Oak Hill Condominiums v. Diane Marchetti

MAINE SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT Reporter of Decisions
Decision: 2026 ME 31
Docket: Sag-25-369
Submitted
On Briefs: February 18, 2026
Decided: April 2, 2026

Panel: MEAD, CONNORS, LAWRENCE, and DOUGLAS, JJ., and HJELM, A.R.J.

OAK HILL CONDOMINIUMS

v.

DIANE MARCHETTI et al.

LAWRENCE, J.

[¶1] Caroline Thibeault appeals from an order of the Superior Court

(Sagadahoc County, Billings, J.) denying her motion to intervene in a foreclosure

action that had been brought by Oak Hill Condominiums against Diane

Marchetti, Thibeault’s mother and the owner of the condominium unit subject

to the foreclosure action. Because we find no error in the court’s determination,

we affirm the court’s denial of Thibeault’s motion for intervention as of right,

filed pursuant to M.R. Civ. P. 24(a)(2), and her alternative motion for permissive

intervention, filed pursuant to M.R. Civ. P. 24(b).
2

I. BACKGROUND

[¶2] Marchetti owns a condominium unit in Oak Hill Condominiums

(the Condominiums). Thibeault, Marchetti’s daughter, occupies the unit along

with her son who has a disability, while Marchetti lives elsewhere.

[¶3] In January 2025, the Oak Hill Condominium Unit Owners

Association (Oak Hill) filed a complaint for foreclosure and sale of Marchetti’s

condominium unit. See 33 M.R.S. § 1603-116(a) (2025); 14 M.R.S. § 6321

(2025). The complaint alleged that Marchetti was in default for failing to pay

common charges and assessments, rule violation fines, and legal fees. The rule

violation fees were allegedly a result of Thibeault’s commercial use of

Marchetti’s condominium while occupying it. In response, Marchetti filed an

answer and asserted several affirmative defenses, including that Oak Hill “failed

to comply” with the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) and the Maine

Human Rights Act (MHRA) by failing to offer and provide an accommodation to

Thibeault and her son.

[¶4] In May 2025, Thibeault filed a motion to intervene as of right and,

in the alternative, for permissive intervention pursuant to M.R.

Civ. P. 24(a)(2)-(b). Thibeault sought intervention as of right because she

argued that she has a direct and substantial interest in the litigation as the
3

occupant of the unit, that her ability to assert and litigate claims under the Fair

Housing Act (FHA) and MHRA will be severely impaired if intervention is

denied, and that her interests are not adequately represented by Marchetti.

See M.R. Civ. P. 24(a)(2). Thibeault alternatively sought permissive

intervention because she contended that her claims and defenses generate

questions of law and fact in common with the foreclosure action. As required

by Rule 24, Thibeault attached to her motion an answer and affirmative

defenses, which included allegations that Oak Hill failed to comply with the

ADA, MHRA, and FHA by failing to offer a reasonable accommodation to her and

her son who occupy the unit. See M.R. Civ. P. 24(c). In response, Oak Hill filed

an objection to Thibeault’s motion to intervene, and Thibeault followed with a

reply to Oak Hill’s objection.

[¶5] The court summarily denied Thibeault’s motion to intervene both

as of right and permissively. Thibeault timely filed a notice of appeal.1

See M.R. App. P. 2B(c)(1).

1 Although an appeal from a denial of a motion to intervene is interlocutory, it falls within a clear

exception to the final judgment rule, and we therefore immediately review the court’s denial of
Thibeault’s motion to intervene. See State v. MaineHealth, 2011 ME 115, ¶ 7, 31 A.3d 911 (recognizing
an exception to the final judgment rule for appeals challenging the denial of a motion to intervene).
4

II. DISCUSSION

[¶6] We review a trial court’s ruling on a motion to intervene, both as of

right and permissively, “for error of law or abuse of discretion.” State v.

MaineHealth, 2011 ME 115, ¶ 7, 31 A.3d 911.

