Thomas A. & Sandra J. Cosenzi v. Board of Assessors of the City of Springfield (October 15, 2008)

COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS

APPELLATE TAX BOARD


THOMAS A. & SANDRA J. COSENZI	v	 BOARD OF ASSESSORS OF
							 THE CITY OF SPRINGFIELD


Docket Nos. F281089		     Promulgated: October 15, 2008
		  X298208 
              		  		   			

	The appeal in Docket Number F281089 was filed under the formal procedure pursuant to G.L. c. 58A, § 7 and G.L. c. 59, §§ 64 and 65 from the refusal of the appellee Board of Assessors of the City of Springfield ("appellee" or "assessors") to abate taxes on real estate located in the City of Springfield ("Springfield"), owned by and assessed to the appellants Thomas A. and Sandra J. Cosenzi ("appellants") under G.L. c. 59, §§ 11 and 38, for fiscal year 2005. The appeal in Docket Number X298208 was filed under the informal procedure pursuant to G.L. c. 58A, § 7A and G.L. c. 59, §§ 64 and 65 from the refusal of the assessors to abate taxes on real estate located in Springfield, owned by and assessed to the appellants under G.L. c. 59, §§ 11 and 38, for fiscal year 2006.
	Chairman Hammond heard these appeals, and was joined in the decisions for the appellee by Commissioners Scharaffa, Egan, Rose, and Mulhern. These findings of fact and report are made at the request of the appellants under G.L. c. 58A, § 13 and 831 CMR 1.32.
	Matthew A. Luz, Esq. for the appellants.
	Kathleen T. Breck, Esq. for the appellee. 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND REPORT
	Based on the testimony and exhibits offered at the hearing of these appeals, the Appellate Tax Board ("Board") made the following findings of fact. On January 1, 2004 and January 1, 2005 ("the valuation dates at issue"), appellants were the assessed owners of a parcel of real estate located at 1355 Boston Road in Springfield ("the subject property").
	For fiscal year 2005, the assessors valued the subject property at $1,519,200. For fiscal year 2006, the assessors valued the subject property at $1,574,700. A tax was imposed at the rate of $33.36 per thousand in the amount of $50,681 for fiscal year 2005. A tax was imposed at the rate of $33.02 per thousand in the amount of $51,997 for fiscal year 2006. Taxes were timely paid. Further jurisdictional information appears as follows: 
	Annual Tax
Bills Mailed	Abatement 
Apps. Filed	Dates of 
Denials	Petition Filed 
With Board	
FY 2005	12/31/05	1/31/05	4/30/05	6/29/05	
FY 2006	3/24/06	4/25/06	7/11/06	9/29/05	

