PAUL C. NORDBERG v. COMMISSIONER OF THE DEPARTMENT OF YOUTH SERVICES & Another.

CourtListener 10312543Massappct13.01.2025

Gesamter Gesetzestext

NOTICE: Summary decisions issued by the Appeals Court pursuant to M.A.C. Rule
23.0, as appearing in 97 Mass. App. Ct. 1017 (2020) (formerly known as rule 1:28,
as amended by 73 Mass. App. Ct. 1001 [2009]), are primarily directed to the parties
and, therefore, may not fully address the facts of the case or the panel's
decisional rationale. Moreover, such decisions are not circulated to the entire
court and, therefore, represent only the views of the panel that decided the case.
A summary decision pursuant to rule 23.0 or rule 1:28 issued after February 25,
2008, may be cited for its persuasive value but, because of the limitations noted
above, not as binding precedent. See Chace v. Curran, 71 Mass. App. Ct. 258, 260
n.4 (2008).

COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS

APPEALS COURT

24-P-28

PAUL C. NORDBERG

vs.

COMMISSIONER OF THE DEPARTMENT OF YOUTH SERVICES & another. 1,2

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 23.0

The plaintiff, Paul Nordberg, filed an amended complaint

under G. L. c. 231A seeking a declaratory judgment against the

defendants. He claimed that legislative appropriations during

several consecutive fiscal years mandated salary increases for

teachers employed by a vendor of the Department of Youth

Services (DYS). On cross motions for summary judgment, a

Superior Court judge allowed the defendants' motion and denied

Nordberg's motion. Nordberg appeals, and we affirm.

1Secretary of the Executive Office for Administration and
Finance.

2The Commonwealth was a named defendant on the original
complaint but was dismissed as a defendant in prior proceedings.
See Nordberg v. Commonwealth, 96 Mass. App. Ct. 237, 245 (2019).
Background. Created in 1969, DYS is one of numerous

departments within the Executive Office of Health and Human

Services (HHS). G. L. c. 6A, § 16; G. L. c. 18A, § 1; St. 1969,

c. 838, § 1. Since 2005, Nordberg has been an English, history,

and life skills teacher employed by Collaborative for

Educational Services (CES), a vendor that provides education

programs for students in DYS custody. In 2005, the Legislature

approved a fiscal year 2006 budget for HHS and included a

separate line item appropriating $2,550,000 "[f]or salary

increases for department of youth services' teachers." St.

2005, c. 45, § 2. As a result of this single pay raise, and the

implementation of a salary schedule, teachers in DYS facilities

received salary increases ranging from 3.3 percent to 53.5

percent, with an average salary increase of about $15,000.

Around 2008, the Service Employees International Union began

representing teachers (including Nordberg) through a collective

bargaining agreement with CES. The collective bargaining

agreement includes a salary schedule.

Between fiscal years 2007 through 2024, the annual State

budget has included a line item related to DYS teacher pay that

has varied from $2,500,000 to $3,154,187. For fiscal years 2007

and 2008, the Legislature directed these sums "shall be expended

to address the salaries of teachers," St. 2006, c. 139, § 2, and

"shall be expended for the annualization of enhanced salaries

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for teachers." St. 2007, c. 61, § 2. In fiscal year 2009, the

Legislature directed that these sums shall be expended for the

"enhancement" of teacher salaries. St. 2008, c. 182, § 2. From

fiscal year 2010 through 2024, the Legislature directed that

these sums shall be used for "enhanced" teacher salaries. See,

e.g., St. 2009, c. 27, § 2.

In 2017, Nordberg filed his initial complaint (amended in

2022) for a declaratory judgment. With respect to fiscal years

2015 through 2022, he sought a declaration that the

appropriations required DYS to pay CES the amount indicated to

increase the overall salary schedule every year. Based on the

undisputed facts set forth above, Nordberg argued in his summary

judgment motion that the Legislature intended the appropriations

as annual "pay raises" for the teachers. In a cross motion for

summary judgment, the defendants argued that the annual

appropriations merely sustained the original pay increase

implemented in fiscal year 2006. The judge agreed with the

defendants and noted that Nordberg's interpretation would call

for an absurd result of an unbroken line of annual pay raises

over nearly twenty years.

Discussion. We apply de novo review to a decision on a

summary judgment motion. See Metcalf v. BSC Group, Inc., 492

Mass. 676, 680 (2023). Summary judgment is appropriate where

there is no material issue of fact in dispute and the moving

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party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Mass.

