State of Maine v. Jacob L. — 2017 ME 112

MAINE SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT 	Reporter of Decisions
Decision: 	2017 ME 112
Docket: 	Pen-16-395
Argued: 	April 13, 2017
Decided: 	June 6, 2017
Panel: 	SAUFLEY, C.J., and ALEXANDER, MEAD, GORMAN, JABAR, HJELM, and HUMPHREY, JJ.
STATE OF MAINE
v.
JACOB L.
HJELM, J.
[¶1] 	Jacob L. appeals from an order denying his motion for return of
property, see M.R.U. Crim. P. 41(j),1 entered after a hearing in the Juvenile
Court2 (Bangor, Lucy, J.), following entry of a judgment adjudicating him of the
juvenile crime of aggravated assault (Class B), 17-A M.R.S. § 208(1)(B) (2016);
see also 15 M.R.S. § 3103(1) (2016) (defining “juvenile crime”). 	Jacob argues
that the court applied an incorrect legal standard when it determined that the
State was entitled to retain possession of cash that had been seized from him
as evidence against a co-defendant, and that the court’s findings were not
1 	The Maine Rules of Unified Criminal Procedure apply to juvenile crime proceedings. 	See
15 M.R.S. § 3309 (2016); M.R.U. Crim. P. 1(b)(3).
2 When exercising its exclusive original jurisdiction over juvenile petitions, the District Court is
referred to as the Juvenile Court. See 15 M.R.S. § 3101(1), 2(A) (2016).

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supported by sufficient evidence. 	Because the court has not yet issued an
order determining who owns or is otherwise entitled to possession of the
cash, we dismiss this appeal as interlocutory.
I. BACKGROUND
[¶2] 	The central facts are undisputed, either as established in the
record or as the parties have framed their arguments.
[¶3] 	In the early morning hours of March 25, 2016, a Bangor police
officer responded to the scene of a reported robbery and assault. 	The victim
told the officer that two males had beaten him with a two-by-four and had
taken about $800 in cash from his pocket, along with some other items.
[¶4] 	Based on physical descriptions provided by the victim and his
girlfriend, other officers detained two suspects, including Jacob, at a nearby
convenience store. The girlfriend identified the suspects as the attackers, and
the officers then arrested Jacob on several outstanding warrants. 	They also
arrested the other suspect. 	One of the arresting officers searched Jacob for
weapons and found a large roll of money in his pocket. 	At the police station
the officer counted the money and found that there was $1,310, which was
retained as evidence. The victim later told the police that the amount of stolen
cash totaled $1,300 rather than the $800 he had reported initially.

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[¶5] 	On March 31, 2016, Jacob was charged by petition with the
juvenile 	crimes 	of 	robbery 	(Class 	A), 	17-A 	M.R.S. 	§ 	651(1)(D) 	(2016);
aggravated 	assault 	(Class 	B), 	17-A M.R.S. 	§ 	208(1)(B); 	and 	theft 	by
unauthorized taking or transfer (Class D), 17-A M.R.S. § 353(1)(B)(5) (2016).
At a hearing on April 26, Jacob entered an admission to the juvenile crime of
aggravated assault, and the State dismissed the remaining charges. The court
committed Jacob to a juvenile detention facility for an indeterminate period to
age twenty. See 15 M.R.S. §§ 3310(5), 3314(1)(F) (2016).
[¶6] 	Pursuant to M.R.U. Crim. P. 41(j),3 Jacob filed a post-judgment
motion for return of property—namely, the cash seized from him when he
was arrested—asserting that the State’s continued retention of the cash was
illegal. 	The State opposed the motion, and a hearing was held on August 2,
2016. 	The evidence presented at the hearing consisted only of the police
reports that had been filed in support of the juvenile petition.
3 Rule 41(j) of the Maine Rules of Unified Criminal Procedure states,
A person aggrieved by an unlawful seizure of property may file a motion in the
Unified Criminal Docket for the return of the property on the ground that it was
illegally seized. The court shall receive evidence on any issue of fact necessary to
the decision of the motion. If the motion is granted the court shall order that the
property be restored unless otherwise subject to lawful detention. The motion may
be joined with a motion to suppress evidence.

