Commonwealth v. Zachary P. Harris.

NOTICE: Summary decisions issued by the Appeals Court pursuant to M.A.C. Rule
23.0, as appearing in 97 Mass. App. Ct. 1017 (2020) (formerly known as rule 1:28,
as amended by 73 Mass. App. Ct. 1001 [2009]), are primarily directed to the parties
and, therefore, may not fully address the facts of the case or the panel's
decisional rationale. Moreover, such decisions are not circulated to the entire
court and, therefore, represent only the views of the panel that decided the case.
A summary decision pursuant to rule 23.0 or rule 1:28 issued after February 25,
2008, may be cited for its persuasive value but, because of the limitations noted
above, not as binding precedent. See Chace v. Curran, 71 Mass. App. Ct. 258, 260
n.4 (2008).

COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS

APPEALS COURT

25-P-20

COMMONWEALTH

vs.

ZACHARY P. HARRIS.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 23.0

The defendant was charged in District Court with negligent

operation of a motor vehicle and with a marked lanes violation.

He moved to dismiss the citation as untimely issued in violation

of the "no-fix" law, G. L. c. 90C, § 2. A judge denied the

motion after an evidentiary hearing. The defendant then entered

a conditional plea, preserving his denied motion to dismiss for

appeal. We agree with the judge that an exception to § 2

applies, and thus we affirm the order denying the motion to

dismiss.

Background. We summarize the judge's findings of fact,

which we accept absent clear error. Commonwealth v. O'Leary,

480 Mass. 67, 67 (2018). On the morning of May 12, 2023, on
Route 2 in the town of Gill, the defendant was involved in a

three-car head-on accident when he took his eyes off the road

and veered into oncoming traffic. All three cars were seriously

damaged; one was smoking. The defendant and the victims in both

of the other cars were all transported to the hospital. One

victim was pregnant at the time and would be monitored going

forward; another sustained a fractured rib. A third victim was

having trouble breathing at the scene and was eventually

transferred by airlift to another hospital.

Though the accident occurred in Gill, emergency response

crews from multiple surrounding towns responded to assist at the

scene. The Gill police chief also requested State police and

crime scene services assistance to photograph and reconstruct

the scene. The collision accident reconstruction services

(CARS) unit documented where each vehicle came to rest and the

surrounding damage to the pavement to then create a digital map

of the scene.

State troopers interviewed the defendant at the hospital.

The defendant told them that he had taken his eyes off the road

to retrieve a bagel and look at his phone when he veered into

the oncoming lane, causing the accident. The defendant further

acknowledged his understanding that all three vehicles were

seriously damaged.

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One week after the accident, the Gill police chief issued

the citation to the defendant. For the reasons that follow, we

affirm the order denying the defendant's motion to dismiss and

hold that the citation was not untimely issued in violation of

G. L. c. 90C, § 2, because the statute's third exception

applies.

Discussion. We review determinations on issues of law de

novo. Commonwealth v. Ilya I., 470 Mass. 625, 627 (2015).

Commonly known as the "no-fix" law, G. L. c. 90C, § 2, requires

that police record automobile law violations and issue a

citation "as soon as possible" after the incident, and further

provides that "failure to give a copy of the citation to the

violator at the time and place of the violation shall constitute

a defense in any court proceeding for such violation." The

statute then sets forth three main exceptions to this

requirement:

"[1] where the violator could not have been stopped or [2]
where additional time was reasonably necessary to determine
the nature of the violation or the identity of the
violator, or [3] where the court finds that a circumstance,
not inconsistent with the purpose of this section to create
a uniform, simplified and non-criminal method for disposing
of automobile law violations, justifies the failure."

Id.
The defendant argues that the Gill police chief did not

comply with the requirements of § 2 when he issued a citation

one week after the accident. Because the defendant's identity

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and all material facts for the citation were known to police by

the end of the day of the accident, the defendant argues that

none of the exceptions apply. Specifically, he argues that no

circumstances justified the delay in issuing the citation, and

contends that he was not on notice that charges could result at

a later date.

The Commonwealth argues that the delay was justified and

not inconsistent with the purposes of the statute, and that the

severity of the accident sufficiently put the defendant on

implicit notice that charges might result.1

1. Circumstance not inconsistent with the purpose of the

statute. We agree with the Commonwealth that a circumstance not

inconsistent with the purpose of the statute justified the

failure to issue a citation at the scene of the accident.2

We determine the applicability of the third exception with

reference to the dual purposes of § 2. The first purpose,

1 Alternatively, the Commonwealth argues that the delay was
reasonably necessary for the police's ongoing investigation into
the nature and extent of the violation. Because we hold that
the third exception applies, we need not reach this argument.

2 Although the text of the no-fix law refers to "a
circumstance," the Supreme Judicial Court's cases do not appear
to require the police to identify a specific circumstance which
justifies the failure, apart from the seriousness of the
accident or the resulting injuries. See, e.g., O'Leary, 480
Mass. at 71-73; Commonwealth v. Cameron, 416 Mass. 314, 316-318
(1993).

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apparent from the common name of the statute, is to prevent

"manipulation or misuse of the citation process because of any

unnecessary or unreasonable delay." O'Leary, 480 Mass. at 71,

quoting Commonwealth v. Cameron, 416 Mass. 314, 316 n.2 (1993).

