Commonwealth v. Rapheal Adebowale.

NOTICE: Summary decisions issued by the Appeals Court pursuant to M.A.C. Rule
23.0, as appearing in 97 Mass. App. Ct. 1017 (2020) (formerly known as rule 1:28,
as amended by 73 Mass. App. Ct. 1001 [2009]), are primarily directed to the parties
and, therefore, may not fully address the facts of the case or the panel's
decisional rationale. Moreover, such decisions are not circulated to the entire
court and, therefore, represent only the views of the panel that decided the case.
A summary decision pursuant to rule 23.0 or rule 1:28 issued after February 25,
2008, may be cited for its persuasive value but, because of the limitations noted
above, not as binding precedent. See Chace v. Curran, 71 Mass. App. Ct. 258, 260
n.4 (2008).
COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS

APPEALS COURT

24-P-258

COMMONWEALTH

vs.

RAPHEAL ADEBOWALE.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 23.0

On June 20, 2019, the defendant was indicted for larceny

over $1,2001 from a person over sixty years old and money

laundering. The defendant's motion to dismiss the indictment

was denied, and the defendant was later convicted following a

jury trial in the Superior Court. On appeal, the defendant

argues that (1) the evidence before the grand jury was

insufficient to establish probable cause that he committed the

1The indictment states "larceny of property over $1,200"
but cites G. L. c. 266, § 30 (5), which sets forth separate
punishments for larceny where the subject property exceeds or
does not exceed a threshold of $250, as opposed to $1,200. The
Superior Court docket reflects a charge of larceny over $250 and
the parties' arguments in this appeal treat it as such. Nothing
relevant to this appeal turns on this distinction.
crimes and (2) the evidence at trial was likewise insufficient.

We affirm.

Background. Because the defendant challenges both the

sufficiency of the evidence presented to the grand jury and the

evidence presented at trial, we summarize the evidence presented

at each proceeding separately.2

1. The evidence at the grand jury proceeding. We

summarize the evidence presented to the grand jury in the light

most favorable to the Commonwealth. See Commonwealth v.

Clinton, 491 Mass. 756, 758 (2023).

In October 2018, the victim, E.F.,3 who was sixty-six years

old, set up an online dating account, where she met "James

Deere" (Deere). Deere told E.F. that he was a successful

executive in the financial industry and that he worked for a

company called "Perpetual Investments," a corporation based in

Australia. Deere expressed a desire to move to the United

States so he could marry E.F. and share his bank accounts with

her. Thereafter, E.F. received "spoofed"4 e-mail messages

We acknowledge that the grand jury minutes remain
2

impounded and discuss the evidence as presented to the grand
jury only as necessary to resolve this appeal.

3 We use the victim's initials to protect her privacy.

There was evidence that a spoofed e-mail message "occurs
4

when a suspect creates either a fraudulent email account or
registers a website using a name that's similar to a legitimate
business name, but with a tiny change in the name, which then

2
purporting to be from both Perpetual Investments and the Bank of

Birmingham in England (the Birmingham bank).

Deere led E.F. to believe she set up an account with the

Birmingham bank, which would, according to Deere, allow Deere to

transfer funds from his Perpetual Investments account into

E.F.'s account. E.F., believing her money would be returned,

wired forty thousand dollars to a bank account in Texas. E.F.

received another spoofed e-mail message from the Birmingham bank

informing her that eleven million dollars had been deposited in

her account, apparently to convince her that Deere had deposited

these funds in her account. She then received a spoofed e-mail

message from the Birmingham bank asking for over $160,000 to be

paid for "tax clearance." She then wired $111,000 to a bank

account in California. After that, she received another spoofed

e-mail message from a different financial institution asking her

to pay approximately seventy-five thousand dollars for a "fund

release order." She wired the money to a bank account

registered to the Jorobri Corporation (the corporation) at Sun

Trust Bank in Florida.

Through a mutual acquaintance, E.F. contacted James Carney,

an investigator in the computer crimes unit at the Essex County

generates an email header which would lead one to believe it was
coming from a legitimate banking institution, but in fact, it's
not."

3
District Attorney's office. After interviewing E.F., Carney

searched the Florida Secretary of State's website and determined

that a person named "John Robert Richards" (Richards) created a

Florida entity called the Jorobri Corporation on October 11,

2018, in an online transaction. Richards provided a Florida

address, which Carney determined was "bogus." Carney also

learned that the corporation had a bank account (the

corporation's account) at Sun Trust Bank in Florida. Carney

obtained the corporation's bank records and confirmed that

E.F.'s wire transfer was deposited in the corporation's account.

