Commonwealth v. Bonia

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24-P-818 Appeals Court

COMMONWEALTH vs. AMANDA L. BONIA.

No. 24-P-818.

Plymouth. September 9, 2025. – January 15, 2026.

Present: Rubin, D'Angelo, & Toone, JJ.

Animal. Dog. Practice, Criminal, Striking of testimony,
Instructions to jury. Intent. Evidence, Intent. Statute,
Construction.

Complaint received and sworn to in the Wareham Division of
the District Court Department on February 1, 2022.

The case was tried before Edward H. Sharkansky, J.

Meghan K. Oreste for the defendant.
Carolyn A. Burbine, Assistant District Attorney, for the
Commonwealth.

TOONE, J. Following a jury trial in the District Court,

the defendant, Amanda L. Bonia, was convicted of animal cruelty

for having "unnecessarily fail[ed]" to provide her dog "with

proper food, drink, shelter, sanitary environment, or protection

from the weather," in violation of G. L. c. 272, § 77. On

appeal, the defendant contends that (1) she was unfairly
2

prejudiced by two witnesses' inadmissible hearsay statements

that were struck by the judge, (2) the judge erred by refusing

to instruct the jury that the Commonwealth had to prove that the

defendant intended the dog to suffer, and (3) there was

insufficient evidence to support her conviction. We affirm.

Background. "Because the defendant challenges the

sufficiency of the evidence presented, we summarize the facts

the jury could have found in the light most favorable to the

Commonwealth." Commonwealth v. Tavares, 471 Mass. 430, 431

(2015).

Prior to June 2020, an animal control officer for the town

of Wareham visited the defendant's house on several, though

fewer than six, occasions to conduct welfare checks on the

defendant's dog, Kayla. During the visits, the officer saw

"issues with proper shelter in bad weather, or lack of food."

Although they never met in person, the defendant told the

officer by phone that she was Kayla's owner and "taking care" of

her. After the officer told the defendant she needed a shelter

if Kayla was to be outside, the defendant obtained a "doggy

igloo." The officer also cited the defendant for failing to

license the dog. One of the defendant's neighbors testified

that she sometimes saw Kayla struggling to walk or just lying

outside. A second neighbor testified that, during the three or

four times he mowed the lawn at the defendant's house, Kayla was
3

always outside, without any food or water. Each time he mowed

at the house, he was there for about an hour.

On the afternoon of June 11, 2020, the first neighbor saw

Kayla lying on the porch without any water. The temperature was

in the seventies, the defendant was not home, and Kayla did not

appear to be breathing or able to lift her head. The second

neighbor also saw Kayla lying motionless on the porch that day,

which he described as "kind of warm," with no food or drink

nearby. The animal control officer was dispatched to the

defendant's house. The officer initially thought Kayla was dead

but then saw that she was alive but in distress: "very

emaciated, a lot of bones, just gasping for air." After the

officer called a colleague to assist, they carried Kayla in a

blanket to a vehicle and transported her to an animal hospital

in Buzzards Bay. During transport, Kayla's "body functions

appear[ed] to be stopping" as she "had vomited and defecated."

Records from the hospital described Kayla as a "mature

adult female husky" that was actively seizing with paddling

limbs and a chomping jaw. The attending veterinarian assessed

Kayla as having "[m]oderate to [s]evere" dehydration, "emaciated

body condition," and "severe diffuse muscle wasting." She was

"unkempt" with mud, dirt, and "unidentifiable ectoparasites" in

her coat and "hair loss over pressure points on [her] pelvis,
4

hind limbs, [and] shoulders."1 Due to her ongoing suffering,

upon the officer's authorization, Kayla was euthanized.

The defendant testified on her own behalf at trial and

denied that she had mistreated her dog. The defendant testified

that she bought Kayla, a husky-coyote mix, as a four month old

puppy and that Kayla was fifteen years old when she died. Kayla

spent most of her time outside because she was "part coyote" and

"that was her habitat." Although the defendant got the doggy

igloo after speaking with the animal control officer, Kayla

never used it because she "didn't want to be in there" or in the

house. According to the defendant, she always left out a bowl

of kibble so that Kayla could "eat whenever she wanted" and kept

a bowl of water by a tree. She walked Kayla several times a day

in the summer. About a week before June 11, 2020, Kayla became

ill and stopped eating and drinking. The defendant called the

animal control offices in Wareham and Carver, but she was told

that they did not euthanize elderly dogs. She called a

veterinarian's office, but she was told that Kayla would have to

be examined before being euthanized, and the defendant could not

afford the $500 fee. When the defendant got home from work on

1 According to the records, the animal control officer
reported that Kayla had been "left on the deck for the past 2
days," although it is not clear from either the records or the
officer's testimony what basis she had to make that statement.
5

June 11, she was distraught to find Kayla missing and did not

learn until days later that animal control officers had taken

her away.

