Todd Main v. Johanna Main.

NOTICE: Summary decisions issued by the Appeals Court pursuant to M.A.C. Rule
23.0, as appearing in 97 Mass. App. Ct. 1017 (2020) (formerly known as rule 1:28,
as amended by 73 Mass. App. Ct. 1001 [2009]), are primarily directed to the parties
and, therefore, may not fully address the facts of the case or the panel's
decisional rationale. Moreover, such decisions are not circulated to the entire
court and, therefore, represent only the views of the panel that decided the case.
A summary decision pursuant to rule 23.0 or rule 1:28 issued after February 25,
2008, may be cited for its persuasive value but, because of the limitations noted
above, not as binding precedent. See Chace v. Curran, 71 Mass. App. Ct. 258, 260
n.4 (2008).

COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS

APPEALS COURT

23-P-1463

TODD MAIN

vs.

JOHANNA MAIN.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 23.0

The appellant, Johanna Main (wife) appeals from multiple

Probate and Family Court judgments finding her guilty of civil

contempt, and Todd Main (husband) not guilty of civil contempt.

The wife claims that these findings and the sanctions ordered

were error, that the judge wrongly quashed several subpoenas

served by the wife, and that the wife's due process rights were

violated by her removal from the hearing. We affirm.

Background. A judgment of divorce nisi was ordered by a

Probate and Family Court judge on January 20, 2020, nunc pro

tunc to October 10, 2019. Pertinent here, the judgment awarded

custody of the divorced couple's four minor children to the

husband, mandated payment of child support from the wife to the
husband, and mandated payment of alimony from the husband to the

wife.

The husband was required to maintain health insurance for

the wife and children "for so long as it is provided as a

benefit of his employment," with the wife responsible for paying

any extra costs incurred to keep her covered. The husband was

obligated to provide the wife with thirty-days' notice of any

such extra cost, and he was permitted to cancel the wife's

coverage if she "fail[ed] to make timely payment" to the husband

for three months. The husband was solely responsible for

uninsured medical expenses for the children.

The judgment of divorce also allocated four of the couple's

real properties to the wife (wife's properties). For each

property, the wife was given a deadline to refinance the

mortgage to remove the husband (and a limited liability company)

from any obligation thereon, and she was required to pay all

future expenses.

Additionally, prior to the judgment of divorce, a judge had

ordered that the husband was not permitted to release

psychiatric evaluations of the wife to the children's therapist.

The husband filed a complaint for civil contempt against

the wife on May 1, 2020 (2020 complaint), alleging, inter alia,

that the wife had failed to refinance the wife's properties and

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failed to fully pay child support, both as ordered in the

judgment of divorce. The wife filed a complaint for civil

contempt against the husband on January 25, 2021 (2021

complaint), alleging that he had unlawfully canceled her health

insurance coverage.

The wife filed another complaint for civil contempt against

the husband on April 27, 2022 (2022 complaint), alleging that he

had failed to fully pay alimony, failed to pay uninsured medical

expenses for the children, failed to pay expenses related to

several of the wife's properties, and had distributed the wife's

psychiatric report to the Department of Children and Families

(DCF) and other third parties in violation of a court order. In

connection with this complaint, the wife served subpoenas on

five banks and one health insurer; the husband twice moved to

quash.

The judge held an evidentiary hearing on all three contempt

complaints on December 20, 2022. During the hearing, the wife

was persistently disruptive, was warned on multiple occasions by

the judge that her behavior could result in removal from the

proceedings, and in the last minutes of the proceedings was

removed from the courtroom. After the hearing, the judge

dismissed the wife's 2021 complaint against the husband. On the

2022 complaint, the judge found the husband guilty of contempt

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for failure to pay alimony, ordering payment of arrears, and

found him not guilty of all other allegations. The judge found

the wife guilty of contempt on the 2020 complaint for failure to

refinance the wife's properties and for failure to pay child

support. Pursuant to that judgment, the judge ordered the wife

to refinance the properties by April 17, 2023; that a special

master would be appointed at the wife's sole expense if that

deadline was not met; and that the wife repay the husband for

post-divorce payments he had made to the mortgages of the wife's

properties. The judge granted both motions to quash the wife's

subpoenas.