He also saw a deposited cashier's check from a person named M.R.5

Carney contacted M.R., obtained a copy of the check, and

discovered that it was made payable to the corporation and

Richards. Using the delivery address on the check, Carney

conducted a reverse driver's license search. The search

revealed that the address on the check was the same address as

on a Florida driver's license issued to the defendant. The

defendant obtained the license on October 16, 2018, five days

after the corporation was created. Carney also determined that

Sun Trust Bank closed the corporation's account on January 9,

2019, due to fraudulent activities.

5 We use initials to protect this individual's privacy.

4
Carney also subpoenaed from Sun Trust Bank photographs and

video footage corresponding to the date, time, and branch

location of ATM withdrawals from the corporation's account.

Several of these images depicted a man who looked like the

defendant as depicted on his driver's license. Carney testified

that at least one of the images that depicted a man who looked

like the defendant was taken on the same date and at the same

Sun Trust Bank branch location as a withdrawal from the

corporation's account. The grand jury indicted the defendant

for one count of larceny over $1,2006 from a person over sixty

years old and one count of money laundering.7

Prior to trial, the defendant moved to dismiss the larceny

count. That motion was denied.

2. The evidence at trial. We summarize the evidence

presented at trial "in the light most favorable to the

prosecution" (citation omitted). Commonwealth v. Latimore, 378

Mass. 671, 677 (1979).

6 See note 1, supra.

7 The grand jury also heard extensive testimony about
another suspect, Hassan Abbas. Carney testified that E.F. wired
funds to the account of a company called Sparta Gijon created by
Abbas. Carney obtained the bank statements for that account and
found several multi-thousand-dollar wire transfers to the
account, including those from E.F. The statements also
reflected wire transfers out of that account and to Abbas at an
address in Chicago. Abbas was indicted for one count of larceny
over $1,200 from a person over sixty years old and money
laundering. The defendant was tried separately from Abbas.

5
The Commonwealth called two witnesses: E.F. and Carney.

E.F. recounted her experience meeting Deere online and Deere

instructing her to make wire transfers to multiple accounts,

including the corporation's account. E.F. also testified she

had never met the defendant in person. Carney testified to

almost exactly the same information described in his grand jury

testimony: the communications between E.F. and Deere, the

spoofed e-mail messages, the creation of the corporation and the

corporation's account at Sun Trust Bank by Richards in October

2018, E.F.'s wire transfer to the corporation's account, M.R.'s

cashier's check addressed to the defendant's address on his

driver's license, and the surveillance images from Sun Trust

Bank ATMs and branch locations, which were taken at times and

locations that corresponded with transactions in the

corporation's account.

The corporation's bank records reflected that approximately

$300,000 was deposited in its account and approximately the same

amount was wire transferred or withdrawn in a three-month period

between October 2018 and January 2019, when the bank closed the

account. Around thirty thousand dollars was manually withdrawn

at ATMs and branch locations. Sun Trust Bank surveillance

images showed that the same individual made most of the manual

withdrawals. Again, the person captured in these images looked

like the defendant as depicted on his driver's license.

6
At the end of the Commonwealth's case, the defendant orally

moved for a required finding of not guilty on both charges. The

judge denied that motion. The jury found the defendant guilty

of one count of larceny over $250 from a person over sixty years

old and one count of money laundering. The defendant timely

appealed.

Discussion. 1. Sufficiency of the grand jury evidence.

Generally, "a court will not review the competency or

sufficiency of the evidence before a grand jury." Commonwealth

v. O'Dell, 392 Mass. 445, 450 (1984). That rule is subject to

the exception that "the grand jury must hear sufficient evidence

to establish the identity of the accused and probable cause to

arrest him" (citation omitted). Commonwealth v. McCarthy, 385

Mass. 160, 163 (1982). "This standard is much lower than that

required for a finding of guilt." Commonwealth v. Lounge, 87

Mass. App. Ct. 906, 907 (2015), citing Commonwealth v. Moran,

453 Mass. 880, 886 (2009).

The defendant's motion to dismiss was directed only to the

indictment charging larceny pursuant to G. L. c. 266, § 30 (5).

To obtain this indictment, the Commonwealth had to establish

probable cause that the defendant (1) unlawfully took and

carried away the property of another (2) who was sixty years old

or older (3) with the specific intent to deprive her permanently

7
of the property. See Commonwealth v. St. Hilaire, 470 Mass.

338, 343 & n.4 (2015).

The Commonwealth proceeded under a joint venture theory and

thus had to establish probable cause that "[the defendant] had

actually associated [himself] with the criminal venture and

assisted in making it a success" (citation omitted).

Commonwealth v. Brown, 477 Mass. 805, 813 (2017). "Knowing

participation in a criminal offense may take any of several

forms, and includes providing aid or assistance in committing

the crime" (quotation and citation omitted). Id. at 812-813.