The foregoing facts established the Board's jurisdiction over the instant appeals.
	Testifying for the appellants was real estate appraiser Donald J. Griffin of Arlington, Massachusetts, whom the Board qualified as an expert witness in the field of real estate valuation. Mr. Griffin offered testimony and a report concerning separate "highest and best use analyses" of the subject property as improved and as vacant, as of the relevant valuation dates. Testifying for the appellee were Richard Allen, a member of the Springfield Board of Assessors and Stephen P. O'Malley, Chairman of the Springfield Board of Assessors. Mr. Allen and Mr. O'Malley testified as to how the assessors arrived at the disputed assessments, and discussed locational influences on the subject property.
	The subject property consisted of an irregularly-shaped lot 2.52 acres in size, improved with a concrete block structure used prior to the valuation dates at issue as a Ford automobile dealership. The improvement had approximately 19,924 square feet of gross building area. As of the valuation dates at issue, the site was unoccupied and being marketed for sale or lease. The subject property has 300 feet of frontage on Boston Road near the intersection of Parker Street, has level topography, and is benefited by a dominant driveway easement across the parking area of a neighboring lot with direct frontage on Parker Street. The subject property is zoned for business use, and is in an area of retail concentration that is considered a leading shopping destination in Western Massachusetts. 
Mr. Griffin indicated that the lease on the Ford automobile dealership formerly operated out of the subject property expired on July 31, 2002. Lou Pronto Group and Plotkin and Associates marketed the property for sale or rental subsequent to the closure of the automobile dealership. One potential buyer, Best Buy, expressed interest, but its purchase was conditioned on the sale of an adjacent property, which did not occur. 
On August 31, 2005, subsequent to the second valuation date at issue and after the July 1, 2005 deadline for taking account of new construction at the subject property, building permit number 0502798 was issued for the demolition of the automobile dealership. On September 7, 2005, building permit number 0502857 was issued for the construction of a bank building. Building permit number 0601043 was issued on July 13, 2006 for the construction of an Applebee's restaurant. At the time Mr. Griffin inspected the property on April 24, 2007, the site was improved for two separate retail uses, by a Webster Bank and an Applebee's restaurant. Appellants leased the land to these businesses, but no information as to rental terms was in evidence.
Since the automobile dealership was gone when Mr. Griffin inspected the subject property, he obtained information about the pre-existing structure through discussions with the owner and a review of Springfield's records. He described the building as one-storied, with concrete block construction. He said the year of construction was 1970, and it was in "average" condition. His report reflected that 73% of the structure was a service garage, 16% was a showroom, and 11% was used for office space. The walls were said to be 12 feet high in the showroom and 17 feet high in the service garage and office. There was open, paved parking on site. Mr. Griffin indicated in his report that the space was used for retail purposes. However, he testified that he viewed the building as "industrial-style" for purposes of developing sales comparisons. 
Mr. Griffin offered four Springfield sales for purposes of gauging the highest and best use of the property as it was improved on the relevant valuation dates. The industrial property at 189 Brookdale Drive was reportedly sold on July 29, 2005 for $1,150,000, with a land area of 122,098 square feet and a building area of 24,530 square feet. The industrial property at 50 Warehouse Street was reportedly sold on March 3, 2006 for $1,075,000, with a land area of 115,346 square feet and a building area of 30,000 square feet. 
The only Springfield retail property Mr. Griffin used for purposes of comparison was situated at 1900 Wilbraham Road, a location he described as "superior" to that of the subject property in the grid appearing at page 22 of his report. A Feldstein's retail store was situated at 1900 Wilbraham Road, which had a land area of 37,256 square feet and a building area of 14,427 square feet. 1900 Wilbraham Road reportedly sold on November 17, 2004 for $900,000. 
Mr. Griffin's fourth Springfield sale was of an industrial property at 220 Brookdale Road, which reportedly sold on May 16, 2006 for $675,000, with 153,941 square feet of land area and a building area of 16,873 square feet. In addition, Mr. Griffin relied on the sale of a banqueting hall in Wilbraham, and the foreclosure sale of a skating rink in Chicopee. 
Mr. Griffin made a number of adjustments to the sale prices of the assertedly comparable properties. However, he made no allowance for the supposedly superior location of 1900 Wilbraham Road in the grid appearing at page 28 of his report that related to the highest and best use of the subject property as improved. He used a value of $36.15 per square foot of building area to estimate a value for the property, land and improvement together, of $720,000.
Mr. Griffin also considered highest and best use as though the subject property were vacant, arriving at an estimated land value on a "value per site" basis. He opined that the subject property was suitable for one business site, which would require only 40,000 square feet of the total area of 109,858+ square feet. Report at page 18. He regarded the land area over 40,000 square feet as excess land unsuitable for a second business site. He explained his reasoning as follows: 
Because of the shape of the site and 300' frontage we concluded that the site is one site with excess land. The most desirable site would be 200' x 200'. If the site were sub-divided, you would get one desirable site and one with 100' frontage that was very irregular. If you divided equally with 150' frontage each, you would have two less desirable irregular sites. 

