Commonwealth v. Shawn Hunt.

NOTICE: Summary decisions issued by the Appeals Court pursuant to M.A.C. Rule
23.0, as appearing in 97 Mass. App. Ct. 1017 (2020) (formerly known as rule 1:28,
as amended by 73 Mass. App. Ct. 1001 [2009]), are primarily directed to the parties
and, therefore, may not fully address the facts of the case or the panel's
decisional rationale. Moreover, such decisions are not circulated to the entire
court and, therefore, represent only the views of the panel that decided the case.
A summary decision pursuant to rule 23.0 or rule 1:28 issued after February 25,
2008, may be cited for its persuasive value but, because of the limitations noted
above, not as binding precedent. See Chace v. Curran, 71 Mass. App. Ct. 258, 260
n.4 (2008).

COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS

APPEALS COURT

24-P-953

COMMONWEALTH

vs.

SHAWN HUNT.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 23.0

Following a trial in the Superior Court, the defendant was

convicted of murder in the second degree. In this appeal, the

defendant argues that the motion judge erred in denying his

second motion for a new trial1 and doing so without holding an

evidentiary hearing. We affirm.2

1After the defendant noticed an appeal from the conviction,
the trial judge denied the defendant's first motion for a new
trial. The defendant's appeal from that order was consolidated
with his direct appeal; a different panel of this court affirmed
both in an unpublished memorandum and order. Commonwealth v.
Hunt, 101 Mass. App. Ct. 1121 (2022). A different judge denied
the defendant's second motion for a new trial.

2Because we conclude that the defendant's claim is barred
by direct estoppel, we need not reach the defendant's argument
that the judge erred by refusing to hold an evidentiary hearing.
Background. In summary, the trial evidence showed that the

victim was shot and killed in a drive-by shooting in New Bedford

on the evening of November 20, 2003. An eyewitness described

the vehicle involved in the drive-by shooting as a Ford Focus

that looked teal blue, driven by a Black man wearing a black

"doo-rag." About two days later, police seized a royal blue

Ford Focus that was rented by the defendant and being driven by

Corey Hubbard. In the car's passenger door pocket was a shell

casing of the same caliber bullet as those used in the shooting,

in its center console was a doo-rag, and elsewhere in the

vehicle was unopened mail addressed to the defendant. At the

scene of the seizure of the defendant's royal blue Focus was a

navy blue Ford Focus rented from the same car dealership and

driven by Lamont Todman. Todman was not detained during this

encounter.

At trial, Todman's testimony identified the defendant's

motive and explained the absence of certain evidence. The

Commonwealth's theory was that the shooting arose out of a fight

between the defendant, the victim, and others that had occurred

a month prior. Todman corroborated this theory, testifying that

the defendant was beaten up "pretty bad" by the victim, who was

"talking shit about it" to others. Todman testified that this

angered the defendant. After the shooting, the defendant left

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town and gave the keys to his Ford Focus to Hubbard, who parked

the car on the side of his building. Todman testified that

Hubbard gave him the keys and told him to clean the car. Todman

took the car to a car wash, where he vacuumed the floor and

seats of the car. He saw a shell casing in the back seat, which

he vacuumed up.

The Commonwealth agreed not to charge Todman with

committing a crime related to the incident in exchange for his

truthful testimony. The defendant was on notice of this

agreement.

After agreeing to testify against the defendant, Todman was

arraigned in two unrelated criminal matters. On November 10,

2010, a State trooper conducted a motor vehicle stop of Todman,

who was driving with three children, and found drugs in the car.

The trooper did not arrest Todman and advised him that he would

receive a summons to appear in court. The Commonwealth

subsequently dismissed this charge. On April 6, 2011, the same

trooper stopped Todman while he was traveling in a car with a

child and found drugs in the car. The trooper did not arrest

Todman and advised him that he would have to appear in court at

a later date to face a charge of possession of a class B

substance with intent to distribute. The Commonwealth

subsequently reduced the charge to possession of a class B

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substance, and Todman admitted to sufficient facts on that

charge.

In his first motion for a new trial, the defendant argued

that the prosecution improperly withheld evidence that Todman

was "actively dealing drugs while cooperating with the

Commonwealth," and that it had provided undisclosed inducements

to Todman in the form of "extraordinarily lenient treatment."

