State of Maine v. Saad Zackaria

MAINE SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT Reporter of Decisions
Decision: 2026 ME 2
Docket: Cum-24-86
Argued: November 13, 2025
Decided: January 13, 2026

Panel: STANFILL, C.J., and MEAD, CONNORS, LAWRENCE, DOUGLAS, and LIPEZ, JJ.

STATE OF MAINE

v.

SAAD ZACKARIA

CONNORS, J.

[¶1] Saad Zackaria appeals from a judgment of conviction for one count

of aggravated assault with a dangerous weapon (Class A) and two counts of

assault with a dangerous weapon (Class C) entered by the trial court

(Cumberland County, J. French, J.) following a jury trial. See 17-A M.R.S. §

208(1)(B) (2025); 17-A M.R.S § 207(1)(A) (2025). On appeal he asserts that

the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress evidence obtained at

Preble Street Resource Center and his motion to dismiss for failure to provide

a speedy trial. We affirm.
2

I. BACKGROUND

A. Incident and Arrest

[¶2] The following facts, which the court found in denying the motion to

suppress, are adequately supported by the record when viewed in the light

most favorable to the order on the motion. State v. Gerry, 2016 ME 163, ¶ 2,

150 A.3d 810.

[¶3] On June 15, 2021, the Portland police spoke with two people who

reported that they were on Congress Street when they had been hit from behind

by a man. Both felt a sharp pain, and one sustained a wound on her back after

being poked. The victims described the assailant in roughly the same way—as

an African-American male with short spiky hair, wearing a green shirt. One of

the victims noted that the assailant carried a backpack and tablet.

[¶4] Based on these descriptions, officers were able to determine that

the assailant was likely Saad Zackaria and that he was likely at Preble Street

Resource Center. The officers went to the center, which was closed due to the

pandemic, though staff had allowed Zackaria to use the shower and the facility.

[¶5] The center’s staff let the officers in, and the officers found Zackaria,

fully dressed, at a sink in the common area, located just across from the shower

room. The door to the shower room was open. The officers asked to speak to
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Zackaria, at which point he walked toward the shower room. Zackaria entered

the shower room but left the door ajar as the officers waited outside. The door

was open wide enough for the officers to see that Zackaria was picking items

up off the floor. After waiting for a brief time, one of the officers opened the

shower room door and asked Zackaria to exit so that the officers could

determine if he had anything that could be used to “poke” them. After Zackaria

left the shower room, the officers saw a sharp object on the floor. Evidence

technicians subsequently inspected the items on the floor, which included

tweezers, a box cutter, and a wire. The officers then arrested Zackaria.

B. Procedure

[¶6] Zackaria was charged by complaint in June 2021 and was indicted

on August 5, 2021. The court found him incompetent to stand trial on

August 11, 2021. On March 16, 2022, the court found that he had been restored

to competency.

[¶7] On June 8, 2022, Zackaria filed a series of motions including a

motion to suppress. A hearing was held on August 25, 2022, and the court

(Cumberland, McKeon, J.) denied the motions on November 21, 2022.

[¶8] Zackaria requested the withdrawal of his counsel on

December 30, 2022, and the court granted the request on February 3, 2023.
4

After new counsel was appointed and jury selection was scheduled for

September 13, 2023, then-appointed defense counsel was involved in a serious

car accident and new counsel was appointed. Jury selection was continued to

December 11, 2023. After the jury was selected, four jurors indicated that they

would not be able to sit for the dates of trial and the court declared a mistrial.

[¶9] In December 2023, Zackaria filed several motions, including a

motion to dismiss for undue delay or, in the alternative, for a new bail hearing.

The court (J. French, J.) held a hearing on the motions on December 21, 2023,

and denied the motions on January 4, 2024.

[¶10] A jury trial was held from January 10 to 12, 2024, and the jury

found Zackaria guilty on all counts. The court sentenced him to six years of

incarceration, with all but thirty-three months suspended, and four years of

probation. Zackaria timely appealed.

II. DISCUSSION

A. The court did not err in denying Zackaria’s motion to suppress.

[¶11] When evaluating a trial court’s ruling on a motion to suppress, “we

review the court’s factual findings for clear error and its legal conclusions

de novo.” State v. Marquis, 2018 ME 39, ¶ 15, 181 A.3d. 684; State v. Lovett,

2015 ME 7, ¶ 6, 109 A. 3d 1135. We “will uphold the court’s denial of a motion
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to suppress if any reasonable view of the evidence supports the trial court’s

decision.” State v. Ormsby, 2013 ME 88, ¶ 9, 81 A.3d 336 (quotation marks

omitted).