R. Civ. P. 56 (c), as amended, 436 Mass. 1404 (2002).

Traditional rules of statutory construction apply when reviewing

a line item in a legislative appropriation. See Wilson v.

Commissioner of Transitional Assistance, 441 Mass. 846, 851

(2004). "Where, as here, we are called to construe the terms of

a statute and its applicability, we begin with the statute's

plain language." Metcalf, 492 Mass. at 681. "[I]f possible a

statute is to be interpreted in harmony with prior enactments to

give rise to a consistent body of law." Hadley v. Amherst, 372

Mass. 46, 51 (1977). We must always construe "legislation in

harmony with common sense and sound reason." Atlas Distrib. Co.

v. Alcoholic Beverages Control Comm'n, 354 Mass. 408, 414

(1968), quoting Morrison v. Selectmen of Weymouth, 279 Mass.

486, 492 (1932).

Here, the plain language of the legislation indicates an

effort to honor a commitment made in 2005 to increase teacher

salaries. Starting in fiscal year 2006, the Legislature

authorized $2,550,000 "[f]or salary increases for department of

youth services' teachers." St. 2005, c. 45, § 2. This

appropriation funded widespread pay raises averaging about

$15,000 and implemented a salary schedule. Around 2008, the

Service Employees International Union began representing

teachers through a collective bargaining agreement that

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ultimately included a salary schedule that reflected the pay

raises. Based on this sequence of events, the Legislature

logically had to appropriate sufficient resources on an annual

basis (varying between $2,500,000 to $3,154,187) to fund the

salary schedule that had been augmented by the initial infusion

of $2,550,000 in pay raises for fiscal year 2006. In his brief,

Nordberg suggests language that he believes would better

articulate legislative goals, but he is not entitled to relief

merely because the Legislature could have utilized alternative

funding methods or more precise language in the annual budget

process. Such alternatives are within the prerogative of the

Legislature, especially where budgetary "appropriation is

exclusively a legislative power." Opinion of the Justices, 375

Mass. 827, 833 (1978).

We disagree with Nordberg's contention that the annual

appropriations stand as independent directives from the

Legislature to raise the pay of DYS teachers. For example, he

points to the language in the annual appropriations requiring

that funds shall be used for the "enhancement" of teacher

salaries, St. 2008, c. 182, § 2, and shall be used for

"enhanced" teacher salaries. See, e.g., St. 2009, c. 27, § 2.

In his view, this language bespeaks an intent to increase

salaries and not just maintain salaries. We disagree. Such an

interpretation would require us to view the statutory language

5
in isolation and thereby disregard two fundamental rules of

statutory construction. First, whenever possible, "a statute is

to be interpreted in harmony with prior enactments to give rise

to a consistent body of law." Hadley, 372 Mass. at 51. As

previously discussed, the appropriations indicate a single and

widespread salary increase in fiscal year 2006 that has been

consistently funded in annual budgets through fiscal year 2024.

Second, "[r]eading in language that the Legislature chose to

remove . . . impermissibly interferes with the legislative

function." Kenniston v. Department of Youth Servs., 453 Mass.

179, 185 (2009). In 2006, the Legislature chose the phrase

"salary increases" to raise teacher salaries, St. 2005, c. 45,

§ 2, and did not use that language thereafter. Thus, we cannot

view "salary increases" as synonymous with later funding

language such as "enhancements" or "enhanced" salaries.

Finally, Nordberg's interpretation is not plausible and

lacks "harmony with common sense and sound reason." Atlas, 354

Mass. at 414, quoting Morrison, 279 Mass. at 492. If Nordberg's

view is correct, that each annual appropriation constitutes a

new pay raise, then the average raise of $15,000 in fiscal year

2006 would have to be repeated every year through fiscal year

2024 -- $285,000 in average pay increases over eighteen years --

a facially absurd result. In his brief and oral argument,

Nordberg downplayed this evident absurdity by asserting that his

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complaint is only limited to four of those fiscal years, and a

successful declaratory judgment would result in more modest pay

increases. Common sense, however, cannot be cabined to just a

handful of fiscal years to achieve a desired result. Canons of

statutory construction require us to review the entire statutory

scheme, not just cherry-picked portions.

Judgment affirmed.

By the Court (Vuono,
Englander & Hodgens, JJ. 3),

Clerk

Entered: January 13, 2025.

3 The panelists are listed in order of seniority.

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