Report at page 19.
	Although frontage and access were his principal reasons for ruling out use of the subject property for two commercial sites, he gave little weight to the dominant driveway easement which enabled ingress and egress via Parker Street. He asserted that the easement "does not appear to add any significant utility to the lot." Report at page 14. 
	In arriving at his opinion of the highest and best use of the subject property as vacant, he considered three other single-use commercial sites in Springfield, and three properties in Central Massachusetts. A realty office at 1300 Boston Road in Springfield was situated on 2.69 acres of land, and sold on February 16, 2006, over a year after the most recent valuation date, for $1,050,000. He noted that this property was across the street from the subject property, but had 218 feet of frontage on Boston Road, less than the subject. 
Mr. Griffin also used the property at 1900 Wilbraham Road in Springfield, which he had considered in valuing the property as improved, to arrive at an opinion of highest and best use for the subject property as though vacant. 1900 Wilbraham Road, with a land area of 0.86 acres, sold for $900,000 on November 17, 2004. Mr. Griffin deemed the Wilbraham Road location superior to that of the subject property. 
He also considered the sale of the 0.80-acre property at 691 Boston Road in Springfield, in an area he described as "less developed." This property sold for $333,000 on March 9, 2005. Based on the three Springfield properties, the Central Massachusetts properties, and the adjustments detailed in his report at page 22, he arrived at an estimated value of $800,000 for a highest and best use of the subject property as vacant. His final opinion was that the highest and best use of the subject property was as vacant, with the $800,000 value greater than the $720,000 value he derived for the land as improved on the valuation dates at issue.
	On cross-examination, Mr. Griffin testified that he had appraised two commercial properties adjacent to the subject property approximately one year before the trial date. He appraised the sites of a Circuit City retail store and a Ruby Tuesday's restaurant using both the sales comparison and the income approaches to value, giving equal weight to each. He could not recall any other appraisals he performed in the Springfield area.
	Mr. Griffin testified that the Boston Road commercial corridor, where the subject property was located, included a number of shopping malls and national restaurants and stores. He placed the Boston Road commercial corridor in the "top 20 percent" of the busiest commercial areas in Springfield, but conceded he did not research other commercial districts in Springfield. He briefly viewed the area at the intersection of Parker Street and Wilbraham Road, from which he took the 1900 Wilbraham Road property, which he deemed to have a superior location. However, he conceded that there was less commercial development in the area of Parker Street and Wilbraham Road, extending only one quarter mile in any direction from the intersection. He also said he believed that there were no national chains (stores or restaurants) at Parker Street and Wilbraham Road.
	Mr. Griffin testified that he was unfamiliar with the legal requirement that properties be assessed at fair cash value as of specific valuation dates. He emphasized that his assignment had been "to value the property in its highest and best use as of those dates." Explaining his choice of industrial properties as comparable sales in attempting to value the subject property's highest and best use as improved, he stated that, given the closure of the automobile dealership, "its alternative highest and best use would have been along the lines of an industrial commercial use." However, Mr. Griffin failed to explain why a location on a busy retail corridor would be chosen for an industrial site. He offered a traffic analysis intended to support his opinion of the relative market appeal of the properties he considered, but failed to explain his methodology with sufficient clarity and detail to lend credence to his conclusions. He also testified that real estate values in Springfield increased at a rate of nine percent during the relevant period.
	Testifying for the appellee were Richard Allen and Stephen P. O'Malley, member and Chairman of the Board of Assessors, respectively. Mr. Allen offered his observations about the Boston Road corridor, based on his familiarity with retail market conditions and sales and leases of property in the area. He described the Boston Road corridor near the intersection of Parker Street as "unquestionably the most robust and vibrant corridor in Springfield. The predominant use is retail." He further explained that the corridor extends two to three miles within Springfield and continues into Wilbraham. He noted the presence of numerous national restaurant chains, banks, retail stores, and the Eastfield Mall in the area. 
He also described the area near the intersection of Wilbraham Road and Parker Street, where Mr. Griffin's only Springfield retail comparable property was located. Mr. Allen indicated that this area was a neighborhood commercial district, featuring only two national chain stores in its mix of retail businesses. Local gas stations and banks are more characteristic of the Wilbraham Road, Parker Street area. Moreover, this retail area is much less concentrated than the Boston Road/Parker Street corridor; a two minute walk in either direction from the Wilbraham Road and Parker Street intersection would lead to residential development. Mr. Allen testified that the Boston Road corridor where the subject property is situated had greater exposure to passing traffic than did the Wilbraham Road, Parker Street intersection, where Mr. Griffin's 1900 Wilbraham Road comparable was situated.
