, unless the state criminal

conviction had "already been invalidated." Id. at 486-487. The

Court went on to state the test for dismissal thusly: dismissal

is required where "a judgment [in the § 1983 claim] would

necessarily imply the invalidity of [the] conviction . . . ."

Id. at 487. Importantly, applying the above standard, the

Supreme Court affirmed the dismissal of Heck's § 1983 claims.

Id. at 490.

The Supreme Judicial Court's Tinsley decision came after,

and in light of, Heck. In Tinsley the plaintiff had been

convicted of resisting arrest, among other offenses, during a

traffic stop, and his civil claims asserted that the arresting

officers had used excessive force, both before and after Tinsley

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was removed from his vehicle. 485 Mass. at 761, 768. The Court

did not "adopt the holding in Heck in its entirety," but did

"adopt . . . its guiding principle . . . ." (footnote omitted).

Id. at 761. The court accordingly held that the plaintiff's

civil claims could proceed only if

"the [civil] action is based on facts . . . other than
those necessary to sustain the plaintiff's criminal
conviction and where the plaintiff demonstrates that the
civil action, if successful, would not necessarily
undermine the validity of the plaintiff's prior criminal
conviction" (emphasis added).

Id. at 766.

Applying this standard, the Supreme Judicial Court held

that Tinsley's claims alleging the use of excessive force prior

to his arrest had to be dismissed, as Tinsley had been convicted

of resisting arrest, and thus the jury necessarily found that

Tinsley was not acting in lawful self-defense when using force

against an officer up to the point of his arrest. Id. at 770.

Tinsley's claims alleging excessive force after being removed

from his vehicle, however, were allowed to proceed, because

those actions occurred after Tinsley's arrest. Id. at 771.

Heck and Tinsley dictate the dismissal of Bradley's claims

here. First, as to Bradley's § 1983 claims, we emphasize that

the claims in Heck were not materially different than Bradley's

claims here. See Heck, 512 U.S. at 479. Bradley alleges that

he was the subject of an unlawful investigation in which public

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officials, among other things, destroyed exculpatory evidence.

The plaintiff in Heck made essentially the same claim, among

others -- that prosecutors and police "knowingly destroyed"

exculpatory evidence. 512 U.S. at 479. The Supreme Court

affirmed the dismissal of those claims in Heck; Heck thus holds

that such claims of knowing destruction of evidence could -- and

in Heck did -- meet the Supreme Court's test that the claims

would "necessarily imply the invalidity of the conviction." Id.

at 487.

Moreover, it is readily apparent that if Bradley were to

succeed in this case, the facts he would establish would

necessarily call into question material facts that were

presented to the jury as evidence of his guilt in his murder

trial. If Bradley succeeded in showing (1) that the

Commonwealth conducted a fingerprint analysis of the rubber

gloves that showed that the gloves did not contain Bradley's

fingerprints, but did contain the fingerprint of someone else,

(2) that the report of the fingerprint test result was

destroyed, and (3) that a different, fabricated, test result was

produced, such evidence undoubtedly would have been material and

exculpatory. The match of the DNA evidence retrieved from the

rubber gloves to Bradley's DNA was undoubtedly significant.

Consequently if, as Bradley asserts, forensic testing of the

gloves revealed a fingerprint that was not his, such evidence

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could have been material to the jury's evaluation of the DNA

evidence.

In arguing that his civil claims should survive the Heck

and Tinsley case law, Bradley argues that a lesser standard

should apply -- one that would make it more easy to avoid

dismissal under those cases. Bradley argues that his civil

claims should survive if a "rational trier of fact could have

found each element of [his] crime charged independent of the

misconduct and procedural improprieties [he alleges]." Put

differently, Bradley is suggesting that his civil claims survive

if there was sufficient evidence of his guilt independent of the

evidence that was tainted by the alleged illegal investigative

conduct. And, Bradley argues, in his case there was sufficient

evidence to convict him of murder, independent of the DNA

evidence on the gloves, so his civil case challenging that glove

evidence should be allowed to proceed. Bradley's argument,

however, does not state the proper test -- the question under

Heck is whether a successful result in Bradley's civil case

would "necessarily imply the invalidity of [Bradley's]

conviction." 512 U.S. at 487. A claim that calls into question

important evidence that was presented during the criminal trial

may "imply the invalidity" of that conviction, even if the

defendant could have been convicted without it. Perhaps the

most telling indication that the Heck test is met in Bradley's

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case is that, as noted above, the Heck Court dismissed claims

very similar to Bradley's. See Heck, supra at 479. The Heck

Court did not pause to analyze whether there would have been

sufficient evidence to convict Heck independent of the evidence

called into question by Heck's claims.

Similarly, Bradley's State law claims must be dismissed

under Tinsley. The Tinsley test is whether Bradley's civil

claims, if successful, would "necessarily undermine the validity

of [his] prior criminal conviction."3 485 Mass. at 766. For the

same reasons stated above, the facts Bradley alleges, assuming

hypothetically they were established, would "necessarily

undermine" Bradley's conviction.4 Id.

3 We acknowledge that the language of the test in Heck
differs slightly from the language in Tinsley. We also
acknowledge that Tinsley in some places states the test in
different language -- in particular, it uses "necessarily
challenge" rather than "necessarily undermine." See, e.g.,
Tinsley, 485 Mass. at 762. Whatever these differences in
language may lead to in some other case (if anything), the
differences in language do not impact the outcome in this case.

4 We of course do not opine on what result might obtain if,
for example, such facts were in some way established, and
thereafter presented in a motion for new trial regarding
Bradley's murder conviction.

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The above analysis applies to Bradley's § 1983 claims, and

to each of the State law claims that Bradley brings in this

case. The matter thus was correctly dismissed.

Judgment of dismissal
affirmed.

By the Court (Vuono,
Englander & Hodgens, JJ.5),

Clerk

Entered: December 20, 2024.

5 The panelists are listed in order of seniority.

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