State of Maine v. Conway

STATE OF MAINE SUPERIOR COURT
CUMBERLAND, ss. DOCKET NO: CR-19-5690

)
STATE OF MAINE, )
) ORDER ON DEFENDANT'S
v. ) MOTION TO SUPPRESS
)
ZACHARY CONWAY )
)
) -.... -
":.­

.. .. ~ .,. . .
• J

Before the Court is Defendant Zachary Conway's Motion to Suppress. Mr. Conway

challenges the validity of a search warrant issued by the Maine District Court for property located

in New Hampshire. A hearing on the motion was held on January 27, 2021. For the reasons set

forth below, Defendant's Motion to Suppress is GRANTED.

I. Facts

The following facts are taken from the affidavits submitted with the search warrant, as well

as the facts elicited at hearing:

On October 5, 2019, Sergeant Phillip Jones (now, and hereinafter referred to as "Captain

Jones") of the Bridgton Police Department responded to an armed robbery alleged to have taken

place in Bridgton. Captain Jones met with Katrina Parker, who stated that three men forcefully

removed multiple bags of cannabis plants from her home. Parker told police that two of the men

appeared to be carrying firearms; and, one of the men struck her with a "crow bar." She said she

recognized one of them, who was later identified as the Defendant, Zachary Conway. Ms. Parker

also told Captain Jones that the men were driving "a blue/green sedan with New Hampshire

plates."

Page 1 of 17
Captain Jones was able to "ping" the location of the cellphone, alleged to belong to the

Defendant, in Conway, New Hampshire. Captain Jones contacted the Conway Police regarding

the cellphone ping. Based on the cellphone location data, Conway Police officers contacted an

individual who stated that the Defendant approached him about committing a robbery. The

individual stated that the Defendant was driving a blue Toyota Corolla registered in the State of

New Hampshire. Captain Jones was later informed that the cellphone "ping" indicated movement

from Conway to Manchester, New Hampshire.

Manchester Police contacted Captain Jones and informed him that Zachary Conway was

also the subject of a separate investigation they were conducting. Captain Jones learned that

Manchester Police had spoken with the Defendant's girlfriend, Tehya Charbonneau and obtained

a text message sent by Charbonneau to the Defendant referencing "the robbery." (Aff. and R. for

Search Warrant pg. 5.) Captain Jones stated that Charbonneau also provided the following

information to Manchester Police:

"[Defendant] had rented a U-Haul truck and made plans to go to

Conway, NH with Tehya, her two daughters, and two other friends

who she identified as Ryan Barden [DOB omitted] and Brandon

Desauliners [DOB omitted]. All of them went to North Conway

traveling in the U-Haul [sic] and the Toyota Corolla that was

registered to [Defendant]. One [sic] in North Conway, Tehya and

her daughters were left at the Applebee's restaurant and the three

males drove away in the two vehicles. While she was in the

restaurant, Tehya checked a location function on [Defendant's]

phone and observed that he was in Maine in a town that she

Page 2 of 17
described as 'Bridge-something." She told them that [Defendant]

had planned to go to Maine to visit his friend named 'Steve.' Tehya

also stated that Ryan and Brandon were known to carry BB guns

that appeared to be real firearms."

During the course of their separate investigation, Manchester Police had obtained a search

warrant for the Toyota sedan. They seized both the Toyota Sedan and U-Haul truck. Captain

Jones was advised that Manchester Police had observed a crow bar during their search of the

Toyota, which they left undisturbed because it fell outside the scope of their search warrant.

On October 16, 2020, eight days after learning all of the above, Captain Jones sought and

obtained a search warrant in the Maine District Court for both the Toyota and U-Haul. The

application indicated that both vehicles were "currently being secured by the Manchester Police

Department, NH." The warrant permitted officers to search both vehicles and seize the following

items: burglar's tools, including crow bars; firearms and or items resembling firearms; cannabis

stored in trash bags; cell phones, including the Verizon Trac phone; and receipts, ledgers, lists and

any other documents showing the identity and details of either vehicle's occupants. Captain Jones

traveled to Manchester, NH that same day. He searched both vehicles and seized a number of

items.