	Mr. Allen also testified as to how the assessors arrived at the valuations at issue for the subject property. He indicated that they had primarily relied on the income approach. Individual rents were assigned to different parts of the structure as it existed on the relevant valuation dates: 1792 square feet of office space; 13,044 square feet of multi-use office space of lesser quality; and 16,788 square feet of auto service space. The assessors also gave consideration to market sales of commercial properties in settling on the assessed values. 
On cross-examination, Mr. Allen testified that the assessors would consider any changes to the improvements on real property up to June 30, 2005 in determining assessed value. However, because the demolition of the auto dealership and the construction of the Applebee's restaurant and the Webster Bank on the subject property occurred after the relevant time period had ended, these structures had no bearing on the assessed values at issue. 
	Mr. O'Malley testified both as a certified assessor and certified real estate appraiser, but was not offered or qualified by the Board as an expert witness. He prepared no appraisal report and offered no opinion of value. He concurred in Mr. Allen's observation that the Boston Road corridor near Parker Street was the most significant retail area and commercial artery in Springfield. He also indicated that the Wilbraham Road and Parker Street intersection was a neighborhood shopping district. Based on Mr. O'Malley's observations of the area, he concluded that the Boston Road corridor was the superior site for a retail business. 
	Mr. O'Malley testified that he had seen no empirical evidence to support Mr. Griffin's assumption of a nine-percent appreciation rate during the relevant period. Mr. O'Malley also said that the owners of the subject property leased the land to the two businesses operating there after the years at issue. 
	Mr. O'Malley offered a selection of sales of similar properties in the Greater Springfield area, listed with pertinent details at Exhibit E. He pointed to the June 28, 2007 sale of an auto dealership in Hadley, for the price of $1,500,000. This property, at 40 Russell Street in Hadley, had a land area of 0.97 acres and a gross building area of 10,978 square feet. The only Springfield transaction from the immediate area of the subject property was the February 16, 2006 sale of 1300 Boston Road, which had previously been the site of a vacant restaurant. The 1300 Boston Road property had a land area of 2.12 acres, slightly smaller than the subject. While the listing of property sales supplied by the assessors reflected no building size for the improvement, Mr. O'Malley testified that the property was sold as improved for $1,500,000.
	Mr. O'Malley also testified about two sales of automobile dealerships on Riverdale Road in the Town of West Springfield, which he described as the main commercial thoroughfare in that town. A former Nissan dealership at 500 Riverdale Road in West Springfield sold for $3,200,000 on October 1, 2001. The two sites involved in that transaction had a total of 4.24 acres in land area, and an improvement with 24,133 square feet in building area. The property at 655 Riverdale Road in West Springfield was located almost across the street from 500 Riverdale Road. This 3.6-acre site, and the 17,199 square-foot structure, sold on September 1, 2006 for $2,500,000.
	Finally, two automobile dealerships in Chicopee were offered as comparable sales. The former Casey Chevrolet site at 505 Memorial Drive in Chicopee was sold for $2,400,000 on December 7, 2004. The property had a land area of 6.1 acres and a building size of 30,613 square feet. Subsequent to the sale, the improvement was demolished and the land made available for commercial development. A Ford dealership at 60 Fuller Road, off Memorial Drive in Chicopee, sold for $1,400,000 on March 1, 2004. The land area was slightly larger than the subject property at 2.94 acres, and the improvement had a building area of 18,800 square feet. 
	The comparable transactions proposed by the assessors had prices per square foot of building area in line with the assessed values of the subject property broken down by square foot of building area. However, Mr. O'Malley did not offer adjustments to account for differences between the comparison properties and the subject property and did not develop final indications of value from his review of relevant sales. 
	On the basis of the foregoing, the Board found and ruled that the appellants failed to carry their burden of proving that the subject property had a lower fair cash value than the amounts assessed on the valuation dates at issue. First, the Board found that Mr. Griffin did not conduct a full valuation analysis of the subject property for the valuation dates at issue. He repeatedly described his assignment in his testimony as focusing on the "highest and best use" of the subject property, suggesting that that preliminary question was as far as he took his conclusions. In response to a query on cross-examination about the assessors' responsibility to assess properties at fair market value on the relevant valuation dates, he indicated he was unfamiliar with the requirement. He went on to state that "my task was to value the property in its highest and best use as of those dates." 
