State of Maine v. Denis Lemieux

MAINE SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT Reporter of Decisions
Decision: 2025 ME 98
Docket: Ken-24-341
Argued: October 7, 2025
Decided: December 23, 2025

Panel: STANFILL, C.J., and MEAD, CONNORS, LAWRENCE, and DOUGLAS, JJ.

STATE OF MAINE

v.

DENIS LEMIEUX

MEAD, J.

[¶1] Denis Lemieux appeals from a revocation of his probation by the

trial court (Kennebec County, Lipez, J.), claiming that his underlying conviction

is void. We do not reach the validity of the underlying conviction because we

affirm the trial court’s ruling that a defendant cannot use a probation

revocation proceeding to collaterally attack an underlying conviction.

I. BACKGROUND

[¶2] On October 17, 2023, the trial court (Kennebec County,

Daniel Mitchell, J.) entered a judgment of conviction after Denis Lemieux

pleaded guilty to domestic violence terrorizing (Class C), 17-A M.R.S.

§ 210-B(1)(B)(1) (2025).
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[¶3] The court sentenced Lemieux to three years of incarceration, with

all but eight months suspended, and probation. The probation conditions

included, among other things, that Lemieux refrain from all criminal conduct,

obtain permission before moving, and not have contact of any kind with three

named family members.

[¶4] On February 5, 2024, the State filed a motion to revoke Lemieux’s

probation, alleging that Lemieux made several threatening statements on social

media about two of the family members whom he was prohibited from

contacting. On June 3, 2024, the court (Lipez, J.) held a hearing on the State’s

motion. The court found by a preponderance of the evidence that Lemieux’s

social media statements constituted direct and indirect contact with the family

members in violation of protection orders and his probation conditions. In

addition, the court found by a preponderance of the evidence that Lemieux

inexcusably failed to comply with probation conditions regarding substance

use evaluation and counseling, psychological evaluation and counseling, and

notifying probation before moving. Accordingly, the court partially revoked

Lemieux’s probation .

[¶5] After the hearing, the court received briefing regarding the

appropriate sanction and held a sentencing hearing. Lemieux argued that the
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court should address whether the terrorizing statute under which he was

convicted was constitutional in light of a recent United States Supreme Court

decision. Lemieux contended that if the underlying conviction is

unconstitutional, the probation court should “treat the motion for probation

violation as if it’s missing the most core element,” that is, “an underlying

conviction and a valid sentence.”

[¶6] The court concluded that it could not address the collateral attack

during the probation-revocation proceeding because the proper avenue for

challenging the constitutionality of the underlying conviction is through

post-conviction review. The court sentenced Lemieux to serve eighteen

months of the suspended portion of his sentence. Lemieux filed a motion for

further findings, which the court denied. Lemieux timely filed an appeal of his

probation revocation pursuant to 17-A M.R.S. § 1813 (2025). On January 30,

2025, we granted a certificate of probable cause permitting full appellate

review.

II. DISCUSSION

[¶7] Lemieux argues that before revoking his probation, the court should

have examined the constitutionality of the statute under which he was

convicted. The State contends that a review of the statute’s constitutionality
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was unavailable because the only means of collaterally attacking a conviction is

through the post-conviction-review process. The State acknowledges that we

have expanded relief in circumstances where a defendant has asserted

ineffective assistance of counsel at probation-revocation proceedings. See

Petgrave v. State, 2019 ME 72, 208 A.3d 371.

[¶8] Lemieux asserts that authorities prohibiting contesting the validity

of a judgment during a post-conviction proceeding are not applicable to his

circumstances because “the facial [un]constitutionality of a statute renders the

court without jurisdiction to impose further sanction.” Lemieux argues further

that Petgrave supports his claim that the trial court can consider the

constitutionality of an underlying conviction at a probation-revocation hearing

because his claim involves an assertion of a violation of a fundamental right.

See id.

[¶9] We review an order revoking probation for an abuse of discretion.

Spinney v. State, 2017 ME 9, ¶ 10, 154 A.3d 138. We have consistently held that

post-conviction review is the exclusive avenue, besides a direct appeal, for

challenging an underlying judgment.1 See State v. Loi Ngo, 2007 ME 2, ¶ 4, 912

1 There is considerable federal jurisprudence surrounding this issue. See United States v.
Francischine, 512 F.2d 827, 828 (5th Cir. 1975) (“[T]he underlying validity of a conviction cannot be
asserted as a defense in a probation revocation proceeding [but the conviction] may be collaterally
attacked . . . in a separate proceeding . . . .”); United States v. Castro-Verdugo, 750 F.3d 1065, 1068
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A.2d 1224 (“[T]he post-conviction review process is the exclusive means for

judicial review.”); State v. Trott, 2004 ME 15, ¶ 8, 841 A.2d 789 (“[E]xcept for

direct appeals from a criminal judgment[,] the statutory

[post-conviction-review process is] the exclusive method of review of

. . . criminal judgments.” (quotations omitted)).