II. Discussion

The Maine Constitution provides that "[t]he people shall be secure in their, persons, houses,

papers and possessions from all unreasonable searches and seizures[.]" Me. Const. Art. I,§ 5; see

also U.S. Const. Amend. IV. A search conducted without a warrant is presumed unreasonable

Page 3 of 17
unless some other exception to the warrant requirement is found. See e.g. State v. Martin, 2015

ME 91,' 8, 120 A.3d 113.

Defendant Zachary Conway seeks to suppress the items seized by Captain Jones from the

Toyota and U-Haul vehicles, upon execution of the Maine search warrant in New Hampshire.

Because the search was conducted pursuant to a warrant, the Court must first determine whether

the warrant was valid. If the warrant was invalid, the Court must next determine whether the

search performed by Captain Jones falls into a recognized exception to the warrant requirement.

Finally, the court must decide whether suppression is warranted under the circumstances in this

case .

A. Validity of Search Warrant

It has long been recognized that, "any search is per se unreasonable if it lacks two

essentials: (1) the existence of probable cause, and (2) the prior determination of such probable

cause by a neutral and detached magistrate[.]" State v. Richards, 296 A.2d 129, 135 (Me. 1972);

see also Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 13-14 (1949). In Maine, the District Court's

authority to issue a search warrant is granted by statute, which provides: "a judge of the District

Court ... shall issue search warrants for any place in the state for such purposes as the Constitution

of the United States and the Constitution of Maine permit[.]" 15 M.R.S. § 55 (emphasis added).

The Maine District Court issued a search warrant for property located in Manchester, New

Hampshire. There is no authority in the Maine Constitution, statutes, or other interstate compact

that grants a Maine judge authority to issue a search warrant for any place or property located

outside the territorial boundaries of Maine. As such, the District Court lacked the authority to

Page 4 of 17
issue a search warrant for the property located in New Hampshire and the warrant is therefore void

ab initio. 1

The State's argument that the warrant is valid because it was issued for Captain Jones to

enforce the laws of the State of Maine, is unpersuasive. Captain Jones authority to seek and

execute a search warrant during an investigation of a Maine crime does not vest the Maine District

Court with the authority to authorize the search of property located in New Hampshire. Indeed, it

is a fundamental principle of Maine law that the authority of the State does not extend past its

territorial boundaries. See l M.R.S. § 1 ("[t]he jurisdiction and sovereignty of the State extend to

all places within its boundaries"). Furthermore, and for the reasons discussed below, this Court

cannot contravene the sovereignty of a separate State, nor its separate constitutional protections,

simply because an officer was investigating a violation of Maine law.

Based on the forgoing, the court finds and concludes that the search warrant was void ab

initio; and, as such, the Defendant's motion to suppress shall be considered in the same light as

warrantless search. Before considering whether an exception to the warrant requirement applies,

however, the Court first determines what authority, if any, Captain Jones had to search property

that was located outside the State of Maine.

B. Scope of Police Authority

''The geographic scope of [an officer's] authority is defined by statute." State v. Turner,

2017 ME 185, ,I 11, 169 A.3d 931. "No [municipal] police officer has any authority in criminal

or traffic infraction matters beyond the limits of the municipality in which the officer is

appointed[.]" 30-A M.R.S. § 2671(2). Indeed, an officer's "intentional disregard of territorial

limits ... could require the suppression of evidence." Turner, 2017 ME 185, '120, 169 A.3d 931.

1
Defined as "from the beginning." Black's Law Dictionary (11th. ed. 2019) .

Page 5 of 17
Captain Jones is a municipal police officer for the Town of Bridgton. Captain Jones therefore

lacks police authority outside the territorial limits of the Town of Bridgton, and certainly lacks

police authority outside the borders of the State of Maine. Capt. Jones' knowledge of these

territorial limitations was evident at hearing, where he testified that if he were in pursuit of a

vehicle that crossed into New Hampshire, police in that State would need to assume pursuit of the

vehicle. Despite this understanding, Captain Jones obtained a search warrant for property located

outside Maine's territorial limits. He traveled to New Hampshire from Maine and conducted a

search and seizure of property from both the Toyota and U-Haul located in Manchester.