The Commonwealth did not have to "prove precisely what role the

defendant played" (citation omitted). Commonwealth v. Lee, 483

Mass. 531, 547 (2019). Accordingly, the Commonwealth had to

establish probable cause that the defendant himself satisfied

the elements of larceny or was a joint venturer in a larceny.

The Commonwealth was permitted to rely on circumstantial

evidence. See Commonwealth v. Baez, 494 Mass. 396, 400 (2024)

("The evidence may be direct or circumstantial, and we draw all

reasonable inferences in favor of the Commonwealth" [citation

omitted]).

The defendant contends that the grand jury heard

insufficient evidence to establish probable cause that he

intended to participate in the alleged larceny scheme because

the Commonwealth could not show any association between the

8
defendant and his codefendant, Hassan Abbas,8 or the defendant

and the victim. In addition, the defendant argues that the

evidence was insufficient where the Commonwealth could not show

that the defendant had exclusive control of the corporation's

account. We disagree.

The Commonwealth presented to the grand jury dated and

time-stamped surveillance images of the same individual using

the ATMs at multiple Sun Trust Bank locations, which the grand

jury could compare to dated and time-stamped transactions in the

corporation's bank records to infer that he was making

withdrawals from the corporation's account. The grand jury

could then compare those images with the defendant's driver's

license to establish probable cause that the defendant executed

those transactions. The grand jury also heard testimony and

received evidence that another victim of the scheme, M.R.,

mailed a cashier's check, payable to the corporation, to the

address the defendant listed on his driver's license, that it

was deposited in the corporation's account on the same day that

it was delivered to defendant's home, and that he withdrew funds

from the corporation's account on the following day. This

evidence was more than sufficient to establish that the

defendant participated in the alleged larceny scheme. See

8 See note 7, supra.

9
Commonwealth v. Hyde, 88 Mass. App. Ct. 761, 771-772 (2015)

(grand jury indictment for larceny supported entirely by

circumstantial evidence sufficient).9

2. Sufficiency of the trial evidence. When reviewing the

denial of the defendant's motion for a required finding of not

guilty, we consider "whether, after viewing the evidence in the

light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of

fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond

a reasonable doubt" (citation omitted). Latimore, 378 Mass. at

677. "Circumstantial evidence is sufficient to find someone

guilty beyond a reasonable doubt and inferences drawn from such

circumstantial evidence need only be reasonable and possible;

[they] need not be necessary or inescapable" (quotation and

citation omitted). Commonwealth v. Davis, 487 Mass. 448, 462

(2021). "Where conflicting inferences are possible from the

evidence, it is for the jury to determine where the truth lies"

(quotation and citation omitted). Commonwealth v. Woods, 466

Mass. 707, 713 (2014).

a. Larceny. At trial, the Commonwealth had to prove the

same elements of larceny discussed above, but beyond a

Because there was sufficient evidence to establish
9

probable cause that the defendant participated in the larceny
scheme on a joint venture theory, it was unnecessary to
establish probable cause that he also had direct association
with the victim or exclusive control of the corporation's
account.

10
reasonable doubt. See St. Hilaire, 470 Mass. at 343. On

appeal, the defendant argues the Commonwealth presented

insufficient evidence to establish that the defendant had the

specific intent to unlawfully take or deprive E.F. of her

property and that the Commonwealth presented insufficient

evidence of a joint venture. Once again, we disagree.

"Direct evidence of a person's specific intent is not

always available, but may be inferred." Moran, 453 Mass. at

885. For example, "[i]ntent may be inferred from the

defendant's knowledge of the circumstances and subsequent

participation in the offense" (quotation and citation omitted).

Commonwealth v. Khan, 92 Mass. App. Ct. 487, 493 (2017). "[T]he

necessary intent is the intent to obtain money from another,

sixty years of age or older, by false pretenses by making false

statements oneself or by having false statements made by a joint

venturer, with the intent that the person, in reliance on the

false statements, would part with money." Id. Intent to

participate in a joint venture may also be proved by

circumstantial evidence. See Woods, 466 Mass. at 713.

There is no dispute in this case that E.F. was a victim of

a larceny by false pretenses when she was induced to wire almost

seventy five thousand dollars to the corporation's account. The

defendant disputes only the sufficiency of the evidence that he

intentionally participated in that scheme. The Commonwealth

11
presented evidence that (1) the corporation was incorporated in

Florida on October 11, 2018, five days before the defendant

obtained a Florida driver's license, (2) the corporation's

account was opened on October 26, 2018, and an individual

closely resembling the defendant made the initial deposit, (3)

Richards purportedly both formed the corporation and opened the

account, (4) M.R. made a cashier's check for $59,482 payable to

the corporation and Richards, (5) on December 13, 2018, M.R.

mailed the check to the defendant's residential address and it

was delivered on December 14, 2018, (6) on the same date, M.R.'s

check was deposited in the corporation's account, (7) on

December 15, 2018, a person closely resembling the defendant

made multiple ATM withdrawals from the corporation's account,

(8) on December 27, 2018, E.F. transferred almost seventy-five

thousand dollars to the corporation's account by wire, and (9)

over the course of four days, from December 27 to 30, 2018, a

person closely resembling the defendant withdrew $4,000 from the

corporation's account.