Mr. Griffin's report, in its table of contents and at page 17, erroneously implied that he had considered all three valuation methodologies used in the appraisal of real estate. An income capitalization analysis is referenced at page 18 of the report, but no discussion of the income approach to value appears there or elsewhere in the report. There is a heading for a cost approach analysis on page 17, but the single sentence appearing under that heading discusses "highest and best use." Although the subject property is income-producing, there is no indication that Mr. Griffin attempted to develop a final estimate of fair cash value giving due consideration to the income approach.
Mr. Griffin's separate sales-comparison analyses for the subject property as vacant and as improved were flawed. He failed to demonstrate in either his report or his testimony that the properties he used for purposes of comparison were fundamentally similar to the subject property. Although the subject property was zoned for business use and had an advantageous retail location, Mr. Griffin relied heavily on sales of industrial properties, without a convincing justification. He did not include in his analysis sales of auto dealerships in the Greater Springfield area, which were brought to light by the assessors, though he said he had researched sales in the area thoroughly. He did, however, rely on sales of dissimilar properties, such as the foreclosure sale of a skating rink in Chicopee, and sales of properties at great distance from the site of the subject property. Moreover, he assumed increases in Springfield property values at a rate of roughly nine percent per annum, but failed to offer market evidence to substantiate this assertion.
	Mr. Griffin considered only one retail property in Springfield in the course of his highest and best use analyses. He deemed 1900 Wilbraham Road to enjoy a retail location superior to that of the subject property. However, persuasive evidence from both Messrs. Allen and O'Malley contradicted Mr. Griffin's opinion about the supposed superiority of the retail area surrounding 1900 Wilbraham Road. Mr. Griffin's negative locational adjustment to the sales price of 1900 Wilbraham Road, in his analysis of highest and best use as though vacant, was unsupported on the basis of the evidence as a whole, and undermined the probative force of his ultimate opinion. 
	Second, Mr. Griffin's analysis of highest and best use was conclusory and unpersuasive. He quoted at page 17 of his report a definition of highest and best use from the eleventh edition of The Appraisal of Real Estate, published by the Appraisal Institute: "'The reasonable [sic] probable and legal use of vacant land or an improved property, which is physically possible, appropriately supported, financially feasible, and that results in the highest value.'" However, there is no discussion in his report indicating that he applied the accepted tests for determining highest and best use to the relevant facts. 
He considered only two possible uses for the subject property: as it was improved on the relevant assessment dates, and as vacant and available for development as a single 40,000 square foot site, with excess land. Although he asserted that the property had insufficient frontage and access to support two retail sites, he did not substantiate that statement. Nowhere in his report or his testimony did he establish that use of the property for a single retail location was maximally productive, e.g. by demonstrating that use for two business sites, presumably yielding more rental income, was not "physically possible" or "financially feasible." 
	Indeed, Mr. Griffin's assertions as to highest and best use were contradicted by the use being made of the subject property at the time he inspected it. There were in fact two businesses in operation at the subject property when he inspected it, subsequent to the time period at issue. This actual use made clear that it was physically possible to accommodate both a restaurant and a bank at the subject property. This simple fact, which appellants placed in evidence, undercut the assumption at the heart of the opinion of highest and best use as vacant, to which Mr. Griffin gave the greater weight. Mr. Griffin never attempted to reconcile his assertion that the subject property was suitable for only a single retail site with the fact that two businesses were operating there at the time of his inspection. In sum, the Board gave no weight to Mr. Griffin's highest and best use analysis. 
	The appellants failed to carry their burden of proof to show that the value of the subject property was less than that assessed for the fiscal years at issue. The Board accordingly decided the instant appeals for the appellee assessors.
OPINION
The assessors are required to assess real estate at its "fair cash value." G.L. c. 59, § 38.  Fair cash value is defined as the price on which a willing seller and a willing buyer will agree if both of them are fully informed and under no compulsion. Boston Gas Co. v. Assessors of Boston, 334 Mass. 549, 566 (1956).  
The appellants have the burden of proving that the property has a lower value than that assessed.  "'The burden of proof is upon the petitioner to make out its right as a matter of law to abatement of the tax.'"  Schlaiker v. Assessors of Great Barrington, 365 Mass. 243, 245 (1974) (quoting Judson Freight Forwarding Co. v. Commonwealth, 242 Mass. 47, 55 (1922)).  "[T]he board is entitled to 'presume that the valuation made by the assessors [is] valid unless the taxpayers . . . prov[e] the contrary.'"  General Electric Co. v. Assessors of Lynn, 393 Mass. 591, 598 (1984) (quoting Schlaiker, 363 Mass. at 245).