Based on the forgoing, the Court finds and concludes that Captain Jones exceeded the scope

of his statutory authority. That said, whether the evidence sized by Captain Jones is admissible

does not, necessarily, tum on whether he exceeded his authority. Instead, the Court must determine

whether suppression is warranted in accordance with the exclusionary rule or whether it is

admissible because it falls within a recognized exception to the warrant requirement.

C. Exclusionary Rule

The exclusionary rule is a judicially developed mechanism used to deter unlawful police

conduct. See e.g. State v. Weddle, 2020 ME 12, ! 31, 224 A .3d 1035; quoting Illinois v. Krull, 480

U.S. 340,347 (1987). Typically, if evidence is illegally obtained, the exclusionary rule "precludes

its use in a criminal proceeding against the victim of the illegal search and seizure." Id. The rule

"is neither intended nor able to cure the invasion of the defendant's rights which he has already

suffered." Weddle, 2020 ME 12, ! 32, 224 A.3d 1035; quoting United States v. Leon, 468 U.S.

897,906 (1984). "Instead, the rule acts as a remedial device that 'safeguard[s] Fourth Amendment

rights generally through its deterrent effect, rather than [as] a personal constitutional right of the

party aggrieved."' Id.; quoting United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338,348 (1974). As such, the

Page 6 of 17
exclusionary rule is properly restricted "to those situations in which its remedial purpose is

effectively advanced." Id.

D. Exception to the Warrant Requirement

If an officer conducts a search without a warrant, the State bears the burden of proving by

a fair preponderance of the evidence that a warrantless search falls within an exception to the

warrant requirement. See State v. Johnson, 413 A.2d 931,933 (Me. 1980). At hearing, the State

argued that the Court should consider the following exceptions to the warrant requirement: (1) the

good faith exception; (2) the automobile exception; and (3) the plain view exception.

( 1) Good Faith Exception

Under the good faith exception to the warrant requirement, illegally obtained evidence is

often admissible if the officer acted with objective good faith that his or her actions were

constitutionally permissible. See e.g. United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897,922 (1984)(recognizing

the good faith exception under the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution). The

Law Court has held, on just one occasion, that illegally seized evidence is admissible under the

good faith exception. See Weddle, 2020 ME 12, !! 34-37, 224 A.3d 224. In Weddle, the Law

Court determined that when an officer acts "in the reasonable good-faith belief that a search or

seizure was in accord with the Fourth Amendment" the exclusionary rule does not apply because

suppression "can in no way affect [the officer's] future conduct[.]" Weddle, 2020 ME 12, j 33,

224 A.3d 1035; quoting Krull, 480 U.S. at 348-49. The Court took a balancing approach in

reaching its decision, stating that "[i]n determining whether the purposes of the exclusionary rule

would be served in a specific case, [the court] examine[s] whether the rule's deterrent effect will

Page 7 of 17
be achieved and weighs the likelihood of such deterrence against the cost of withholding reliable

information from the truth-seeking process." Id.; quoting Krull, 480 U.S. at 347.

In Weddle, an officer seized a blood sample from a driver who was involved in a fatal

motor vehicle accident. Weddle, 2020 ME 12,, 5,224 A.3d 1035. Although the officer suspected

that the driver could be intoxicated, the officer lacked probable cause to seize and search the

driver's blood for intoxicants. Id. Instead, the officer seized the driver's blood based solely on his

understanding that Maine law required blood to be drawn from any driver who was involved in a

fatal car accident, without regard to 'probable cause. Id. On appeal, the Law Court held that the

mandatory blood draw statute was facially unconstitutional. Weddle, 2020 ME 12,, 29,224 A.3d

1035. However, the Law Court concluded that "in this highly unusual and exceptional

circumstance," suppression of the driver's blood was not warranted. The officer acted pursuant to

a statute that he had no reason to believe was unconstitutional. The Court found, based on the good

faith exception, that the evidence obtained was admissible. Weddle, 2020 ME 12,, 35,224 A.3d

1035.