Discussion. A finding of civil contempt requires "clear

and convincing evidence of disobedience of a clear and

unequivocal command." In re Birchall, 454 Mass. 837, 853

(2009). "We review the judge's ultimate finding of contempt for

abuse of discretion, but we review underlying conclusions of law

de novo and underlying findings of fact for clear error"

(citation omitted). Commercial Wharf E. Condominium Ass'n v.

Boston Boat Basin, LLC, 93 Mass. App. Ct. 523, 532 (2018).

Likewise, the "formulation of [remedies] is within the judge's

discretion." Eldim, Inc. v. Mullen, 47 Mass. App. Ct. 125, 129

(1999).

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1. Contempt complaints against husband. The wife claims

that the judge abused her discretion in finding the husband not

guilty of several claims alleged in her contempt complaints. We

are unpersuaded.

There was no abuse of discretion in finding the husband not

guilty of contempt for distributing the wife's psychiatric

report to DCF and other third parties. Civil contempt

constitutes "disobedience of a clear and unequivocal command"

(citation omitted). Birchall, 454 Mass. at 852. Although the

husband had previously been ordered not to release the report

"to the children's therapist," the wife alleged distribution "to

DCF and other third parties," not to the children's therapist.

The judge properly found the husband not in contempt.

Additionally, we cannot find that the judge abused her

discretion in finding the husband not guilty of contempt on the

claim of nonpayment of property expenses and uninsured medical

expenses. Neither the transcript nor the record appendix

indicates the documents relevant to these claims were brought

before the judge.1 As the appellant, it is the wife's burden to

1 Although the record appendix filed by the wife in this
case labels purportedly supporting documents as
"presented/available to court 12/20/22," there is no evidence
that they were ever filed in the lower court or presented to the
judge in this case, and no reference to them is apparent in the
transcript.

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provide "a record of all the evidence which was before the

judge." Connolly v. Connolly, 400 Mass. 1002, 1003 (1987);

Mass. R. A. P. 8, as appearing in 481 Mass. 1611 (2019).

Presuming as we must that this evidence was not before the

judge, we cannot find that her ruling was an abuse of

discretion. See Connolly, supra.

We also find no abuse of discretion in the judge's

dismissal of the contempt complaint stemming from the

cancellation of the wife's health insurance. The judgment of

divorce required the husband to maintain health insurance for

the wife so long as it was provided as a benefit of his

employment and unless she failed to make timely payment to the

husband for additional costs incurred by keeping her on the

husband's plan. During the hearing and uncontested by the wife,

the judge found that the husband had provided at least thirty-

days' notice of the expenses as required but the wife did not

make payments for approximately ten months. The judge therefore

found that the termination was justified and appropriately

dismissed the complaint.2

2 As the judge found that the wife did not make the required
payments and that the husband had provided the required notice,
findings the wife does not challenge here, the wife's subpoena
to the health insurer was properly quashed as irrelevant. See
Hull Mun. Lighting Plant v. Massachusetts Mun. Wholesale Elec.
Co., 414 Mass. 609, 616 (1993).

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2. Complaint for contempt against wife. The wife also

challenges the judgment finding her guilty of contempt and

several of the subsidiary orders. We discern no abuse of

discretion.

The judge acted within her discretion in appointing a

special master to sell the wife's properties in the event the

wife did not meet the imposed deadline to refinance. The wife

claims that she was unable to refinance the properties.

Providing an extended deadline before appointment of a special

master was not "outside the range of reasonable alternatives"

available to the judge and so was not an abuse of discretion.

L.L. v. Commonwealth, 470 Mass. 169, 185 n.27 (2014).