[¶12] The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides

that “[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and

effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated.”

U.S. Const. amend. IV.1 This right is violated when the government unlawfully

searches a space in which an individual has a reasonable expectation of privacy.

See State v. Akers, 2021 ME 43, ¶ 25, 259 A.3d 127. Zackaria asserts that he had

a reasonable expectation of privacy in both the shower room and in the

common area of Preble Street Resource Center.2

1Zackaria has invoked his rights only under the Fourth Amendment, not that federal provision’s
counterpart in the Maine Constitution, art. 1, § 5.

2 Whether one has a reasonable expectation of privacy is a two-part inquiry in which we ask
“[f]irst, has the individual manifested a subjective expectation of privacy in the object of the
challenged search; and second, is society willing to recognize that expectation as reasonable?” State
v. Bridges, 513 A.2d 1365, 1367 (Me. 1986). Each stage of this two-part inquiry carries a different
standard of review. At the first stage, the inquiry into whether an individual has a subjective
expectation of privacy involves a finding of fact and, therefore, is reviewed for clear error. See, e.g.,
id. at 1367-68. (finding that where the facts did not suggest that the defendants took measures to
conceal their activities from public view, the trial court could not properly find that the defendants
had a subjective expectation of privacy). The second stage, whether such an expectation is one that
society is willing to respect, is a legal question that we review de novo. See, e.g., State v. Sylvain, 2023
ME 5, ¶ 11, 814 A.2d 984 (stating that objective reasonableness of suspicion is a question of law).

The parties in this instance failed to address the first stage of this inquiry, and no findings were
made by the court as to whether Zackaria had a subjective expectation of privacy. Although this does
not impact the outcome given that the defendant’s argument fails at the second stage, ordinarily, both
stages ought to be addressed. Because no finding was made regarding Zackaria’s subjective
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[¶13] Whether one has an objectively reasonable expectation of privacy

is determined based on the totality of the circumstances. State v. Sargent, 2009

ME 125, ¶10, 984 A.2d 831 (citing Ohio v. Robinette, 519 U.S. 33, 39 (1996)).

We conclude that under the circumstances presented here, Zackaria did not

have a reasonable expectation of privacy in the shower room or in the common

area.

[¶14] Preble Street Resource Center is a day shelter; thus, none of the

protections recognized as to overnight guests come into play. See State v.

Carton, 2016 ME 119, ¶ 16, 145 A.3d 555 (“[T]he United States Supreme Court

has generally recognized that an overnight guest in a home has a reasonable

expectation of privacy in that home.”); Minnesota v. Olson, 495 U.S. 91, 96-97

(1990) (“Olson’s status as an overnight guest is alone enough to show that he

had an expectation of privacy . . .”) Zackaria produced no evidence as to why he

would have any expectation of privacy when invited into the center for only a

brief day visit and not to use as his residence, even if only temporarily. See

Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence v. Unknown Agents of U.S. Marshals Serv., 791 F.

Supp. 1, 6 (D.D.C. 1992) (concluding that overnight resident of shelter had

expectation of privacy); Prophete v. Acevedo-Smith, 743 F. Supp. 3d 440, 447

expectation of privacy, we review, de novo, only whether Zackaria had an objectively reasonable
expectation of privacy.
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(E.D.N.Y. 2024) (“Prophete did not lose all reasonable expectations of privacy

simply because he resided at a shelter.”); see generally Steven R. Morrison, The

Fourth Amendment’s Applicability to Residents of Homeless Shelters, 32 Hamline

L. Rev. 319, 425 (2009).

[¶15] An individual who is not an overnight guest might still have a

reasonable expectation of privacy in the property of another. State v. Filion,

2009 ME 23, ¶ 12, 966 A.2d 405. When considering whether a non-overnight

guest has such a reasonable expectation, we consider “whether the defendant

had possession or ownership of the property, the defendant’s prior use of the

property, whether the defendant’s presence on the property was legitimate, the

defendant’s ability to control or exclude others from using the property, the

defendant’s access to the property in the owner’s absence, and the defendant’s

subjective expectation of privacy.” Id. ¶ 13. Here, Zackaria did not have any

ownership rights over the center and did not have the right to exclude the

officers that staff allowed into the facility. He had no objectively reasonable

expectation of privacy at least as to any common area of the center. See Walker

v. Gatsios, No. 19 C 6072, 2024 WL 4476118, at 3 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 11, 2024)