Viewing this evidence in the light most favorable to the

Commonwealth, the jury could reasonably have found beyond a

reasonable doubt that the defendant was a knowing participant in

a larceny scheme. See Brown, 477 Mass. at 813 (evidence that

defendant provided some instrumentality that played important

role in underlying crime was sufficient for jury to find joint

12
venture); Commonwealth v. Bonilla, 89 Mass. App. Ct. 263, 264-

265 (2016) (jury could find specific intent for larceny where

defendant's bank activity circumstantially suggested fraudulent

behavior).

b. Money laundering. The Commonwealth indicted the

defendant for money laundering under G. L. c. 267A, § 2 (3). To

prove this charge, the Commonwealth had to prove beyond a

reasonable doubt (1) that the defendant directed, organized,

financed, planned, managed, supervised, or controlled (2) the

transportation of or transactions in property derived from

criminal activity and (3) that he did so knowingly, or that a

reasonable person would know such property was derived from

criminal activity. See G. L. c. 267A, § 2 (3). There is no

dispute that the property in this case, the wired funds, was

derived from criminal activity.

As to the first element, the defendant argues the evidence

was insufficient that he had exclusive control over the

corporation's account. However, the evidence, viewed in the

light most favorable to the Commonwealth, showed that the

defendant opened the corporation's account as Richards, made the

initial deposit in the corporation's account, and withdrew four

thousand dollars in cash shortly after E.F. wired thousands of

dollars into the corporation's account. From this evidence, the

jury could reasonably have inferred that the defendant either

13
financed, organized, managed, supervised, or controlled the

transactions of the fraudulently obtained property; a finding of

any one of these would be sufficient.

As to the third element, the defendant argues he was merely

a "pawn" who performed only small transactions, which he

characterizes as "salary withdrawals." He submits that the

evidence did not support an inference that he knew that the

funds were derived from criminal activity. Knowledge is rarely

proven by direct evidence and may be inferred from the facts and

circumstances. See Commonwealth v. Casale, 381 Mass. 167, 173

(1980). Again, the evidence established that the defendant

opened the corporation's account and made the initial deposit,

that M.R. mailed a cashier's check for $59,482 to the

defendant's address payable to the corporation and Richards --

the name used to create the corporation and open the account --

for delivery on December 14, 2018, that the check was deposited

into the corporation's account the same date it was delivered to

the defendant's address, that E.F. was defrauded into wiring

almost seventy-five thousand dollars to the corporation's

account on December 27, 2018, and that from December 27 to 30,

2018, the defendant made withdrawals totaling four thousand

dollars from the corporation's account. From this evidence, the

jury could reasonably have inferred that the defendant was

14
deeply involved in the larceny scheme and thus knew that the

funds in the account were fraudulently obtained.10

The defendant also argues that the Commonwealth did not

prove that concealment was an animating purpose of the

transaction. However, that is a requirement of G. L. c. 267A,

§ 2 (2); there is no similar language in § 2 (3). Cf.

Commonwealth v. Braune, 481 Mass. 304, 307-314 (analyzing

language of § 2 [2] in depth with no reference or application to

§ 2 [3]). Accordingly, the Commonwealth did not have to prove

that any of the transactions were designed or motivated by a

desire to conceal the scheme. See Garcia v. Steele, 492 Mass.

322, 326 ("We do not construe terms in isolation; instead, we

10The defendant also argues that the evidence suggests
merely that he was an unwitting "dupe." This claim is
unavailing because the "[t]he proper inquiry is 'whether the
evidence would permit a jury to find guilt, not whether the
evidence requires such a finding.'" Commonwealth v. Platt, 440
Mass. 396, 401 (2003), quoting Commonwealth v. Lydon, 413 Mass.
309, 312 (1992). Just because the jury could have accepted a
theory that the defendant was "dupe[d]" does not mean the
Commonwealth's evidence was insufficient; it is ultimately up to
the jury to decide which conflicting theory to accept. See
Woods, 466 Mass. at 713.

15
consider the specific language of a provision in the context of

the statute as a whole").

Judgments affirmed.

By the Court (Neyman, Shin &
Wood, JJ.11),

Clerk

Entered: May 28, 2025.

11 The panelists are listed in order of seniority.

16