[¶10] In 2012, we held that a defendant may not collaterally attack a

prior conviction used for sentence enhancement by claiming that the

underlying guilty plea leading to the prior conviction was not based on an

effective waiver. State v. Johnson, 2012 ME 39, ¶ 23, 38 A.3d 1270. We reasoned

that “[a]llowing a collateral attack in cases like [that one] would provide

convicted defendants an incentive to forego a timely appeal or petition for

post-conviction review, knowing that they will never lose the ability to

challenge the validity of the conviction if, in the future, it is relied upon by the

State to enhance a new criminal charge.” Id. ¶ 21.

(9th Cir. 2014) (“An appeal challenging a probation revocation proceeding is not the proper avenue
through which to attack the validity of the original sentence.” (quoting United States v. Gerace, 997
F.2d 1293, 1295 (9th Cir. 1993))); United States v. Torrez-Flores, 624 F.2d 776, 778–79 (7th Cir. 1980)
(“[W]e hold that defendant may not collaterally attack his underlying conviction at a probation
revocation hearing. . . .”).
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A. Petgrave

[¶11] In Petgrave, we established a new procedure for a defendant

asserting a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel in circumstances where no

statutory procedure to enforce the right to counsel existed. 2019 ME 72, ¶ 1,

208 A.3d 371. In that case, Jonathan Petgrave pleaded guilty to a charge of

unlawful possession of a scheduled drug. Id. ¶ 2. Petgrave’s sentence included

two years of probation. Id.

[¶12] One year after sentencing, the State moved to revoke Petgrave’s

probation. Id. ¶ 3. After a hearing, the trial court revoked the probation. Id.

Petgrave, with new counsel, filed a petition for post-conviction review in the

trial court, alleging that his counsel had been ineffective at the revocation

hearing. Id. ¶ 5. The trial court concluded that the post-conviction-review

process is unavailable in a probation-revocation proceeding and dismissed

Petgrave’s petition. Id. ¶ 9; see 15 M.R.S. §§ 2121-2122 (2018).2 As a result,

Petgrave’s only available option to contest his probation revocation was to file

a discretionary appeal to the Law Court. Petgrave, 2019 ME 72, ¶ 10, 208 A.3d

371.

Title 15 M.R.S. § 2121 has since been amended, though not in any way that affects the present
2

case. See P.L. 2019, ch. 113, § C-37 (emergency, effective May 16, 2019) (codified at 15 M.R.S.
§ 2121(2) (2025)).
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[¶13] Before Petgrave’s appeal, we did not, in criminal cases, consider

claims of ineffective assistance on direct appeal from convictions or probation

revocations but considered such claims only on appeal from a

post-conviction-review proceeding, Petgrave was therefore deprived of an

opportunity to obtain an evidentiary hearing on his claim of ineffective

assistance of counsel. Id.; see State v. Nichols, 1997 ME 178, ¶¶ 4-5, 698 A.2d

521. This led us to develop a procedure to allow a defendant to pursue a claim

of ineffective assistance of counsel at a probation revocation hearing. Petgrave,

2019 ME 72, ¶ 15, 208 A.3d 371.

[¶14] Unlike Petgrave, Lemieux is not unable to assert his claim due to a

lack of a statutory procedure. On the contrary, a post-conviction-review

proceeding is the exact procedure to challenge a conviction that a defendant

claims becomes void.3 See 15 M.R.S. § 2122 (2025). “The fact that a party has

not availed himself of the specified rule or statute in a proper and timely

manner, or anticipates that the procedure may not provide complete relief or

3 Prior to the probation-revocation hearing, Lemieux’s counsel filed a petition for post-conviction

review, arguing that the underlying conviction was unconstitutional. On April 24, 2024, the court
denied the petition and asked counsel to follow procedures laid out in 15 M.R.S. § 2129 (2025) and
Maine Rules of Unified Criminal Procedure 67 and 68. During oral arguments, Lemieux’s counsel
stated that the petition for post-conviction review has been stayed pending this appeal.
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would be unconstitutional as applied, does not change the fact that a procedure

has been made available.” Loi Ngo, 2007 ME 2, ¶ 6, 912 A.2d 1224.

[¶15] Given that a procedure exists, and remains available, for Lemieux

to contest the validity of his underlying conviction, we see no reason to expand

the methods available to him for relief. As a result, the trial court did not abuse

its discretion in determining that it was not required to consider the

constitutionality of Lemieux’s underlying conviction before revoking his

probation. The proper and exclusive mechanism for challenging an underlying

conviction is through a petition for post-conviction review.

The entry is:

Judgment of probation revocation affirmed.

Daniel Lawson, Esq. (orally), Capital Region Public Defender’s Office, Augusta,
for appellant Denis Lemieux

Maeghan Maloney, District Attorney, and Jacob Demosthenes, Asst. Dist. Atty.
(orally), Office of the District Attorney, Augusta, for appellee State of Maine

Kennebec County Unified Criminal Docket docket number CR-2023-308
FOR CLERK REFERENCE ONLY