Chapoteau v. Bella Sante, Inc.

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22-P-341 Appeals Court

DANIEL CHAPOTEAU1 & another2 vs. BELLA SANTE, INC., & others.3

No. 22-P-341.

Suffolk. December 9, 2022. - September 8, 2023.

Present: Wolohojian, Henry, & Hershfang, JJ.

Common Day of Rest. Practice, Civil, Summary judgment, Class
action. Statute, Construction. Sale.

Civil action commenced in the Superior Court Department on
January 22, 2020.

The case was heard by Catherine H. Ham, J., on a motion for
summary judgment.

Raven Moeslinger for the plaintiffs.
David H. Rich for the defendants.

1 Individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated.

2 Victoria Perez, individually and on behalf of all others
similarly situated.

3 Bella Sante Wellesley, LLC; Tiffany Amorosino; and Cara M.
Finnegan.
2

HENRY, J. The "Sunday closing laws," "Blue Laws," or

"Common Day of Rest Law[s]," G. L. c. 136, §§ 1-11,4 prohibit

business activities on Sundays but provide for numerous

exemptions. One of those exemptions, G. L. c. 136, § 6 (50),

permits the retail sale of goods. Prior to January 1, 2023,

G. L. c. 136, § 6 (50), as amended through St. 2018, c. 121,

§§ 5-8, required certain employers that sold goods at retail to

pay employees premium pay for hours worked on Sunday (Sunday

pay).5 This case presents the question whether an employer who

principally provided beauty and massage therapy services, which

are exempted or permitted activities that did not require Sunday

pay, see G. L. c. 136, § 6 (54), (54 1/2), may still have been

required to pay Sunday pay to employees engaged in ancillary

retail sales before that requirement was phased out. Because

the statutory exemptions for beauty and massage therapy services

4 Section 1 of G. L. c. 136 states that "[s]ections one to
eleven, inclusive, of this chapter may be cited as the Common
Day of Rest Law," so we refer to the scheme by the name as
defined in the statute. See Zayre Corp. v. Attorney Gen., 372
Mass. 423, 424 (1977) (referring to "'Sunday closing laws,'
'Blue Laws' or 'common day of rest laws'").

5 Pursuant to G. L. c. 136, § 6 (50), as amended through
St. 2018, c. 121, §§ 5-8, until December 31, 2022, certain
employers were required to pay Sunday pay -- a percentage
increase on an employee's hourly rate for hours worked on
Sunday, similar to overtime -- to employees who engaged in the
retail sale of goods on Sunday. The Sunday pay requirement has
since been phased out by the Legislature and is no longer
required as of January 1, 2023. See St. 2018, c. 121, § 9. See
part 2, infra.
3

do not allow the retail sale of goods on Sunday, and because the

employer was a "store or shop" as used in § 6 (50), which

authorized the retail sale of goods subject to the Sunday pay

requirement, we vacate the order allowing summary judgment in

favor of the employer.

Background.6 Plaintiffs Daniel Chapoteau and Victoria Perez

commenced a putative class action suit against the defendants,

Bella Sante, Inc., Bella Sante Wellesley, LLC, Tiffany

Amorosino, Cara M. Finnegan (collectively, Bella Sante or

employer), claiming that Bella Sante failed to pay Sunday pay to

them and other employees as required by G. L. c. 136, § 6 (50),

as amended through St. 2018, c. 121, §§ 5-8. Each of Bella

Sante's three locations7 employs massage therapists, spa

concierges, nail technicians, and estheticians; the Wellesley

location also employs hair stylists. All locations sell beauty

products, including on Sundays. These beauty products include

items such as creams, cleansers, lotions, body scrubs, toners,

6 In reviewing a grant of summary judgment, we view the
undisputed facts in the light most favorable to the nonmoving
parties. See Augat, Inc. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 410 Mass.
117, 120 (1991).

7 Bella Sante, Inc., operates the Boston location, and Bella
Sante Wellesley, LLC, operates the Wellesley location. A third
company, Gromax Enterprise, Inc., operates the Lexington
location and was not named in this suit.
4

soaps, serums, moisturizers, masks, gels, lip gloss, acne

treatments, and nail polish.

