William Howard v. Massachusetts Trial Court.

NOTICE: Summary decisions issued by the Appeals Court pursuant to M.A.C. Rule
23.0, as appearing in 97 Mass. App. Ct. 1017 (2020) (formerly known as rule 1:28,
as amended by 73 Mass. App. Ct. 1001 [2009]), are primarily directed to the parties
and, therefore, may not fully address the facts of the case or the panel's
decisional rationale. Moreover, such decisions are not circulated to the entire
court and, therefore, represent only the views of the panel that decided the case.
A summary decision pursuant to rule 23.0 or rule 1:28 issued after February 25,
2008, may be cited for its persuasive value but, because of the limitations noted
above, not as binding precedent. See Chace v. Curran, 71 Mass. App. Ct. 258, 260
n.4 (2008).

COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS

APPEALS COURT

23-P-495

WILLIAM HOWARD

vs.

MASSACHUSETTS TRIAL COURT.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 23.0

Plaintiff William Howard is a court officer who alleges

that he suffered debilitating injuries on the job on multiple

dates beginning in 1998. In 2022, he brought a complaint

related to such injuries. In count one of the complaint, he

sought so-called "assault pay" pursuant to G. L. c. 30, § 58, to

make up the difference between what he was receiving in workers'

compensation payments and his salary. In count two, he sought

treble damages and attorney's fees pursuant to the Wage Act,

G. L. c. 149, § 148, based on the Commonwealth's failure to pay

him assault pay. On the defendant's motion to dismiss, a

Superior Court judge ruled in the Commonwealth's favor and

dismissed the complaint in its entirety. For the reasons that

follow, we affirm in part and vacate in part.
Count one. The judge dismissed count one on statute of

limitations grounds. As the defendant now appropriately

concedes, this was error. See Flaherty v. Sheriff of Suffolk

County, 87 Mass. App. Ct. 157, 161 (2015), quoting Chambers v.

Lemuel Shattuck Hosp. 41 Mass. App. Ct. 211, 213 (1996) ("[W]e

consider each alleged violation of the continuing weekly payment

obligation a new claim for statute of limitations purposes").

However, the defendant requests that we affirm the dismissal of

count one on the alternative ground that Howard's complaint

fails to state a claim. Specifically, the defendant argues that

the complaint does not sufficiently allege that the injuries at

issue (the ones for which Howard was eligible for workers'

compensation) were covered by the assault pay statute, that is,

were ones that "result[ed] from acts of violence in the

courtroom or public areas, holding areas and other designated

areas of the courthouse or from subduing or apprehending

escaping prisoners." G. L. c. 30, § 58. The defendant had

raised that argument in its motion to dismiss, but the judge did

not reach it.

To survive a motion to dismiss for failure to state a

claim, a complaint must include "factual 'allegations plausibly

suggesting (not merely consistent with)' an entitlement to

relief." Iannacchino v. Ford Motor Co., 451 Mass. 623, 636

(2008), quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 557

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(2007). In determining whether the complaint meets that

standard, "[w]e accept as true the facts alleged in the

plaintiffs' complaint as well as any favorable inferences that

reasonably can be drawn from them." Galiastro v. Mortgage

Electronic Registration Sys., Inc., 467 Mass. 160, 164 (2014).

We turn to the specific allegations of the complaint.

Howard alleges that over the course of his employment as a court

officer, he "suffered multiple and recurrent injury to both

hands, the digits of both hands and both wrists resulting from

the physical and/or violent acts of prisoners in his custody

and/or being transported." After referencing ten specific such

incidents between 1998 and 2018 and describing in detail the

nature of the injuries and treatment he received, his complaint

alleges that he has been out of work receiving workers'

compensation since June 5, 2020, "[a]s a result of his work

injuries." It also references the fact that, in 2021, a medical

examiner retained by the trial court concluded -- after

reviewing Howard's medical records -- "that the current

condition and need for treatment is most likely a result of his

34 years as a court officer and repeated trauma and sprains to

the base of both hands. These prior work injuries are a major

cause for the need for treatment, including surgery."

Reading the allegations of the complaint as a whole, along

with the reasonable inferences that can be drawn therefrom, we

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conclude that the complaint sufficiently pleads that Howard was

out of work because of, and receiving workers' compensation for,

injuries that qualified under the assault pay statute. In

arguing that the complaint nevertheless fails as a matter of

law, the defendant goes outside the allegations of the

complaint. Specifically, the defendant points to the fact that

when Howard filled out his application for workers'

compensation, he stated that he was injured when he "tripped on

the stair tread." The defendant appears to treat that answer as

a binding admission that the injury for which he was seeking

workers' compensation was caused in a manner that is not

compensable under the assault pay statute (based on Howard's

failure to mention prisoner violence when he applied for

worker's compensation).

Putting aside whether the completed application form was

even properly before the judge on a motion to dismiss,1 we do not

view it as negating the allegations in the complaint that

Howard's injuries were caused by incidents involving violent

1 The workers' compensation application form was not attached to
the complaint or referenced in it, and it is doubtful that
Howard properly could be said to have relied on it "in framing
the complaint." Contrast Marram v. Kobrick Offshore Fund, Ltd.,
442 Mass. 43, 45 n.4 (2004) (submittal of contractual documents
with defendant's motion to dismiss did not convert motion to one
for summary judgment where "plaintiff had notice of these
documents and relied on them in framing the complaint"). We
need not resolve whether the workers' compensation application
form was properly before the judge.

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prisoners. Even if we were to assume that Howard's most recent

absence from work was precipitated by a noncompensable incident,

that does not preclude Howard from alleging that the incident

served to aggravate the "repeated trauma and sprains" that

Howard sustained from prior incidents that do appear to fit

comfortably within the assault pay statute. Applying the

standards appropriate to motions filed pursuant to Mass. R. Civ.

P. 12 (b) (6), 365 Mass. 754 (1974), we conclude that the

allegations in the complaint are sufficient to state an assault

pay claim. To the extent that there is evidence that

potentially contradicts or precludes Howard's claim, that may be

addressed through summary judgment or other appropriate

mechanisms.

In sum, the judge erred in dismissing count one on statute

of limitations grounds, and that ruling cannot be upheld on the

alternative ground that the defendant now presses.

Count two. The judge dismissed Howard's Wage Act claim

based on sovereign immunity. That ruling is supported by

Donahue v. Trial Court, 99 Mass. App. Ct. 180, 183-187 (2021)

(affirming dismissal of court officer's Wage Act claim on

sovereign immunity grounds). Howard seeks to distinguish

Donahue on the ground that it involved an overtime claim, while

here the predicate violation involved the assault pay statute.

We are unpersuaded that this distinction matters. The reasoning

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of Donahue turned on the fact that the circumstances of a court

officer who is injured while working in a court house do not fit

within the relevant terms of the statute that effected a limited

waiver of sovereign immunity for Wage Act claims. See Donahue

at 185-186 (court officer "is not a mechanic, workman, or

laborer," and "court houses are not penal institutions"). The

same reasoning applies to the case before us. The dismissal of

count two therefore was correct.

We vacate the judgment insofar as it dismissed count one of

the complaint and remand the matter to the Superior Court for

further proceedings consistent with this memorandum and order.

We affirm the dismissal of count two.

So ordered.

By the Court (Milkey,
Massing & Neyman, JJ.2),

Assistant Clerk

Entered: March 14, 2024.

2 The panelists are listed in order of seniority.

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