(holding that defendant had no reasonable expectation of privacy in conference

room in a shelter, collecting cases regarding common areas).
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[¶16] This leaves only the more targeted question of whether Zackaria

had any reasonable expectation of privacy in the shower room where the seized

objects were located. Other jurisdictions have determined that under certain

conditions, individuals have reasonable expectations of privacy in spaces such

as public-restroom stalls. See People v. Vinson, 161 A.D. 3d 493, 494 (N.Y. App.

Div. 2018) (holding that defendant had a right to privacy in a single occupancy

restroom when the door was closed); State v. Limberhand, 788 P.2d 857, 861

(Idaho Ct. App. 1990) (“It is clear beyond question that, after Katz, clandestine

or surreptitious surveillance into a closed restroom stall constitutes a fourth

amendment search.”); City of Tukwila v. Nalder, 770 P.2d 670, 674 (Wash. Ct.

App. 1989) (“When a person enters a toilet stall and closes the door, he has an

expectation of privacy which ‘society would recognize as objectively

reasonable.’” (quoting State v. Biggar, 716 P.2d 493, 495 (Haw. 1986)).

[¶17] Here, however, the shower room space was not invaded when

Zackaria was using the shower room to shower. He was fully dressed and

outside the shower room when the police arrived, at which point he had left the

subsequently seized objects in the shower room, with the door open, while he

engaged in activities outside the shower room. Under these circumstances, as
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counsel for Zackaria conceded at oral argument, no reasonable expectation of

privacy as to the shower room existed at that moment.

[¶18] Zackaria argues, however, that he regained a reasonable

expectation of privacy when he went back to the shower room. But Zackaria

left the door to the shower room partially open, enabling the police to see that

objects were strewn on the floor. Even if we assume that society would

recognize a reasonable expectation of privacy in a shower room after the use of

that room for the purpose of showering has been completed and the user has

exited—a dubious proposition, see State v. Mudloff, 36 P.3d 326, 328 (Kan. Ct.

App. 2001) (“[A]n individual can assert a subjective expectation of privacy in a

public bathroom stall, but society will not recognize that expectation as

reasonable if the stall’s occupant is engaged in activity other than the stall’s

intended use.”)—there was no reasonable expectation of privacy when,

re-entering the shower room, he left the door of the shower room partially

open. In Vinson, Limberhand, and Tukwila, one of the facts that the courts

considered when reaching their conclusions that the claimants had a

reasonable expectation of privacy was that the doors to the spaces searched

were fully closed. Vinson, 161 A.D. 3d 493, 494 (N.Y. App. Div. 2018);

Limberhand, 788 P.2d 857, 861 (Idaho Ct. App. 1990); City of Tukwila, 770 P.2d
10

670, 674 (Wash. Ct. App. 1989). Here, moreover, the door was left open wide

enough for the police to see that there were objects strewn on the floor of the

shower room at a time when the police had reasonable suspicion that the

objects could include sharp devices evidencing a crime and which could pose a

safety threat to them.

[¶19] For these reasons, looking at the totality of circumstances, we

affirm the court’s rejection of Zackaria’s motion to suppress.

B. Zackaria was not deprived of his right to a speedy trial guaranteed
under the Maine Constitution.

[¶20] Zackaria contests the trial court’s denial of his motion to dismiss

for failure to provide a speedy trial as guaranteed by article I, section 6 of the

Maine Constitution.3 We review his claim for abuse of discretion. State v.

Christen, 2009 ME 78, ¶ 14, 976 A.2d 980.

[¶21] The balancing test we employ when considering speedy trial

claims examines four factors: (1) the length of the delay, (2) the reasons for the

delay, (3) the defendant’s assertion of the right, and (4) prejudice.4 State v.

The right to a speedy trial exists under both the Maine Constitution and the Sixth Amendment
3

of the United States Constitution. Zackaria asserts only his right under the Maine Constitution. We
cite federal case law herein, therefore, only to the extent that we consider these federal
interpretations of the analogous federal provision persuasive. State v. Athayde, 2022 ME 41, ¶ 20,
277 A.3d 387.

