Commonwealth v. Almilkal M. Ruiz.

NOTICE: Summary decisions issued by the Appeals Court pursuant to M.A.C. Rule
23.0, as appearing in 97 Mass. App. Ct. 1017 (2020) (formerly known as rule 1:28,
as amended by 73 Mass. App. Ct. 1001 [2009]), are primarily directed to the parties
and, therefore, may not fully address the facts of the case or the panel's
decisional rationale. Moreover, such decisions are not circulated to the entire
court and, therefore, represent only the views of the panel that decided the case.
A summary decision pursuant to rule 23.0 or rule 1:28 issued after February 25,
2008, may be cited for its persuasive value but, because of the limitations noted
above, not as binding precedent. See Chace v. Curran, 71 Mass. App. Ct. 258, 260
n.4 (2008).

COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS

APPEALS COURT

25-P-646

COMMONWEALTH

vs.

ALMILKAL M. RUIZ.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 23.0

The Commonwealth appeals from a District Court judge's

order allowing the defendant's motion to suppress evidence

obtained from a detention and patfrisk following a traffic stop.

The Commonwealth argues that the judge erred in allowing the

motion because the patfrisk was justified by reasonable

suspicion that the defendant was armed and dangerous. We

affirm.

Background. We recite the facts as found by the motion

judge, "supplemented by additional undisputed facts where they

do not detract from the judge's ultimate findings."

Commonwealth v. Jessup, 471 Mass. 121, 127-128 (2015). On April

5, 2024, Sergeant Gary Hagerty was on patrol around Rockaway
Street in Lynn. This is considered a high crime area of Lynn

and "an area that police were focused on as a result of an

increase in gang activity in the approximately four months prior

to April, 2024," which included a "triple shooting" and "double

murder" in December 2023. That evening, Sergeant Hagerty was on

patrol in an unmarked vehicle when he saw a motor vehicle travel

through a stop sign without slowing or stopping. He checked the

license plate, which "came back to a Black Infiniti, but the

vehicle was a Subaru." The license plate was associated with a

vehicle belonging to Brian Khampharasavath (Khampharasavath).

Sergeant Hagerty knew Khampharasavath from a prior firearms-

related arrest and his association with gangs in the area.

Sergeant Hagerty radioed for marked units to assist in making a

motor vehicle stop. Sergeant Hagerty "put the blue lights on"

and performed a motor vehicle stop. Of note, the vehicle

stopped in the middle of the road and not close to the curb.

As Sergeant Hagerty executed the stop, he saw the passenger

door open and the passenger, later identified as the defendant,

get out of the Subaru.1 After the defendant got out of the

vehicle, the defendant was ordered to remain at the vehicle by

the police, which he did. Sergeant Hagerty noted that the

1 There was no exit order given to the defendant as he had
already stepped out of the vehicle after the stop and as the
police were approaching.

2
defendant's exit from the vehicle seemed "quicker" than a normal

exit. The defendant's quick exit heightened Sergeant Hagerty's

concerns because, based on his training and experience, people

trying to get out of motor vehicles quickly after being stopped

by police do so because of what is in the car or on their

person. As the defendant walked back to the vehicle, Sergeant

Hagerty "observed a satchel-type bag around his body." The

defendant's wearing of this bag, in the present circumstances,

heightened Sergeant Hagerty's concerns because "he had made at

least [ten] arrests wherein persons were carrying firearms in

this type of bag." Accordingly, Sergeant Hagerty patfrisked the

defendant's bag but did not find anything therein. Sergeant

Hagerty then patfrisked the defendant's waist and felt what

turned out to be a black nine millimeter firearm with no serial

number.

Upon locating the loaded firearm, Sergeant Hagerty

testified that he "demanded" the defendant produce a license to

carry a firearm. In response the defendant said that he was in

the "process of getting one." The defendant was placed under

arrest.

Discussion. "In reviewing a ruling on a motion to

suppress, we accept the judge's subsidiary findings of fact

absent clear error but conduct an independent review of [the

3
judge's] ultimate findings and conclusions of law" (quotation

and citation omitted). Commonwealth v. Scott, 440 Mass. 642,

646 (2004). We "leave to the [motion] judge the responsibility

of determining the weight and credibility to be given . . .

testimony presented at the motion hearing." Commonwealth v.

Meneus, 476 Mass. 231, 234 (2017), quoting Commonwealth v.

Wilson, 441 Mass. 390, 393 (2004). However, we "make an

independent determination of the correctness of the judge's

application of constitutional principles to the facts as found."

Commonwealth v. Mercado, 422 Mass. 367, 369 (1996).

The Commonwealth contends that the totality of the facts

found and credited by the motion judge provided the officers

with reasonable suspicion that the defendant was armed and

dangerous, justifying the detention and patfrisk of the

defendant. We disagree.