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[¶7] 	At the conclusion of the hearing, the court denied Jacob’s motion.
The court found that the State was entitled to retain the cash because there
was “probable cause to believe that [Jacob and his co-defendant] beat up [the
victim] and took his money[,] [a]nd that the money that the State [was]
holding represent[ed] some or all of what was taken from [the victim] after
[Jacob] hit him with a two-by-four.” 	The court further explained that charges
were still pending against Jacob’s co-defendant and that evidence in his trial
would “further inform this issue.”
[¶8] 	After the court announced its decision, Jacob asked whether he
would be permitted to file a renewed motion for return of property after the
case against the co-defendant was concluded. 	The court responded that it
would not give an advisory opinion about “whatever may or may not happen
in the future,” and restated its determination that the State was entitled to
retain the cash. 	The court further stated, “There may be other recourse
through civil process . . . , but . . . as it stands now there’s nothing else for me to
do on this case.”
[¶9] 	Jacob timely appealed. 	At oral argument, both parties told us that
after the court issued its order denying Jacob’s motion, the case against the
co-defendant was fully resolved and is no longer pending. 	The State also

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acknowledged that given this development, the cash seized from Jacob has no
remaining evidentiary value.
II. DISCUSSION
[¶10] 	We 	must address, as a threshold issue, 	whether we have
jurisdiction to consider an appeal from an order denying a motion for return
of property in a juvenile crime proceeding. 	See M.R. App. P. 4(d) (“Whenever
it appears by suggestion of the parties or otherwise that the Law Court lacks
jurisdiction of the subject matter, the Law Court shall dismiss the appeal.”).
[¶11] 	As the parties acknowledge, the types of orders that a juvenile
may appeal are statutorily enumerated as orders of adjudication, disposition,
and detention. 	See 15 M.R.S. § 3402(1) (2016). 	The order denying Jacob’s
Rule 41(j) motion is none of these.4 See 15 M.R.S. § 3003(1), (4-B), (5) (2016)
(defining 	“[a]djudicatory 	hearing,” 	“[d]ispositional 	hearing,” 	and
“[d]etention”). 	If we have appellate jurisdiction over this matter, it must
therefore arise from a different source.
4 Contrary to Jacob’s argument, the order denying his Rule 41(j) motion is not a de facto order of
restitution, which would be appealable pursuant to 15 M.R.S. § 3402(1)(B) (2016), because neither
the dispositional order nor the order on Jacob’s Rule 41(j) motion directs that the cash be paid over
to the victim. 	See 15 M.R.S. § 3314(1)(E) (2016) (stating that, as one of the dispositional
alternatives available in a juvenile case, “[t]he court may require the juvenile to make restitution for
any damage to the victim or other authorized claimant as compensation for economic loss”).
Rather, the court simply determined that the State was entitled to hold the cash temporarily while
the prosecution against Jacob’s co-defendant was pending.

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[¶12] Adult criminal defendants are entitled to appeal from an adverse
ruling on a Rule 41(j) motion. 	See State v. Miller, 645 A.2d 1140, 1141
(Me. 1994);5 	see 	also 	15 	M.R.S. 	§ 	2111(1) 	(2016) 	(“[I]n 	any 	criminal
proceeding in the District Court, a defendant aggrieved by a judgment of
conviction, ruling or order may appeal to the Supreme Judicial Court sitting as
the Law Court.”). We recognize that a juvenile adjudicated to have committed
a juvenile crime is not viewed as “a defendant aggrieved by a judgment of
conviction,” 15 M.R.S. § 2111(1); see also 15 M.R.S. § 3310(6) (2016) (“An
adjudication of the commission of a juvenile crime shall not be deemed a
conviction of a crime.”). 	Nonetheless, the Juvenile Code expressly states that
one of the “goals of the juvenile appellate structure” is to assure “substantial
uniformity of treatment to persons in like situations,” 15 M.R.S. § 3401(2)(B)
(2016), and that the Code’s provisions “shall be liberally construed,” 15 M.R.S.
§ 3002(2) (2016). 	Indeed, the Juvenile Code and the Maine Rules of Unified
Criminal 	Procedure 	themselves 	make 	the 	Rules 	applicable 	to 	juvenile
proceedings. 	See supra n.1. 	This enables juveniles to seek the return of
property pursuant to Rule 41(j), just as adult criminal defendants are entitled
5 In State v. Miller, 645 A.2d 1140, 1141 (Me. 1994), we referenced M.R. Crim. P. 41(e), which
was an earlier formulation of the present M.R.U. Crim. P. 41(j). 	See M.R.U. Crim. P. 41, Advisory
Committee’s Note to 2013 amend.