The majority of Bella Sante's revenue is derived from fees

paid for services. At each location, only about one percent of

the square footage is dedicated to displays for the retail sale

of beauty products. Nonetheless, a significant portion of Bella

Sante's revenue comes from product sales. From 2017 through

2019, approximately twenty percent of Bella Sante's revenue was

generated from product sales. In total, the three spas

collectively made over $2.4 million in product sales during that

time period, including sales on Sundays.

Bella Sante's massage therapists, nail technicians,

estheticians, and hair stylists earn the majority of their

income through services but are able to earn additional income

through commissions on their retail sales of beauty products.

Spa concierges are paid an hourly wage, do not receive

commissions on product sales, and do not have sales targets,

although Bella Sante requires concierges to encourage customers

to purchase products. While some of the employees have sales

targets, no employee has been terminated for failing to meet

those goals, although one spa concierge was verbally

reprimanded.

Neither of the named plaintiffs, nor any of the other

employees, was paid Sunday pay for hours worked on Sundays.
5

Chapoteau worked at the Wellesley location from 2014 until

January 2020 as a licensed massage therapist. He was paid on

commission, based nearly exclusively on the value of massage

therapy sessions he performed.8 For any product sales, of which

Chapoteau made very few, he was paid on commission.9 Perez

worked as a spa concierge at the Boston location. She was paid

an hourly wage and did not receive any commissions on product

sales.

In January 2020, Chapoteau and Perez commenced this

putative class action against Bella Sante, alleging that because

Bella Sante sold beauty products at retail on Sundays, it was

required to pay employees Sunday pay, and that its failure to do

so violated G. L. c. 136, § 6 (50), as amended through St. 2018,

c. 121, §§ 5-8. They sought relief for the nonpayment of the

Sunday pay pursuant to the Wage Act, G. L. c. 149, §§ 148, 150.

Bella Sante moved for summary judgment, arguing that because it

provides beauty and massage therapy services, which are

separately exempt business activities under G. L. c. 136,

§ 6 (54), (54 1/2), it was not required to pay employees Sunday

pay. The motion judge agreed with Bella Sante and granted it

summary judgment. This appeal followed.

8 Chapoteau also received tips from customers.

Chapoteau was paid only $149.35 in commissions for product
9

sales in 2019.
6

Discussion. 1. Standard of review. "We review the

allowance of a motion for summary judgment de novo." Genworth

Life Ins. Co. v. Commissioner of Ins., 95 Mass. App. Ct. 392,

394 (2019), citing Federal Nat'l Mtge. Ass'n v. Hendricks, 463

Mass. 635, 637 (2012). "In so doing, we consider 'whether,

viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the

nonmoving party, all material facts have been established and

the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.'"

Genworth Life Ins. Co., supra, quoting Augat, Inc. v. Liberty

Mut. Ins. Co., 410 Mass. 117, 120 (1991).

2. Statutory framework. Our analysis begins with an

examination of the actual words of the common day of rest law

and the fundamental purpose of the statutory scheme. "A

fundamental tenet of statutory interpretation is that statutory

language should be given effect consistent with its plain

meaning and in light of the aim of the Legislature unless to do

so would achieve an illogical result." Marengi v. 6 Forest Rd.

LLC, 491 Mass. 19, 24-25 (2022), quoting Sullivan v. Brookline,

435 Mass. 353, 360 (2001).

The "general philosophy" of the common day of rest law "is

to begin with a general prohibition of all work, labor and

amusements on Sunday and then to engraft on that general

prohibition the exemptions which the Legislature deems required

by necessity or the general purpose of the statute." Zayre
7

Corp. v. Attorney Gen., 372 Mass. 423, 429 (1977). See G. L.

c. 136, § 5. Any business that is open on Sunday is subject to

criminal prosecution10 and a fine,11 unless the activity falls

within at least one of more than fifty exemptions, see G. L.

c. 136, § 6 ("Section five shall not prohibit the following:

. . .").