Furthermore, assigning costs of the special master to the wife

was a permissible contempt sanction. See Judge Rotenburg Educ.

Ctr. v. Commissioner of the Dep't of Mental Retardation, 424

Mass. 430, 461 (1997), quoting United Factory Outlet, Inc. v.

Jay's Stores, Inc., 361 Mass. 35, 36 (1972) ("contempt sanctions

are an appropriate mechanism by which 'the power of the court

[can] secure to the aggrieved party the benefit of the

decree'").

Additionally, the judge did not abuse her discretion in

calculating the amount of child support the wife owed the

husband. The wife acknowledged that she owed child support.

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While she initially disputed only the amount, she waived that

dispute in open court. And although she claims the judge erred

by not incorporating into the ordered payment an unquantified

credit due to one child living with her for the year prior to

the hearing, the judgment of divorce awarded custody of all

children to the husband and mandated that the wife make weekly

child support payments to the husband. The judge did not make

"a clear error of judgment in weighing the factors relevant" to

deciding the amount owed and thus did not abuse her discretion

(citation omitted). L.L., 470 Mass. at 184 n.27.

Also, the judge acted within her discretion in ordering the

wife to repay the husband for post-divorce mortgage payments on

properties awarded to the wife in the judgment of divorce. See

Labor Relations Comm'n v. Salem Teachers Union, Local 1258, MFT,

AFT, AFL-CIO, 46 Mass. App. Ct. 431, 435 (1999) ("sanctions in

civil contempt proceedings may be employed . . . to compensate

the complainant for losses sustained" [quotation and citation

omitted]). The husband presented documentation that he made

these payments. The judge correctly found that the judgment of

divorce placed responsibility for the payments on the wife, and

noted that the wife had presented no proof that she had made any

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of the payments herself. These findings are not clearly

erroneous, and therefore no abuse of discretion is discernible.3

3. Procedural due process. Lastly, the wife asserts that

her forced removal from the courtroom violated her rights to due

process. We disagree.

"Trial judges have the inherent power to deal with

contumacious conduct in the court room in order to preserve the

dignity, order, and decorum of the proceedings." Sussman v.

Commonwealth, 374 Mass. 692, 695 (1978). Due process rights

extend to a contempt hearing and require that a defendant "have

a reasonable opportunity to meet [the charges] by way of defense

or explanation, have the right to be represented by counsel, and

have a chance to testify and call other witnesses in his behalf,

either by way of defense or explanation." Sodones v. Sodones,

366 Mass 121, 127 (1974), quoting In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257,

275 (1948). However, a judge must be able to control "[her] own

proceedings [and] the conduct of participants . . . for a court

to function effectively and do its job of administering

3 As the judge commented at the hearing, where the subpoenas
were intended to determine whether the husband had actually made
the mortgage payments at issue, a less oppressive approach would
have been for the wife "to get a printout of the mortgage
payments and unless she paid them, he paid them." There was no
abuse of discretion in quashing the unduly oppressive subpoenas
to the banking institutions. See Hull Mun. Lighting Plant, 414
Mass. at 616.

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justice." Chief Admin. Justice of Trial Court v. Labor

Relations Comm'n, 404 Mass 53, 57 (1989).

The wife's conduct during the hearing was highly

disruptive. She received multiple admonishments about her

behavior, was expressly warned that continued disruption would

result in her removal, and ultimately was removed. The wife was

afforded her right to a "reasonable opportunity" to confront the

claims levied against her and offer her own explanation, and the

judge properly controlled the proceedings by having the wife

removed during the last minutes of the hearing while permitting

her counsel to continue advocating on her behalf.4

Judgments affirmed.

By the Court (Ditkoff,
D'Angelo & Wood, JJ.5),

Clerk

Entered: November 26, 2025.

4 To the extent that the wife's reply brief raises new
issues, we do not consider those issues. See Mass. R. A. P
16 (c), as appearing in 481 Mass. 1628 (2019).

5 The panelists are listed in order of seniority.

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