Discussion. 1. Struck statements. The defendant claims

that she was unfairly prejudiced by two witness statements at

trial, even though both were struck by the judge. First, after

the prosecutor asked the first of the defendant's neighbors to

testify whether she ever saw Kayla in distress, she responded,

"I love my dogs, and the animal abuse going on was going on.

And I knew . . . ." Defense counsel objected and moved to

strike the statement, and the judge did so after a sidebar

conference. Second, in response to a question about what he

observed, the second neighbor volunteered, "There was a lot of

complaints made about the dog." Again, defense counsel

immediately objected and moved to strike the statement, and the

judge did so.

"[I]n response to the jury's exposure to inadmissible

evidence, the judge may 'correctly rel[y] on curative

instructions as an adequate means to correct any error and to

remedy any prejudice to the defendant.'" Commonwealth v.

Torres, 86 Mass. App. Ct. 272, 280 (2014), quoting Commonwealth

v. Bryant, 447 Mass. 494, 503 (2006). "Only a compelling

showing of ineradicable prejudice would cause us to conclude

that the judge's instructions to disregard [a witness's]
6

testimony were inadequate." Commonwealth v. Thad T., 59 Mass.

App. Ct. 497, 508 (2003). The defendant has made no such

showing here. In his preliminary instructions, the judge

explained that, if he struck an answer from the record, the jury

"shouldn't consider it at all." After striking the first

neighbor's statement, the judge instructed the jury that they

"should not consider the comment that animal abuse was going on"

because that was "essentially the question you have to answer

today." Defense counsel did not object to this curative

instruction or ask for an additional instruction, a mistrial, or

any other relief. See Commonwealth v. Mullane, 445 Mass. 702,

712 (2006) (curative instruction following witness's improper

testimony "was sufficient to remedy any prejudice against the

defendant"). The judge also immediately struck the second

neighbor's statement about complaints. "Jurors are presumed to

follow a judge's clear instructions and disregard [struck]

testimony." Commonwealth v. Auclair, 444 Mass. 348, 358 (2005).

2. Instruction on intent. Relying on Commonwealth v.

Russo, 494 Mass. 356, 365 (2024), the defendant contends that

the judge erred in refusing to instruct the jury that the

Commonwealth had to prove that the defendant "intended Kayla to

endure unnecessary suffering." The ruling in Russo is

inapplicable, however, because it involved a different provision

of the animal cruelty statute. The intent requirement for the
7

provision charged here required the Commonwealth to prove that

the defendant intentionally failed to provide Kayla with proper

food, drink, or shelter.

Massachusetts has a longstanding "public policy promoting

the humane treatment of animals." Commonwealth v. Duncan, 467

Mass. 746, 752, cert. denied, 574 U.S. 891 (2014). In 1641, the

Massachusetts Bay Colony established the first animal welfare

statutes in North America. E.S. Leavitt & D. Halverson, Animals

and Their Legal Rights: A Survey of American Laws from 1641 to

1990, at 1 (4th ed. 1990).2 In 1836, the Legislature enacted the

second animal cruelty statute in the United States and

substantially broadened its protections in 1868. St. 1868,

c. 212, § 1; St. 1836, c. 131, § 22. As drafted in 1868, the

statute was divided into two sections. The first established a

list of prohibited conduct against animals, and the second

prohibited "knowingly and wilfully" subjecting an animal to

unnecessary torture or cruelty. St. 1868, c. 212, §§ 1, 2. In

1972, these sections were consolidated in what is now G. L.

c. 272, § 77, but the "knowingly and willfully" standard

2 The Massachusetts Body of Liberties prohibited "Tirranny
or Crueltie towards any bruite Creature which are usuallie kept
for man's use" and required that any "Cattel" being driven or
led be given periodic rest and refreshment. Massachusetts Body
of Liberties, arts. 92, 93 (1641).
8

remained limited to the clause prohibiting unnecessary torture,

suffering, or cruelty. St. 1972, c. 46.