Three of the exemptions under § 6 are at issue here.

Section 6 (54) permits "[t]he cutting and styling of hair,

manicuring, and the furnishing of related cosmetological and

beauty services" (beauty services), and § 6 (54 1/2) permits

"[t]he performance of massage therapy services by a massage

10Section five of the common day of rest law allows for
criminal punishment of employers who fail to close on Sunday
without a qualifying exemption. See G. L. c. 136, § 5. See,
e.g., Commonwealth v. Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co., 404 Mass. 476,
476-477 (1989) (company "found guilty on three complaints
charging it with unlawfully keeping open [two locations] in
violation of G. L. c. 136, § 5"). The plaintiffs here are
pursuing their claims not criminally under § 5, but instead
civilly under G. L. c. 149, § 150. The plaintiffs argue that
Bella Sante's failure to pay the Sunday pay was a violation of
its obligation to pay the plaintiffs the full amount of their
earned wages when they became due and payable, in violation of
G. L. c. 149, § 148.

11"Whoever on Sunday keeps open his shop, warehouse,
factory or other place of business, or sells foodstuffs, goods,
wares, merchandise or real estate, or does any manner of labor,
business or work, except works of necessity and charity, shall
be punished by a fine of not less than twenty dollars nor more
than one hundred dollars for a first offense, and a fine of not
less than fifty dollars nor more than two hundred dollars for
each subsequent offense, and each unlawful act or sale shall
constitute a separate offense." G. L. c. 136, § 5.
8

therapist licensed pursuant to [G. L. c. 112, § 228]" (massage

therapy services). In addition, § 6 (50) permits "[t]he keeping

open of a store or shop and the sale at retail of goods therein,

. . . and the performance of labor, business, and work directly

connected therewith on Sunday" (retail sale of goods).

The exemptions for beauty and massage therapy services have

never required Sunday pay. By contrast, during the relevant

time period, the exemption for the retail sale of goods required

"[a]ny store or shop which qualifies for exemption under this

clause . . . and which employs more than a total of seven

persons, including the proprietor, on Sunday or any day

throughout the week," to pay Sunday pay to employees "engaged in

the work performed on Sunday pursuant to the provisions of this

clause . . . ." G. L. c. 136, § 6 (50), as amended through

St. 2018, c. 121, §§ 5-8.

For many years the Sunday pay rate was one and one-half

times an employee's regular hourly rate, similar to overtime.

Starting in 2019, the Sunday pay rate was reduced by one-tenth

of one percent as part of legislation that increased the minimum

wage over a period of years, until January 1, 2023, when the

Sunday pay rate was phased out entirely. See St. 2018, c. 121,

§ 5, effective Jan. 1, 2019; St. 2018, c. 121, § 6, effective

Jan. 1, 2020; St. 2018, c. 121, § 7, effective Jan. 1, 2021;

St. 2018, c. 121, § 8, effective Jan. 1, 2022; St. 2018, c. 121,
9

§ 9, effective Jan. 1, 2023. Thus, businesses that sold goods

at retail on Sunday under the § 6 (50) exemption were subject to

the Sunday pay requirement through December 31, 2022, which

encompasses the entirety of the alleged nonpayment of the

plaintiffs.

3. Statutory interpretation. In arguing that no Sunday

pay was required, the employer relies on exemptions that allow

businesses to offer beauty and massage therapy services on

Sunday. See G. L. c. 136, § 6 (54), (54 1/2). These exemptions

allow certain types of business activities to be performed.

Nothing in either exemption permits the retail sale of goods.

An employer that provides both exempted and nonexempted services

does not thereby exempt the latter; "a store that is lawfully

open for some kinds of business may nonetheless be prosecuted

for being open for business in violation of the act."

Commonwealth v. Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co., 404 Mass. 476, 479

(1989). In other words, "[t]he various clauses in § 6 do not

qualify each other. Each must be read independently."

(Quotation omitted.) Id. at 478. See Ralph's Market, Inc. v.