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to do. 	We therefore conclude that section 2111(1) supports the existence of
appellate jurisdiction from a ruling on a Rule 41(j) motion in this juvenile case
to the same extent that adult defendants are entitled to seek appellate relief.
[¶13] Although we conclude that Jacob has a right to appeal, we do not
reach his substantive challenges to the court’s denial of his Rule 41(j) motion
because the order is not a final judgment. 	See Bank of N.Y. v. Richardson,
2011 ME 38, ¶ 7, 15 A.3d 756 (“Whether or not a party has argued the issue,
we consider sua sponte whether a matter is properly before us on appeal from
a final judgment.”).
[¶14] “It is well settled that appeals, in order to be cognizable, must be
from 	a 	final 	judgment.” 	State 	v. 	Lemay, 	611 	A.2d 	67, 	68 	(Me. 	1992).
Interlocutory orders that do not fully dispose of the entire matter pending in
the trial court are appealable only in narrowly-defined circumstances that are
not present here. See State v. Black, 2014 ME 55, ¶ 8, 90 A.3d 448; Alexander,
Maine Appellate Practice § 301 at 218-19, 226-33 (4th ed. 2013).
[¶15] 	The court denied Jacob’s motion for return of property based on
its determination that there was probable cause to believe that the seized cash
was stolen and that the State was therefore entitled to retain it as evidence in
the then-pending case against Jacob’s co-defendant. 	See Amerisource Corp. v.

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United States, 525 F.3d 1149, 1153 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (stating, in a case rejecting
the plaintiff’s claim pursuant to the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment,
that “the police power encompasses the government’s ability to seize and
retain property to be used as evidence in a criminal prosecution”); see also
State v. Sweatt, 427 A.2d 940, 950-51 (Me. 1981) (stating that the State may
properly retain seized property if there is probable cause to believe that it is
stolen or that it is “evidence of a crime”). The order, however, is interlocutory.
[¶16] 	When 	the 	court 	denied 	Jacob’s 	Rule 	41(j) 	motion, 	the
co-defendant’s case was still pending, and the court noted that given that
circumstance there was “nothing else for [it] to do.” The court accordingly did
not decide the ultimate question of who owned the cash. 	Because the
co-defendant’s case is no longer pending, however, the justification for the
State to possess the cash—and the court’s rationale for denying Jacob’s
motion—no longer exists. 	As a result, the court’s order does not serve as a
final disposition of the issue directly raised in Jacob’s motion. 	See Lemay,
611 A.2d at 68.
[¶17] 	“The general rule is that seized property, other than contraband,
should be returned to its rightful owner once the criminal proceedings have
terminated.” 	United States v. LaFatch, 565 F.2d 81, 83 (6th Cir. 1977). 	No

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adjudication of “the rightful owner” has yet occurred. 	See id. 	Because—as it
acknowledged 	at 	oral 	argument—the 	State 	no 	longer 	has 	a 	possessory
interest in the cash, and because the court stopped short of determining
whether Jacob is entitled to possession of the cash, we must remand the
matter for a full determination of the issues pending before it. 	See Lemay,
611 A.2d at 68. We therefore dismiss the appeal as interlocutory and remand
to the trial court for further proceedings.6
The entry is:
Appeal 	dismissed. 	Remanded 	for 	further
proceedings consistent with this opinion.
Benjamin Fowler, Esq. (orally), Bangor, for appellant Jacob L.
R. Christopher Almy, District Attorney, Tracy Collins, Asst. Dist. Atty., and
Mark A. Rucci, Asst. Dist. Atty. (orally), Prosecutorial District V, Bangor, for
appellee State of Maine
Bangor Juvenile Court docket number JV-2016-23
FOR CLERK REFERENCE ONLY
6 To the extent that the victim is asserting an ownership or possessory interest in some or all of
the cash, the court will have an opportunity on remand to provide some avenue—through the State
or by some other means—by which the victim will have an opportunity to be heard.