CHARLES SCHWAB & CO., INC. v. MARIKO KAMIO & Another.

NOTICE: Summary decisions issued by the Appeals Court pursuant to M.A.C. Rule
23.0, as appearing in 97 Mass. App. Ct. 1017 (2020) (formerly known as rule 1:28,
as amended by 73 Mass. App. Ct. 1001 [2009]), are primarily directed to the parties
and, therefore, may not fully address the facts of the case or the panel's
decisional rationale. Moreover, such decisions are not circulated to the entire
court and, therefore, represent only the views of the panel that decided the case.
A summary decision pursuant to rule 23.0 or rule 1:28 issued after February 25,
2008, may be cited for its persuasive value but, because of the limitations noted
above, not as binding precedent. See Chace v. Curran, 71 Mass. App. Ct. 258, 260
n.4 (2008).

COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS

APPEALS COURT

25-P-874

CHARLES SCHWAB & CO., INC.

vs.

MARIKO KAMIO & another.1

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 23.0

Appellant Elizabeth Kamio (Elizabeth) appeals from the

denial of her motion for summary judgment and the granting of

appellee Mariko Kamio's (Mariko) motion for summary judgment.

Elizabeth, the widow of Michael Kamio (Michael), claims

entitlement to the assets of her late husband's individual

retirement account (IRA). Because we find that the Superior

Court judge erred in holding that no material facts were in

dispute, we conclude that summary judgment is not appropriate

for either party and therefore vacate the summary judgment in

1 Elizabeth Kamio.
favor of Mariko and remand to the Superior Court for further

proceedings.

Background. We begin with the relevant undisputed facts

from the summary judgment record. See Masonic Temple Ass'n of

Quincy, Inc. v. Patel, 489 Mass. 549, 551 (2022).

In 1991, Michael opened an IRA account with Charles Schwab

& Co., Inc. ("Schwab"), naming his parents as primary

beneficiaries and Mariko as the contingent beneficiary. The IRA

is governed by a written agreement between Michael and Schwab,

which stated that Michael could only change beneficiaries "in

writing using an acceptable format prescribed by [Schwab], and

it will only be effective when it is filed with [Schwab] during

[Michael's] lifetime."

Michael and Elizabeth married in 1995, and they had three

children. They hired an attorney to create an estate plan, and

in or around 2000, were advised by that attorney to name

Elizabeth as the beneficiary of Michael's IRA. In 2000, in

order to change beneficiaries, Schwab required the client to

submit a hard copy change of beneficiary form to Schwab.

Elizabeth believes that Michael made the beneficiary change

himself by logging onto Schwab's website, but she does not

believe that he printed out a form and sent it to Schwab.

Schwab cannot locate and does not possess a "Schwab Change of

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Beneficiary Form" signed by Michael that removes Mariko as

Michael's sole beneficiary.

Importantly, Schwab possesses two material internal

electronic records relating to Michael's IRA. The first, an

undated entry from Schwab's Client Central System, lists

Elizabeth as the beneficiary of Michael's IRA. Around 2000,

only Schwab employees would have had access to the Client

Central System to input information relating to the name of

Michael's beneficiary. The second record is a note from

Schwab's "MARS system," dated 12 A.M., February 11, 2000,

stating, "SUBMITTED CHG OF BENEFICIARY ON IRA ACCT SET FORM TO

BE PROCESSED." MARS was a system primarily used by Schwab

representatives in branch offices to document client

interactions. A Schwab designee stated that based on the latter

entry, he cannot "specifically determine . . . that a form was

processed."

Michael passed away in 2019, with both his parents having

predeceased him. Schwab initially transferred the assets of

Michael's IRA to Mariko on May 6, 2021, then removed those

assets later that month in light of Elizabeth's claim that she

is Michael's beneficiary.

Schwab initiated this action by filing an interpleader

complaint, naming Mariko and Elizabeth as defendants. Mariko

and Elizabeth filed cross motions for summary judgment, and the

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motion judge granted Mariko's motion and denied Elizabeth's

motion.

Discussion. The question before us is if a genuine factual

dispute exists on the issue of whether Michael "substantially

complied" with the requirements of his agreement with Schwab to

change the beneficiary of his IRA to Elizabeth. American Family

Life Assur. Co. of Columbus v. Parker, 488 Mass. 801, 810 n.10

(2022). See Acacia Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Feinberg, 318 Mass.

246, 250-251 (1945). We review the judge's decisions on summary

judgment de novo, "review[ing] the evidence and draw[ing] all

reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to the

nonmoving party." Verdrager v. Mintz, Levin, Cohn, Ferris,

Glovsky & Popeo, P.C., 474 Mass. 382, 395 (2016). Summary

judgment may only be affirmed where the moving party has met its

"burden of establishing that there is no genuine issue as to any

material fact and that [it is] entitled to judgment as a matter

of law." Id.

Elizabeth argues that the summary judgment record compels

the conclusion that Michael substantially complied with the

requirements to change his beneficiary to Elizabeth. We

disagree. The agreement between Michael and Schwab governed the

process for changing a beneficiary, see UBS Fin. Servs., Inc. v.

Aliberti, 483 Mass. 396, 414 (2019), and it required Michael to

submit a form to Schwab to effect that change. It is undisputed

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that Schwab does not have a copy of the form, but Elizabeth's

theory of Michael's substantial compliance relies on his having

submitted it. Viewing the evidence and drawing all reasonable

inferences in the light most favorable to Mariko as the

nonmoving party, see Verdrager, 474 Mass. at 395, the judge

could not -- and did not -- find that Michael had submitted the

form, and thus properly denied Elizabeth's cross motion for

summary judgment.

We do, however, agree with Elizabeth's claim that the judge

erred in granting Mariko's motion for summary judgment.

Schwab's computer system contains one record listing Elizabeth

as the beneficiary, and another record noting the submission of

a "CH[AN]G[E] OF BENEFICIARY ON IRA ACCT" and acknowledging the

existence of a "FORM." And both parties agree that any change

to a beneficiary could have only been made by a Schwab employee.

Evidence of Schwab's MARS system records showing that the

submission of a form to change the beneficiary of Michael's IRA,

and evidence of the Client Central System entry listing

Elizabeth as Michael's beneficiary to his IRA, viewed in the

light most favorable to Elizabeth as the nonmoving party,

permits an inference that Michael had submitted a form to Schwab

and therefore substantially complied with the agreement's

requirements. See Verdrager, 474 Mass. at 395. We conclude

that the judge's determination that there was "no evidence that

5
would demonstrate that Michael substantially complied with the

terms of the IRA agreement to name Elizabeth as beneficiary" was

erroneous.2

The summary judgment in favor
of Mariko Kamio is vacated,
and the matter is remanded
for further proceedings.

By the Court (Meade,
D'Angelo & Tan, JJ.3),

Clerk

Entered: May 8, 2026.

2 We are unpersuaded by Mariko's claim that Elizabeth has
waived any argument as to the presence of disputed facts.
Elizabeth plainly argued at summary judgment that "Schwab
accepted and processed [a change of beneficiary] form" from
Michael, thus raising to the motion judge -- and preserving for
this court -- the question of whether that fact was disputed.
See R.W. Granger & Sons v. J & S Insulation, 435 Mass. 66, 74
(2001).

3 The panelists are listed in order of seniority.

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