In Russo, the defendant was charged under the clause of

G. L. c. 272, § 77, that prohibits "knowingly and willfully

authoriz[ing] or permit[ting] [an animal] to be subjected to

unnecessary torture, suffering or cruelty of any kind." Russo,

494 Mass. at 357, 362-363. As the Supreme Judicial Court

explained, this clause "stands out for its inclusion of the

heightened mental state of 'knowingly' and 'willfully.'" Id. at

363.3 Here, the defendant was charged with a different clause of

the statute, one of its "long list of 'thou shalt not'

provisions that directly prohibit a defendant's harmful actions

or omissions" (citation omitted). Id. at 362.4 This provision

applies to a person who, "having the charge or custody of an

animal, either as owner or otherwise, inflicts unnecessary

The court proceeded to examine these terms "to determine
3

the requisite criminal intent for this portion of the statute."
Russo, 494 Mass. at 363. It interpreted "knowingly" to mean
that "the defendant consciously authorized or permitted
something that the defendant was aware would subject an animal
to 'unnecessary torture, suffering or cruelty of any kind,'" and
it interpreted "willfully" to mean that the defendant intended
"for the animal to be subjected to 'unnecessary torture,
suffering or cruelty'" (citations omitted). Id. at 364, 365.

When asked at the start of trial to identify the
4

Commonwealth's theory, the prosecutor stated that "[t]he
allegations are that [the] dog . . . essentially wasn't provided
food and water, and [was] left out in bad weather conditions."
9

cruelty upon it, or unnecessarily fails to provide it with

proper food, drink, shelter, sanitary environment, or protection

from the weather." G. L. c. 272, § 77. The use of the

disjunctive "or" evinces the Legislature's intent that a person

who unnecessarily fails to provide an animal with a listed need

may be found liable, regardless of whether that person inflicted

unnecessary cruelty on the animal. See Commonwealth v. Wade,

475 Mass. 54, 61 (2016).5

Importantly, although the provision charged here does not

require the heightened mental state of "knowing" and "willful"

conduct, it is still "directed at intentional conduct."

Commonwealth v. Trefry, 89 Mass. App. Ct. 568, 573 (2016). See

id. at 573-574 (distinguishing misdemeanor offense for improper

chaining, tethering, and confinement of dogs under G. L. c. 140,

§ 174E [f], for which "no mental state is explicitly required").

Specifically, the Commonwealth must prove that the defendant

5 Even though the Legislature added the language prohibiting
the infliction of "unnecessary cruelty" to this clause in 1972,
there is no indication that by doing so it intended to limit the
scope of the preexisting prohibition against the unnecessary
failure of owners and custodians to provide animals with the
listed basic needs. See G. L. c. 272, § 77; St. 1972, c. 46.
See also Commonwealth v. Curry, 150 Mass. 509, 512 (1890) (where
statute prohibited both "unnecessarily failing to provide . . .
proper food, drink, and protection from the weather" and "the
infliction of unnecessary cruelty upon an animal," it "cannot be
held as matter of law that the two clauses mean the same thing,
or that the meaning of one clause is to be determined by the
meaning of the other").
10

"intentionally failed to provide" the animal with one of the

listed needs. See Commonwealth v. Erickson, 74 Mass. App. Ct.

172, 177 (2009), cert. denied, 558 U.S. 1153 (2010). That

requires proof that the defendant acted "voluntarily and

deliberately," not accidentally, and "intended the act to occur

which constitutes the offense" (citation omitted). Id.

Accordingly, the judge properly instructed the jury that

the Commonwealth did not have to prove beyond a reasonable doubt

that "the defendant knew she was violating the statute, or that

she specifically intended the harm that it forbids" but, rather,

that she intentionally did acts that violated the statute.6

6 The judge instructed the jury that "the Commonwealth must
prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant intentionally
and knowingly did acts that were plainly of a nature as would
violate the statute" (emphasis added). See Criminal Model Jury
Instructions for Use in the District Court, Instruction 7.270
(cruelty to animals) (2017). The model instruction's language
reflects the intent requirement applicable to offenses that
involve "the direct infliction of pain on an animal" but the
"knowing and willfully" standard is not statutorily required.
See id. See also Commonwealth v. Szewczyk, 89 Mass. App. Ct.
711, 716 (2016); Commonwealth v. Zalesky, 74 Mass. App. Ct. 908,
909 (2009); Erickson, 74 Mass. App. Ct. at 177, quoting
Commonwealth v. Magoon, 172 Mass. 214, 216 (1898) ("in
circumstances involving the direct infliction of pain on an
animal all that must be proved is that the defendant
'intentionally and knowingly did acts which were plainly of a
nature to inflict unnecessary pain'"). Even though "knowingly"
is not part of the intent requirement for the offense charged
here, Erickson, supra, the defendant was not prejudiced by an
instruction that provided "more protection than the law afforded
[her]," Commonwealth v. Simpson, 434 Mass. 570, 589-590 (2001).
11