Real estate valuation experts, the courts, and this Board generally utilize three principal methods to arrive at fair cash value: the cost approach, income capitalization, and comparable-sales analysis. See Correia v New Bedford Redevelopment Authority, 375 Mass. 360, 362 (1978). "The capitalization of income approach . . . is frequently applied with respect to income-producing property." Taunton Redevelopment Authority v. Assessors of Taunton, 393 Mass. 293, 295 (1984.) However, "[t]he Board is not required to adopt any particular method of valuation."  Pepsi-Cola Bottling Co. v. Assessors of Boston, 397 Mass. 447, 449 (1986).  Regardless of which method is employed to determine fair cash value, the Board "must determine 'the highest price which a hypothetical willing buyer would pay to a hypothetical willing seller in an assumed free and open market.'"  Irving Saunders Trust v. Assessors of Boston, 26 Mass. App. Ct. 838, 843 (1989) (citation omitted). "The validity of a final estimate of market value depends to a great extent on how well it can be supported by market data." Chatham Investment Trust of Newton v. Assessors of Newton, Mass. ATB Findings of Fact and Reports 2007-298, 2007-308 (citing The Appraisal of Real Estate, Appraisal Institute (12th ed. 2001)). 
The ascertainment of a property's highest and best use is a prerequisite to valuation analysis. See Peterson v. Assessors of Boston, 62 Mass. App. Ct. 428, 429 (2004); Irving Saunders Trust, 26 Mass. App. Ct. at 843. "A property's highest and best use must be legally permissible, physically possible, financially feasible, and maximally productive." Northshore Mall Limited Partnership v. Assessors of Peabody, Mass. ATB Findings of Fact and Report 2004-195, 246, aff'd 63 Mass.App.Ct. 1116 (2005).
In the instant appeals, appellants' evidence was confined to the preliminary question of highest and best use, and failed to provide a basis upon which a finding could be made on even that issue. In arriving at his opinion of the highest and best use of the subject property, the appellants' expert, Mr. Griffin, utilized a selection of sales-comparison properties that lacked fundamental similarities with the subject property. He ignored sales of comparable retail properties in the Springfield area in favor of transactions involving industrial properties and properties at considerable distance from the subject property. See James Millar Co. v. Commonwealth, 251 Mass. 457, 464 (1925)("There would seem to have been no insuperable difficulty in ascertaining the fair market value of the land . . . in a town the size of Plymouth, without resort to evidence of sales of land twenty-five miles away").
A more serious flaw in Mr. Griffin's opinion arose from his failure to apply the four criteria which govern determination of highest and best use -- legal permissibility, physical possibility, financial feasibility, and maximum productivity -- to the relevant facts. He asserted that only one retail site of a single acre was "most desirable" for development on the subject property, but offered no opinion in terms of the applicable criteria. "As a general rule, the highest and best use statement should summarize the discussion that precedes it and follow the sequence of the four tests. A logically structured review of the four tests forms the foundation for the opinion of value." The Appraisal of Real Estate, supra, at 319.
The report failed to supply necessary discussion of the basis for Mr. Griffin's conclusion as to highest and best use. Nor can any reasonable basis for his opinion of the highest and best use of the subject property as vacant be surmised. Mr. Griffin's assignment was conducted after the valuation dates at issue, at a time when two retail businesses were operating at the subject property under leases from the appellants. He could not have logically concluded that the use of the subject property for two retail businesses was physically impossible when two businesses were present on the site at the time he inspected it. See The Appraisal of Real Estate, supra, at 318. (An "existing use is obviously physically possible"). Nor could he plausibly have deemed use of the subject property for a single business, with an acre and a half of excess land to spare, to be "maximally productive" when the subject property obviously could accommodate two retail businesses as of the relevant assessment dates. Mr. Griffin's unsupported assertions about highest and best use were not credible and were given no weight by the Board.
"The Board was not required to believe the testimony of any particular witness." Assessors of Quincy v. Boston Consol. Gas Co., 309 Mass. 60, 72 (1941) "'The mere qualification of a person as an expert does not endow his testimony with any determinative weight.'" Mayflower Emerald Square, LLC v. Assessors of North Attleborough, Mass. ATB Findings of Fact and Report 2007-421, 527. As was emphasized in Foxboro Associates v. Assessors of Foxborough, 385 Mass. 679, 683 (1982), "'[t]he board was not required to accept the opinion expressed, or the valuation principles used by [the taxpayer's expert witness.]'" Rather, "[t]he essential requirement is that the Board exercise judgment." New Boston Garden Corp. v. Assessors of Boston, 383 Mass. 456, 473 (1981).
Findings of fair cash value by the Board must be based on substantial evidence, defined to mean "'such evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.'" RCN-BecoCom LLC v. Commissioner of Revenue, 443 Mass. 198, 204 (2005) (citation omitted.) Mr. Griffin's conclusory opinion of the highest and best use of the subject property, detached as it was from the controlling analysis and relevant circumstances, did not support a finding of fair cash value at variance with the assessed values of the subject property on the valuation dates at issue. 
On the basis of all the evidence of record, the Board found and ruled that the appellants failed to meet their burden of proving that the fair cash value of the subject property was less than its assessed value for each of the years at issue.  Accordingly, the Board decided the instant appeals for the appellee assessors.
 