Prior to the "highly unusual and exceptional circumstance" in Weddle, the Law Court has

been careful to avoid ruling on whether the good faith exception is recognized under the Maine

Constitution. See e.g. State v. Arbour, 2016 ME 126,, 16, n. 16,146 A.3d 1106; State v. Nadeau,

2010 ME 71,, 48, n. 10, 1 A.3d 445; State v. Tarantino, 587 A.2d 1095, 1097-98 (Me. 1991). In

fact, the Law Court has specifically observed in a previous instance "that a number of state

supreme courts have rejected the good faith exception on state constitutional grounds." State v.

Nunez, 2016 ME 185, j 17, n. 8, 153 A.3d 84. Because of this uncertainty, a brief discussion of

how some the Federal Circuit Courts have approached the good faith exception and void warrants

is helpful in reaching a decision in this matter.

Page 8 of 17
(a) Good Faith Exception and Void Warrants

Whether the good faith exception applies when a warrant is void ab initio has not been

addressed by the United States Supreme Court and the Circuit Courts are split on the issue. In the

Sixth Circuit, courts apply a balancing test. To suppress evidence obtained pursuant to a void

warrant, the benefits of deterrence must outweigh the cost to the justice system. United States ·v.

Master, 614 F.3d 236, 243 (6th Cir. 2009). The Sixth Circuit has further explained that the

culpability of the officers involved in the illegal search is relevant, but not determinative of whether

suppression is warranted. See e.g. United States v. Godfrey, 427 FedAppx. 409,413 (6th Cir.

2011); see also Herring v. United States, 555 U.S. 135, 143 (2009)("The extent to which the

exclusionary rule is justified by these deterrence principles varies with the culpability of the law

enforcement conduct."). The First Circuit has held that when an officer acted pursuant to an invalid

warrant, suppression is warranted only in those limited instances where: (1) the judge issuing a

warrant was misled by information in an affidavit that the affiant knew was false or was made in

reckless disregard of the truth; (2) the issuing judge wholly abandoned his judicial rule; (3) the

executing officer relied on a warrant so lacking in indicia of probable cause as to render the official

belief in its existence unreasonable; or (4) a warrant is so facially deficient that the executing

officers cannot reasonably presume it to be valid. See United States v. Levin, 874 F.3d 316,322

(1st Cir. 2017); quoting Leon, 468 U.S. at 923.

In this case, the court finds that the balancing test adopted by the Sixth Circuit is

substantially similar to the Law Court's reasoning in Weddle. Therefore, in order for this court to

properly determine whether the good faith exception applies, the Court will "examine whether the

[exclusionary] rule's deterrent effect will be achieved ... [by] weigh[ing] the likelihood of such

deterrence against the costs of withholding reliable information from the truth-seeking process."

Page 9 of 17
Weddle, 2020 ME 12, ! 33,224 A.3d 1035. Further, because the Law Court has not specifically

recognized or defined the parameters of the good faith exception in this instance, the Court will

consider the culpability of Captain Jones as just one factor influencing the applicability of the

exclusionary rule.

i. Likelihood of Deterrence

As the parties recognized at hearing, there are no cases in Maine that address the issue of

an officer searching property outside the State's territorial boundary. As such, suppression of the

evidence seized by Captain Jones would certainly be a clear deterrence to any subsequent officer

who might seek to search evidence located outside the State. To hold otherwise would sanction

an officer's conduct in defiance of their statutory authority and disregard of the sovereignty of

another State. Accordingly, the likelihood that suppression would deter future unlawful conduct

is strong under these circumstances.

ii. Reasonableness of Captain Jones' Conduct

The Law Court adopted the following rationale regarding how reasonableness factors into

whether suppression will effectively deter illegal police conduct:

"Where the officer's conduct is objectively reasonable ... excluding

the evidence will not further the ends of the exclusionary rule in any

appreciable way; for it is painfully apparent that the officer is acting

as a reasonable officer would and should act in similar

circumstances. Excluding evidence can in no way affect his future

conduct unless it is to make him less willing to do his duty."

Page 10 of 17
Weddle, 2020 ME 12, '133, 224A.3d 1035; quoting Krull, 480 U.S. at 347.