The trial judge held an evidentiary hearing at which the trooper

who conducted the motor vehicle stops of Todman testified. The

trial judge denied the motion for a new trial and credited the

trooper's testimony that he did not know of Todman's status as a

testifying witness during the November 10 stop and chose not to

arrest Todman because "that would have meant taking the three

officers off the streets to book him and process the paperwork,"

and would also have required the trooper to arrest Todman in

front of his children and then make arrangements for them. The

trooper testified that he chose not to arrest Todman on April 6

for the same reasons. However, the trooper was aware of

Todman's status as a witness at this point. The trial judge

found that the trooper's treatment of Todman did not tend to

show the existence of an undisclosed agreement between Todman

and the Commonwealth.

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In his first motion for a new trial, the defendant also

took issue with the Commonwealth's destruction of its records

related to Todman's drug charges in 2010 and 2011. This is also

the core issue of the instant appeal. The trial judge found the

following:

"By the time [the defendant] filed his motion for a new
trial, the District Attorney's case files on Todman's
earlier cases had been destroyed in the ordinary course of
business, but police reports concerning the arrests were
produced from police files. The court finds no credible
evidence that Todman ever received consideration from the
Commonwealth beyond that disclosed to [the defendant's
trial attorney]."

In his second motion for a new trial, the defendant argued

that the Commonwealth's destruction of Todman's case files

constituted improper destruction of exculpatory evidence. The

motion judge denied this motion without an evidentiary hearing,

in a handwritten endorsement incorporating by reference the

Commonwealth's memorandum of law in opposition.

Discussion. The Commonwealth argues that the defendant's

claim that the Commonwealth improperly destroyed exculpatory

evidence is barred by direct estoppel. We agree.

Direct estoppel operates "as a bar to the defendant's

attempt . . . to relitigate issues." Commonwealth v. Rodriguez,

443 Mass. 707, 711 (2005). "For direct estoppel to apply, the

Commonwealth must show that the issues raised in the defendant's

. . . motion were actually litigated and determined . . ., that

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such determination was essential to the defendant's conviction,

and that the defendant had an opportunity to obtain review of

the determination." Id. at 710.

Here, the defendant's second motion for a new trial relies

on a claim that was already argued and decided in his first

motion for a new trial. In the first motion, the defendant

argued that the Commonwealth suppressed evidence that Todman

received inducements in exchange for his cooperation in the

defendant's prosecution. In the second motion, the defendant

argued that the Commonwealth destroyed evidence of the

additional, undisclosed inducements requested by the defendant

after his conviction. Though the two arguments differ slightly,

they both require the defendant to show that the evidence in

question -- the supposed undisclosed inducements -- is

exculpatory. See Commonwealth v. Pope, 489 Mass. 790, 798

(2022) (defendant can obtain new trial on grounds that

Commonwealth failed to disclose certain evidence if that

evidence was, inter alia, exculpatory); Commonwealth v. Murphy,

442 Mass. 485, 495 (2004) ("A defendant who seeks relief from

the loss or destruction of potentially exculpatory evidence has

the initial burden . . . to establish a reasonable possibility

. . . that access to the [evidence] would have produced evidence

favorable to his cause" [quotations and citation omitted]).

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Because both motions for a new trial require the defendant

to show that the evidence of undisclosed inducements was

exculpatory, the defendant's claim is barred because that issue

was already "litigated and determined," that determination was

"essential" to the disposition of the first motion, and the

denial of the first motion was subject to appellate review.

Rodriguez, 443 Mass. at 710. Whether the evidence in question

was exculpatory was an issue litigated at the evidentiary

hearing on the first motion. Following that hearing, the trial

judge found no prosecutorial misconduct because "[the defendant]

simply has failed to prove that Todman in fact received

preferential treatment in exchange for his testimony." The

defendant subsequently appealed to this court, where a panel

held that the trial judge's findings of fact were not clearly

erroneous and supported his conclusions of law. Commonwealth v.

Hunt, 101 Mass. App. Ct. 1121 (2022). The defendant's second

motion did not offer any new evidence, other than an affidavit

from the prosecutor who handled Todman's plea agreements in

2012. The affidavit did not provide any additional material

information because the prosecutor could not specifically recall

Todman's cases or the thinking behind the Commonwealth's

sentencing recommendations. Because the defendant raises no new

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factual or legal issues, we conclude that his claim is barred by

direct estoppel. See Rodriguez, 443 Mass. at 710-711.

Order denying second motion
for new trial affirmed.

By the Court (Meade, Shin &
Tan, JJ.3),

Clerk

Entered: August 20, 2025.

3 The panelists are listed in order of seniority.

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