ROBYN CAPLIS-SEVELITTE, Trustee v. JOSEPH M. SEVELITTE.

NOTICE: Summary decisions issued by the Appeals Court pursuant to M.A.C. Rule
23.0, as appearing in 97 Mass. App. Ct. 1017 (2020) (formerly known as rule 1:28,
as amended by 73 Mass. App. Ct. 1001 [2009]), are primarily directed to the parties
and, therefore, may not fully address the facts of the case or the panel's
decisional rationale. Moreover, such decisions are not circulated to the entire
court and, therefore, represent only the views of the panel that decided the case.
A summary decision pursuant to rule 23.0 or rule 1:28 issued after February 25,
2008, may be cited for its persuasive value but, because of the limitations noted
above, not as binding precedent. See Chace v. Curran, 71 Mass. App. Ct. 258, 260
n.4 (2008).

COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS

APPEALS COURT

24-P-847

ROBYN CAPLIS-SEVELITTE, trustee,1

vs.

JOSEPH M. SEVELITTE.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 23.0

The defendant, Joseph M. Sevelitte, appeals from a Housing

Court summary judgment in favor of the plaintiff, Robyn Caplis-

Sevelitte, trustee of The Sevelitte Family Revocable Trust

(trust). The defendant argues that the trustee lacked standing

to bring a summary process action against him. We affirm the

judgment.

Background. On January 8, 2020, the defendant's father,

Joseph F. Sevelitte, Jr. (settlor), executed a will and the

trust. The will provided that the settlor gave his interest in

13 Allen Court, Medford (property), to the trust. The trust

1 Of The Sevelitte Family Revocable Trust.
names as trustee the settlor's wife, Caplis-Sevelitte (wife).2

Article 7.1 of the trust grants the wife a life estate in the

property. Article 7.2 of the trust provides that, when the

defendant reaches the age of forty-two, the trust assets shall

be distributed to the defendant, subject to the wife's life

estate in the property. Article 8.6(a) grants the trustee broad

power over the property, including "to take such . . . actions

as they may deem appropriate with respect to such real estate."

More specifically, article 8.6(a)(iv) gives the trustee the

power "to determine when the trust beneficiaries may use the

real estate and whether it is appropriate to charge them rent

for such use, and to rent the real estate to persons who are not

beneficiaries of the trust, all in its sole discretion."

On December 23, 2020, the settlor died. In February 2021,

an order of informal probate entered appointing the wife as

personal representative of his estate.

In August 2022, the trustee served a notice to quit on the

defendant, who was living at the property. In October 2022, the

trustee filed a summary process complaint against the defendant.

The parties cross-moved for summary judgment. In support of his

motion, the defendant asserted that the trust did not hold title

2 We refer to Caplis-Sevelitte in her personal capacity as
"the wife" and in her capacity as trustee and plaintiff as "the
trustee."

2
to the property. Concluding that ownership of the property

passed to the trust upon the settlor's death, a Housing Court

judge issued a summary judgment in favor of the trustee.3 The

defendant appeals.

Discussion. "We review a decision to grant summary

judgment de novo." Bank of N.Y. v. Bailey, 460 Mass. 327, 331

(2011). "The standard of review of a grant of summary judgment

is whether, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to

the nonmoving party, all material facts have been established

and the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of

law." Id., quoting Augat, Inc. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 410

Mass. 117, 120 (1991). To the extent that the defendant raises

claims on appeal that he did not make on summary judgment, we

assume, without deciding, that they are properly before us, and

conclude that they are meritless.

1. Ownership of property. "A plaintiff may bring a

summary process action to evict a tenant and recover possession

of his or her property only if the plaintiff is the owner or

lessor of the property." Rental Prop. Mgt. Servs. v. Hatcher,

479 Mass. 542, 546 (2018). See G. L. c. 239, § 1 ("the person

In parallel proceedings in Superior Court, judges granted
3

summary judgment in favor of the trustee, apparently for similar
reasons. Those rulings are not before us.

3
entitled to the land or tenements may recover possession"

through summary process action).

The defendant argues that the wife, as personal

representative of the settlor's estate, never transferred to the

trust the title to the property, and as a result the trustee

does not have standing to evict the defendant. We disagree.

