Commonwealth v. Admilson Rodrigues.

NOTICE: Summary decisions issued by the Appeals Court pursuant to M.A.C. Rule
23.0, as appearing in 97 Mass. App. Ct. 1017 (2020) (formerly known as rule 1:28,
as amended by 73 Mass. App. Ct. 1001 [2009]), are primarily directed to the parties
and, therefore, may not fully address the facts of the case or the panel's
decisional rationale. Moreover, such decisions are not circulated to the entire
court and, therefore, represent only the views of the panel that decided the case.
A summary decision pursuant to rule 23.0 or rule 1:28 issued after February 25,
2008, may be cited for its persuasive value but, because of the limitations noted
above, not as binding precedent. See Chace v. Curran, 71 Mass. App. Ct. 258, 260
n.4 (2008).

COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS

APPEALS COURT

22-P-1117

COMMONWEALTH

vs.

ADMILSON RODRIGUES.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 23.0

Following a jury-waived trial in the District Court, the

defendant was convicted of operating a motor vehicle while under

the influence of intoxicating liquor (OUI), second offense.1 We

discern in the defendant's claims no cause to disturb the

judgment and affirm.

1. Motion to suppress. There was no error in the motion

judge's denial of the defendant's motion to suppress. The

record supports the motion judge's finding that the trooper had

reasonable suspicion to believe the defendant had committed a

traffic offense, based on a license plate query showing that the

vehicle the defendant was driving had an expired inspection

sticker. See Commonwealth v. Pacheco, 51 Mass. App. Ct. 736,

1 The defendant was acquitted of unlicensed operation of a motor
vehicle.
739 (2001). Accordingly, there is no basis to suppress evidence

on the ground that the stop of the vehicle was improper.

To the extent the defendant seeks to challenge the motion

judge's failure to suppress statements made by the defendant

during the stop, the claim is unavailing. As the defendant

failed to raise this issue in his motion to suppress, the

Commonwealth was under no obligation to provide evidence at the

motion hearing bearing on the admissibility of the statements.

In his motion to suppress, and at the hearing on the motion, the

defendant advanced no argument directed to statements made

during the stop, and he attempts now to raise it for the first

time on appeal. "This he may not do." Commonwealth v. Edwards,

71 Mass. App. Ct. 716, 719 (2008), quoting Commonwealth v.

Lodge, 431 Mass. 461, 474 (2000).

In any event, any such request would have been futile, so

there is no basis for the defendant's related contention that

his counsel was ineffective for failing to advance such an

argument before the motion judge. See Commonwealth v. Gosselin,

486 Mass. 256, 264 (2020). The testimony of the arresting

officer regarding his observations that the defendant's speech

was slurred does not concern the statements themselves, but only

the fact that the defendant's inability to speak clearly served

as an indication of his impairment. Testimony regarding the

defendant's slurred speech accordingly does not implicate his

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privilege against self incrimination. See Vanhouton v.

Commonwealth, 424 Mass. 327, 336 (1997).

2. Equal protection. There is likewise no merit to the

defendant's equal protection claim. As the issue was not raised

prior to or during the trial, we review the claim for a

substantial risk of a miscarriage of justice. Commonwealth v.

Francis, 485 Mass. 86, 106 (2020). We discern no such risk

because the defendant offers no evidence or argument to support

his claim.

"A defendant seeking to suppress evidence based on a claim

that a traffic stop violated principles of equal protection

bears the burden of establishing, by motion, a reasonable

inference that the officer's decision to initiate the stop was

motivated by race or another protected class." Commonwealth v.

Long, 485 Mass. 711, 713 (2020). The defendant did not argue an

equal protection violation in his motion to suppress, nor did he

offer evidence of his claim on appeal. Moreover, there is no

evidence in the record to suggest that the trooper knew the

defendant's race when he stopped him.

3. Records of the registry of motor vehicles. "[P]ublic

records are generally admissible absent confrontation . . .

because — having been created for the administration of an

entity's affairs and not for the purpose of establishing . . .

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[a] fact at trial — they are not testimonial." Melendez-Diaz v.

Massachusetts, 557 U.S. 305, 324 (2009).

The records of the registry of motor vehicles of the

defendant's driving history and notices of suspension are public

records prepared in the ordinary course of business and are not

testimonial. See Commonwealth v. Parenteau, 460 Mass. 1, 10

(2011).

Similarly, the certificate of authenticity, though prepared

in anticipation of trial, is "a clerk's affidavit authenticating

an official record" and "is not testimonial for purposes of the

confrontation clause." Commonwealth v. McMullin, 76 Mass. App.

Ct. 904, 904 (2010), citing Melendez-Diaz, 557 U.S. at 322.

Therefore, their admission did not violate the confrontation

clause.2

4. Sufficiency of the evidence. "In assessing the

sufficiency of the evidence, we consider 'whether, after viewing

the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any

2 The record included an additional certification which states:
"I further certify in accordance with G. L. [c. 90, § 23], that
there has since been no reinstatement of [the defendant's]
license or right to operate motor vehicles in the Commonwealth
of Massachusetts." This certification is testimonial, and its
admission violated the defendant's right to confrontation. See
Parenteau, 460 Mass. at 8. However, because the defendant was
acquitted of the charge of unlicensed operation of a motor
vehicle and it bore no relation to the charge of which the
defendant was convicted, we discern no substantial risk of a
miscarriage of justice.

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rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements

of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.'" Commonwealth v.

Davis, 487 Mass. 448, 462 (2021), quoting Commonwealth v.

Latimore, 378 Mass. 671, 677 (1979).

The Commonwealth presented sufficient proof of impairment

to allow a rational trier of fact to conclude that the defendant

was operating a motor vehicle under the influence of

intoxicating liquor. The arresting trooper testified that the

defendant had bloodshot and glassy eyes, slurred speech, and a

moderate odor of alcohol that followed the defendant. The

physical evidence recovered during the motor vehicle stop

included a mostly empty Coronita beer bottle found in the

driver’s side door pocket of the defendant's car. The

defendant's conduct, abruptly pulling over to allow the trooper

in a fully marked State Police Cruiser to pass him, suggested

consciousness of guilt.

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Taken together, the evidence was sufficient to support a

finding that the defendant operated a motor vehicle under the

influence of intoxicating liquor.3

Judgment affirmed.

By the Court (Green, C.J.,
Neyman & Englander, JJ.4),

Assistant Clerk

Entered: March 5, 2024.

3 The defendant raises a variety of other claims, many of which
are unsupported by reasoned analysis or relevant authority. As
such, they fail to rise to the level of adequate appellate
argument as required by Mass. R. A. P. 16(a) (9), as appearing
in 481 Mass. 1628 (2019). See Commonwealth v. Beverly, 485
Mass. 1, 16 (2020). To the extent that we do not address the
defendant's other contentions, "they 'have not been overlooked.
We find nothing in them that requires discussion.'" Commonwealth
v. Sosa, 493 Mass. 104, 124 n.12 (2023), quoting Commonwealth v.
Domanski, 332 Mass. 66, 78 (1954).

4 The panelists are listed in order of seniority.

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