Adoption of Um.

NOTICE: Summary decisions issued by the Appeals Court pursuant to M.A.C. Rule
23.0, as appearing in 97 Mass. App. Ct. 1017 (2020) (formerly known as rule 1:28,
as amended by 73 Mass. App. Ct. 1001 [2009]), are primarily directed to the parties
and, therefore, may not fully address the facts of the case or the panel's
decisional rationale. Moreover, such decisions are not circulated to the entire
court and, therefore, represent only the views of the panel that decided the case.
A summary decision pursuant to rule 23.0 or rule 1:28 issued after February 25,
2008, may be cited for its persuasive value but, because of the limitations noted
above, not as binding precedent. See Chace v. Curran, 71 Mass. App. Ct. 258, 260
n.4 (2008).

COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS

APPEALS COURT

25-P-295

ADOPTION OF UM. 1

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 23.0

Following a trial, a Juvenile Court judge found that the

mother was unfit to parent her youngest child and ordered entry

of a decree terminating her parental rights to that child. The

mother appealed, and she also filed a motion to stay the appeal

and for leave to file a motion for relief from judgment pursuant

to Mass. R. Civ. P. 60 (b), 365 Mass. 828 (1974). That motion

was denied by a single justice of this court. Before us is the

mother's consolidated appeal from the single justice order and

the decree. On appeal, the mother contends that (1) the trial

judge abused her discretion in denying the mother's motion to

continue the trial so that she could obtain additional evidence

of her fitness, (2) there was not clear and convincing evidence

1 A pseudonym.
that her unfitness would persist indefinitely, and (3) denying

the motion to stay was an abuse of discretion. We affirm.

Background. We set forth the facts found by the judge

after trial, saving some facts for later discussion.

The mother has one child with the father, and that child is

the subject of this appeal. 2 The mother has two older children

with different fathers. The child who is the subject of this

appeal was removed from the mother's custody after birth by the

Department of Children and Families (DCF) and was two years old

at the time of trial. The mother is unemployed and relies for

income on government assistance. She currently lives with her

mother and has a history of housing instability and

homelessness, primarily due to her lack of employment and her

substance use. The mother has a long history of using alcohol,

marijuana, cocaine, and opiates. She also has an extensive

criminal history, including charges of assault and battery on a

family or household member and child endangerment by operating a

motor vehicle while under the influence of alcohol. She has

been the named defendant on two harassment prevention orders

issued pursuant to G. L. c. 258E. The mother has experienced

extensive domestic violence in her intimate relationships,

2 The judge also terminated the parental rights of the
father. Neither the father nor the child appealed; in her
brief, the child requests the decrees be affirmed.

2
including with the fathers of her three children. During her

relationship with Um's father, and while the mother was pregnant

with Um, the father provided the mother with drugs and alcohol

and was physically and mentally abusive to her. After the

mother's relationship with the father ended, she continued to

have intimate relationships marked with domestic violence. The

judge found that during her testimony the mother was not

truthful or insightful about her substance use or violent

relationships.

The mother has been the subject of numerous reports under

G. L. c. 119, § 51A (51A reports), and investigations under

G. L. c. 119, § 51B, involving allegations of neglect and abuse

of her two older children. These investigations resulted in DCF

filing a care and protection petition and removing them from her

care. 3 In March 2022, DCF received a 51A report alleging neglect

of the child who is the subject of this appeal, due to the

mother using alcohol, cocaine, and marijuana during pregnancy

and not receiving prenatal care. After the allegations were

supported, a case was opened for Um and incorporated into the

open care and protection. 4

3In June 2020, DCF removed the two older children from the
mother's care after she hit nine vehicles while driving
intoxicated with one of the children in the car.
4 In March 2023, the mother stipulated to the termination of

her parental rights to the two older children, as did the father

3
Um has never lived with the mother or had any unsupervised

visits with her. She remains in a kinship placement with her

preadoptive resource. The mother's termination of parental

rights trial occurred in August and September 2024; after

evaluating the evidence, on October 4, 2024, the judge granted

custody of the child to DCF and ordered entry of a decree

terminating the mother's parental rights. The judge found by

clear and convincing evidence that the mother "is currently

unfit to further the interests and welfare of [the child] and

that her unfitness will continue for the indefinite future to a

near certitude."