Beverly, 353 Mass. 588, 590 (1968) (business was permitted to

sell items specifically enumerated in § 6, including certain

foodstuffs, but not all foodstuffs generally).

Massachusetts cases demonstrate application of the statute.

In Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co., 404 Mass. at 477, the employer was
10

permitted to sell various items, including newspapers, fuel and

lubricating oil, and State lottery tickets, pursuant to at least

ten different exemptions under § 6, yet was found guilty under

§ 5 of violating the common day of rest law for selling canned

goods before noon, an activity that was not covered by an

exemption.12 The Supreme Judicial Court rejected the employer's

argument that by virtue of being lawfully open for business on

Sunday to sell certain items, the business was permitted to sell

other nonexempt items. See id. at 478-479. Similarly, in

Commonwealth v. Graham, 176 Mass. 5, 6 (1900), where a duly

licensed victualer ran a restaurant and also sold cigars, the

Supreme Judicial Court rejected the defendant's argument that if

the defendant's "principal business was supplying meals," she

could not be guilty of violating a precursor to the common day

of rest law.13 Id. The court held that "[i]f one of her

purposes in keeping the place open was the sale of cigars she

was guilty of the offense charged." Id. In other words, even

though the victualer was lawfully operating under the victualer

12At the time, the § 6 (50) exemption for the general
retail sale of goods applied only after noon. See Great Atl. &
Pac. Tea Co., 404 Mass. at 478-480.

13In Graham, 176 Mass. at 6, the defendant violated
St. 1895, c. 434, § 2, which also prohibited the opening of
businesses on Sunday. See Local 1445, United Food & Commercial
Workers Union v. Police Chief of Natick, 29 Mass. App. Ct. 554,
555-558 (1990) (discussing history of Lord's Day laws becoming
secular common day of rest law over time).
11

exemption to the common day of rest law, she was not authorized

to sell cigars.

While Bella Sante has demonstrated that it was permitted to

perform some activities on Sundays -- namely, beauty and massage

therapy services -- the exemptions that allowed those activities

did not allow retail sales. If Bella Sante was permitted to

sell goods at retail on Sundays, that permission came from

§ 6 (50), which required Sunday pay.14 The alternative is that

Bella Sante was selling the goods at retail in violation of § 5.

The question then becomes whether, pursuant to § 6 (50),

Bella Sante is a "store" or "shop" that sells goods at retail on

Sundays such that it may have been required to pay some

employees Sunday pay.15 By a plain reading of the common day of

rest law, Bella Sante is both. A store is "a place where

traffic is carried on in goods, wares, or merchandise" (citation

omitted), Commonwealth v. Moriarty, 311 Mass. 116, 121 (1942),

14While § 6 allows for the retail sale of specific goods
without requiring Sunday pay, see, e.g., G. L. c. 136, § 6 (18)
(tires, batteries, and automotive parts for emergency use) and
§ 6 (28) (greeting cards and photographic films), Bella Sante
was not selling those goods here and cannot take refuge from the
Sunday pay requirement under those subsections.

15The "sale at retail of goods," G. L. c. 136, § 6 (50),
occurs within each Bella Sante location, a point which Bella
Sante does not contest. See Commonwealth v. Moriarty, 311 Mass.
116, 121 (1942) ("The word 'retail' imports primarily that the
sale or traffic in goods, wares or merchandise carried on in
such 'stores' shall be in small quantities").
12

and a shop includes a "place of business," Commonwealth v.

Chamberlain, 343 Mass. 49, 50-51 (1961), and "may include places

of business that are not 'retail stores' or even 'stores,'"

Moriarty, supra at 120. Based on this broad definition, the

Supreme Judicial Court has held that both a laundromat,

Chamberlain, supra, and a tavern, Moriarty, supra, constituted

"shops." Here, Bella Sante is certainly a place of business,

and its sale of various types of beauty products makes it a

place where traffic is carried on in goods, wares, and

merchandise, such that it is a store or a shop for purposes of

§ 6 (50).16

Bella Sante argues that because its spas are "primarily"

engaged in beauty and massage therapy services, it should not be

considered a "store" or "shop" within the meaning of § 6 (50).