3. Sufficiency of the evidence. The defendant also

contends that there was insufficient evidence to support her

conviction under G. L. c. 272, § 77. We conclude that the

Commonwealth did not meet its burden of proving that the

defendant unnecessarily failed to provide Kayla with proper

shelter and protection from the weather, but the evidence did

establish beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant

unnecessarily failed to provide her with proper food and drink.7

In reviewing the denial of a motion for a required finding

of not guilty, "we assess the evidence in the light most

favorable to the prosecution to determine whether any rational

trier of fact could have found each element of the crime beyond

a reasonable doubt." Commonwealth v. Robinson, 493 Mass. 303,

307 (2024), citing Commonwealth v. Latimore, 378 Mass. 671, 677-

678 (1979). "A conviction may rest exclusively on

circumstantial evidence, and, in evaluating that evidence, we

draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the Commonwealth"

(citation omitted). Commonwealth v. Bonner, 489 Mass. 268, 275

(2022). "The relevant question is whether the evidence would

7 The defendant does not argue that a specific unanimity
instruction was required. See Commonwealth v. Palermo, 482
Mass. 620, 629-631 (2019). Nor does the defendant argue that
the Commonwealth had to prove the deprivation of each listed
need in order to sustain the conviction. See Commonwealth v.
Inoa, 97 Mass. App. Ct. 262, 263-265 (2020).
12

permit a jury to find guilt, not whether the evidence requires

such a finding." Commonwealth v. Brown, 401 Mass. 745, 747

(1988). "Because the defendant moved for a required finding of

not guilty at the close of the Commonwealth's case, we review

the sufficiency of only the evidence presented at the time the

Commonwealth rested after its case-in-chief . . . ."

Commonwealth v. Carrillo, 483 Mass. 269, 271-272 (2019).

As discussed, the Commonwealth prosecuted the defendant

under the theory that, "having the charge or custody" of Kayla,

"either as owner or otherwise," the defendant unnecessarily

failed to provide Kayla with proper food, drink, or shelter.

G. L. c. 272, § 77. At the outset, we are unpersuaded by the

defendant's contention that, because she was not home when the

animal control officers found Kayla in distress and transported

her to the animal hospital, the defendant did not have "charge

or custody" of Kayla. There was sufficient evidence to find

that the defendant was Kayla's custodian at that time, including

her earlier statement to the officer that she was Kayla's owner

and "taking care" of her.

We interpret the applicable clause in G. L. c. 272, § 77,

to require proof beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant

unnecessarily deprived the dog of either proper food, proper

drink, or proper shelter. See Commonwealth v. Martin, 304 Mass.

320, 322 (1939) ("Where [a] statute disjunctively prescribes
13

several acts in a series of acts, all of which are alleged in

the complaint, then the Commonwealth may prove the violation of

the statute by proof of the performance by the defendant of any

one of the said acts"). We also construe "unnecessarily" and

"proper" in their ordinary sense to require proof that, even

though the defendant could have provided food, drink, or shelter

as required to keep the animal in reasonably good health, she

failed to do so. See Commonwealth v. Spaulding, 495 Mass. 300,

306 (2025), quoting Commonwealth v. Zone Book, Inc., 372 Mass.

366, 369 (1977) (in absence of statutory definitions, we "give

[words] their usual and accepted meanings, as long as these

meanings are consistent with the statutory purpose"); Curry, 150

Mass. at 512 (words used in predecessor statute "are common

English words, and it must be taken that they are used in their

ordinary signification"). This construction is consistent with

how other States have construed comparable prohibitions in their

animal cruelty laws. See, e.g., Tuck v. United States, 467 A.2d

727, 732 (D.C. 1983) (construing "unnecessarily" and "proper" in

their ordinary sense to mean that "a person, although he could

provide food, drink or shelter as required to sustain the

animals in reasonably good health, failed to do so"); State v.

Persons, 114 Vt. 435, 437 (1946) (same).

So construed, this clause in G. L. c. 272, § 77, does not

envision unbounded criminal liability for, for example, every
14

failure to provide a pet its ordinary feeding. The term

"unnecessarily" contemplates that at least some failures to

provide animals with basic needs may be reasonable in the

circumstances, and thus not prohibited by the statute. Further,

not all deprivations of basic needs will amount to a failure to

provide what is required to keep an animal in reasonably good

health, as the term "proper" requires. It is true that the

clause does not require proof that the defendant's failure

caused the animal harm or even a risk of harm. Erickson, 74

Mass. App. Ct. at 178. See Curry, 150 Mass. at 512 (predecessor

statute did not require proof that "the failure to provide

proper food, drink, and protection must be such that on account

of it the animal has cruelly suffered"). Nevertheless, the

likelihood that a deprivation of a basic need will undermine an

animal's health is relevant to determining whether that

deprivation is sufficiently serious to establish liability under

the clause. See Curry, supra (leaving horse harnessed to

carriage in woods for twenty-four hours without food and drink

is "evidence of a failure to provide the horse with proper food

and drink" since that "treatment has some tendency to injure a

horse"). Finally, as discussed supra, the Commonwealth must

also prove that the defendant acted intentionally in the failure

to provide the animal with a basic need. Erickson, 74 Mass.