Discussion. 1. Denial of motion to continue. The mother

contends that the judge abused her discretion by denying the

mother's motion to continue her termination of parental rights

trial so that she could provide certified methadone treatment

records to document her sobriety. We are not persuaded.

On August 9, 2024, after both DCF and the child rested, the

mother's counsel stated that he might, "on the next date,"

submit in evidence documents that would be authenticated by a

live witness or by agreement. The judge continued the trial

of the oldest child with respect to his rights to her. Pursuant
to that stipulation, the judge ordered entry of decrees
terminating the mother's parental rights as to the older
children in April 2023, and the mother waived her right to
appeal from those decrees.

4
until August 20, 2024. On that date, the mother moved to submit

a letter from her methadone treatment provider regarding her

attendance and four toxicology screens for May, June, and July

2024. DCF objected because the records were not in admissible

form pursuant to G. L. c. 233, § 79G. While stating that the

"timing of this is concerning, especially given the fact that

this case has been substantially delayed by different requests

by different parties for continuances," the judge acknowledged

that the issue of the mother's participation in treatment was

"highly relevant." After the mother suggested that she could

likely secure the records in admissible form in seven days, the

judge granted her a two-week continuance, but warned that "if

those records aren't produced in certified form in two weeks,

the evidence is closed and there'll be no further continuances."

At the next trial date on September 4, 2024, the mother did not

have the certified records and requested an additional

continuance "for purposes of obtaining those records," which the

judge denied.

"The decision on whether to continue any judicial

proceeding is a matter entrusted to the sound discretion of the

judge, and the judge's decision will be upheld absent an abuse

of that discretion." Adoption of Gillian, 63 Mass. App. Ct.

398, 409-410 (2005). We reverse the decision to deny a

continuance only where we find that "the judge made a clear

5
error of judgment in weighing the factors relevant to the

decision, such that the decision falls outside the range of

reasonable alternatives." Vazquez Diaz v. Commonwealth, 487

Mass. 336, 345 (2021), quoting L.L. v. Commonwealth, 470 Mass.

169, 185 n.27 (2014).

The judge did not abuse her discretion in denying the

mother's request for an additional continuance. "Speedy

resolution of cases involving issues of custody or adoption is

desirable," Care & Protection of Quinn, 54 Mass. App. Ct. 117,

122 (2002), quoting Adoption of Emily, 25 Mass. App. Ct. 579,

581 (1988), and a judge may consider "[o]ther interests,

specifically the paramount interests of the children involved,"

in determining whether a requested continuance should be

allowed. Care & Protection of Quinn, supra. By the time the

mother requested the additional continuance, the case had been

pending for over two years, and the trial had been postponed

multiple times. The record does not clearly show that trial

counsel made diligent efforts to obtain properly certified

records from the mother's treatment facility during the trial,

either before DCF and the child rested their cases or during the

two-week continuance granted for this purpose. Counsel

acknowledged that he obtained a necessary release from his

client only on the day he requested the additional continuance.

In any event, we discern no prejudice stemming from the mother's

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failure to submit the four toxicology screens in evidence. In

denying the continuance request, the judge took "note of

mother's testimony, which outlines her efforts that she's made

in treatment . . ., which was seven months clean at the time of

her testimony." The judge acknowledged in her decision that the

mother had consistently engaged in methadone maintenance since

2024, but she concluded that such "evidence of recent

improvements" had to be considered "within the context of

earlier and continuing deficits." 5

2. Unfitness and termination of parental rights. The

mother also argues that the judge clearly erred in finding that

the mother is not currently fit to care for the child and that

her unfitness is likely to persist into the foreseeable future.