"A patfrisk is permissible only where an officer has

reasonable suspicion that the stopped individual may be armed

and dangerous." Commonwealth v. Sweeting-Bailey, 488 Mass. 741,

744 (2021), cert. denied, 143 S. Ct. 135 (2022). "In assessing

whether an officer has reasonable suspicion to justify a

patfrisk, we ask whether a reasonably prudent [person] in the

[officer's] position would be warranted in the belief that the

safety of the police or that of other persons was in danger"

4
(quotations and citation omitted). Id. "An innocent

explanation for an individual's actions 'does not remove [those

actions] from consideration in the reasonable suspicion

analysis.'" Id., quoting Commonwealth v. DePeiza, 449 Mass.

367, 373 (2007).

The Commonwealth urges us to reverse the allowance of the

defendant's motion to suppress because the totality of

circumstances showed that (1) Sergeant Hagerty was patrolling a

high crime area; (2) tensions and gang violence were heightened;

(3) the car from which the defendant exited bore a license plate

which was registered to a person with known gang associations

and a prior firearms-related arrest; (4) the vehicle carrying

the defendant and another person stopped in the middle of the

road rather than at the curb; (5) the defendant made a "quicker"

than normal exit from the vehicle; and (6) Sergeant Hagerty saw

the defendant wearing a satchel-type bag from which Sergeant

Hagerty had recovered firearms on prior occasions.

Although the above factors provide evidence of a heightened

need for caution and perhaps reasonable suspicion that the

defendant may be dangerous, the totality of the facts did not

provide reasonable suspicion that the defendant was also armed.

See Sweeting-Bailey, 488 Mass. at 744. There was no particular

reason to believe that the defendant was carrying a weapon.

5
Indeed, our case law is clear that merely exiting a vehicle

during a police stop does not support a finding of reasonable

suspicion. Commonwealth v. Torres, 424 Mass. 153, 159 (1997)

("It is not unnatural for either the driver or the passenger in

an automobile [or both] to get out of the vehicle to meet a

police officer who has signalled the vehicle over to the side of

the road"). Moreover, Sergeant Hagerty's initial concerns were

based on the driver's traffic violation, the record of the

driver of the vehicle, and his associations with gangs, not the

defendant's identity. See id. at 157.

We acknowledge that the police officers were confronted

with a potentially dangerous situation in real time and we are

loathe to say that Sergeant Hagerty acted unreasonably in light

of the factors delineated above and his training and experience.2

We further note that reasonable suspicion is lower than the

standard of probable cause and requires only "the sort of

common-sense conclusio[n] about human behavior upon which

2 We acknowledge the difficult result reached here.
Although "[t]he touchstone of search and seizure law is
reasonableness," Commonwealth v. Harris, 93 Mass. App. Ct. 56,
63 (2018), and "police officers need not gamble with their
personal safety when there are legitimate safety concerns to
justify [their actions]" (quotations and citation omitted),
Commonwealth v. Demos D., 497 Mass. 78, 87 (2026), our
jurisprudence requires reasonable suspicion that a defendant is
both dangerous and "armed" in order to justify a patfrisk.
Sweeting-Bailey, 488 Mass. at 744.

6
practical people -- including government officials -- are

entitled to rely" (quotations and citation omitted).

Commonwealth v. Gonzalez, 93 Mass. App. Ct. 6, 11-12 (2018).

Nevertheless, the Commonwealth did not present adequate evidence

to justify the patfrisk. The defendant did get out of his car

rapidly but complied with officer instructions to return to the

vehicle. The defendant did not make any furtive gestures or

movements that were consistent with carrying a firearm. See

Commonwealth v. Powell, 102 Mass. App. Ct. 755, 762-763 (2023).

The defendant's use of a satchel-type bag is also not enough to

provide reasonable suspicion that he was armed; the defendant

made no attempt to conceal or hide the bag justifying

"reasonable suspicion that the bag contained an illegal firearm

or other contraband" (citation omitted). Commonwealth v.

Johnson-Rivera, 104 Mass. App. Ct. 533, 537 (2024). Moreover,

we only consider that an area is high crime if the "high crime"

nature of the area has a "direct connection with the specific

location and activity being investigated." Commonwealth v.

Torres-Pagan, 484 Mass. 34, 41 (2020). Here, the police were

investigating a civil motor vehicle infraction, and

Khampharasavath's associations with gang activity dated years

back. Accordingly, we discern no error in the judge's

7
conclusion that there was no reasonable suspicion to conduct a

patfrisk of the defendant.

Order allowing motion to
suppress affirmed.

By the Court (Vuono, Neyman &
Sacks, JJ.3),

Clerk

Entered: February 17, 2026.

3 The panelists are listed in order of seniority.

8