App. Ct. at 177.
15

Here, even when viewed in the light most favorable to the

Commonwealth, Latimore, 378 Mass. at 677, the evidence did not

prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant unnecessarily

failed to provide Kayla with proper shelter. While the animal

control officer testified that there had been "issues with

proper shelter in bad weather" during her visits, it is

undisputed that the defendant obtained a doggy igloo after the

officer raised that issue. Absent other evidence, the

defendant's reasonable response to the officer's expression of

concern precludes a finding that she deprived Kayla of "proper"

shelter, or that she acted with the general intent required

under the statute. While the Commonwealth argues that the jury

could infer that Kayla was denied proper shelter because,

according to the animal hospital records, she was found with

hair loss and mud, dirt, and "unidentifiable ectoparasites" in

her coat, that inference "cannot bear the weight of proof beyond

a reasonable doubt" where there was no evidence that Kayla was

unable to use the doggy igloo. See Commonwealth v. Lee, 460

Mass. 64, 71 (2011), quoting Commonwealth v. Rodriguez, 456

Mass. 578, 583 (2010).8 In particular, the Commonwealth could

8 The defendant testified that Kayla, being part-coyote, did
not want to be in either the doggy igloo or the house. At oral
argument, the Commonwealth contended that an owner has the
responsibility to bring a dog inside the house if the dog
declines to use the outdoor shelter made available to her. That
might be true in some circumstances, although the statute that
16

not meet its burden of proof in the absence of expert testimony

as to what, if anything, the unidentifiable ectoparasites in

Kayla's coat had to do with her being deprived of shelter. See

Commonwealth v. Corey, 493 Mass. 674, 688 (2024), citing

Commonwealth v. Scott, 464 Mass. 355, 364 & n.9 (2013) ("expert

testimony is needed where an issue is outside the general

knowledge and experience of the jury").

By contrast, there was sufficient evidence to prove that

the defendant unnecessarily failed to provide Kayla with proper

food and drink. As to water, one of the defendant's neighbors

testified that he mowed the lawn at the defendant's property for

an hour at a time on multiple occasions, and each time he saw

Kayla outside the house without any food or water. He could

also see the defendant's yard from his house and had observed

Kayla outside "all day long" and "never saw anything down for

the dog." On June 11, 2020, both neighbors saw the dog lying on

the porch without any food or water, even though it was a warm

day. The animal control officer testified that she observed a

"lack of food" during her earlier welfare checks at the house

governs the chaining, tethering, and confinement of dogs
provides that they may be confined in a securely enclosed yard
if they have, among other things, "access" to "appropriate dog
shelter." See G. L. c. 140, § 174E (c), (d). Here, the
evidence was insufficient to show that the defendant
intentionally deprived Kayla of proper shelter after getting the
doggy igloo for her.
17

and described the dog on June 11 as "emaciated" and "a lot of

bones." The medical records described the dog as having

moderate to severe dehydration at the animal hospital before she

was euthanized.

The defendant contends that the evidence was insufficient

because it "not only failed to establish that [she] intended for

Kayla to suffer unnecessarily but actually supported the

opposite: [she] did not want this dog to suffer at the end of

her life." The defendant refers to her own testimony that Kayla

had stopped eating and drinking a week before June 11, 2020, and

that she had sought to get Kayla euthanized. As discussed,

however, the pertinent clause of G. L. c. 272, § 77, does not

require the Commonwealth to prove that the defendant's conduct

caused the animal harm but, rather, that the defendant

unnecessarily failed to provide the animal with proper food or

drink. Erickson, 74 Mass. App. Ct. at 178. Here, the jury

could have reasonably concluded that the defendant unnecessarily

left Kayla outside without food or water for substantial periods

of time on numerous days. They could have also reasonably

concluded that the defendant acted intentionally in doing so,

and that her conduct amounted to a failure to provide food and

drink required to keep Kayla in reasonably good health. See

Commonwealth v. Gomez, 495 Mass. 688, 693 (2025) (under Latimore

standard, inferences "need only be reasonable and possible and
18

need not be necessary or inescapable" [quotation and citation

omitted]).

Judgment affirmed.