4 This test is similar to the test applied when evaluating federal constitutional speedy trial claims,

see, e.g., Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 530-31 (1972), although “we have noted ‘nuances’ that cause
11

Norris, 2023 ME 60, ¶ 14, 302 A.3d 1.

1. The delay was sufficiently long to consider the other factors.

[¶22] In conducting a speedy trial analysis, a court will first look to the

length of delay and determine whether it was long enough to warrant

consideration of the other three factors. State v. Engroff, 2025 ME 83, ¶ 28, 345

A.3d 91. We have not explicitly stated how long a delay must be in order to

proceed with the inquiry but have noted the federal presumption that a delay

of one year is sufficient to initiate a speedy trial analysis weighing the other

three factors. See id.; State v. Norris, 2023 ME 60, ¶ 23, 302 A.3d 1.5

[¶23] More than thirty months passed between when Zackaria was

charged and when he was tried. This was a relatively straightforward case, and

the delay was sufficiently lengthy to trigger review of the other factors.

factors to be weighed differently under the Maine test.” State v. Engroff, 2025 ME 83, ¶ 26, 345 A.3d
91. One difference between the tests is that under the Maine Constitution, failing to assert or to
attempt to assert the right to a speedy trial can be determinative. Winchester v. State, 2023 ME 23,
¶¶ 29, 33, 291 A.3d 707.

5 We have eschewed bright lines and made clear that such a presumption is not required under
our Constitution. Winchester, 2023 ME 23, ¶¶ 27, 37, 291 A.3d 707. See generally 21A Am. Jur. 2d
Criminal Law § 934 (“Simply to trigger the speedy trial analysis, the accused must allege that the
interval between accusation and trial has crossed the threshold dividing ordinary from
presumptively prejudicial delay. This generally requires a delay that approaches one year although
some jurisdictions require a shorter amount of time and others longer.”) (citing State v. Taylor, 869
N.W.2d 1, 19 (Minn. 2015) (sixty days from the date of the demand for a speedy trial); Claiborne v.
State, 176 So. 3d 769, 775 (Miss. 2015) (270 days); State v. Maloney, 354 P.3d 611, 616 (Mont. 2015)
(200 days); State v. Spearman, 283 P.3d 272, 277 (N.M. 2012) (to be presumptively prejudicial, a
delay must be one year in simple cases, fifteen months in intermediate cases, and eighteen months in
complex cases).
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2. Most of the reasons for the delay were not attributable to
either the defendant or the State.

[¶24] Periods of delay occasioned by the accused should not be counted

against the State, while delays attributable to the State include court backlogs.

State-attributed delays are weighed more heavily against the State when the

delays are animated by an intent to prejudice the defendant. See Engroff, 2025

ME 83, ¶ 30, 345 A.3d 91; Norris, 2023 ME 60, ¶ 24, 302 A.3d 1.

[¶25] Here, there were myriad reasons for the delay in Zackaria’s trial.

A few can be attributable to the defendant; the rest were primarily caused by

factors outside either party’s control. See supra ¶¶6-10. Some delay due to his

filing of pretrial motions can be attributable to Zackaria, as can a delay caused

by appointment of new counsel by Zackaria’s choice. The need to appoint new

counsel because of an accident that his attorney suffered was not precipitated

by any conscious conduct on his part, nor was it attributable to the State. For

seven months, Zackaria was found incompetent to stand trial. Given that an

incompetent defendant cannot be tried, State v. Furrow, 424 A.2d 694, 698

(Me. 1981), the reason for this delay cannot be attributed to the State, although

it also was not caused by a conscious choice on Zackaria’s part. In the same

vein, that a mistrial had to be declared after a number of jurors indicated that
13

they were unable to sit for the trial date also cannot be attributed to conduct by

either Zackaria or the State.6

[¶26] Viewed holistically, most of these delays were attributable to

neither Zackaria nor the State. We give some weight to fact that at no time did

the State engage in dilatory conduct, and a few of the delays can be fairly

attributed to choices that Zackaria made.

3. Zackaria asserted his right to a speedy trial.

[¶27] Zackaria filed a motion to dismiss on speedy trial grounds and

attempted to assert the right on numerous occasions prior to the formal

motion. See Winchester, 2023 ME 23, ¶ 29, 291 A.3d 707 (“Given the weight of

this factor under the Maine Constitution . . . we must look not only to whether

the defendant actually asserted the right to a speedy trial but also to whether

the defendant attempted to assert the right to a speedy trial.”) (emphasis in

original).