[¶7] Maine Rule of Civil Procedure 24 governs intervention, both as of

right and permissively, in civil suits. For a nonparty to intervene as of right,

Rule 24(a)(2) provides:

Upon timely application anyone shall be permitted to intervene in
an action . . . when the applicant claims an interest relating to the
property or transaction which is the subject of the action and the
applicant is so situated that the disposition of the action may as a
practical matter impair or impede the applicant’s ability to protect
that interest, unless the applicant’s interest is adequately
represented by existing parties.

In other words, a nonparty can intervene as of right if “(1) he claims an interest

in the property or transaction that is the subject of the action, and (2) he is so

situated that the disposition of the action may impair or impede his ability to

protect his interest, and (3) his interest is not adequately represented by the

existing parties to the action.” Doe v. Roe, 495 A.2d 1235, 1237 (Me. 1985); M.R.

Civ. P. 24(a)(2). Alternatively, a court may grant permissive intervention when

a nonparty’s “claim or defense and the main action have a question of law or

fact in common” and intervention will not “unduly delay or prejudice the
5

adjudication of the rights of the original parties.” M.R. Civ. P. 24(b);

In re Children of Mary J., 2019 ME 2, ¶ 6, 199 A.3d 231. We have previously

stated that Maine’s rule governing intervention is “virtually the same as the

federal rule.” Doe, 495 A.2d at 1237 n.4.

A. Intervention as of Right

[¶8] In concluding that the court did not err by denying Thibeault’s

motion to intervene as of right, we agree that she does not satisfy any of the

three prongs of Rule 24(a)(2).

[¶9] First, Thibeault argues that she has a direct, substantial, and legally

protectable interest for several reasons, including that she has occupancy rights

and federal and state statutory civil rights at stake in the underlying foreclosure

action.

[¶10] We have recognized that what constitutes an interest under

Rule 24(a)(2) “may elude precise and certain application in some instances,”

but have characterized the interest as a “direct interest at stake in the

underlying claim itself.” Doe, 495 A.2d at 1238. In this foreclosure action, the

interest at stake is one of ownership, an interest only Marchetti has as the sole

owner of the condominium unit. Further, only Marchetti has a contractual

relationship with Oak Hill because she purchased the unit subject to the terms,
6

conditions, and restrictions contained in the Condominiums’ Declaration,

which states that “[e]ach unit owner shall comply strictly with the Bylaws and

with the administrative rules and regulations adopted by the [Oak Hill] Board.”

(Emphasis added.) See 33 M.R.S. § 1602-101(a) (2025) (stating that real estate

of the condominium to be conveyed to unit owners must be described in the

Declaration that is recorded in the same manner as a deed). Thibeault and Oak

Hill do not have any contractual relationship, and so she is not subject to any

contractual agreement with Oak Hill; nor does Thibeault have a leasehold

interest because, as far as the record shows, there is no lease agreement

between Marchetti and Thibeault and Thibeault has no obligation to pay rent

to Marchetti. This makes Thibeault’s interest purely possessory as an occupant,

an interest that would be a stake in any potential eviction proceeding.

Thibeault’s argument that her statutory and federal civil rights are the interests

at stake is unpersuasive because the underlying foreclosure action puts the

ownership rights of the unit at stake, not her civil rights or rights to housing.

[¶11] Second, beyond a lack of any legal interest that Thibeault has in the

foreclosure action, Thibeault’s argument that denying intervention will impair

or impede her ability to protect her purported interests is similarly

unpersuasive. Thibeault can seek protection of statutory civil rights through
7

filing a complaint with the Maine Human Rights Commission, a process which

she has already started, demonstrating that those rights are not impaired by

her exclusion as a party in this foreclosure action. See 5 M.R.S. §§ 4582-A(2),

4611 (2025). Additionally, Thibeault can assert a reasonable accommodation

defense in any eviction action, which Oak Hill might pursue depending on the

circumstances after the foreclosure action. See 14 M.R.S. §§ 6001(5), 6322-A

(2025); Hous. Auth. of Bangor v. Maheux, 2000 ME 60, ¶ 6, 748 A.2d 747. Finally,

Thibeault in fact is already active, albeit through Marchetti, in the foreclosure

