Commonwealth v. James Bellard.

NOTICE: Summary decisions issued by the Appeals Court pursuant to M.A.C. Rule
23.0, as appearing in 97 Mass. App. Ct. 1017 (2020) (formerly known as rule 1:28,
as amended by 73 Mass. App. Ct. 1001 [2009]), are primarily directed to the parties
and, therefore, may not fully address the facts of the case or the panel's
decisional rationale. Moreover, such decisions are not circulated to the entire
court and, therefore, represent only the views of the panel that decided the case.
A summary decision pursuant to rule 23.0 or rule 1:28 issued after February 25,
2008, may be cited for its persuasive value but, because of the limitations noted
above, not as binding precedent. See Chace v. Curran, 71 Mass. App. Ct. 258, 260
n.4 (2008).

COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS

APPEALS COURT

22-P-593

COMMONWEALTH

vs.

JAMES BELLARD.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 23.0

Following a jury-waived trial, the defendant was convicted

of violating G. L. c. 268, § 13B (b), by attempting to bribe an

anticipated witness in his upcoming trial. On appeal, the

defendant contends that the judge erred in denying his motion

for a required finding of not guilty because the evidence was

insufficient to support his conviction. We affirm.

Background. We recite the facts in the light most

favorable to the Commonwealth, reserving certain details for

later discussion. Commonwealth v. Latimore, 378 Mass. 671, 676-

677 (1979). This offense stemmed from an earlier one in which

the defendant was charged with domestic assault and battery on

his girlfriend and was detained pending trial. Less than two

weeks before the scheduled trial, the defendant called the
victim twice from the house of corrections.1 Based on the

recorded statements in those calls, the Commonwealth charged the

defendant with violating G. L. c. 268, § 13B, sometimes called

the "witness intimidation" statute, although its scope is much

broader.2

At trial on the § 13B charge, the Commonwealth pursued the

theory that the defendant "conveyed a gift, offer or promise

[of] anything of value" to the victim –- in other words, a

bribery theory.3 The judge heard from the Commonwealth's

witnesses, listened to the recordings in their entirety, and

denied the defendant's motion for a required finding of not

guilty,4 ruling, among other things, that the defendant was

"obviously attempting to convince the witness not to show up in

[c]ourt, [or] not to accept [the] summonses" and that the

defendant conveyed something of value to the victim,

specifically an "offer of marriage." This appeal followed.

1 Because neither party appealed the judge's findings that the
defendant and victim were the participants in the phone call, we
accept that the voice of the inmate was that of the defendant
and the other, female voice was that of the victim.
2 At the time the calls were made, the defendant's trial was

scheduled for August 2, 2016, about ten days later. The trial
was then rescheduled.
3 The complaint charged all theories of witness intimidation.
4 In his motion for a required finding, the defendant primarily

argued that he did not convey a thing of value to the victim and
that there was insufficient evidence that the female on the call
was the victim.

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Discussion. 1. Standard of Review. We review this claim,

considering the evidence introduced at trial in the light most

favorable to the Commonwealth, to determine whether any rational

trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the

crime beyond a reasonable doubt, Latimore, 378 Mass. at 677-678,

bearing in mind that guilt may be established by circumstantial

evidence and that inferences drawn from such evidence "need only

be reasonable and possible and need not be necessary or

inescapable" (citation omitted). Commonwealth v. Lao, 443 Mass.

770, 779 (2005), S.C., 450 Mass. 215 (2007). "[F]indings drawn

partly or wholly from testimonial evidence are accorded

deference and not set aside unless clearly erroneous,"

Commonwealth v. Tremblay, 480 Mass. 645, 655 (2018), but where

the judge's factual findings are "predicated not on the

assessment of witness credibility but rather on documentary

materials," Commonwealth v. Pugh, 462 Mass. 482, 495 (2012),

such as an audio recording, we review the evidence de novo. See

Tremblay, supra at 656.

A violation of G. L. c. 268, § 13B (b) (ii), requires proof

that the defendant (1) willfully; (2) conveyed a gift, offer, or

promise of anything of value; (3) to a witness or potential

witness in a criminal proceeding of any type; (4) with the

intent to impede or interfere with a criminal investigation or

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proceeding.5 See G. L. c. 268, § 13B. As did the parties, we

direct our analysis at the second and fourth elements, i.e.,

whether the defendant promised anything "of value" and

specifically intended his words to influence the victim not to

testify at his upcoming trial. We are satisfied that the

evidence was sufficient to support the defendant's conviction.

2. Gift, offer or promise of anything of value. The

recordings and testimony support that the defendant conveyed an

offer or promise of a thing of value to the victim. Because the

term "value" is not defined in § 13B, we look at its "usual and

accepted meanings, as long as [those] meanings are consistent

with the statutory purpose" (citation omitted). Commonwealth v.

Paquette, 475 Mass. 793, 800 (2016). Dictionaries define

"value" as "[t]he significance, desirability, or utility of

something," Black's Law Dictionary 1864 (11th ed. 2019), or the

"[w]orth in usefulness or importance to the possessor; utility

or merit." The American Heritage Dictionary of the English

Language (5th ed 2022),

https://www.ahdictionary.com/word/search.html?q=value.