Based on the evidence presented, the court finds that Captain Jones' application for a search

warrant was ___
.......__., At hearing, Captain Jones admitted that if he were in
--.... not objectively reasonable.

active pursuit of a suspect, New Hampshire police would be charged with taking over that pursuit

once the suspect crossed into New Hampshire. Captain Jones was in active communication with

Manchester Police regarding their separate, co-existent investigations. Captain Jones also waited

approximately eight days from the time he learned Manchester Police had possession of the

vehicles before he sought a search warrant. There is no evidence that Captain Jones made any

attempt to coordinate with Manchester Police to either request or obtain a valid New Hampshire

search warrant, or arrange for the property to be transported to Maine. Finally, it is not objectively

reasonable for an experienced municipal police officer to think that he or she has authority to act

in the State of New Hampshire, particularly when their own authority rarely extends beyond the

territorial boundaries of their given municipality. Combined, these facts make it difficult, if not

impossible, to find that Captain Jones conduct in obtaining a search warrant for property located

in New Hampshire was objectively reasonable.

It is also difficult to imagine how suppression in this case would affect another officer's

ability or willingness to fulfill his or her duty as a law enforcement officer. As stated above,

Captain Jones could have obtained a proper search warrant or arranged for the vehicles to be

transported to Maine. 2 Suppression should not make Captain Jones, or any other officer, less

willing to seek proper search warrants for out-of-state property. However, suppression would

certainly deter future officers from seeking and conducting extra-territorial searches in an attempt

2
It has been this court's experience, that out-of-state officers investigating a crime committed in their home state
have and do request that Maine officers seek a search warrant for property located in Maine.

Page 11 of 17
to ferret out evidence of a crime. As such, exclusion in this instance is an effective deterrence

against further "grossly negligent or ... recurring or systemic negligence" in the search warrant

process. See Master, 614 F.3d at 242.

Based on the forgoing, the court finds and concludes that it was not objectively reasonable

for Captain Jones to assume he had authority to search property that was located outside the State

of Maine, with or without a Maine search warrant.

iii. Cost to the Truth-Seeking Process

The Court notes that the Sixth Circuit favors preserving evidence for use in obtaining

convictions, even if illegally seized, over excluding evidence in order to deter police misconduct

unless the officers engage in "deliberate, reckless, or grossly negligent conduct." Master, 614F.3d

at 243; quoting Herring, 555 U.S . at 144. The court also notes that it is unsettled whether Maine's

application of the good faith exception is narrower than that of the United States Supreme Court.

See Nunez, 2016 ME 185, '1 17, n. 8, 153 A.3d 84. Regardless of application, the court concludes

that the benefit of deterrence in this case outweighs any attendant cost that suppression may have.

Suppression in this case does not foreclose a widely utilized law enforcement technique,

nor does it impose any additional restrictions on law enforcement investigations. The only "cost"

to the truth-seeking process is the affirmance that law enforcement officers cannot act outside the

scope of their prescribed authority. No truth-seeking system has a legitimate interest in preserving

the unlawful exercise of police power. Because there is no legitimate interest that can be furthered

by the unlawful exercise of police power, the benefit of deterrence far outweighs any other interest

at stake here. Therefore, the court finds and concludes that Captain Jones ' search of the Toyota

Page 12 of 17
and U-Haul was unlawful; and, the State has failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence

that the good faith exception to the warrant requirement applies in these circumstances.

2. Automobile Exception

Maine has adopted the United States Supreme Court's automobile exception to the warrant

requirement in that "the existence of probable cause justifies a warrantless seizure and reasonable

search of a motor vehicle ... whether or not exigent circumstances prevailed at either the time of

the seizure or the time of the search." State v. Lzzo, 623 A .2d 1277, 1181-82 (Me. 1993 )( citations

and quotations omitted). "Probable cause to search exists when there is a fair probability that

contraband or evidence of a crime will be found in a particular place." State v. Michael M., 2001

:ME 92, '16, 772 A.2d 1179. Probable cause "is flexible and based on common sense" but "requires

more than mere suspicion[.]" State v. Martin, 2015 :ME 91, '110, 120 A.3d 113 (citations and

quotations omitted). "The information determining the existence of probable cause includes all

the information known to the police, and the determination is based on an objective standard, not

on whether the particular officer believed he had probable cause." Id. (citations and quotations

omitted).

a. U-Haul

"To meet the standard for probable cause, the warrant affidavit must set forth some nexus

between the evidence to be seized and the locations to be searched." State v. Samson, 2007 :ME

33, '1 15, 916 A.2d 977. Based on the facts presented, the court finds the nexus between the

suspected robbery and the U-Haul was insufficient and, therefore, Captain Jones lacked probable

cause to search the U-Haul.