APPELLATE TAX BOARD


				 By:	___________________________________
					Thomas W. Hammond, Jr., Chairman






A true copy,

Attest:____________________________
	  Assistant Clerk of the Board

 Mr. Griffin compared the indicated values he estimated under each highest and best use analysis and concluded that the use which resulted in the highest value was the subject property's highest and best use.
 The assessors also offered evidence regarding the sale of 1300 Boston Road, but said the parcel was 2.12 acres in size.
 A 10% negative adjustment for location was made to the sales price of 1900 Wilbraham Road in the context of determining highest and best use as though vacant. In contrast, no negative adjustment on account of location was made to the price of 1900 Wilbraham Road in the grid relating to highest and best use as improved. Compare pages 22 and 28 of the Report. The discrepancy was never explained.
 Although a reference is made to the income approach to value in Mr. Griffin's Report, no income capitalization analysis nor indicated value derived from that approach appeared in the Report. 
 The testimony is at variance with the assessors' sales listing at Exhibit E, however, which indicates the sales price was $1,050,000 in the February 16, 2006 transaction. The record is not clear as to whether the price listed in Exhibit E was a typographical error.

 Because he was neither offered nor qualified by the Board as an expert witness, and many of his comparable properties were located outside of Springfield, Mr. O'Malley, on this record, would not have been a competent witness to testify as to adjustments or an opinion of value. 
 Mr. Griffin spent only five or ten minutes observing the Parker Street and Wilbraham Road intersection before deeming that retail location "superior" to the Boston Road corridor.
 While Mr. Griffin opined that sub-division of the subject property would result in "two less desirable irregular sites," he did not exclude such a use as being physically impossible. See Report at page 19. 

ATB 2008-1299