It is correct that Bella Sante is primarily a services company,

as approximately eighty percent of its revenue is derived from

16Bella Sante argues that the previous cases interpreting
the terms "store" and "shop" occurred under previous iterations
of the common day of rest law and were thus superseded.
However, "when the Legislature amends a statute it is aware of
the prior state of the law as explicated by the decisions of
this court, and where it has reenacted statutory language
without material change, they are presumed to have adopted the
judicial construction put upon it" (quotations and citation and
omitted). Commonwealth v. Colturi, 448 Mass. 809, 812 (2007).
Bella Sante's further argument that prior cases should be
ignored as they involved criminal cases is unavailing. Where
the common day of rest law can be enforced both civilly and
criminally, we see no reason to interpret the terms differently
for each purpose.
13

services, and only about one percent of its square footage is

devoted to the retail sale of products. However, § 6 (50) is

not limited to only businesses known primarily as "retail

store[s]," as Bella Sante contends, but instead applies to any

store or shop which sells goods at retail therein. This

definition is in sharp contrast to other exemptions under § 6,

where the Legislature used the word "primarily" when describing

the nature of other exemptions. See G. L. c. 136, § 6 (29)

(permitting the "sale, at retail, of gifts, souvenirs, antiques,

secondhand furniture, handcrafted goods and art goods, in an

establishment primarily engaged in the sale of such merchandise,

or on the premises of a licensed common victualler" [emphasis

added]); G. L. c. 136, § 6 (30) (permitting the "opening of a

store or shop primarily engaged in the retail sale of pets, and

the sale therein of pets and articles necessary for the keeping,

care and feeding of pets" [emphasis added]). Unlike those

exemptions, the § 6 (50) exemption is not limited only to those

businesses engaged "primarily" in the retail sale of goods.

"Where the Legislature used different language in different

paragraphs of the same statute, it intended different meanings"

(citation omitted). Commonwealth v. Williamson, 462 Mass. 676,

682 (2012). The Legislature used the word "primarily" in

§ 6 (29) and § 6 (30) and chose not to in § 6 (50). "This use

of different language strongly suggests the legislative intent
14

to convey a different meaning." Williamson, supra. We

therefore reject the argument that § 6 (50) should apply only to

those businesses engaged "primarily" in retail sales.17

This construction does not "re-write" the common day of

rest law or "reclassify" Bella Sante as a "retail store[] or

shop[]," as Bella Sante contends, even where retail sales may be

ancillary to the employer's primary purpose. Instead, it

supports the underlying purpose of the statutory scheme of

creating an "economic disincentive for employers and providing

additional compensation to employees with respect to work done

on Sunday" (quotation and citation omitted). Sullivan v.

Sleepy's LLC, 482 Mass. 227, 235 n.16 (2019). Prior to 2023, a

business that was primarily engaged in nonretail activity, such

as a spa or hair salon, but that engaged in a small amount of

retail sales (and had at least seven employees)18 could have

avoided the Sunday pay requirement by selling goods at retail

only on Monday through Saturday, or it could have continued to

sell goods at retail on Sunday and paid employees engaged in

that activity Sunday pay as required by the statutory scheme.

17As noted above, even if Bella Sante were correct that it
is not a "store" or "shop" within the meaning of § 6 (50), no
other exemption permitted it to sell goods at retail on Sunday.

18Bella Sante's vice-president of operations testified that
it always had at least seven employees at the relevant
locations. Bella Sante has not contested that it met the
threshold number of employees.
15

This interpretation is consistent with the plain meaning of the

statute, the prior case law, and the over-all purpose of the

common day of rest law.19

Conclusion. The order allowing summary judgment is

vacated, and the matter is remanded to the Superior Court for

further proceedings consistent with this opinion.20

So ordered.

19The parties did not brief and we do not reach the
question of which employees Bella Sante was required to pay
Sunday pay, or in what amount. Those questions are to be
determined on remand.

20 The plaintiffs' request for appellate attorney's fees is
denied.