Page 13 of 17
The only mention of the U-Haul came from the Defendant's girlfriend, who stated that the

Defendant left Applebee's with two friends in both the U-Haul and Toyota. The victims of the

robbery did not reference a U-Haul. There is nothing in the record that places the Defendant

behind the wheel of the U-Haul. There is no evidence that the U-Haul was in anyway used in

furtherance of the robbery, and no evidence suggesting how or why the U-Haul was transported to

Manchester, New Hampshire. Without more, it cannot be said that there is any probable nexus

between the U-Haul and the crime of robbery beyond that of mere suspicion. As such, Captain

Jones' search of the U-Haul does not fall within the automobile exception to the warrant

requirement because Captain Jones lacked the probable cause necessary to justify the search.

b. Constitutional Requirements of Vehicle Stops Under the New Hampshire
Constitution

The Court also finds that it would be inappropriate to apply Maine's automobile exception

to Captain Jones' search of the vehicles. The New Hampshire Supreme Court has determined that

"the federal automobile exception is too broad" and has adopted "a more limited automobile

exception to [it's] warrant requirement[.]" State v. Glavan, 171 N.H. 457,459, 198 A.3d 254,256

(N.H. 2018)(citations and quotations omitted). "Under that limited exception, the police do not

need a warrant to enter an automobile when: (1) the vehicle has been stopped in transit pursuant

to a lawful stop; and (2) the police have probable cause to believe that a plainly visible item in the

vehicle is contraband." State v. Cora, 170 N.H. 186, 196, 167 A.3d 633,642 (N.H. 2017). New

Hampshire reasons that a warrantless search is justified only when a vehicle's mobility increases

the likelihood that its occupants will remove or destroy the contents of the vehicle. State v.

Camargo, 126 N.H. 766,771,498 A.2d292,292 (N.H.1985). Conversely,Maine does not require

any exigent circumstances under its application of the automobile exception. See Tarantino, 587

Page 14 of 17
A.2d at, 1098 (Me. 1991)(citations and quotations omitted); see also California v. Carney, 471

U.S. 386 (1985).

In this case, both the U-Haul and Toyota were in Manchester Police custody. As such,

neither vehicle posed any mobility related risk as contemplated by New Hampshire's exigency

requirements. Moreover, there is no evidence that either vehicle was seized by New Hampshire

police while in-transit. Captain Jones search, without a valid warrant, did not comport with the

constitutional protections applicable within the State of New Hampshire. As such, it would be

inappropriate for this court to contravene the protections New Hampshire affords its residents

when a search is conducted entirely within the State of New Hampshire. Accordingly, the court

declines to extend the automobile exception to the warrant requirement in this case for either the

Toyota or U-Haul.

3. Plain View Exception

Generally, objects falling within the plain view of an officer are subject to seizure without

violating a defendant's search and seizure rights. See State v. Sullivan, 2018 tv1E 37, ! 15, 181

A.3d 178. In order for the plain view exception to apply, the "incriminating character of the

evidence must be immediately apparent" to the officer, and the officer must have a legitimate

reason to be in the place from which they make their observation." Id.; see also State v.

McNaughton, 2017 tv1E 173, ! 42, 168 A.3d 807. In New Hampshire however, the plain view

exception also requires that "the discovery of evidence ... [be] inadvertent." State v. Davis, 149

N.H. 698,701,828 A.2d 293 (N.H. 2003).

In this case, the only item in plain view of Captain Jones was the crow bar. However,

Captain Jones did not have a legitimate reason to be in a position to view the crow bar because he

Page 15 of 17
was acting outside his lawful authority when he traveled to New Hampshire to search the Toyota.