The wife was not required to transfer title to the trust

because title already had transferred by will. The settlor's

will provided, "I give and devise my interest in real estate

located at 13 Allen Court, Medford, . . . to [the wife] as

trustee of [the trust]." The will was informally probated soon

after the settlor died, and title passed to the wife as trustee

of the trust. See Daley v. Daley, 300 Mass. 17, 21 (1938)

("Title to real estate devised by will passes directly, on

probate of the will, to the devisee and relates back to the

instant of the death of the testator"). This is in accordance

with Massachusetts probate statutes. See G. L. c. 190B, § 3-101

("Upon the death of a person, the decedent's real and personal

property devolves to the persons to whom it is devised by the

decedent's last will"); G. L. c. 190B, § 2-602 ("Property owned

by the testator at death . . . passes under the will unless a

different intention appears").

4
The defendant relies on Lannin v. Buckley, 256 Mass. 78, 81

(1926), to argue that the wife may not act as trustee until the

estate has been fully administered. Because Lannin predates the

enactment of the Massachusetts Uniform Probate Code, G. L.

c. 190B, inserted by St. 2008, c. 521, § 9 (effective March 31,

2012), that reliance is misplaced. See Cusack v. Clasby, 94

Mass. App. Ct. 756, 757 (2019) (G. L. c. 190B displaced common-

law principles inconsistent with it). Further, Lannin involved

the appointment of trustees "under a will," but here the wife's

appointment as trustee is set forth in the trust instrument.

Lannin, supra.

The defendant also argues that his paternal grandmother,

who died in 2019, still has a recorded life estate in the

property. On the contrary, life estates terminate upon the

death of the life tenant. See Ciani v. MacGrath, 481 Mass. 174,

182 n.7 (2019) ("The owner of a life estate in real property, as

that term is commonly understood, has a right to possess the

property . . . during his or her lifetime"). See also Hershman-

Tcherepnin v. Tcherepnin, 452 Mass. 77, 88 n.20 (2008).

Because the trust has ownership of the property, the

trustee had standing to bring the summary process action against

the defendant. See Frechette v. D'Andrea, 494 Mass. 167, 172

(2024) ("As owners of the property in question, the plaintiffs

5
have standing to bring summary process against the defendants").

We also note that article 8.1(f) of the trust grants the trustee

the power to "lease" the property, and lessors may bring summary

process actions against their tenants. Contrast Ahmed-Kagzi v.

Williams, 479 Mass. 1027, 1028 (2018) (property manager lacked

standing to bring summary process action to evict tenants from

properties that he did not own).

2. Effect of defendant's remainder interest.4 The

defendant further argues that he holds "equitable title" to the

property by virtue of his remainder interest as set forth in

article 7.2 of the trust. We disagree.

The defendant's remainder interest in the trust property

does not grant him equitable title or any other right to

possession of the property. This is particularly so where

article 8.1(f) of the trust grants the trustee the power to

lease the property, and article 8.6(a)(iv) grants her the power

"to determine when the trust beneficiaries may use the real

estate." As the trust was sole owner of the property, the

4 In his reply brief, the defendant argues for the first
time that even if the trust has standing, he "cannot be evicted
when he is paying rent for his occupancy of the premises." We
decline to consider an argument raised for the first time in a
reply brief. Mass. R. A. P. 16 (c), as amended, 489 Mass. 1602
(2022). If we were to consider it, we would deem it meritless,
as this was a no-fault eviction terminating a tenancy at will,
and thus whether the defendant was current in rent payments was
immaterial.

6
trustee lawfully initiated a summary process action against the

defendant, a trust beneficiary occupying the property. See

Cambridge St. Realty, LLC v. Stewart, 481 Mass. 121, 129 (2018)

(landlord may bring summary process action against tenant).

3. Attorney's fees. The trustee requests sanctions

against the defendant, on the ground that his appeal is

"frivolous and vexatious." See G. L. c. 211A, § 15. "The

determination whether an appeal is frivolous is left to the

sound discretion of the appellate court" (citation omitted).

Marabello v. Boston Bark Corp., 463 Mass. 394, 400 (2012).

Although there is force to the trustee's argument, we decline to

exercise our discretion to award attorney's fees.5

Judgment affirmed.

By the Court (Hand, Grant &
Wood, JJ.6),

Clerk

Entered: May 28, 2025.

5 The defendant's request for attorney's fees is also
denied.

6 The panelists are listed in order of seniority.

7