"In deciding whether to terminate a parent's rights, a judge

must determine whether there is clear and convincing evidence

that the parent is unfit and, if the parent is unfit, whether

the child's best interests will be served by terminating the

5 For similar reasons, we affirm the single justice's order
denying the mother's motion to stay this appeal and for leave to
file in the Juvenile Court a motion for relief from judgment
pursuant to rule 60 (b). The toxicology screens were not "newly
discovered evidence which by due diligence could not have been
discovered in time to move for a new trial," rule 60 (b) (2),
but rather records that the mother knew about during trial but
failed to introduce in admissible form. Nor did the exclusion
of these records violate the mother's rights to due process,
where the judge considered the mother's recent methadone
treatment in her decision.

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legal relation between parent and child" (citation omitted).

Adoption of Patty, 489 Mass. 630, 637 (2022). The judge must

decide "both whether the parent is currently unfit and whether,

'on the basis of credible evidence, there is a reasonable

likelihood that the parent's unfitness at the time of trial may

be only temporary.'" Adoption of Ilona, 459 Mass. 53, 59

(2011), quoting Adoption of Carlos, 413 Mass. 339, 350 (1992).

"[A] parent's unfitness is not temporary if it is reasonably

likely to continue for a prolonged or indeterminate period."

Adoption of Ilona, supra at 60. "We give substantial deference

to a judge's decision that termination of a parent's rights is

in the best interest of the child, and reverse only where the

findings of fact are clearly erroneous or where there is a clear

error of law or abuse of discretion." Id. at 59.

The mother does not contest the judge's findings, but

rather argues that the judge failed to give adequate

consideration to her "recovery trajectory" at the time of trial.

We disagree. The judge found that the mother is incapable of

protecting the child from future abuse and neglect due to

several factors, including her substance use, history of

domestic violence, criminal history, and poor decision-making.

Although DCF met its obligation to make reasonable efforts to

place the child in the mother's care, the mother failed to

maintain her sobriety, resisted services, failed to complete

8
action plan tasks, 6 and was dishonest with DCF about her

circumstances and substance use. The mother abandoned substance

use treatment against medical advice and only engaged in

therapeutic services, anonymous support groups, methadone

maintenance, and psychiatry on a consistent basis after she was

involuntarily committed to a hospital by her probation officer.

"Even where a parent has participated in programs and

services and demonstrated some improvement, we rely on the trial

judge to weigh the evidence in order to determine whether there

is a sufficient likelihood that the parent's unfitness is

temporary." Adoption of Ilona, 459 Mass. at 59-60. Here, the

judge concluded that, despite the mother's recent participation

in these services, she derived no tangible benefit that aided

her parenting skills or granted her insight into how her choices

have affected or could affect the child. The judge "continue[d]

to be concerned with Mother's ability to place [the child's]

6 In April 2022, DCF provided the mother with an updated
action plan that had eight tasks for her to complete, including
meeting with DCF, refraining from substance use, participating
in substance use treatment and demonstrating sobriety,
participating in individual counselling, attending court and
meetings, and participating in supervised visits with her
children. In November 2022, DCF provided an updated action
plan, which required the mother to also attend a parenting
class, discuss with her providers how substance use impacts
children and parenting, and provide proof of steady employment,
income, and housing. In July 2023, the action plan was updated
again and required the mother to complete a psychological
evaluation and information release.

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needs above Mother's own desires," finding she had made "little,

if any, genuine effort to remedy the conditions which placed the

child in harmful and neglectful circumstances." See Adoption of

Jacques, 82 Mass. App. Ct. 601, 608 (2012) (judge is entitled to

consider evidence of recent improvements within context of

earlier and continuing deficits).

Conclusion. We conclude that the judge had before her

ample clear and convincing evidence on which to base her

findings that the mother was unfit to parent the child, that her

unfitness as a parent was likely to continue, and that

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termination of her parental rights was in the child's best

interests. 7

Decrees affirmed.

Order of the single justice
affirmed.

By the Court (Vuono,
Desmond, & Toone, JJ. 8),

Clerk

Entered: October 20, 2025.

7 In a reply brief, the mother identifies eight "Additional
grounds" for vacating or reversing the decree as to her, which
were not argued in her principal brief and so we decline to
address them. Tedeschi-Freij v. Percy Law Group, P.C., 99 Mass.
App. Ct. 772, 781 (2021), and cases cited.

8 The panelists are listed in order of seniority.

11