In addition, the State has failed to prove that Captain Jones' seizure of the item without a warrant

comports with the requirements of the plain view exception. Without more, the court cannot

conclude that Captain Jones was justified in seizing the crow bar under the plain view exception.

Finally, and for the reasons stated above, it would be inappropriate to apply the plain view

exception in this instance because Captain Jones' discovery of the crow bar was not inadvertent.

Captain Jones traveled to New Hampshire with the specific intent to seize the crow bar that was

seen by the Manchester Police. Therefore, the plain view exception is likely inapplicable to this

case when applying New Hampshire law and, again, this Court is unwilling to contravene the

protections New Hampshire affords its residents. Accordingly, the Court declines to extend the

plain view exception to the warrant requirement to the Toyota or U-Haul.

III. Conclusion

The Maine District Court lacked the authority to issue a search warrant for property located

outside the state of Maine and thus the search warrant issued for the Toyota and U-Haul located in

Manchester New Hampshire was void ab initio. Captain Jones is an experienced police officer

who has demonstrated an understanding that his police authority has territorial limitations. As

such, it was not objectively reasonable for Captain Jones to rely on the search warrant issued for

out-of-state property. The benefit of deterring future unlawful conduct far outweighs the

diminished cost that exclusion would have on the truth-seeking process. Finally, it would be

inappropriate to apply the automobile or plain view exceptions in this case because such would

contravene the heightened protections New Hampshire affords its residents during the course of

police investigations.

Page 16 of 17
Based on the forgoing, Defendant's Motion to Suppress is GRANTED.

The court ORDERS that all items seized by Captain Jones during his search of the Toyota

and U-Haul are hereby excluded.

The Clerk is directed to incorporate this Order into the docket by reference pursuant to

Maine Rule of Civil Procedure 79(a).

Page 17 of 17
STATE OF MAINE CRIMINAL DOCKET
v. CUMBERLAND, ss.
ZACHARY R CONWAY Docket No CUMCD-CR-2019-05690
91 KIDDER DRIVE
FREEDOM NH 03836 DOCKET RECORD

DOB: 02/13/1996
Attorney: NICOLE MILAM State's Attorney: JONATHAN SAHRBECK
H & H LAW CENTER
PO BOX 4784
PORTLAND ME 04112
APPOINTED 06/23/2020
Attorney: DEVENS HAMLEN
HEMINWAY HAMLEN LAWCENTER PA
PO BOX 4784
PORTLAND ME 04112
APPOINTED 05/12/2020

Filing Document: CRIMINAL COMPLAINT Major Case Type: FELONY (CLASS A,B,C)
Filing Date: 10/21/2019

Charge(s)

1 ROBBERY 10/05/2019 BRIDGTON
Seq 4293 17-A 651 (1) (C) Class A
JONES / BRI

2 ROBBERY 10/05/2019 BRIDGTON
Seq 747 17-A 651(1)(D) Class A
JONES / BRI

3 ROBBERY WITH A DANGEROUS WEAPON 10/05/2019 BRIDGTON
Seq 4294 17-A 651(1) (E) Class A
JONES I BRI
4 KIDNAPPING 10/05/2019 BRIDGTON
Seq 4313 17-A 301 (1) (B) (1) Class A
JONES / BRI

5 AGGRAVATED ASSAULT 10/05/2019 BRIDGTON
Seq 630 17-A 208 (1) (B) Class B
JONES / BRI

6 THEFT BY UNAUTHORIZED TAKING OR TRANSFER 10/05/2019 BRIDGTON
Seq 8423 17-A 353 (1) (A) Class E Charged with INDICTMENT on Supple m

Docket Events:

10/21/2019 FILING DOCUMENT - CRIMINAL COMPLAINT FILED ON 10/21/2019

10/21/2019 Charge(s): 1,2,3,4,5
WARRANT - ON AFFIDAVIT REQUESTED ON 10/21/2019

10/21/2019 Charge(s): 1,2,3,4,5
CR_200, Rev. 07/15 Page 1 of 6 Printed on: 02/18/2021