The second purpose is "to afford prompt and definite notice of

the nature of the alleged offense to the putative violator."

Commonwealth v. Pappas, 384 Mass. 428, 431 (1981). We also bear

in mind the principle that, under the no-fix statute, "[e]ach

case must be decided on its own peculiar facts." Commonwealth

v. Provost, 12 Mass. App. Ct. 479, 484 (1981).

a. Preventing manipulation. The Supreme Judicial Court has

repeatedly affirmed that "serious injuries resulting from the

traffic violation . . . create[] an ineradicable record of the

event" such that "manipulation is extremely unlikely."

Commonwealth v. Carapellucci, 429 Mass. 579, 581-582 (1999).

Accord O'Leary, 480 Mass. at 73. The same is true of serious

accidents where it is "inconceivable" that responding officers

"would regard this as a minor accident in which their discretion

concerning whether to issue a citation would be absolute and

unchecked." Pappas, 384 Mass. at 431-432.

The severity of the accident is more likely to create a

sufficient basis for preventing abuse when there are multiple

vehicles involved and third-party injuries, as opposed to

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single-car accidents with no serious injuries. For example, in

both Cameron and Pappas, the defendant's vehicle crossed the

center line before striking and seriously injuring a third

party. See Cameron, 416 Mass. at 315; Pappas, 384 Mass. at 431-

432. In Commonwealth v. Babb, the defendant's car "went from

side to side in the road" before striking a parked car and a

bicyclist. Babb, 389 Mass. 275, 276 (1983). All three of those

situations satisfied the anti-abuse purposes of the statute. By

contrast, O'Leary and Carapellucci involved single-vehicle

accidents where only the driver and other passengers in the same

vehicle were injured, and the injuries were more minor. See

O'Leary, 480 Mass. at 68; Carapellucci, 429 Mass. at 580.

There, the anti-abuse purposes of the statute were not

sufficiently served, and so the exception did not apply.

The present case is more aligned with Pappas, Cameron, and

Babb. The citation here stems from a three-car head-on

accident, caused when the defendant crossed over the center

line, where the defendant and multiple third-party victims were

all transported to the hospital, including one who was later

transferred to another hospital by airlift. Emergency services

from multiple towns responded to the scene. Furthermore, the

Gill police chief took steps to ensure that there would be a

record of the accident itself when the CARS unit was brought in

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to create a digital map of the scene. The severity of this

accident created an ineradicable record, rendering the risk of

manipulation extremely low. As a result, the anti-abuse

purposes of the statute were not frustrated by the delay in

issuing a citation here.

b. Notice. The defendant argues that he was never told

that criminal charges could result from the accident, and

therefore that he was not on notice of this possibility. The

notice requirements of the no-fix statute, however, can be

satisfied with implicit notice.3

"[T]he cases make clear that the very seriousness of

particular charges tends to minimize the importance of absolute

observance of the procedures because, again, 'fix' is virtually

excluded, and notice is implicit." Cameron, 416 Mass. at 317,

quoting Babb, 389 Mass. at 283. The purpose of notice is "to

prevent a situation in which a person cannot establish a defence

due to his being charged with a violation long after it occurs."

Cameron, supra at 316, quoting Commonwealth v. Gorman, 356 Mass.

355, 357-358 (1969). This purpose is served when it is "not

3 The Commonwealth concedes that the record does not support
the judge's additional finding that State troopers explicitly
notified the defendant that charges might result, and so we do
not rely on this finding.

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reasonable to conclude that the defendant was not aware of the

seriousness of the accident." Cameron, supra.

The seriousness of the accident here, and the defendant's

awareness thereof, was sufficient to put him on notice that

charges might result at a later date. Here, the defendant

acknowledged his fault in the crash during his interview with

State troopers in the hospital. He further expressed

understanding that multiple vehicles were seriously damaged.

Even if the defendant was not aware of the severity of the

others' injuries, it is unreasonable to conclude that he was not

aware of the seriousness of the accident.

c. Inadequacy of explanation. The defendant additionally

argues that the delay was inexcusable because the police already

had all the information needed to issue the citation on the day

of the accident. However, where notice is satisfied and no

purpose of § 2 is being thwarted, simple inadequacy of the

police explanation for the delay does not overcome the third

exception so long as police were not "seriously deficient or

negligent in their handling of the matter." Cameron, 416 Mass.

at 317-318.

Here, the record does not support a conclusion that the

Gill police chief was seriously deficient or negligent in his

handling of the matter when he issued the citation one week

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after the accident. While the record is not completely clear

about the extent to which the chief may have been conducting an

ongoing investigation or communicating with State troopers

during the period of the delay, this lack of clear explanation

does not rise to being seriously deficient or negligent. There

is also nothing in the record here to indicate that the delay

stemmed from a review process that risks subverting the anti-

abuse purposes of the statute. Cf. O'Leary, 480 Mass. at 72-73

(delay resulting from supervisory review process was "strikingly

similar" to review processes in place before § 2's enactment and

which Legislature sought to eliminate).

Order denying motion to
dismiss affirmed.

By the Court (Sacks, Smyth &
Wood, JJ.4),

Clerk

Entered: October 10, 2025.

4 The panelists are listed in order of seniority.

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