Something is "of value" for purposes of § 13B if the witness

would perceive it as so important or significant as to influence

5 Massachusetts courts have construed § 13B (b) (ii), as bribery.
See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Hamilton, 459 Mass. 422, 434 (2011)
("§ 13B applies to one who threatens, bribes, misleads,
intimidates, or harasses").

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their participation in the proceeding. See Commonwealth v.

Hayes, 311 Mass. 21, 27 (1942) (key consideration in bribery

case was whether offer was valuable to person seeking or

obtaining it); Commonwealth v. Ruano, 87 Mass. App. Ct. 98, 99,

101 (2015) (sufficient evidence that defendant police officer

conveyed offer or promise of value by telling witness he "could

make 200 plus friends[,] . . . have the key to the city[,] . . .

[and] could get out of trouble" if he recanted).

The recordings reflect the victim's frustration with the

police officers who kept "coming to the house," "banging on" the

door, and "threat[ening]" her to go to court. She voiced

concerns about "los[ing]" her children because of a "DSS case"

that had been initiated; complained about dealing with it "by

[her]self"; and explicitly told the defendant that she wanted

"it to stop," "to all go away," and for "DSS to leave [her]

alone." Viewed in the context of the frequent contact by law

enforcement officers and other state actors, the victim's

statements permit an inference that she valued an end to the

criminal proceedings and a return to normalcy. See Commonwealth

v. Pagels, 69 Mass. App. Ct. 607, 613 (2007) (factfinder "may

consider the context in which the allegedly threatening

statement was made and all of the surrounding circumstances");

Commonwealth v. Vazquez, 69 Mass. App. Ct. 622, 633 (2007)

(where corrections officer expressed desire to borrow inmate's

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Jaguar vehicle, he solicited something "of substantial value"

for purposes of G. L. c. 268A, § 3 (b), by seeking temporary use

of vehicle in exchange for delivering contraband to inmate).

The evidence further permits an inference that the

defendant offered or promised the victim an end to the

proceedings in exchange for her noncooperation with the

authorities. The defendant assured her that "it" would all stop

and "go away" if she "stop[ped] answering them, stop[ped]

responding, and stop[ped] opening the door" for the authorities.

The defendant repeatedly pressured the victim to "stop" opening

the door and to "listen to [him]"; at one point, he purported to

describe his lawyer's advice that, if the victim did not

testify, the defendant did not need to worry, implying that his

promise was backed by professional judgment. See Weida v.

MacDougall, 300 Mass. 521, 524 (1938) (where defendant asked

plaintiff to come look at business opportunity because of

plaintiff's knowledge of the type of business, plaintiff's

advice was "of value" to defendant). Throughout the

conversations, the defendant played on the victim's insecurities6

and appealed to her emotions by, among other things, assuring

her that they were "still getting married," and telling her that

6 For example, knowing that the victim feared losing her children
if she did not cooperate, the defendant assured her that the
authorities "[didn't] know shit about [him] or [her]," and were
just "trying to play hardball" by "making shit up."

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he "care[d] about [them] and [their] family."7 See Commonwealth

v. Nordstrom, 100 Mass. App. Ct. 493, 502 (2021) (defendant's

pressuring of victim and appeals to sympathy rather than fact

were evidence of intimidation). In this context, the judge

reasonably could have inferred the defendant was explicitly

offering the victim something of value by telling her that she

"[wouldn't] be going through this shit if [he] was out there

with [her]."

3. Specific intent to influence witness. "[A] statutory

violation is not established unless there is also proof of a

defendant's specific intent to 'impede, obstruct, delay, harm,

punish, or otherwise interfere thereby' with a criminal

investigation." Commonwealth v. Morse, 468 Mass. 360, 371

(2014), quoting G. L. c. 268, § 13B (1) (c) (v); Scaccia v.

State Ethics Comm'n, 431 Mass. 351, 356 (2000) (bribery requires

proof of "corrupt intent" to enter unlawful quid pro quo).

Here, the evidence supports that the defendant knew of the

victim's vulnerability; advised her to abandon the prosecution;

repeatedly referred to his upcoming trial date;8 relayed his

lawyer's purported advice not to talk to the authorities, and

7 We need not rely on the purported "offer of marriage" to affirm
the defendant's conviction.
8 At one point, the defendant told the victim not to "answer the

door or nothing for nobody" until then because "if [she's] not
there, they can't do too much."

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appealed to the victim's emotions. Viewing the evidence in the

light most favorable to the Commonwealth, the judge reasonably

could have found that the defendant's purpose was to influence

the victim not to participate in the trial. See Commonwealth v.

Robinson, 444 Mass. 102, 111 (2005) (intent to influence may be

inferred from place, time, and circumstances of conduct);

Scaccia, supra at 357. We are satisfied that, in the context of

his upcoming trial for domestic abuse, the defendant's intent to

interfere with the proceeding was inferable from his statements

to the victim. Commonwealth v. Degnan, 91 Mass. App. Ct. 266,

271-272 (2017) (intent to solicit donation in exchange for

maintaining city contract inferable from words and actions).

Judgment affirmed.

By the Court (Wolohojian,
Henry & Hershfang, JJ.9),

Clerk

Entered: April 12, 2023.

9 The panelists are listed in order of seniority.

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