action. Although Marchetti’s opposition to Oak Hill’s motion for summary

judgment was not before the court at the time it denied Thibeault’s motion,

Thibeault’s affidavit attached to the opposition underscores that she is

providing information and evidence relevant to the request for a reasonable

accommodation to Marchetti. Thibeault can provide, and already has provided,

affidavits and testimony in the foreclosure action, which shows that denying

her intervention will not prevent evidence based on her personal involvement

and firsthand knowledge from being presented and considered. Therefore,

even if Thibeault arguably had some interest in the foreclosure action, denying

intervention would not impair or impede her ability to personally engage in

protecting those purported interests.
8

[¶12] Third and finally, there is no question that Thibeault’s interests are

adequately represented by Marchetti. Marchetti’s objective is to prevent the

foreclosure of her condominium unit by asserting affirmative defenses,

including those under the ADA and MHRA. Thibeault’s objective if she were

permitted to intervene would also be to prevent the foreclosure action by

asserting several affirmative defenses, most of which are similar to or the same

as those asserted by Marchetti. See Sec. & Exch. Comm’n v. LBRY, Inc., 26 F.4th

96, 99 (1st Cir. 2022) (holding that a proposed intervenor’s interests were

adequately represented where the objectives lined up seamlessly by attacking

the same element of the claim at issue). Marchetti is represented by counsel

and, with the benefit of Thibeault’s assistance, has responded to all pleadings

and opposed Oak Hill’s motion for summary judgment, presenting an active

defense to the foreclosure action to protect her ownership interest. Thus,

insofar as Thibeault had any such interests, they are already adequately

represented by Marchetti because she has the same objective as Thibeault.

[¶13] Therefore, the court did not err or abuse its discretion in denying

Thibeault’s motion to intervene as of right.
9

B. Permissive Intervention

[¶14] We also conclude that the court did not err or abuse its discretion

in denying Thibeault’s motion for permissive intervention. When a proposed

intervenor seeks permissive intervention, there is the threshold requirement

that the intervenor’s “claim or defense and the main action have a question of

law or fact in common.” M.R. Civ. P. 24(b). Once that threshold requirement is

met, the court must then “consider whether intervention will unduly delay or

prejudice the adjudication of the rights of the original parties.” Id.

[¶15] In this case, Thibeault’s defenses present common questions of

both law and fact because the underlying defenses that Marchetti intends to

assert are the same as those that underpin a claim by Thibeault against Oak Hill

for housing discrimination. See 5 M.R.S. § 4582-A(2). Despite having common

questions of law and fact, however, joining Thibeault as a party would unduly

delay the foreclosure action. Oak Hill filed a motion for summary judgment in

March 2025, to which Thibeault would then need to file an opposition.

Marchetti has already submitted Thibeault’s lengthy affidavit in opposition to

Oak Hill’s motion for summary judgment. Moreover, as discussed above,

Thibeault’s defenses are being asserted and adequately presented by Marchetti.

See T-Mobile Ne. LLC v. Town of Barnstable, 969 F.3d 33, 41 (1st Cir. 2020)
10

(giving weight to whether the original parties to the action adequately

represented the interest of the proposed intervenors in its analysis of

permissive intervention). Effectively, the efforts contemplated by Thibeault

seem to be duplicative of the measures already advanced by Marchetti, which

would unduly delay the proceedings beyond what has already taken place.

Therefore, denial of permissive intervention was not an abuse of discretion by

the court.

The entry is:

Order denying Thibeault’s motion to intervene
affirmed.

James E. Belleau, Esq., and Meredith W. Scott, Esq., Trafton, Matzen, Belleau &
Frenette, LLP, Auburn, for appellant Caroline Thibeault

Jonathan M. Flagg, Esq., Flagg Law PLLC, Portsmouth, New Hampshire, for
appellee Oak Hill Condominiums

Diane Marchetti did not file a brief

Sagadahoc County Superior Court docket number RE-2025-1
FOR CLERK REFERENCE ONLY