4. Although the pre-trial detention was lengthy, Zackaria’s
ability to mount his defense was not impacted by the delay.

[¶28] The final factor to be considered when evaluating a speedy trial

6 The speedy trial clock does not begin to run anew after a mistrial, but here there was no lengthy

delay between the first aborted trial and the second. See State v. Castro, 402 P.3d 688, 693 (N.M.
2017) (concluding that a delay of thirty-two months between a mistrial and a second trial was
“particularly disturbing”).
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claim is prejudice to the defendant. Three harms that we have identified that

the right to a speedy trial seeks to prevent are “(1) undue and oppressive

incarceration prior to trial; (2) the accused’s anxiety and concern

accompanying public accusation, and (3) impairment of the accused’s ability to

mount a defense.” Winchester, 2023 ME 23, ¶ 30, 291 A.3d 707.

[¶29] Because Zackaria did not have the resources to pay his bail, he

remained incarcerated for over thirty months prior to trial. This is a lengthy

time to be subject to pre-trial incarceration, and the length of pre-trial

incarceration is a significant factor under the Maine Constitution. See id. ¶¶ 31,

56. Beyond the length of time involved, however, there is no argument or

indication that the incarceration was undue or oppressive because the bail

amount was not appropriate or conditions of the incarceration were unusually

harsh. See State v. Kirn, 530 P.3d 1, 13 (Mont. 2023) (stating that “being held

on appropriate bond militates against oppressiveness” and noting that nothing

in the record showed that the defendant experienced overcrowding or

inadequate conditions while incarcerated); Hakeem v. Beyer, 990 F.2d 750, 761

(3d Cir. 1993) (“[W]ere the oppressiveness of such conditions to worsen or the

treatment of the accused to fall below established, standard levels, so as to place

the physical or mental integrity of the accused in jeopardy for example, the
15

length of pretrial delay which a just system in a civilized society could tolerate

would have to be reconsidered.”); Taylor v. State, 792 S.E.2d 101, 108 (Ga. App.

Ct. 2016), aff’d, 810 S.E.2d 113 (Ga. 2018) (analyzing prejudice and concluding

that the speedy trial right was not violated, noting that there was “no evidence

that [the defendant] was exposed to substandard conditions while

incarcerated, such as a lack of adequate food, climate control, proper medical

care, or cleanliness”); United States v. Ogiekpolor, 122 F.4th 1296, 1308 (11th

Cir. 2024) (stating that “[o]ther circuits have suggested that to show actual

prejudice a defendant must demonstrate that the delay in trial resulted in

substandard conditions of confinement or other consequences of the

detention”).

[¶30] Most importantly, neither before the trial court nor to us has

Zackaria argued, let alone identified any evidence in the record supporting any

suggestion, that his defense was hampered in any way from the delay, such as

through witnesses’ loss of memories.

[¶31] The court applied the correct law and, balancing the relevant

factors, concluded that the right to a speedy trial was not violated. We find no

abuse of the court’s discretion. See Engroff, 2025 ME 83, ¶ 39, 345 A.3d 91 (“On

review, we conclude that based on the court’s findings and conclusions with
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respect to the four factors, the court did not abuse its discretion in denying [the

defendant’s] state speedy trial claim.”)

III. CONCLUSION

[¶32] Both of the arguments presented—based on the Fourth

Amendment and asserting the right to a speedy trial—involve particularly

fact-sensitive inquiries. As to the first argument, we make no general

pronouncement as to the scope of privacy rights under federal law relating to

shelters for the unhoused. Instead, our conclusion that Zackaria lacked an

objectively reasonable expectation of privacy is based on the totality of the

specific circumstances reflected in the record before us. The speedy trial claim

is governed by a test in which the court applies a balancing test that similarly

examines the specific facts presented; our review is only for abuse of discretion;

and the court’s ruling that the right was not violated was sound.

The entry is:

Judgment affirmed.

Michelle R. King Esq. (orally), Thistle Weaver & Morris, Portland, for appellant
Saad Zacharia

Jaqueline Sartoris, District Attorney, and Grant S. Whelan, Asst. Dist. Atty.
(orally), Prosecutorial District Two, Portland, for appellee State of Maine
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Cumberland County Unified Criminal Docket docket number CR-2021-2456
FOR CLERK REFERENCE ONLY